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ABSTRACT
This thesis provides, for the first time, a detailed examination of the
factors affecting British disarmament policy in the period 1918-25 and the inter-
action of that policy with negotiations for multi-lateral disarmament at the
League of Nations. It considers the issues of the arms traffic, the private
manufacture of armaments, chemical warfare, naval disannament in the period
19 18-24, the problems of land and air disarmament, the Draft Treaty of Mutual
Assistance and the Geneva Protocol of 1924-25. Disarmament is defined as the
limitation and control of armaments by international agreement. It should be
understood in terms of aims and process, not simply in terms of product, of
crude figures for the reduction of military, naval and air armaments. The pursuit
of disarmament, therefore, would have required British Governments to reveal a
commitment to the international control and limitation of armaments as a foreign
policy objective. International tensions in the period following the Great War,
the French obsession with security and the USA's failure to approve the
Versailles Treaty were serious obstacles to disarmament. In this thesis it is
argued, however, that few British decision-makers understood the disarmament
problem and that there was insufficient commitment to the process of
international negotiation through the League. Although there were influential
personalities within the British Government who wanted to see a reduction in
Britain's expenditure on the Fighting Services, successive Governments failed to
integrate the national and international components of the disarmament question.
It is also argued that inappropriate decisions by the League itseW played a
significant part in the failure of initiatives to extend the scope of naval
disarmament and to achieve land and air disarmament.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Historians of British defence and foreign policy between the two world
wars have identified several important themes: the relationship between
disarmament and security, the differing ambitions of revisionist and non-
revisionist States, the tensions between so-called idealist and realist decision-
makers, and the influence of public opinion on policy making. These themes are
relevant to this study which examines the factors affecting British disarmament
policy in the period 19 18-25 and the inter-action of that policy with League of
Nations' negotiations for multilateral disarmament. Such a study is necessary
because there is a wide gap in the literature covering disarmament during these
years, except for the Washington Conference of 192 1-22. Until now there has
been no attempt to provide an integrated study of the arms traflic, the private
manufacture of arms, chemical warfare, the attempt to extend the principles of
the Washington Conference to non-signatoty Powers, and schemes initiated at
the League of Nations to achieve land and air disarmament.
The most significant of the older studies of disarmament which deal with
this period are those by Chaput, Madariaga and Wheeler-Bennett.' Chaput and
Wheeler-Bennett both provided useful surveys of the action taken to reduce
armaments between 1918 and 1925 but their work was based on the very limited
evidence then available and they both eschewed value judgements. These
observations also apply to the study of the security problem in the period 19 17-
'Chaput, R.A. Disarmament in British Foreign Policy (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1935); Madariaga, S. de Disarmament (Washington: Kennikat Press,
1929); Wheeler-Bennett, J.W. Information on the Reduction of Armaments
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1925)
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1926 which Wheeler-Bennett produced with Langermann. 2 Salvador de
Madariaga was Director of the Disarmament Section of the League of Nations
Secretariat from 1922 to 1927 and his study was infonned by his experience of
the efforts made at Geneva to achieve disarmament. It combined analysis of
these efforts with a passionate appeal for a re-organization of the world
community on the basis of a universal League of Nations. He argued that the
principal reason for the slow pace of disarmament was the USA's refusal to join
the League. The negative attitude of British Governments to disarmament
initiatives at Geneva also merited criticism, however, and he considered that
Britain's record there would have been abysmal had it not been for the efforts of
Robert Cecil, Lord Privy Seal in Baldwin's short-lived Conservative
Administration of 1923.
During the last twenty years there have been three important studies
covering British disarmament policy in the 1920s. 4 Shomey's thesis examined the
period from 1916 to 1931 and attached considerable importance to the role of
public opinion. He argued that the attitudes of the British people in the inter-war
years were essentially pacific and that during the period 19 19-23, the Treasuiy
successfully exerted pressure in favour of arms reduction, a policy which had 'the
wholehearted support of the Press, Parliament and public opinion'. 5 He
concluded that in the three years following the end of the Great War of 1914-18,
2Wheeler-Bennett, J.W. and Langermann, F.E. Information on the Problem of
Security (19 17-1926) (London: Allen and Unwin, 1927)
3Madariaga, op.cit.. p.304
4Shorney, D.J. 'Britain and Disarmament 1916-1931', Durham University, Ph.D.,
1980; Richardson, D. The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s
(London: Pinter, 1989); Kitching, C.J. Britain and the Problem of International
Disarmament 19 19-1934 (London: Routledge, 1999)
5Shorney, op.cit., p.4
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arms limitation was an important objective of British foreign policy but
thereafter 'Britain did more to obstruct than promote international disarmament'.6
This assessment of British disarmament policy in the second half of the 1920s is
largely supported by Richardson's highly critical analysis of Baldwin's second
Conservative Government:
With the exception of the National government of 1931-5, it is
difficult to find a more incompetent handling of disarmament policy
by a British government in the twentieth century.7
Kitching's study covered the period from 1919 to 1934 and reached conclusions
very similar to those of Richardson, namely, that British Governments generally
pursued 'a purely reactive policy, with a considerable element of procrastination
thrown in for good measure'. 8 She argued that it might have been possible to
achieve international disarmament if Britain had been prepared to provide France
with the security guarantee it so desperately wanted.9
In recent articles Philip Towle and Zara Steiner have criticized British
disarmament policy from a different perspective, arguing that the attempt to
achieve international disarmament was doomed to failure from the outset
because it was based on assumptions which contradicted the realities of relations





'°Towle, P. 'British Security and Disarmament Policy in Europe in the 1920s' in
Ahmann, R., Birke, A.M. and Howard, M. (eds.) The Ouest for Stability.
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between the British and the French which should not have been discussed in
open forums. He argued that the result of this public discussion was that British
disarmament and security policy led in the opposite direction from that desired:
it produced insecurity and pressure for rearmament.
Before examining these issues it is essential to have a clear definition of
disarmament. Shorney defined disarmament as 'the general limitation and
reduction of national armaments by voluntary international agreement'.' 1 This
definition has several important implications. First, it suggests that limitation and
reduction of national armaments are policies moving in the same direction
whereas it is possible both to limit 4 increase national armaments. Second, it
precludes either arms limitation or arms reduction resulting from agreements
between a limited number of Powers, such as the Washington Naval Treaty.
Third, it precludes unilateral decisions to reduce or limit armaments such as
those which British Government Ministers claimed they had made in the years
immediately following the conclusion of the Great War. These last two points
are of considerable importance because, while British Government Ministers
publicly stated their support for the League, at no time in the period under
consideration were decisions taken either to limit or reduce armaments through
international agreement under the auspices of the League. These points do not of
themselves invalidate Shomey's definition but he tended to confuse the issue by
identiFying different types of disarmament, none of which accord with his own
definition: the disarmament imposed on Germany in 1919, unilateral
Problems of West European Security 1918-1957 (London, the German
Historical Institute: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.127-153; Steiner, Z.
'The League of Nations and the Quest for Security' in	 pp.35-70
"Shorney, op.cit., p.2
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disarmament and disarmament resulting from agreements between a limited
number of Powers.
To provide an adequate definition of disarmament in the period under
examination is no easy matter for the term was used by decision-makers in a
variety of different ways. The Report of Committee No. 6 (Armaments) to the
First League Assembly in 1920 saw disarmament as the final stage of a three part
process. First, there should be agreement by members of the League 'not to
exceed their present scale of armaments save at the request of the League or in
circumstances recognised as exceptional'. This the Committee defined as
limitation of armaments. Second, there should be general agreement 'for a
proportionate and simultaneous reduction either in the scale of armaments or in
the existing military budgets of the Members of the League'. This the Committee
regarded as reduction of armaments. The final stage, which the Committee quite
explicitly defined as disarmament, would see 'a scientific and comprehensive
reduction of armaments under the supervision of the League to the lowest figure
compatible with national security.' 2
 The Committee's three part definition,
admirably clear though it is, would appear not to have been noticed by Britain's
leading decision-makers. On 29 June 1923 the Committee of Imperial Defence
(CD) considered the question of the reduction of armaments and treaties of
mutual guarantee. Before it was a memorandum by its Secretaiy, Maurice
Hankey, who was also the Cabinet Secretary. Lord George Curzon, Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, was unhappy that Hankey had stated that Britain was
in favour of 'general disarmament.. .It appeared perfectly obvious to him that the
' 2F0371/5843: League of Nations - Report of Sub-Committee A of Committee
No.6 (Armaments), 14 December 1920
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country was not in a position to cut down its armaments further than had been
done already'.' 3
 If this claim by Curzon could be proved correct, it would mean
that Britain had unilaterally carried through reduction of armaments to a level
defined by the League in 1920 as 'disarmament'. Lord Salisbury, the Lord
President of the Council, chaired this CII) meeting and he suggested that, as
Harikey's statement of the aims of the British Government went too far, 'it might
be possible to amend the wording of the resolution to a question of "reduction of
armaments" instead of "general disarmament" •14 This distinction might have
been of psychological value in easing the susceptibilities of those who feared that
Britain's Armed Forces were inadequate, but it does not aid intellectual clarity.
At this same CU) meeting Robert Cecil, who was the principal advocate of
League action to bring about reduction of armaments, held 'that it would only be
possible to guarantee peace by ultimate disarmament. In using the term
"disarmament" he intended in reality to imply a limitation and reduction of
armaments'.' 5
 Cecil was prepared, therefore, to link limitation and reduction of
armaments in the same way that Shorney has done. Salisbury, however, pulled
them a little further apart by referring to 'reduction or limitation of armaments'.'6
Thus it is clear that the decision-makers were themselves prone to use the terms
disarmament, reduction of armaments and limitation of armaments in a confused
and sometimes confusing way. This, though, does not exonerate the historian
from the need for clarity.
' 3Cab213: CII) minutes, 29 June 1923
'4lbid.
'5lbid.
' 6thid Author's italics
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Richardson, unlike Shorney, was admirably clear about the meaning of
disarmament: it is 'the limitation and control of armaments by international
agreement'.' 7 In explaining this definition he also made a most important
distinction between 'the disarmament problem in external policy and the
armaments question in internal policy'.' 8 Richardson was here concerned to point
out that the Conservative Government of 1924-29 pursued an armaments policy
which was based on 'the concept of minimum perceived requirements' but
motivated by a thoroughly pragmatic analysis of national and imperial
requirements.' 9 This should not be mistaken for a disarmament policy, as such a
policy would have required the Government to reveal a commitment to the
international control and limitation of armaments as a foreign policy objective.
Richardson, therefore, was defining disarmament in terms of aims and process,
not simply in terms of product, of crude figures for military, naval and air
armaments. This sophisticated definition has a much wider application than the
period 1924-29 and casts light on the realist-idealist dichotomy so frequently
referred to by historians of British defence and foreign policy after the 1919
Peace Settlement. 2° It can too easily be assumed that there was a chasm
separating the idealists from the realists and that this was evident in the practical
policies which they pursued. As a result, the important differences regarding




20Carr, E.H. The Twenty Years Crisis (London, Macmillan, 1981), passim;
Kennedy, P. The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British
External Policy. 1865-1980 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp.240-42
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September 1925 between Maurice Hankey, an arch-realist, and Cecil, Chancellor
of the Duchy of Lancaster from 1924-27, reveals this point.
On 6 August 1925, Hankey wrote to Cecil asking him to comment on a
paper which he had written concerning disarmament. 2' This paper, headed 'An
Introduction to the Study of Disarmament', was not an official paper. Rather, it
was intended only to assist Hankey in the development of his thoughts on the
issue. The objective was to question what Hankey regarded as a widespread
feeling, namely, that disarmament was generally beneficial. Here Hankey was
using the term disarmament in the limited sense, to describe arms reduction. He
argued that the collapse of the Roman Empire and its defeat by barbarian tribes
were closely linked with disarmament and the inter-related decline in militaiy
spirit. He clearly feared that the British Empire was in danger of following a
similar path and experiencing a similar fate. Hankey nevertheless considered,
however, that British arms reduction since the end of the Great War had brought
'benefits in the improvement in our credit and reduction in taxation.. .advantages
not lightly to be set aside'. Yet, despite these benefits, Hankey was worried that
zeal for disarmament - in the sense of arms reductions - would undermine the
enthusiasm of young men for military careers. He suggested, therefore, that it
would be wise to move slowly on disarmament and he ended the paper with an
Italian proverb:
2	 Papers: ADD5 1088, Hankey to Cecil, 6 August 1925
Cecil Papers: ADD5 1088, paper by Hankey, 'An Introduction to the Study of
Disarmament', 4 August 1925
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"Chi va sano, va piano ; chi va piano va lontano." (He who goes
wisely goes slow; he who goes slow goes far.)23
Cecil's reply is not available but Hankey wrote to him on 18 August thanking
him for his thoughts. It is clear from this letter that Cecil had expressed strong
disagreement with Hankey's philosophy, so strong that Hankey set out to explain
that there was some misunderstanding:
But my paper was not written as an opposition to peace, as you
suggest. I tried to show rather that, whatever you do, war will come
sooner or later, and, if you carry disarmament too far and crush the
military spirit, your civilisation will go under.24
At this point it is possible to view the correspondence as revealing very
clearly the widely differing perspectives of realist and idealist decision-makers. It
is interesting, however, that when Cecil replied on 24 August he felt able to
write that he was 'glad to find we are not so far apart as I feared'. His
agreement with Hankey on the need for caution suggests that this was more than
conventional courtesy:
The danger does not seem that we shall disarm too quickly at any
rate under any general scheme. There j a danger that the West
Europeans who are the most peaceful and civilised states shall be
Jbid.
24Cedil Papers: ADD5 1088, Hankey to Cecil, 18 August 1925
Cecil Papers: ADD5 1088, Cecil to Hankey, 24 August 1925
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hurried by their own public opinion into reckless reduction of
armaments leaving the world at the mercy of central and East
Europe which would be a black result. That is one of the reasons
why I have always been anxious for a general scheme [of
disarmament].. 26
The striking feature of this passage is the importance which Cecil attached to 'a
general scheme', to international action and, therefore, to the process of
disarmament. Arms reduction alone did not constitute progress and might even
harm the cause of peace: progress would only be achieved if there was general
agreement between Powers on the pace and scale of the reduction. In this sense
Cecil was prepared to see truth in the Italian proverb which Hankey quoted. This
is arguably of greater importance as far as practical politics in the post-war years
were concerned than the more obvious differences in philosophy between the
realists and the idealists. It is for this reason that throughout this thesis the term
disarmament will be used, following Richardson, to describe policies, advanced
through the League or through other forms of international agreement, which
were intended to limit and control armaments generally.
On the conflict between idealists and realists, both Steiner and Towle
made a number of important observations. Towle argued that the principal
division within British policy was not between pro-Europeans and imperialists
but 'between those who hoped to solve international problems by general
disarmament measures negotiated through the newly established League of
Nations and those who wanted to improve Franco-German relations by regional
9bid. Underlining original
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agreements and by political concessions.r Cecil, Philip Noel-Baker, a member
of the League Secretariat from 19 19-22 and subsequently a Cabinet Minister in
the 1946-5 1 Labour Government, and their colleagues in the League of Nations
Union were the most important representatives of the first group and must be
identified as idealists. Ranged against these idealists were most of the officials in
the Foreign Office and the Service Ministries. Steiner put forward a realist view
about the essential nature of the League arguing that it was 'based on
unrealizable assumptions about the behaviour of states and people; the League
ultimately "failed for the deeper reason that its basic conception is impracticable
at any time" '. She argued that the idea of collective security was a myth and
that the myth was part of the reality. In an important and perceptive piece of
analysis she observed that the statesmen of the inter-war period attempted to use
the League system and did not exclude it from their calculations. This was
because there was a general recognition, even among experienced diplomats,
that the pre-1914 system had failed and that, in the League, 'a new instrument
had been fashioned which could be used for the reconciliation of opposing
interests'? It is an indication of the seriousness with which the League was
taken that most European Foreign Ministries set up League of Nations
Departments. It is this analysis which justifies Steiner's view that, 'If there was a
"myth" of collective security, the statesmen not only encouraged its spread but






While Towle did not refer explicitly to the idea of a myth, he clearly
shared Steiner's view that some influential politicians were entrapped by the
League and by the idea of disarmament through international negotiation. He
wrote that 'there were many like Austen Chamberlain who erroneously thought
that negotiations might help to heal Europe's wounds and that, since the League
was committed to disarmament, Britain should do what she could to improve the
prospects for such measures'. 3' As Richardson pointed out, however, Austen
Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary from 1924 to 1929, never believed that general
disarmament through the League was realistic but he went on with the
negotiations because the decision to do so had already been taken. 32 There were
also, of course, those who saw disarmament as the best way to avoid a return to
the trenches of the Great War - the 'Never again' men. Cecil, for example, held
that there was a causal link between armaments and war:
• . . saying that armaments do not lead to war.. .is very much like
saying that alcohol does not lead to drunkenness.. .without alcohol
there would be no drunkenness and without armaments there would
be no war.33
Towle did not think much of this as a metaphor for encouraging faith in
disarmament as it was written shortly after the failure of the prohibition of
alcohol in the USA. Towle appears, however, to have missed the important
point that Cecil was trying to create a different caste of mind which would
3t lowle, op.cit.. p.150
32Richardson, op.cit., p.99
33Quoted in Towle, op.cit.. p.150
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release people from arms-dependence. As Towle himself recognized, the veiy
fact that Cecil played such an important governmental role in League affairs was
because successive Prime Ministers forced him upon reluctant Foreign
Secretaries. In so doing, these Prime Ministers were 'responding to public
opinion and their own ill-thought-out feeling that they should support the
League and disannament'. Such a view indicates that Steiner was right to
identify the myth of collective security as a part of the reality for it suggests that
the idealists had gone some not inconsiderable way towards undermining
confidence in the pre-1914 diplomatic structure. Their problem was that some of
those most strongly committed to security through armaments and the old
diplomacy - men such as Hankey and Eyre Crowe, Permanent Under-Secretaiy
at the Foreign Office - occupied stronger positions in the decision-making
system.
The distinction between idealists, or liberals, and realists has some
validity but there is a danger of distorting the truth if too much emphasis is
placed on the differences between pro-Europeans and imperialists and between
internationalists and regionalists. As Ferris has argued, this structure is not
adequate to deal with the views of the principal decision-makers in the early
1920s: in both theory and practice the situation was more fluid than some
analysts have suggested. 35 Thus, Leopold Amery, First Lord of the Admiralty
from 1922 to 1923 and then Colonial Secretary from 1924 to 1929, was an
imperialist for whom regional treaties were as dangerous as general treaties
because the inevitable tendency of both was to draw Britain into European
ThI4, p.152
35Ferris, JR. The Evolution of British Strategic Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1989), pp.43-46
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conflicts. Cecil, approaching the issue from an entirely different perspective, was
nevertheless prepared to encourage the establishment of regional treaties as long
as they were open and registered with the League. Although Cecil's ultimate
objective was the limitation and control of armaments by international
agreement, this did not prevent him from recognizing that serious conflict was
more likely to break out in Europe than in any other continent. It was for this
reason that he was prepared to support the conclusion of partial or regional
treaties under the League, convinced that they would ease tension in Europe. In
this sense he was a realist who recognized that in Europe there were particular
problems which required special treatment. It cannot be said, however, that this
made Cecil a regionalist or undermined his credentials as a proponent of
international disarmament.
If it is unwise to divide the decision-makers into rigid groups, it is also an
error to see in the League Covenant an outright rejection of all that had taken
place in the century before 1914. While Jaffe has shown that Britain did not take
up the issues of German disarmament and general disarmament until late in 1918
and then largely because of public pressure during the 1918 General Election
campaign to end conscription, the international context in which the
disarmament debate developed emerged from the pre-war diplomatic structure
rather than being a rejection of it. Northedge identified important features of
the nineteenth centuty system which provided the basis of the League Covenant.
By 1914 the principle of arbitration had developed to the point where there was
a conviction that this system should be strengthened by providing for penalties
against States refusing either to go to arbitration or to accept an arbitral award.
Jaffe, L.S. The Decision to Disarm Germany (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981)
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In much the same way, it was held that the nineteenth century conference system
had to be formalized and given an on-going character. Further, in order to
prevent the slide into war which many believed had happened in 1914,
arbitration and the conference system had to be employed so as to bring a delay
in the development of any dispute.31
This analysis draws attention to important continuities in the structure of
international relations. The Great War and the 1919 Peace Settlement, however,
altered the distribution of power, especially in Europe, and created new tensions
between States. Indeed, Towle argued that the revisionist States held the key to
international relations in the 1920s. The Settlements achieved at Paris in 1919
and Washington in 1922 both failed because they were unable to deal with the
challenge posed by the revisionist States: Germany in Europe and Japan in the
Pacific. As regards security:
In fact disarmament and arms limitation treaties self-evidently
provide no answers to the problems presented by revisionist states.
The only way revisionists - for as long as they remain such - can be
prevented from overthrowing the status quo is by assembling
superior force to dissuade them, as the French knew only too well. A
balance of power is a recipe for disaster and self-evidently
revisionists will not agree to treaties which enshrine their military
inferiority.38
37Northedge, F.S. The League of Nations - its life and times 1920-46 (Leicester:
Leicester University Press, 1986), p.25
38Towle, op.cit.. p.151. Italics original
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Towle regarded disarmament negotiations as 'one of the most poisonous of the
inheritances left by Wilson to the League.. .It would have been far better to
ignore armaments until political reconciliation had taken pIace'. His thesis is
flawed on two counts. First, it does not take sufficient account of one of the
most important schemes which emerged from the League in the early 1920s, the
Treaty of Mutual Assistance (TMA).The TMA was first proposed by Cecil in
1922 and aimed to provide security through the creation of an international
environment in which any State, revisionist or otherwise, seeking to achieve its
objectives by force would be met by the 'superior force' which Towle considered
to have been essential. Once such security was provided for vulnerable Powers,
it might then be possible to create a diplomatic environment conducive to the
peaceful settlement of disputes. Second, it is essential to examine why States
were revisionist and to provide some scheme by which their objectives could be
reconciled with those of non-revisionist or satiated States. Idealists held that
conflicts between revisionist and non-revisionist States were the product of the
mistrust and warfare created by the old diplomacy. It is hardly convincing for
Towle to assert that what was required was an Anglo-French agreement which
would maintain French military superiority and then, from this position of
strength, seek to appease Germany in other ways. In place of disarmament
negotiations, Towle argued that 'Europe needed a long respite under French
military domination whilst German grievances were gradually redressed'. 4° Yet
he did not explain how it would be possible for any Power or group of Powers




grievances. As he pointed out in the same article, any acceptance of the plan put
forward in 1922 by Lord Esher, which aimed to limit European land forces
according to a pre-determined ratio, could only have been temporary because
the Germans could not have been expected indefinitely to accept the proposed
Franco-German ratio of 6 to 3.3 armed men in Europe.
In September 1922, Arthur Balfour made the following observation:
The root difficulty of every scheme for linking disarmament with
guarantees lies in the fact that, so far as I am able to judge, France
will never be contented with anything which the British Empire are
prepared to give.4'
These words focus attention on the connection between security and
disarmament. The period following the Great War presented British
Governments with both opportunities and difficulties as far as disarmament was
concerned. At one level the horrors of the war had demonstrated the need to
organize international affairs on a more rational basis. The League of Nations
was the outcome of such thinking and its establishment suggested that it might
be possible to create a world community based on collective security and
disarmament. Yet, at the time the League was formed, 'The psychology of
conflict had merged into the mood of victoiy, and more than a trace of
41Marks, S. Ménage a Trois: the Negotiations for an Anglo-French-Belgian
Alliance in 1922'; The International History Review. 4, 4, November 1982,
p.548
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vindictiveness appeared in the proceedings at Paris'. 42 This especially
characterized the attitudes of successive French Governments towards Germany
in the period from 1918 to 1925 and it presented a serious obstacle to the
achievement of disarmament. As Claude pointed out, confidence is essential to
the success of collective security:
.collective security cannot work unless the policies of states are
inspired by confidence in the system, but it requires an extraordinary
act of political faith for states to repose confidence in the system
without previous demonstration that security works. The stakes are
high in the world of power politics, and states do not li3I111.j
undertake experiments in the critical field of national security.43
The absence of the USA was, of course, a major blow to the collective security
system drawn up by those responsible for the creation of the League. A logical
response would have been for States to withdraw from the League but instead
'they shifted to a halfhearted acceptance of the responsibilities and reliance upon
the safeguards of collective security, which betrayed an implicit
acknowledgement of the fact that the objective conditions of the successfiul
operation of the system had been destroyed'.' As will be shown later in this
study, the attitudes of British decision-makers to disarmament issues during the
42Claude, IL. Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of




period after the Great War provide considerable evidence to support this
analysis.
It must also be recognized that, although a collective security system
does not theoretically require disarmament, in practice such disarmament is
essential. This is because 'If every state is reduced to military weakness, no
aggressor will be strong enough to make a catastrophic war out of an encounter
with the community's forces, and no member of the enforcement team will be
tempted to feel that its joining up has been a jump from the military fiying pan
into the military fire'. 45
 In the particular circumstances of the period 1918-25, the
need for disarmament was also formally stated in the League Covenant.
British defence and foreign policy decision-makers, therefore, had to
work within an especially challenging international environment. Britain was a
world Power with extensive imperial responsibilities which necessitated the
maintenance of significant naval and military forces; it was also an important
member of the League with a commitment to achieve disarmament. It was
extremely difficult to deal with these interlinked issues of disarmament and
security. Although, as Steiner pointed out, 'reduction or limitation of armaments
can increase the sense of security among the states and make it easier to mobilize
resources for collective action', it can also cause problems: 'for the French
disarmament reduced security, and lower force levels can still leave a heavy
burden on the suppliers of security'. Britain was one of the principal suppliers
of security but its military and naval chiefs argued against both the TMA and its




to take on unlimited commitments. These commitments, they claimed, could not
be met if the British Armed Forces operated from ower force levels': a
significant rearmament programme was required, they argued, in the event of
Britain signing these security agreements.
It is important to consider, therefore, whether all attempts to provide
collective security were bound to lead to a situation in which the principal
Powers, the suppliers of security, had to increase their armaments in order to
fulfil their additional commitments. Were security and disarmament two separate
issues or was it possible to link them in such a way as to preserve the integrity of
the League ideal? Steiner provided an ambiguous answer concerning the early
1920s, for she wrote that Resolution 14 of the Third League Assembly in 1922
'linked the reduction of armaments with satisfactory guarantees of security and
shifted the focus of League attention from disarmament to security. 47 In so
doing Steiner drew too sharp a distinction between disarmament and security
and missed the essential feature of the TMA, which developed from Resolution
XIV. At its very core was a commitment to disarmament. Signatory Powers
were required to reduce their military forces in time of peace to a level laid down
by the League Council. Any Power which was the victim of aggression would be
guaranteed the assistance of the other signatory Powers only if it complied with
this requirement. Given that the commitment would only apply once arms
reduction had taken effect, there was justification for Cecil's argument that the
chance of aggression would be significantly reduced. It is a mistake, therefore, to
assess the TMA in isolation from its twin, a disarmament plan which, in the
event, never saw the light of day. Further, as Richardson points out, the TMA
bid, p.45
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had the considerable merit of being acceptable to the French. This was also true
of the Geneva Protocol but it was an overly ambitious scheme which, in
particular, failed to meet the needs of the European security situation. The
TMA, on the other hand, suggested that it was possible for the British Empire to
make France an offer with which it would be contented and, in contradiction of
Towle, to provide a scheme for disarmament which did not poison international
relations. The TMA failed not because of fundamental and self-evident flaws but
because the British Government agreed with the views of the Admiralty and the
War Office and decided to reject it.
The role of public opinion has been referred to several times and some
historians of disarmament have attached considerable importance to its influence.
Shorney's thesis included a survey of the attitudes taken by the principal
newspapers to the question of disarmament. The purpose of this survey of Press
opinion was to show that 'from 1919 to 1931 and well beyond, Britain's Press
assumed that there was a national consensus which strongly favoured
disarmament'. Of the period 19 19-23, he argued that the Treasury successfully
exerted pressure in favour of arms reduction, a policy which had The
wholehearted support of the Press, Parliament and public opinion'. There are a
number of serious problems with this argument. First, it reveals a strong
tendency to assume that Press opinion and public opinion are one and the same.
That newspapers are inextricably linked with public opinion is undeniable but, as
the American political scientist, Harwood Childs, observed, 'there is not




general public'. 50 On this subject Donald Cameron Watt is even more of a
minimalist, arguing that the quality Press only represents public opinion in the
sense that it makes opinions public by publishing them. 5' Second, Shorney
treated public opinion as an unchanging, homogeneous given to which political
parties and decision-makers had to respond. In reality the relationship between
political and foreign policy making elites, on the one side, and public opinion or
opinions, on the other, is a complex one. In his study of British strategic policy
in the seven years after the Great War, Ferns argued convincingly that 'the
government believed that public opinion simultaneously supported many
conflicting things, such as service economies and RAF and naval rearmament.
Public opinion did not drive Britain in one direction alone or determine its
policies'. 52
 Further, the fact that some decision-makers believe public opinion to
be of a particular kind does not mean that they are either responsible or
responsive to that opinion to any significant extent. Watt pointed out that
'studies of such movements and currents [mass public opinion] do not
necessarily have any bearing on the currents and movements of opinion among
their ranks [the foreign policy making elite]'. 53
 The arguments of Ferris and Watt
concerning the role of public opinion are closer to the truth regarding
disarmament policy in the six years following the Treaty of Versailles than that
advanced by Shorney. Issues of disarmament were rarely considered in Cabinet
or CII) meetings and there is little evidence in these years that shifts in public
50Childs, H. Public Opinion: nature, formation and role (New York: van
Nostrand, 1965), p.67
5'Watt, D.C. Personalities and Policies. Studies in the formulation of British
foreign policy
 in the twentieth century (London: Longman, 1965), p.13
5 Perns, op.cit., p.44
53Watt, op.cit., p.1
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opinion were identified or impinged in any consistent way upon the thinking of
the principal foreign and defence policy decision-makers.
Within the historical and methodological context which has been
outlined, a thematic approach is adopted to the problem of disarmament in
British defence and foreign policy during the period 19 18-25. Chapters 2 and 3
examine the attempts which were made to achieve international control of the
arms trade, focusing on the traffic in arms and the private manufacture of arms
respectively. The attitude of successive British Governments to these two
elements of the arms trade was markedly different. Britain played a significant
and constructive role in the post-war negotiations at Paris which sought to
regulate the arms traffic. These negotiations resulted in the Convention for the
Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, which was signed in St. Germain
on 10 September 1919. The Foreign Office expressed strong support for this
Convention because it would contribute positively to the security of Britain's
imperial possessions by preventing arms falling into the hands of waning
tribesmen whose activities would seriously disturb the peace. On this issue,
therefore, the British Government demonstrated, in the immediate post-war
period, a genuine commitment to disarmament, as defined in this study, even
though its principal concern was imperial security. Lloyd George's
Administration was not, however, prepared to ratify the Convention unless the
USA also ratified it. This was because British ratification, in the absence of US
ratification, would result in British arms manufacturers losing trade to American
firms. The negative attitude of the US Government was, therefore, a significant
blow to Britain's policy of seeking to bring the arms trade under international
control and it resulted in the rapid collapse of British support for a
27
comprehensive settlement of the issue through negotiations at the League.
During the following five years British policy on the arms trade was negative and
unimaginative. The successful negotiation of a new Arms Traffic Convention in
June 1925 was the result of a more co-operative attitude on the part of the US
Government and a realistic response by the League's Temporary Mixed
Commission for the Reduction of Armaments (TMC) rather than a change in
British policy.
The private arms industry, which is the subject of chapter 3, was
specifically criticized in the League Covenant and some of the most energetic
advocates of disarmament, notably Philip Noel-Baker, believed that it was
essential for this industry to be brought under control. Following the conclusion
of the Paris Peace Settlement, however, it soon became clear that there was
considerable international opposition to the abolition of private manufacture and
it proved impossible for the League to devise a practical regulatory scheme. At
no stage did British decision-makers provide any support for schemes to abolish
or regulate the operation of the private arms industry. The Fighting Services, in
particular, argued that any such scheme would damage British interests. While
there are grounds for criticizing the British Government's approach to the arms
traffic question, in this chapter it is argued that its policy regarding the private
arms industry was undoubtedly right: all proposals to ameliorate its alleged evils
were impractical.
Chapter 4 deals with chemical weapons, one of the most controversial
issues to emerge from the Great War. It is argued that chemical warfare
functioned as an element both of the disarmament problem in British external
policy and the armaments question in internal and imperial policy. As such it
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caused serious technical and moral problems which proved impossible to
resolve. In dealing with these problems, however, British Governments displayed
a persistent and depressing failure of imagination. Although it was widely
believed that chemical weapons would ultimately prove to be enormously
destructive, at no stage did the leading decision-makers endeavour to initiate a
programme of disarmament. Instead, the preferred modus operandi of British
Ministers was to deplore the existence of chemical weapons while
simultaneously declaring that nothing could be done about them. In their
handling of the issue successive British Governments displayed incompetence,
cynicism and uncertainty.
Following analysis of these issues, chapters 5-7 examine specific
attempts to achieve naval, land and air disarmament. Chapters 5 and 6, which
deal with naval disarmament in the period 1918-24, revolve around the
Washington Conference 192 1-22. Between 1918 and 1921, Lloyd George's
Government sought to develop a naval policy which would enable it to maintain
Britain's naval supremacy in the face of serious competition from the USA and
Japan but avoid an expensive naval construction programme at a time of
considerable financial difficulty. The Admiralty's Plans Division did put forward
proposals to resolve this dilemma by initiating a disarmament process. These
proposals did not, however, win support within the higher echelons of the
Admiralty and failed, therefore, to progress beyond the Plans Division.
Nevertheless, in June 1921 it became clear that the British Government was
planning to call a naval Conference in order to achieve a reduction in the naval
building programmes of Britain, Japan and the USA. As a result of President
Warren Harding's initiative, however, the Conference was summoned by the
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USA and took place in Washington rather than London. The initiative remained
firmly in the hands of the US Government and the Naval Limitation Treaty
which resulted from the Washington Conference was based on the detailed
proposals which it had prepared. Although the British Government had wanted
such a Conference and contributed significantly to its success by imposing its
will on the Admiralty, its preparations for the Washington Conference were
inadequate and revealed that it had little confidence in there being a successful
outcome.
An interesting and largely unnoticed outcome of the Washington
Conference was Captain Segrave's plan to extend the principles of the Naval
Limitation Treaty to non-signatory Powers. Although ultimately unsuccessful,
the history of this initiative, which is examined in chapter 6, reveals that the
Admiralty was prepared to use the League in pursuit of a disarmament
agreement which, it believed, could benefit the country's naval interests.
Negotiations regarding this proposal exposed the absence of a co-ordinated
approach to disarmament within the British Government and, on this issue at
least, the excessive ambitions of some advocates of disarmament within the
League.
Chapter 7 examines two proposals which emerged from the League in
1922 and were intended to achieve land and air disarmament. The authors of
these proposals, Lords Reginald Esher and Robert Cecil, both acted in a private
capacity as members of the TMC and had close personal relations with leading
British decision-makers. Esher's plan, like Segrave's initiative, drew its
inspiration from the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty and, initially, there
appeared to be a good chance that the Government would support him.
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However, although Lloyd George had over-ruled the Admiralty at Washington,
he was not prepared to back Esher's plan against War Office objections. Cecil's
scheme aimed to achieve arms limitation through budgetary methods but he, too,
faced strong opposition from the War Office. Esher's plan was also subjected to
strong criticism by technical experts within the League. This opposition resulted
in Esher's resignation from the TMC but Cecil retained his membership even
when he joined Baldwin's Administration in May 1923. By this time his
proposals for budgetary limitation had been pushed into the background by his
proposal that disarmament should be achieved through a Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee (TMG). It is argued that the failure of these two schemes was
unfortunate because together they might have provided the basis for a successful
land and air disarmament process.
Chapters 8 and 9 examine the two proposals which were put forward in
the period 1922-25 to secure disarmament through the establishment of a
general security guarantee that would create a political climate in which Powers
were prepared to reduce their armed forces. It is argued that the first of these,
the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (TMA), was the more realistic because its
operation could have been limited to Europe, where international tension and the
danger of land and air rearmament were most severe. Although the TMA
received considerable support from within the League, it was strongly opposed
by British decision-makers, especially within the Foreign Office and the Fighting
Services. Their arguments, although they were often tendentious and revealed
little understanding of the draft Treaty, ensured that MacDonald's Labour
Government rejected the scheme in July 1924. It was remarkable, therefore, that
this same Government played a key role in drawing up the Geneva Protocol at
31
the Fifth League Assembly in 1924 for this was a more complex version of the
TMA and imposed potentially greater constraints upon signatory Powers'
freedom of action. The decision of Baldwin's second Administration to reject the
Protocol in March 1925 was inevitable in the light of the Conservatives' previous
hostility to the TMA.
The collapse of the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1934 marked the
end of the attempt to achieve disarmament by general agreement through the
League. Richardson described this as 'a turning point in international relations.
The post-war world became a pre-war world.M Few would doubt the validity of
this judgement but there is also a case for stressing the significance of the
Conservative Government's rejection of the Geneva Protocol in March 1925 for
this decision was a victory for traditional diplomacy and marked the end of a
defined period of negotiations within the 19 19-34 era. These negotiations
affected the Armed Services and the direction of British defence and foreign
policy, the issue of chemical warfare and the future of the armaments industry.
They were taken seriously by decision-makers at the time and they merit more
attention from historians than they have as yet received: disarmament was a part
of the reality of British defence and foreign policy in the period 19 18-25.
TMRichardson, op.cit., p.211.
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Chapter 2 - The Arms Traffic
Debate concerning the arms industiy during the period 19 19-25 has
received little attention from historians interested in British disarmament policy
and the League of Nations. Although it was rarely discussed within the Cabinet
and the CID, this omission is surprising because the problem of the arms
industry casts further light on the tension between realist and idealist decision-
makers and underlines the importance of defining disarmament in terms of both
aims and process and not simply in terms of product.
In the years following the Great War there were serious efforts to
achieve international control of the arms trade. Those concerned with the issue
held that it comprised two separate but closely connected elements, namely, the
traffic in arms and their manufacture by private industry. Both of these elements
were covered in the League Covenant. Paragraph 5 of Article 8 declared that
'the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is
open to grave objections' and instructed the League Council to 'advise how the
evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being
had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to
manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety'.1
Since Article 8 of the Covenant set out the League's commitment to
disarmament and members of the League used up a considerable amount of time
and energy in an attempt to translate this commitment into real achievement, the
inclusion of the private manufacture of arms within Article 8 suggests that the
Powers considered it to be an element of considerable significance within the
disarmament question as a whole. The traffic in arms also featured in Article 23
under which the members of the League entrusted the new international
1 The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany.
28 June 1919, Cmd.l53 of 1919
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organization with a number of tasks, one of which was 'the general supervision
of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of
this traffic is necessary in the common interest'. 2 There were suggestions that the
two elements, the private manufacture of, and the traffic in arms, should be dealt
with simultaneously. Despite, however, the greater importance accorded by the
Covenant to the problem of the private manufacture of arms, the conviction that
the traffic in arms should be dealt with first held sway amongst British decision-
makers and within the League for most of the period covered by this thesis. This
is largely explained by the fact that there was serious concern within the British
Government about the traffic in arms before the Great War ended and there was
a determination to address the issue during the peace negotiations at Paris in
advance of the establishment of the League. While, however, efforts in this
direction met with some success, the progress made represented a poor return
on the diplomatic energies invested.
One of the last acts of the Asquith Coalition Government was to
establish a CU) sub-committee on the arms traffic under the chairmanship of
Lord Islington, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the India Office. This sub-
committee held five meetings between 8 January and 26 February 1917 and
delivered its report on 10 March 1917. The tone and recommendations of
Islington's report indicate that the sub-committee sought to make a contribution
to disarmament as defined in this thesis, that is, in terms of aims, process and
product, while at the same time adhering to a fundamentally realist
understanding of international relations.3
2Thjd
3Cabl6/44: Report of the CII) Sub-Committee on the Arms Traffic, 10 March
1917
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Islington assumed that the end of the war would leave the belligerents
with substantial stocks of weapons and that it would be very difficult to prevent
these weapons falling into undesirable hands. The sub-committee wanted to
prevent access to surplus weapons by two broad groups: savage or semi-
civilised tribesmen who wanted rifles and ammunition, and anarchists and those
referred to as the' "intellectual" malcontent [sic] of the great cities' who wanted
bombs and automatic pistols. 4
 It recognized, however, that this would be
difficult to achieve because sales of such weapons would provide Governments
with an opportunity to acquire funds to offset their heavy war-time expenditure.
It was further feared that, if Germany emerged from the war having lost its
colonies, it would have no interest in preventing the import of arms into Africa;
in fact, through facilitating such trade, Germany might be able to strike at its
former enemies. The extent of Britain's Empire in Asia and Africa made it
especially vulnerable in this respect. The sub-committee, therefore, urged the
British Government to take the initiative in raising the arms traffic question at
the post-war Peace Conference 'as a high moral issue of the utmost consequence
to civilisation in general'. 5
 It asserted that the Peace Conference would offer an
opportunity unlikely to occur again of'securing the adoption of a policy of
permanent international co-operation in the matter, which, if faithfully adhered
to, should go far towards ensuring the world against future incidents calculated
to imperil the general peace'.6
In order to achieve genuine progress in this aspect of disarmament, the
Islington sub-committee made three important recommendations. First, at the





pledges that they would not dispose of their surplus weapons at the end of the
war and that they would prohibit the export of pistols to any destination except
under Government licence. Second, a separate agreement with France should be
concluded, ideally before the Peace Conference opened, by which France would
pledge to co-operate in the implementation of any measures arrived at by
international agreement. This was held to be necessary because in the past the
French had been happy to allow the arms trade to continue in certain regions
under their control. Specifically mentioned was the port of Jibuti in French
Somaliland through which arms entered East Africa, a trade encouraged by the
local French administration. It was argued that this trade threatened the peace in
the adjoining British and Italian territories but did not affect French security
because it had no territorial interests in the hinterland. It was believed, however,
that the French were concerned about the import of arms into their West African
territories and were also likely to be concerned about the arms trade in Asia
Minor and Syria, regions which had been allotted to France as spheres of
influence after the war. The sub-committee considered that this might provide
the basis for a reciprocal Anglo-French agreement on the subject. Such an
agreement should provide either for the cession of French Somaliland to Britain
or for the strict control, ideally the suppression of the arms traffic at Jibuti. 7 In
its observations on the report of the Islington sub-committee, the Indian
Government supported the importance given to the arms traffic at Jibuti and
went so far as to suggest that a large part of British Somaliland might be ceded
to the French so as to provide them with a hinterland which it would be in their
interests to secure by controlling the import of arms through that port. 8 The
7lbid.
8Recol/341: Observations of the Indian Government on the Report of the
Islington Sub-Committee, 21 December 1917
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Islington sub-committee's third principal recommendation was that there should
be an international Convention to regulate the arms traflic in what it referred to
as the 'danger zone'. 9 Such a zone had been established by the Brussels General
Act of 1890 and in 1908 there had been an attempt to enlarge the zone. This,
however, had been blocked by French opposition. The sub-committee wanted
the international Convention, which it envisaged, to re-activate an amended
version of this enlarged danger zone. This would include all of Africa except
Algeria, Tunis and the South African Union, the whole of Arabia, excluding
Muscat and the Arab littoral of the Persian Gulf the whole of Asia Minor, Syria
and Palestine and all islands adjacent to these regions to a distance of 100
nautical miles from the coast.'°
There can be no doubt that Islington's sub-committee was committed to
addressing the arms traffic problem within the context of internationally agreed
arms control and limitation. Moreover, its assessment of the threat which the
French and German attitudes might pose to this process revealed that the sub-
committee understood very clearly the obstacles to genuine progress on this
issue. This combination of idealism and realism is evident in the report's
conclusion:
[The sub-committee members were] under no illusions as to the
permanent value of any international Convention, however
skilfully framed. Examples of the futility of a "scrap of paper",
when it conflicts with the determination of an individual State to
act as its interests or necessities dictate, are not far to seek. The




most that can be expected of such agreements as we have
recommended is that they will prove reasonably effective for a
certain number of years after the war, and that the principle of
international co-operation, once firmly established, may afford a
valuable basis for such further joint action as future developments
may render desirable.1'
This approach to the arms traffic problem is important for it did much to shape
British policy on the issue in the unmediate post-war period. The hopes of
Islington's sub-committee were not, however, to be realized. The withdrawal of
the USA from involvement in European affairs caused serious problems and the
League was to develop structures and procedures which were considered
inappropriate by senior officials within the Foreign Office. An important result of
this was that Islington's commitment to viewing the arms traffic problem as an
element of external policy was diluted and increasingly it was perceived as an
element of British imperial policy. In short, the product came to assume greater
importance than the process. These conflicting tendencies can be identified in
Islington's report: although he recommended an international Convention, his
starting point was the need to prevent arms falling into the hands of native
tribesmen who might threaten the security of Britain's imperial possessions.
Nevertheless, they were neither immediately perceived nor relevant to the
international situation - in 19 18-19 British policy adhered closely to the
recommendations of the Islington report. As a result, the initial impetus in favour
of an international Convention to control the arms traffic came from within the
Foreign Office and not from so-called idealistic supporters of the League, whose
"thid.
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alleged failures to understand the workings of the real world had to be
combatted by the realists in the Foreign Office and their allies elsewhere in the
Government.
A little over one month after the signing of the Armistice on 11
November 1918, Rowland Sperling, Chief Clerk in the American Department,
was arguing from within the Foreign Office in favour of Islington's proposal that,
before the League of Nations was established, there should be an international
agreement to prevent the unloading of surplus arms in regions where trouble had
previously occurred or where there was potential for trouble. 12 Sperling
advocated this in a memorandum produced just two days before the Foreign
Office completed work on its own draft Convention for the Control of the Arms
Traffic.' 3 This draft Convention embodied the principal recommendations of the
Islington report. Surplus stocks of arms and ammunition were not to be
exported, arms exports to specified danger zones were in future to be licensed
under Government authority, the import of arms and ammunition into the
specified danger zones was to be strictly controlled and Powers were to publish
an annual return showing the numbers, amount and destination of the arms and
ammunition for which export licences had been granted. At this stage the
Foreign Office appeared fully to support the process of disarmament, for the
draft Convention also envisaged the establishment of a Central Office which
would be responsible for the operation of this international agreement. This
Central Office - in effect an international organization of verification - was to be
under the direct supervision of the League.' 4
 Following an inter-departmental
conference in February 1919, the draft Convention proposed a still closer
' 2F0371/4356: memorandum by Sperling, 18 December 1918




control of the arms traffic for it was recommended that a licence should be
required for all exports of arms and ammunition, without exception.15
This Foreign Office determination to control the arms traffic brought it
into conflict with the War Trade Department in the summer of 1919. This was
because the War Trade Department had issued an open general licence
permitting the export of cartridges and industrial explosives to the greater part
of the world, except Central America and Eastern Asia. Curzon, Lord President
of the Council and Balfour's deputy as Foreign Secretary, strongly advocated,
however, a policy which would be in accordance with the draft Convention for
the Control of the Arms Traffic. He wanted the War Trade Department,
therefore, to cancel the open general licence and apply a system of special
licences to the export of cartridges and explosives to all foreign countries.'6
While the War Trade Department would not act entirely in accordance with
Curzon's wishes, it was prepared to delete from its licence any destinations
which Curzon considered to be dangerous." Curzon did not achieve a total
victory in this inter-departmental battle, but developments at Paris moved rapidly
in a direction entirely favourable to his perception of the arms traffic issue.
On 10 September 1919 the Convention for the Control of the Trade in
Arms and Ammunition was signed in Paris. This closely followed Britain's draft
Convention and did much to satisf' the concerns about the disposal of surplus
arms in Africa and the Middle East. Under this Convention the signatory Powers
agreed that they would not allow the export of arms from their territories except
with a licence from the Government authorities. Such licences were to indicate
the quantities of arms to be exported and their destination. Copies of these
' 5Cab 29/2 Vol.11: No.108 - Arms Traffic - Report of an Inter-Departmental
Conference, held at the India Office, 24 February 1919
' 6F0371/3829: FO letter to the WTD, 23 June 1919
' 7F0371/3830: WTD letter to the FO, 24 June 1919
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licences were to be sent to the Central Office, which would be established by the
League. Once the Central Office had received these licences, they were to be
published. This procedure was established because many believed that, by
securing in this way the flullest publicity for traflic in arms, something at least
would be done to get rid of the evils attendant upon it'.' 8
 The Convention also
defined large parts of Africa and the countries bordering the Red Sea as
prohibited zones into which the import of arms should be prevented except
under very strict control. Together these two principal elements of the
Convention of St.Germain did much to satisfy both the realist and the idealist
decision-makers within the British Government. Those whose primaiy concern
was the internal security of Britain's imperial possessions considered that the
establishment of so-called 'prohibited zones' would do much to prevent arms
falling into the hands of warring tribesmen. The idealists hoped that an
internationally approved system of licensing, buttressed by full publicity through
the League, would be a major contribution to the disarmament process. At this
stage it appeared that the two elements of a genuine disarmament policy, aims
and process on the one hand and product on the other, would be integrated
successfully.
These hopes would only be realized if the Convention of St.Germain
were ratified promptly by the principal arms manufacturing nations, but it soon
became clear that the attitude of the USA was likely to deal them a serious blow.
In April 1920 the British Colonial Secretary, Lord Milner, sent a telegram to the
Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland and South
Africa explaining that the US Government, pending ratification of the
Convention of St.Germain, could not prevent its private arms firms from trading
' 8F0371/83 19: Report of the Third Committee to the Third Assembly of the
League of Nations, 22 September 1922
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with countries which had not signed the Convention.' 9 This development
prompted the British Government to propose a significant change to the
Convention. It suggested to the French, Italian, Belgian and Japanese
Governments that the Convention should apply only to small bore arms and
ammunition and to bombs. This had been Britain's original proposal when
negotiations for the Convention had begun in 1919 and Mimer argued for it once
again on two grounds:
Chief obstacles to legitimate trade with civilised countries would be
thus removed while most important feature of Convention would be
retained namely prohibition of export to prohibited zones of arms
etc. likely to be used by turbulent tubes.20
The Belgian and Japanese replies to this proposal suggested a different course,
that the Convention should be restricted to the prohibited areas. 2' Although the
five countries agreed to this modification in August 1920, discussion within the
British Government revealed how difficult it was to reconcile realist policies
with idealist or liberal means. Lawrence Lockhart, a temporary Clerk in the
Foreign Office, wrote that Britain was being compelled 'to choose between an
ideal and the commercial interests of this country If the existing situation
continued, he argued that it was inevitable that British arms manufacturers
would lose trade to firms in the USA. The modification proposed by the Belgian
wF037 114419: telegram from Mimer, 9 April 1920
20Ibid.
21F0371/4419: letter from the Belgian Government, 17 April 1920; letter from
the Japanese Government, 15 May 1920
FO371/4419: letter from Seymour to other Government Departments, 11
August 1920
FO371I4419: memorandum by Lockhart, 17 May 1920
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and Japanese Governments, however, meant that 'one of the principal objects of
the Convention, viz., the prevention of the indiscriminate dispersal of war
stocks, would be defeated'.24
It might be argued that, in giving its support to the decision of August
1920, the British Government was acting cynically in defence of its imperial
interests. It is certainly true that Britain had initially argued in favour of a limited
Arms Tra.ffic Convention which would prevent the unrestricted import of
weapons to those regions which became known as the prohibited areas. There
can be little doubt, however, that Britain would have ratified the Convention of
St.Germain had the US Govermnent been prepared to do so. Early in 1921
Curzon, now Foreign Secretary, and the Secretary of State for War, Laming
Worthington-Evans, expressed support for the Convention provided that the
principal Powers, especially the USA, ratified it. Control of the arms traffic,
through the Convention, would have contributed to the security of Britain's
imperial possessions. This is a clear instance of decision-makers recognizing
that idealist or liberal means could be beneficial. The problem was that these
liberal means could only operate effectively if the other major Powers also
appreciated their value. In the case of the Convention of St.Germain, the failure
of the USA to commit itself to international co-operation threatened to deal a
major blow to this particular element in the disarmament policy initiated through
the League.
The attitude of the US Government rendered futile much of the
discussion within the relevant organs of the League. Between 18 November and
16 December 1920 Committee No.6 (Armaments, Mandates and the Economic
Weapon) held eight meetings. At its third meeting on 25 November, a sub-
24thjd
FO371/7047: draft FO memorandum, 11 February 1921
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committee was appointed to consider a number of issues, one of which was the
traffic in arms. Although this sub-committee heard Cecil denounce as 'a veiy
great international scandal' the failure of any Power to ratify the Convention of
St.Germain, its final report recognized that Governments could not be expected
to do anything else 'when the effect of such action would not terminate the trade
in arms, but would merely divert it into other hands', those of the USA. In the
face of this difficulty the League Council adopted the proposal put forward by
Britain's representative at the League, Arthur Balfour, that a letter be addressed
to the signatoly Powers asking them to ratify the Convention as soon as possible
with the reservation that this ratification would only become effective when all
the Powers had done so.
During 1921 and the first half of 1922 very little progress was made on
the issue of the Convention of St.Gerrnain. H.A.L. Fisher, President of the
Board of Education and a member of the recently established Temporary Mixed
Commission (TMC), urged the British Government to use all its influence in
favour of the ratification of the Convention. In his opinion this was a treaty
'based upon such clear principles of right reason and humanity' that it could only
improve the system of international law. Despite Fisher's memorandum, there
was no change in the policy of the British Government but the Cabinet did agree
that the question should be raised with the US Government at the forthcoming
Washington Conference. In September 1921 the Third Committee of the
League also called for the ratification of the Convention and further suggested
FO371/7O48: 4th meeting of Sub-Committee A of Committee No.6 of the First
Assembly of the League of Nations, 25 November 1920; Report of Committee
No.6 of the First Assembly of the League of Nations, 14 December 1920
27F0371/7042: minutes of the Twelfth Session of the Council of the League of
Nations, 25 February 1921
Cab24/127: CP3242, 16 August 1921
FO371/5529: extract from Cabinet conclusions, 19 August 1921
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that all non-signatory States should be invited to adhere to it. 3° This was wishful
thinldng. Those seriously committed to the Convention would have been better
advised to pursue the approach suggested by Horace Seymour, First Secretary at
the Foreign Office. 3' He wanted the references to the League to be removed
from the Convention so as to make it more acceptable to the US Government.
Four years later this amendment was to play an important part in winning US
support for a new Arms Traffic Convention: its adoption in 1921 might have
saved a considerable amount of time and effort.
As it was, those who sought disarmament through the League
experienced in 1922 the disappointment occasioned by the US Government's
final rejection of the Convention of St.Germain. This followed a definite
initiative by the British Government to find a way around the USA's objections
to the Convention. At the Washington Naval Conference the issue had been
discussed privately between Arthur Balfour, the head of the British delegation,
and Charles Evans Hughes, the US Secretary of State. Following this, on 4
January 1922, Balfour had sent Hughes a draft resolution prepared by the British
Empire delegation which, if it had been adopted, would have involved the
Powers represented at the Conference declaring their acceptance of the
Convention and their intention to give effect to its provisions as soon as
possible. There would have been a reservation to the effect that the USA, not
being a member of the League, would reserve its assent to any provisions which
required disputed questions to be submitted to the League for its judgement and
this reservation would have been accepted by the other Powers. 32
 Balfour's
30F0371/7056: Report of the Third Committee of the Second Assembly of the
League of Nations, 27 September 1921
31FO371/5529: minute by Seymour, 1 June 1921
32FO371/7178: Seymour to Tufion, 18 March 1922; FRUS, 1922, vol.!, pp.545-
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suggestion was not, however, followed up by Hughes and the US Government
did not at this stage provide a clear statement of its position on the issue.
Within the Foreign Office there was some disagreement about the
appropriate response to the USA. Seymour thought that the Foreign Office
should ask the US Government to provide an expression of its opinion as It
would be useful to get even a definite refusal to ratif". 33 This opinion was
opposed by Sperling who saw no point in extracting from the US Government a
refusal to ratify because 'the Convention with its present limited scope is doing
the only work we really want it to do & that we had better leave wefl alone'.' In
taking this line Sperling was adhering to a limited conception of the Arms Traffic
Convention and he received influential support from Sir William Tyrrell,
Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. 35 The US
Government's delay in ratifying the Convention had prompted influential
decision-makers to emphasise the importance of real, if limited, product over
apparently unrealizable process.
The uncertainty about the USA's position was resolved early in August
1922 when Hughes wrote to Chilton, Chargé d'Affaires at the British Embassy in
Washington, stating that the US Government could not ratify the Convention of
St. Germain. Hughes gave two reasons for this decision. First, it would prevent
arms shipments to any Powers which had not signed the Convention and there
were a number of Latin American countries which had not signed to which the
US Government might consider it appropriate to sell arms. Secondly, the
Convention was embedded in the League of Nations of which the USA was not
a member. These objections were not surprising but the US Government's
33F037117178: minute by Seymour, 27 March 1922
FO37l/7l78 : minute by Sperling, 28 March 1922
35F0371/7178: minute by Tyrrell, 28 March 1922
FO371I7l79: Hughes to Chilton, 5 August 1922
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rejection of the Convention rendered nugatory three years of hope and effort by
those who believed that the control of the international traffic in arms was a vital
element in disarmament.
In the period 19 19-22 those who supported international action to
regulate the operation of the arms trade had been forced to mark time by the
dilatory response of the US Government to the question of ratil,ring the
Convention of St.Germain. Within the British Foreign Office there was some
satisfaction with this situation because the Convention, as amended by the
European Powers in August 1920, had done much to control the import of arms
to the prohibited zones. Officials such as Sperling and Tyrrell would clearly have
been pleased had this arrangement been indefinitely prolonged. The US
Government's decision of August 1922 meant that this was impossible. Further,
it stimulated new approaches within the TMC which provoked much criticism
from the British Fighting Services and Foreign Office officials. As a result, in
1923 the gap between the idealist and realist approaches to this question became
more pronounced. This caused serious conflict between Cecil and the Foreign
Office and brought to the surface the opposition of senior officials to the role of
the TMC.
In 1922 the Third League Assembly adopted a draft Convention for the
control of the private manufacture of arms which will be considered in more
detail in the next chapter. This scheme was intended to provide the basis for an
international Conference for the purpose of controlling private manufacture. The
League Council decided, however, at its January-February 1923 session, that
this was not a priority and that it would be a mistake to set in motion the
necessary machinery. 37
 The TMC took a slightly different view. While it agreed
37FO371/8422: memorandum by Drummond, 21 March 1923
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with the Council that it would be inappropriate to call an international
Conference, it suggested at its session in February 1923 that preparatory work
should be undertaken and that the USA should be invited to make firm proposals
as to how they might be prepared to co-operate with other Governments
regarding control of the private manufacture of and traffic in anns. This
determination on the part of the TMC to keep the issue alive was sufficient to
persuade the Council to write such a letter to the US Government on 21 April
1923. This, of course, meant that progress on both aspects of the arms trade
within the League of Nations was once again largely dependent upon the policy
of the USA. These developments prompted Sperling to minute in obvious
exasperation, 'The League is a futile body'.4°
On 12 September 1923 the US Government responded to the Council's
letter of 21 April in such a negative way as to justify Sperling's assessment. It
offered neither constructive proposals nor any further explanation of its rejection
of the Convention of St.Germain. Instead the reply simply re-stated the reasons
given in 1922 for that rejection. 4' Once again the USA appeared to have
prevented any prospect of international progress towards control of the arms
trade through the League. This, though, did not bring an end to the League's
efforts.
The Fourth Assembly in 1923 requested the TMC to produce a draft
Convention dealing with both the traffic in and the private manufacture of arms
and to invite the US Government to appoint representatives to co-operate with
the TMC in this work. Once the Council had received the reports of the TMC, it
was to consider summoning an international Conference to draw up appropriate
Ibid.
9FO371/8422: report by Salandra, 18 September 1923
40FO371/8422: minute by Sperling, 6 July 1923
41 F0371/8422: memorandum by Drummond, 12 September 1923
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Conventions. 42
 In the light of the USA's continued aloofness towards the League
this was a remarkably optimistic approach and it was perceived as such by the
Foreign Office. At the end of November 1923, Cecil, now a member of the
Government and its official representative at the League, received a Foreign
Office memorandum giving him clear instructions to oppose the League
resolutions regarding these two matters when they were discussed on the
Council. 43
 The Foreign Office view was that the attitude of the US Government
rendered futile any attempt to negotiate Conventions dealing with either the
traffic in or the private manufacture of arms. Any Arms Traffic Convention
which reduced the control envisaged by the Convention of St.Germain would be
useless. Further, any attempt to draw up a new Convention would tend to focus
attention on the limited manner in which the principal European Powers and
Japan had interpreted the Convention of Germain since August 1920. The
Foreign Office considered that this would be unfortunate because, although that
'convention may not be perfect.. .it does at least check the supply of arms to
turbulent races in Africa and the Middle East, and this was precisely the object
which His Majesty's Government had in view when they initiated the
negotiations leading up to the convention'. The same memorandum rejected as
impractical the TMC's proposals concerning the private manu±àcture of arms:
given that the US Government had not ratified the relatively moderate
Convention of St.Germain, it was bound to oppose 'the meddlesome restrictions'
envisaged in the scheme adopted by the Third League Assembly in 1 922.
FO371/8422: Report of the Third Committee to the Fourth Assembly of the
League of Nations, October 1923




Charles Dodd, a Second Secretary in the Foreign Office, expected that
Cecil would follow his instructions and oppose any further efforts to draw up
Conventions dealing with the arms trade. Sperling, however, clearly had less
confidence in Cecil's willingness to follow instructions for, on 10 December, he
minuted, 'I wouldn't be too sure'. 47
 On that same day, at a meeting of the League
Council, Cecil successfully argued that the TMC should be requested to begin
work on drafting two Conventions, one to replace that of St. Germain and one
to deal with private manufacture, and to invite the US Government to participate
in this process. This clear breach of Foreign Office instructions infuriated
Tyrrell, Crowe and Curzon and resulted in the Foreign Secretary sending a letter
of protest to Cecil. Curzon wrote this letter as the Conservative Administration
prepared to give way to the first Labour Government and the Foreign Secretary
therefore recognized that nothing which he wrote on the subject was likely to be
of any practical significance. He wanted, nevertheless, to stress his opinion that
The principle that a Government representative should act in close accord with
his Government is a sound one and that the opposite practice can only lead to
trouble'.5°
In January 1924 Curzon was replaced as Foreign Secretary by the new
Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald. The Foreign Office officials no longer had
to deal with Cecil as their representative on the Council but their work was still
affected by the initiatives of the TMC. Crowe was especially hostile to the TMC
on the ground that its members were not representatives of their Governments.
FO371/8422 : minute by Dodd, 8 December 1923
47F0371/8422: minute by Sperling, 10 December 1923
FO371I8423: minutes of the Council of the League of Nations, 10 December
1923
FO371/8423: minutes by Tyrrell, Crowe and Curzon, 18 December 1923; letter
from Curzon to Cecil, 26 December 1923
50F0371/8423: letter from Curzon to Cecil, 26 December 1923
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He considered that to entrust 'the most delicate international questions to an
absolutely irresponsible body is bound to do harm'. 5' Crowe wanted the question
of the traffic in arms to be taken out of the hands of the TMC and the TMC to
be abolished as soon as possible. The Fifth League Assembly in 1924 granted
Crowe this particular wish when it decided that the TMC should be replaced by
the Co-ordination Commission which was set up primarily to prepare an Arms
Reduction Conference in connection with the Geneva Protocol. This Co-
ordination Commission was to consist of a ten member Committee of the
Council assisted by two representatives each of the Economic, Financial and
Transit Committees of the League, six members of the PAC, two members each
of the Employers' and Workers' Group of the International Labour Office and, if
considered advisable, various experts appointed by the Council. By this stage,
however, the situation concerning control of the arms trade had altered
significantly.
In February 1924 a new Arms Traffic Convention emerged from the
TMC. 52
 What was remarkable about this development was that the TMC's
meetings had been attended by Joseph Grew, the American Minister at Berne
who, in September 1924, was appointed Under-Secretary of State at
Washington. Further, the British member of the TMC who was largely
responsible for the new Convention, Major John Hills, reported that Grew's
attitude suggested that there was a good chance of winning US support for this
Convention. 53
 In May 1924 the Secretary-General of the League, Sir Eric
Drummond, told Parmoor, the Lord President of the Council and Britain's
representative on the League Council, that he was confident that the US
51F037118423: minute by Crowe, 21 February 1924
52F0371/10524: Hills to Parmoor, 15 February 1924
53Ibid.
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Government was prepared to co-operate with the League in establishing
international control of the arms traffic.M Drummond's confidence took Foreign
Office Counsellor Gerald Villiers by surprise: he did not know why Drummond
thought that the US Government would accept the draft Convention nor why it
had apparently changed its mind concerning the issue. 55 However, despite
Crowe's strictures concerning the 'absolutely irresponsible amateurs' who
comprised the TMC, that body had drafted the new Convention so that it took
account of the principal US objections to the Convention of St. Germain.
The new Convention differed very little in substance from that of
St.Gennain but the TMC did identifj three clear concerns on the part of the US
Government which had to be addressed. First, the 1919 Convention did not
permit trade in arms with countries which were not parties to the Convention, a
stipulation which would have prevented the USA selling arms to a number of
Latin American countries. Second, the US Government was not prepared to
subscribe in advance to international obligations which would require national
legislation which the Government could not be sure Congress would enact.
Third, the Convention was inextricably linked with the League, of which the
USA was not a member. The first objection was dealt with by Article 3 of the
new Convention which stated that it was permissible to supply arms to any
Government recognized as such by the Government of the exporting country.
Article 26 overcame the second objection by allowing Governments to adhere to
the Convention on a partial or conditional basis provided that the other Powers
agreed and this did not impair the effectiveness of the Convention. Finally, it was
decided that a Central International Office was to be established by the Council
FO371/1O525: conversation between Drummond and Parmoor, 23 May 1924
55F0371/10525: minute by Villiers, 4 June 1924
FO371I1O524: minute by Crowe, 1 March 1924
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to deal with all the documents and papers relating to the arms trade. The
purpose of this article was to leave it to the Council to decide whether or not
this Central International Office was to be under the aegis of the League.57
In the light of these amendments to the Convention of St.Germain it is
not surprising that Drummond should have described the new draft Convention
as 'a very conservative document'. However, this conservative document
served British interests, as defined by the Foreign Office, particularly well.
Although the US Government declined the League Council's invitation to send a
representative to the meetings of the Third Committee of the Fifth Assembly in
September 1924 which would consider the TMC's draft Convention, Hugh
Gibson, who had replaced Grew as American Minister at Berne, declared on 2
September that the US Government would take part in an international
Conference dealing with the arms traffic question. 59
 It was this decision which
paved the way for the Arms Traffic Conference of spring 1925.
This Conference opened at Geneva on 4 May 1925 under the Presidency
of Count Henry Carton de Wiart, formerly Prime Minister of Belgium. Forty
three nations were represented including four which were not League members:
the USA, Germany, Turkey and Egypt. 6° Six weeks of negotiations resulted in
the Arms Traffic Convention of 17 June 1925 which, in the short term at least,
represented a triumph for those committed to disarmament as defined in this
thesis and, at the same time, protected British imperial concerns by preserving
the concept of prohibited zones, albeit under the new name of'special zones'.
The progress made regarding control of the arms traffic also had the benefit,
57F0371/1 0526: Drummond to the FO, 9 October 1924
FO371/10525: Drummond to Parmoor, 23 May 1924
59F0371/10525: press release by the US Department of State, 2 September 1924
60FO371/1 1033: the text of Henry Carton de Wiart's speech opening the Arms
Traffic Conference, 4 May 1925
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from the point of view of the Foreign Office and the Fighting Services, of
pushing discussion of control of the private manufacture of arms into the
background. The first two meetings of the Co-ordination Committee on 16 and
17 February 1925 decided that discussion of the private manufacture of arms
should be adjourned until the question of control of the arms traffic had been
dealt with.61
Although the Arms Traffic Convention was signed by eighteen Powers
on 17 June 1925, ratification by fourteen was required if it were to come into
force.62 While in Geneva towards the end of 1925, Alexander Cadogan, First
Secretary at the Foreign Office and Assistant to the British delegate to the
League of Nations, received inquiries from the Secretary-General of the League,
Eric Drummond, as to when Britain would be prepared to ratify the Convention.
Cadogan consulted the Service Departments whose opinion was that it would be
unwise to ratify before the other arms producing States did so. 63 In a minute
which serves as a fitting epitaph on negotiations for an Arms Traffic Convention,
Cadogan wrote:
The Service representatives are undoubtedly right. On the other
hand, this will no doubt be the attitude of all the other producing
States also, so that ratification of the Arms Traffic Convention
will take place on the Greek Kalends. This may be very desirable,
and a good choice of date, but if so, it seems rather a pity that we
wasted so much time over the negotiation of the convention.
61 F0371/1 1032: McNeil to the FO, 18 February 1925
9O371/1 1038: message from Onslow, 17 June 1925
FO371/1 1040: minute by Cadogan, 21 December 1925
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It is difficult to find anything positive in the Bntish Government's
handling of the arms trade question. The Foreign Office concern with imperial
security was entirely understandable: it was orthodox thinking to consider it
desirable to prevent arms from falling into the hands of the so-called uncivilized
races. Nevertheless, it was short-sighted to believe that the modified operation
of the Convention of St.Gennain could be maintained for any significant period.
It would, therefore, have been more coherent to argue in favour of Seymour's
suggestion that the Convention be amended by removing the references to the
League to make it more palatable to the US Government. Similarly, senior
Foreign Office officials would have had a better chance of influencing discussion
at the League in the ways they desired had they been less hostile to the TMC. It
is highly ironic that the body which drew so much of Crowe's not inconsiderable
ire should have been responsible for drafting an Arms Traffic Convention which
brought the US Government back into open co-operation with the League. With
rather more imagination this might have been achieved earlier.
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Chapter 3 - The Private Manufacture of Arms
In the previous chapter it was argued that successive British
Govermnents failed to integrate the national and international components of the
arms traffic question. Although there were decision-makers who believed that
international control of the arms trade would be beneficial, there was insufficient
commitment to the process of international negotiation through the League to
bring this about. As regards the private manufacture of arms, however, there is
little evidence of this dislocation between aims and process in disarmament on
the one hand and product on the other. The principal decision-makers were
convinced that the control or abolition of private manufacture were unrealistic
aims which would bring no benefits to the British Empire and threatened to
undermine the effectiveness of its Armed Forces. As a result, there was little
official discussion of the problem and there is not much information available in
the Government archives, particularly before 1923. Such an attitude was in
direct opposition to an influential body of opinion which held that the
unrestrained operation of the private arms industry had been a significant cause
of the Great War and that its ill effects would have to be removed if
disarmament were to be achieved. In 1919 such critics of the private arms
industry succeeded in so far as reform of the industry was included in Article 8
of the Covenant which set out the League's commitment to disarmament. Yet,
once the question was subjected to detailed consideration within the League,
translating this desire for reform into practice proved enormously problematic.
Consequently few positive proposals emerged which merited the attention of
leading British decision-makers. By 1925 the objective set out in paragraph 5 of
Article 8 of the Covenant was no closer to fliffilment than it had been in 1918.
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One of the most powerful and determined British opponents of the
private arms industry was Philip Noel-Baker whose long career took him from
service in the Foreign Office League of Nations Section formed by Cecil in 1919
to positions in Winston Churchills war-time Coalition and Clement Attlee's post-
war Labour Governments. In 1937 he published The Private Manufacture of
Armaments, a long and detailed critique of the industry. Noel-Baker's biographer
has rightly observed that in this work the case against the private arms industry
was built up 'in an unwieldy and repetitive fashion'.' It remains, nevertheless, a
valuable analysis of what its critics regard as the malign influence of the private
arms industry. Noel-Baker provided a very considerable amount of evidence to
show the far-reaching political and financial influence of arms manufacturers
throughout the world. As an advocate of disarmament, Noel-Baker stressed that
the arms manufacturers' concern with profits conflicted with international efforts
for peace. In his view it was wholly wrong and indeed paradoxical that men
might be required to give their lives in war and tax-payers be required to support
huge expenditure on arms while private manufacturers were able to profit by
selling their product both to their own Governments and to those of enemy
nations. Noel-Baker's thesis was strengthened by his determination to stress the
political rather than the exclusively moral aspects of the private arms industry
and to reject the view that the private manufacture of arms was the sole cause of
war. Although he was convinced that the industry was an obstacle to
disarmament, he asserted that the causes of war were far too complex to be
explained by the activities of one group of industrialists and their agents. Noel-
Baker wanted the arms industry to be nationalized but he stated quite clearly that
arms produced in Government arsenals could be just as threatening as those
'Whittaker, D.J. Fighter for Peace - Philip Noel-Baker 1889-1982 (York,
Sessions, 1989), p.96
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manufactured by private firms. Further, responsibility for the strength of the
industry lay firmly with the political decision-makers for it was Governments
that ensured that their relationships with private arms companies were closer
than those with any other industries. Governments chose to give assistance to
arms manufacturers and to support their exporting activities.
In Part II of his book Noel-Baker set out the principal objections to the
private manufacture of arms. Throughout the world these firms solicited orders
from Governments and used bribeiy to gain contracts. There was the extensive
transfer of retired politicians, civil servants and military officers to influential
positions in private arms firms. He argued that the consequences of this practice
were the possible loss of efficiency and enterprise in Government arsenals and
ordnance factories when such officials left public service before normal
retirement age, the lowering of the reputation and morale of Government service
and the possible revelation of national secrets to foreign States. This threat to
national security was increased by the fact that private arms companies would
sell to any Government and this meant that they would sell to States which were
potential enemies of their own country. For instance, in the Austro-Prussian War
of 1866, the Austro-Hungarian forces used artillery supplied by Krupps, a
Prussian firm. In 1914 Turkey possessed 22 warships built by four countries
which were to be its enemies in the Great War - Britain, France, Italy and the
USA. 2
 It was also argued by Noel-Baker that the existence of private firms made
it easier for Governments to evade international treaties for disarmament and
against aggression. This was because Governments could deny involvement in
breaches of international disarmament agreements if the arms were being
supplied to another Power by private companies. Governments would not so
2Noel-Baker, P.J. The Private Manufacture of Armaments vol.! (London: Victor
Gollanz, 1937) pp.190-191
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easily be able to do this if the arms were being supplied by Government-owned
companies. In support of this argument Noel-Baker provided instances of how
the activities of pnvate firms such as Krupps and Junkers enabled the German
Government to evade the limitations imposed on its armaments by the Treaty of
Versailles. He provided further evidence to show that this was also true of the
other countries compulsorily disarmed following the Great War.
In support of their activities the private arms companies also sought to
influence public opinion through control of the Press. This control might take
the form of direct ownership or control of newspapers and journals by arms
producers, subsidies to or bribery of such publications or threats to withdraw
and promises to increase advertising. The influence of the private arms
companies was strengthened still further by their close connnection with
societies such as the British Navy League and the British Air League. Such
societies considered that their country's security would benefit from the
possession of powerful armed forces and, therefore, they were inevitably the
friends of the private arms manufacturers. The British Navy League, for
example, while it was rare amongst this type of organization in not accepting
financial contributions from arms companies, had as some of its honorary
officers and active members people who, as shareholders and directors, had a
direct interest in private arms firms.
Noel-Baker's analysis of the activities of the private arms manufacturers
indicated that they were prepared to 'use all means of propaganda which may
produce conditions in which their armament orders are likely to increase'. 3 He
placed these means in three categories: ' "playing Governments off' one against
the other; direct propaganda against Disarmament; the creation of "panics" and
3Th4., p.347
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"scares" ' By playing Governments off against each other he meant the
activities by agents for arms companies in two or more countries which are
potential enemies. By telling each country that the other was arming and by
secretly providing the arms, these agents contributed significantly to the tension,
to the arms race and, of course, to the profits of their company. As regards
direct propaganda against disarmament, Noel-Baker provided, as an example,
the activities of the Electric Boat Company of the USA which was prepared to
allow one of its agents in South America, Commander Luis Aubry, leave of
absence so that he could be a member of the Peruvian delegation to the
Disarmament Conference scheduled in the Geneva Protocol for June 1925. The
Geneva Protocol was never ratified and the planned Disarmament Conference
did not take place in June1925 but Aubry had intended to use his position as a
delegate to argue against any limitation on submarine building and for
submarines being classified as defensive weapons. 5 It was clearly significant that
the Electric Boat Company produced submarines. Noel-Baker attached such
importance to the panics and scares initiated by the arms manufacturers that he
devoted 61 pages in Part ifi to an examination of the Mulliner panic of 1909 in
Britain. The basis of this panic, according to Noel-Baker, was that H.H.
Mulliner, Managing Director of the Coventry Ordnance Works, claimed to have
evidence that the Germans were secretly building more Dreadnought battleships
than they were then publicly stating. This resulted in the 'We want eight and we
won't wait' public agitation of April-July 1909 which demanded that Britain
should increase its Dreadnought building programme and the consequent
Government decision of 26 July 1909 to lay down four additonal Dreadnoughts.




Dreadnoughts were untrue and that he was motivated by a desire to secure
orders for his company which had done poorly in the years 1906-9 as a result of
the Liberal Government's attempt to reduce expenditure on arms.
The Private Manufacture of Armaments is the work of a man who was
totally committed to the cause of disarmament but it cannot easily be dismissed
as an example of one-sided and high-minded idealism which had no place in the
real world of post-war politics. This is because the essential elements in Noel-
Baker's argument had already been articulated by influential voices within the
Imperial War Cabinet immediately following the Armistice. In his famous
memorandum of December 1918, General Jan Smuts expressed his strong
opposition to the private manufacture of arms:
The veiy success of that sort of business depends on the
stimulation of the war atmosphere among the peoples. The Press,
influenced by the large profits and advertising enterprise of the
armaments firms, whip up public opinion on every imaginable
occasion; small foreign incidents are written up and magnified
into grave international situations affecting the pacific relations of
States, and the war temperature is artificially raised and kept up.6
Smuts believed that this problem could only be resolved through State
intervention and the establishment of a League of Nations. He wanted the post-
war Peace Settlement to include the nationalization of the arms industry and the
creation of a system by which the League received a regular supply of
information about arms export and imports. Here Smuts was setting out a
6F0 371/4353: memorandum by Smuts, 16 December 1918
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radical, idealist case against the private manufacture of arms and arguing that it
had to be addressed if progress on disarmament were to be made. A little over a
week later this idea that action should be taken against the private arms industry
received backing from Sir Robert Borden, Canadian Prime Minister, and Lord
Robert Cecil. Although Borden was not convinced that profit-making in arms
directly contributed to the outbreak of war, he had no doubt that the public held
this view and that 'the Peace Conference would be a sham' if there were no
progress towards arms reduction.7
Such thinking had important consequences. First, there was the decison
to include reform of the private arms industry in Article 8 of the Covenant. This
was followed in February 1921 by the League Council authorizing the
establishment of the TMC which was required, together with the Permanent
Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions (PAC), to conduct
an inquiry into the private arms industry and submit a report to the Council. 8 The
first session of the newly created TMC was held in Paris in July 1921 when it
appointed a sub-committee to examine both the private manufacture of, and the
international trade in, arms. This sub-committee worked with sufficient
determination to be able to present a report for the TMC's consideration in
September 1921. This report is significant because it both set out very clearly the
case against the private manufacture of arms and also began the process of
shifting the focus of attention from reform of the private arms industry to control
of the international traffic in arms.
Echoing Borden's comments of December 1918, the report points out
that, although the Covenant did not identi1' the grave objections to the private
7Cab23/42: Cabinet conclusions, 24 December 1918
8F0 371/7042: minutes of the Council of the League of Nations, 21 February-4
March 1921
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manufacture of arms, 'it is a common belief that wars are promoted by the
competitive zeal of private armament firms, and would be rendered less frequent
were the profit-making impulse brought under control or eliminated altogether'.9
The sub-committee considered that the objections to the private arms industry
could be grouped under six main headings. Four of these objections - that arms
firms fomented war scares, bribed Government officials, spread false reports
about the military and naval spending of other countries and tried to influe,,c
public opinion through control of newspapers - were subjected to detailed
examination in The Private Manufacture of Armaments. The report, however,
makes two further criticisms of the industry, namely, that firms had organized
international arms rings which enabled them to accentuate the arms race by
playing one country off against another and that they had established
international arms trusts so as to push up the price of arms sold to Governments.
Despite being able to identify these objections, the sub-committee was unable
either to recommend the abolition of private manufacture or advise upon the
means by which it might be brought under control, should it be allowed to
continue. Indeed, its analysis of the problems involved in abolishing the private
manufacture of arms constituted a powerful case for rejecting this option.
The TMC sub-committee set out a number of closely connected
obstacles in the way of abolition of the private arms industry. Of considerable
significance was the fear that abolition might, paradoxically, result in a world-
wide increase in arms. This possibility was based on two factors. First, under
international law the supply of arms by a neutral Government to a beffigerent
Government constituted a breach of neutrality. This could prompt all
Governments to prepare for a possible war by stock-piling weapons and by
9Adm 116/2142: Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments,
15 September 1921
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developing their own capacity to produce arms. Second, non-arms producing
States would be under still greater pressure to build their own arms industries as
this was the only way that they could be sure of acquiring the weapons they
needed. The sub-committee also held that it was necessary to consider the
impact of abolition not just on international relations but also on countries'
domestic industrial structures. This raised further problems because it was not
easy to define war industries and there were very few companies which were
involved exclusively in the production of arms. Nationalization of such firms was
clearly inappropriate unless it was argued that all industry should be under State
control.
These arguments against abolition led the sub-committee to consider the
ways in which the private manufacture of arms might be brought under control.
Its principal options were based on licensing and publicity. A system which
required arms exports to be licensed by the exporting country's Government and
imports to be licensed by the importing country's Government would certainly
have an impact on the international arms traffic and hence on the private
manufacture of arms, especially if it was agreed that such licences had to be
registered with and published by the League. This licensing of the arms trade
could be reinforced by stipulating that arms could not be manufactured without a
Government licence and that, once again, these licences would have to be
published by the League. Publicity could also be extended to the accounts and
the names of shareholders in arms producing companies. If such information
were made public it would also be possible to prevent foreigners from holding
shares. Given the opinions expressed by men such as Smuts, it is not surprising
that the sub-committee also suggested that people with substantial interests in
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arms firms should be prevented from 'owning, controlling, or unduly influencing,
the newspaper press'.'°
In the light of its analysis of the possible ways in which the private
manufacture of arms might be brought under control, the sub-committee argued
that 'Whatever views be held as to the nature and extent of the evils which,
according to Article 8 of the Covenant, result from the unrestricted private
manufacture of munitions, it is evident that an essential feature in any scheme
which aims at removing or diminishing these evils must be to bring the
international arms traffic under control'. 1 Although the purpose of the
Convention of St.Germain had been to prevent arms falling into the hands of
irresponsible people who might threaten the peace in unstable regions rather than
to promote disarmament amongst established States, the sub-committee
considered that the machineiy of this Convention could provide the basis for the
general restriction of the arms trade. In putting forward this proposal the sub-
committee appeared to attach greater importance to control of the arms traffic
than to international efforts aimed at bringing the private manufacture of arms
under control. This move had the support of Captain John Segrave who was
Britain's naval representative on the PAC and also served on the TMC. He
recognized, however, that implementation of an Arms Traffic Convention would
not deal with objections to the arms rings identified by opponents of the private
arms industry. Segrave was not convinced that the existence of such rings had
been proved but, if it were the case that they exercised such influence, it could
only exist 'while governments are quite free in deciding their expenditure on
armaments': if arms reduction were achieved 'the question will be automatically




"Armaments Ring" '•12 The problem that Segrave quite explicitly recognized was
that arms firms would use their influence to block effective disarmament
measures. In his view this meant that 'steps to obviate the evils of private
manufacture, if they are to be of any use, must have become effective before the
day of reduction of armaments has arrived'.' 3 He supported the TMC's
judgement that the most practical means of achieving this was through an Arms
Traffic Convention.
This change of emphasis as regards the two elements in the arms trade
question gradually became more firmly entrenched but in autumn 1921 this was
not yet evident. In its report to the Second League Assembly in 1921 the Third
Committee recommended action on both private manufacture and the trade in
arms. It wanted the Council to summon an international Conference dealing with
both issues. All members of the League, together with other interested States
which were not League members, should be invited to this Conference which
should ideally take place before the Third League Assembly in 1922. The TMC
should be given the task of preparing the programme for this Conference and
drawing up a draft Convention for its discussion.' 4 Although this programme
was authorized by the Council on 12 October 1921, the TMC made very slow
progress during 1922. A scheme was, however, submitted to the TMC by Sir
Hubert Liewellyn Smith, the British Chairman of the League's Economic
Committee, acting on his own initiative. This scheme was adopted by the TMC
and then by the Third Assembly as Resolution V.' 5 This development, however,
' 2Adm 116/2142: memorandum by Segrave, 17 October 1921
'3lbid.
' 4F0 371/7056: Report by the Third Committee of the Second Assembly of the
League of Nations 1921, 'Reduction of Armaments', 27 September 1921
' 5F0 37118319: Report of the Third Committee to the Third Assembly of the
League of Nations, 22 September 1922
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came far too late in the year for the Council to summon an international
Conference.
Nevertheless, the adoption of Liewellyn Smith's draft Convention for the
Control of the Private Manufacture of Arms by the Third League Assembly in
1922 brought this element of the arms trade problem once again into greater
prominence. Liewellyn Smith's scheme proposed a strict licensing system.
Companies would only be able to manufacture and sell arms if they held a
licence from their Government and such licences were conditional on companies
accepting a number of undertakings. Arms companies would have to keep their
Governments informed of any orders which they accepted, they would have to
be free of any foreign influence or control and no director or senior manager
would be allowed to hold a controlling interest in any newspaper or magazine.'6
These constraints were intended to prevent arms manufacturers from behaving in
the manner which had prompted the criticisms advanced by Smuts in December
1918 and by the TMC in 1921.
The British Armed Forces had strong objections to this scheme. The
most important was the argument that such a licencing system would discourage
companies from producing arms unless this were their principal manufacturing
activity, If firms which produced parts of munitions, but whose main business
involved manufacturing for civilian work, were not prepared to take on the
restrictions involved in the licences proposed by Liewellyn Smith, the effect
'would tend to throw everything into the hands of the great armaments firms and
to strengthen their ring, and thus enhance the prices and profits'.' 7 If this were
correct then it certainly followed that the introduction of a licensing system
'6F0 371/8422: FO memorandum, January 1923
' 7F0 371/8422: minutes of informal conference of Fighting Services, 9 January
1923
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would restrict the Fighting Services in purchasing the arms that they required. It
is also interesting that the use of the term 'armaments ring' appears to be an
instance of the Armed Forces giving some credence to the claims of those who
were so opposed to the workings of the arms industry. The Fighting Services
also argued that the restrictions involved in Liewellyn Smith's scheme might
discourage British firms from making arms for foreign Governments. They held
that such a development would be prejudicial to British interests on a number of
grounds. First, supplying foreign Governments meant that British firms could
maintain a larger volume of production which was beneficial to the British
Government in time of war and also tended to keep prices down. Second, arms
sales to foreign Governments brought money into the country and provided
employment. Finally, from the point of view of the League, it was better that
countries with no arms producing capacity of their own should buy from foreign
firms rather than be driven, by fear that licences might hamper their supply of
weapons, to develop their own arms industry.'8
This analysis of Llewellyn Smith's scheme is clearly highly tendentious
but it cannot easily be dismissed for it connects so closely with the arguments set
out in the TMC's report of September 1921. In 1923, however, any progress
regarding the private manufacture of and trade in arms was dependent on the
attitude of the USA. At this stage the USA showed no inclination to co-operate
with the League and, as a result, nothing of any substance was achieved in 1923.
On 21 April the President of the Council, Antonio Salandra, had written to the
US Government inviting it to state in what manner it would be willing to co-
operate with other Governments on this subject.' 9 The TMC had further
suggested, at its June session, that the Council should invite the Governments of
'8lbid.
19J() 371/8422: report by Salandra, 18 September 1923
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all countries not members of the League to state how far they would be prepared
to co-operate in finding a solution to these problems. 2° While the Council
approved this TMC recommendation, it decided that no action should be taken
until the US Government's reply had been received. 2' The US Government's
response of 12 September 1923 was so wholly negative that the Council further
postponed action on the TMC's recommendation of the previous June until after
the League Assembly had discussed the matter. Despite these setbacks the
Fourth League Assembly in 1923 recommended the Council to invite the TMC
to submit Llewellyn Smith's scheme regarding the private manufacture of arms
to the Economic Committee of the League for its comments and to draw up a
draft Convention in co-operation with this Committee. Once this had been done,
the Council was then to consider summoning an international Conference with
the intention of achieving agreement on such Conventions.
As was shown in the previous chapter, 1924 brought significant progress
concerning an Arms Traffic Convention because the US Government adopted a
much more positive and constructive approach to initiatives emerging from the
League. The private manufacture of arms, however, continued to present serious
problems. In part this was because the Canadian member of the TMC, Colonel
David Carnegie, complicated matters by submitting a fresh draft Convention in
February. Between 26 and 28 April 1924 a sub-committee of the TMC met in
Prague to revise this draft Convention. Sir George Clerk, Britain's Ambassador
in Prague, reported that Carnegie's scheme, like Liewellyn Smith's, envisaged
control being exercised through a licensing system, with the issue of licences
°FO 371/8422: memorandum by Drummond, 25 June 1923
2'FO 371/8422: report by Salandra, 2 July 1923
9O 371/8422: memorandum by Drummond, 12 September 1923 and report by
Salandra, 18 September 1923
FO 371/1 0526: letter from Avenol to the Chairman of the Economic
Committee, 7 August 1924
69
being determined by a number of considerations 'amongst which prominence is
given to the condition that no person who is in a position to influence the policy
of a newspaper shall be entitled to receive a licence'. 24 The document approved
by the TMC on 9 July in Geneva also proposed that licence holders should be
prohibited from carrying on any kind of propaganda relating to the arms for
which the licence had been granted. Furthermore, licence holders would have to
provide their Governments with information about the directors, managers and
higher officials of the company and with the names of the companies producing
arms with which they were associated. Finally, arms manufacturers would have
to publish an annual report of their companies' operations relating to the
production of the material for which the licence had been granted. 25 Ths scheme,
though, gave rise to differences of opinion significant enough for Carnegie
himself to give Clerk 'the impression that the Sub-Committee were not unduly
sanguine as to the results of their deliberations and that, in their opinion, the best
chance of securing the end in view lay in the possible ratification by the United
States Government of the St. Germain Arms Traffic Convention of September
1919'. The principal cause of dissension within the TMC was the demand by a
minority for the absolute prohibition of the private manufacture of arms. If this
were not practical, the minority group urged that the control of the private arms
industry should be on an international and not a national basis as proposed by
the majority on the TMC.V
The Fifth League Assembly in 1924 was dominated by the Geneva
Protocol and it was there decided that the TMC should be superseded by the
24F0 37 1/10525: letter from Clerk to the FO, 1 May 1924
FO 3 71/10525: TMC document, Principles recommended as a basis for an
international convention on the national control of the private manufacture of
arms munitions and implements of war', 8 July 1924
FO 37 1/10525: letter from Clerk to the FO, 1 May 1924
27F0 37 1/10526 : TMC, Minority Report, 30 July 1924
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Co-ordination Commission which was established primarily to prepare for the
Arms Reduction Conference envisaged by the Protocol. This Assembly,
however, also requested the Council to reconsider the private manufacture of
arms with a view to preparing a Convention which would serve as a basis for the
long envisaged international Conference on this subject. At this time the arms
trade had not been discussed in Cabinet since the Versailles Treaty and there is
no evidence that any of the post-war British Governments had formulated an
attitude to the problem. On 15 January 1925, however, despite the differences of
opinion within the TMC during the previous summer, the Cabinet believed that
this development was important enough to justify establishing an inter-
departmental sub-committee of the CII) to consider it. At this same meeting the
Cabinet appointed Ronald McNeill, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, to be Britain's representative on the Co-ordination Commission.
Until the Geneva Protocol was ratified the Co-ordination Commission would be
unable to begin work in preparation for the Disarmament Conference. In the
meantime it was to take over from the TMC responsibility for examining control
of the private arms industry. The CII) sub-committee, under McNeil's
chairmanship, was to draft instructions which he could use when the Co-
ordination Commmission met on 16 February to deal with the subject.
The CII) sub-committee was dominated by the representatives of the
Fighting Services and their hostility to control of the private manufacture of
arms remained as strong as ever. The sub-committee recognized, however, that
there were political as well as defence considerations to be taken into account:
It is realised, however, that in view of the above-mentioned
article of the covenant [Article 8] and of the hesitation of 1-us
Majesty's Government to accede to the Geneva Protocol, it
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would be most impolitic for the British representative to adopt a
non possumus attitude from the beginning, and to declare that
His Majesty's Government could not accept any scheme for the
control of the private manufacture of arms.
It was for this reason that it recommended that the Government agree to any
system of control which met the following criteria:
(1.) The similar consent of all the principal manufacturing
countries, and in particular of the United States of America.
(2.) The previous conclusion of a satisfactory international
convention dealing with the traffic in arms.
(3.) The scheme must not apply to finns manufacturing solely for
their own Government.
(4.) The scheme must not operate in time of war.
(5.) Control must be national, and not international.
International agreement on a scheme which met these criteria was clearly beyond
the realm of practical politics, as the sub-committee doubtless intended. Its
concern, however, that the British Government might be criticized for
obstructiveness on the issue proved entirely groundless for the first two meetings
of the Co-ordination Commission on 16 and 17 February 1925 adjourned
Cab 4/12: CID memorandum 588-B, 2 February 1925
Ibid. Italics original.
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consideration of the subject until the question of control of the arms traffic had
been dealt with. In the meantime, a Committee of Enquiry was established and
given the innocuous tasks of enquiring of Governments what were their
objections to the private manufacture of arms, what measures existed in their
countries regarding private manufacture and the extent to which these might
obstruct the conclusion of an international agreement on the subject. The
Committee was then to prepare a report suggesting the best means of
supervising private manufacture. From the point of view of the British
Government, the most pleasing feature of these developments was that they
were largely the result of proposals by the Brazilian representative and so
McNeil had not been placed in a situation where he appeared obstructive.30
The repetitive discussion of how best to overcome the perceived
problems associated with the private arms industry suggests that, on this matter
at least, Richard Sperling was right to describe the League as 'a futile body'. 31
 By
the end of 1921 it was clear that there was nothing approaching an international
consensus in favour of abolition of private manufacture, and the regulatory
systems based on Llewellyn Smith's initial scheme were far too complex to be
practical. In the previous chapter there was considerable criticism of the way in
which the British Government handled the arms trade question. Such criticism
would be inappropriate concerning the private arms industry. Within the League
there was too strong a tendency to remain shackled by paragraph 5 of Article 8
30F0371/1 1032: McNeil to the FO, 18 February 1925
31 F0371/8422: minute by Sperling, 6 July 1923
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of the Covenant rather than focusing attention firmly on the more realistic
objective of an Arms Traffic Convention. A comment by Alexander Flint,
Principal Assistant Secretary at the Admiralty, however, indicates that an
achievement - perhaps the only achievement - of the campaign against the
private manufacture of arms might have been to influence the British
Government's decision to sign the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925. Observing
that the aim of that Convention had been to ensure publicity, he wrote:
In this connection it has to be borne in mind that if the extremists
do not obtain publicity at least as to the arms exported and the
places to which they are consigned, then a strong movement will
be initiated, after the Arms Traffic Conference has dispersed, to
replace the private manufacture of arms by Government
manufacture. It is more important I think [sic] for this country to
uphold the private manufacture of arms than to oppose publicity
as to its exports, as in the event of war we wish to rely on as
many private firms as possible expanding, with the help of their
skilled labour, to an enormous extent.32
This linkage of the two elements in the arms trade question constitutes an ironic
judgement on the efforts of those who between 1918 and 1925 sought to abolish
or control the private arms industry.
32Adml/8693/267: minute by Flint, 14 May 1925
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Chapter 4 - The Problem of Chemical Warfare
The two previous chapters examined attempts to bring the arms industry
under international control. One of the products of that industry, chemical
weapons, were used for the first time in the Great War and this development
caused considerable controversy. In the period 19 18-25 the issue of chemical
warfare remained of greater significance than has hitherto been recognized. It is
a subject which historians have largely ignored yet it functioned as an element
both of the disarmament problem in external policy and the armaments question
in internal and imperial policy. The debates within the Government expose some
of the decision-makers' perceptions of the nature and importance of public
opinion and the differences of analysis which have so often been characterized as
the conflict between realists and idealists. What is more striking, however, is the
scale of incompetence, cynicism and uncertainty displayed by successive British
Governments in their handling of the issue of chemical warfare.
It is an historical common-place to state that war accelerates change but
this was certainly true of the impact of the Great War on chemical warfare. Prior
to the Great War it was recognized that poison might be used as a weapon of
war and there had been international agreements outlawing the use of such
weapons. By the Declaration of the Hague of 29 July 1899 the great Powers had
agreed 'to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the
diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases'. This ban was renewed in the
International Declaration of 1907 which resulted from the Second Peace
Conference at the Hague.' As a result of this moral condemnation of gas
weapons, Britain went into the Great War having established no organization for
'Cab4/12: CID memorandum 535-B, 21 November 1924
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chemical warfare research. The extent to which it had ignored the potential of
chemical warfare is revealed by the proposal in December 1914 to employ "stink
bombs". This weapon would not have infringed the 1899 and 1907 Conventions
because the bombs would have contained non-poisonous materials. 2 Against this
background it is hardly surprising that the use of gas by the Germans on 22 April
1915 during the second Battle of Ypres should have seemed so shocking. On 23
April, General Sir John French telegraphed the War Office from the Western
Front reporting the German action and requesting that he be supplied, as soon as
possible, with gas weapons with which to retaliate. In his reply of 24 April, Lord
Kitchener stated that, as the use of gas was contrary to the rules of war, he
would have to submit the matter to the Government before he could comply
with the request. Kitchener was outraged by the German action and described
the possibility of Britain using gas weapons as falling 'to the level of the
degraded German'. As far as Kitchener was concerned the German methods
'show to what depths of infamy our enemies will go, in order to supplement their
want of courage in facing our troops'.3
Despite Kitchener's abhorrence of the weapon, the British Government
rapidly authorized the use of gas in warfare and on 3 May 1915 the task of
providing for the use of offensive gas was given to a sub-section of the
Fortifications and Works Directorate of the War Office. For Britain this marked
the beginning of chemical warfare. On 28 May 1915 the Ministry of Munitions
was formed and within a year it had taken over responsibility for the
organization of Britain's chemical warfare capability. This organization grew
rapidly with the acquisition of the Porton Experimental Ground near Salisbury in
2WO33/987B: 1st Annual Report of the CWC, 1921
3W0142/241: telegraph from French to Kitchener, 23 April and from Kitchener
to French, 24 April 1915
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January 1916 and the formation of the Chemical Warfare Committee (CWC) on
17 October 1917.
The use of gas in warfare was still a cause of moral repugnance nearly
three years after the German action in the Ypres Salient. Early in March 1918
the International Red Cross called on the belligerents to stop using such
weapons. In order to determine their response to this call, the Allies held a
Conference at Versailles and declared that it would only be appropriate to stop
using poison gas if the German Government provided 'new detailed and effective
guarantees that an agreement to discontinue the use of gas will be observed'.5
The Allies held that until such guarantees were provided, Allied use of gas was
justified as retaliation against the German use and that it would clearly be useless
for the Allies to abandon the use of gas when there was no guarantee that the
Germans would not use this weapon when it suited their purposes. This war-
time position remained the basis of the British Government's peace time policy
regarding chemical warfare: until such time as effective guarantees against gas
research and chemical weapons could be established it was impossible for the
Government to terminate its chemical warfare organization. Even at this
relatively early stage in the development of Britain's chemical warfare policy
there was, however, a very different policy being advocated. A War Office
memorandum written in late December 1918 suggested that a possible result of
the Peace Conference would be that all armies would be reduced to relatively
small professional organizations. If that were to be the case, these small armies
would have to become more scientific so as to counter-balance the restriction on
their numbers. One aspect of this scientific approach to warfare would be the use
of gas which, if developed effectively together with tanks and aircraft, could
'W033/987B: 1st Annual Report of the CWC,1921
5Cab4/12: CD memorandum 535-B, 21 November 1924
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have a devastating effect in battle. The writer held that international Conventions
would not protect armies against the use of gas. Instead, the best means by
which to prevent loss of life as a result of gas weapons was precisely the
opposite of that proposed by those who sought international agreements to
outlaw the use of gas:
If the humanitarian wishes to render impossible such an action [the
destruction of an army by chemical weapons] . . .his surest method is
to encourage the use of gas in war in place of inducing nations to
declare it illegal, for if all armies are prepared to use gas as a weapon
they will be equally prepared to protect themselves against its effect.6
At this stage such an argument won little favour with the British
Government, for when the war ended the legitimacy of gas as a weapon was
seriously questioned. This caused problems for the CWC which considered that
the developments in chemical weapons since 1915 indicated that this would be
an important element in any future wars. The CWC did not want research to be
stopped for if this were to happen the experience gained during the war would
be lost and continuity would be crucially interrupted. 7 Article 171 of the Treaty
of Versailles, however, forbade the Germans from using, manufacturing or
importing poisonous gases and liquids. This article obviously raised the question
of how far the Allied Powers were morally bound themselves to desist from
research and preparation regarding chemical warfare. For the British
Government much would depend on the attitude of the other Powers. Soon after
6W0188/143: 'The development of gas and its influence on tank warfare', 21
December 1918
7W033/987B: 1st Annual Report of the CWC, 1921
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the Treaty of Versailles was signed it became clear that none of the major
Powers intended to bring a halt to their chemical warfare preparations. The War
Cabinet decided, therefore, that the War Office should continue its work on the
use of asphyxiating gases in warfare but without denouncing the Conventions of
1899 and 1907.8
Early in 1920 the issue was raised once again within the Cabinet because
the War Office sought a decision on the use of animals in chemical warfare
research. This was not a simple matter for the Home Secretary to resolve and it
proved necessary for him to consult the Crown's Law Officers to determine
whether the use of animals in chemical warfare research was covered by the
Vivisection Act. The general view within the Cabinet at this stage, however, still
favoured the War Cabinet decision of October 1919. On 4 March 1920 the
Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Home Secretary which gave the Law
Officers' advice that the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876 allowed such
experiments and did not prevent the Home Secretary from issuing the
appropriate licences. This advice, however, meant that the question of chemical
warfare research was one of policy which the Cabinet would have to decide.
During the course of the discussion which followed, two rather different
arguments were put. That which might be described as the realist position held
that 'nothing was more likely to prevent wars in future than the realisation on the
part of the people that such wars would be fought by ruthless methods of
wholesale extermination by gases'. In support of this view it was stated that both
France and the USA were 'already making arrangements on a large scale to
study chemical warfare, and that we could not allow ourselves to fall behind'. It
was also pointed out, however, that the Versailles Peace Treaty condemned gas
8Cab231l2: Cabinet conclusions, 16 October 1919
9Cab23/20: Cabinet conclusions, 3 February 1920
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warfare and prohibited Germany from making preparations for gas warfare and
from resorting to gas as a weapon. In view of this provision, were we ourselves
justified in conducting similar researches which we condemned in the case of the
Germans ?' The Cabinet response to these important questions was to
prevaricate. The matter was to be referred to the League and the British
representative there was given instructions as to the policy which the Cabinet
wished to present:
[he] should indicate the view of the Government to be that this new
method of warfare ought never to have been employed; that we should
rejoice to see it stopped; that if it is not stopped it would be necessary
for us, in self-defence to keep abreast of other countries in research and
preparations in order to defend our soldiers and mete reprisals: at the
same time, the Government hopes that the League of Nations will
discover an effective means of putting an end to such warfare.
Until such time as the League considered the matter and the Cabinet was able to
make a final decision, the Secretary of State for War was authorized to continue
chemical warfare research but 'on the narrowest possible scale and in the most
unobtrusive mannerY°
The tone of these discussions and the interim decisions taken reflect an
unedifying mixture of uncertainty and cynicism. From a realist perspective it
might be argued that this was in Britain's best interests in that the country's
security would be endangered if it terminated chemical warfare research at a
time when other major Powers apparently had every intention of intensifying
'°Cab23120: Cabinet conclusions, 4 March 1920
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their research. In providing Britain's representative at the League with such
instructions, however, the Cabinet was giving public approval to a policy which
it appeared privately to consider unachievable. There were other policies which
the Government might have pursued had it possessed the necessary courage and
qualities of leadership. An idealist approach would have required the
Government to declare its support for the existing Conventions condemning the
use of gas weapons, to suspend all chemical warfare research and to make
genuine efforts to achieve chemical warfare disarmament through the League.
Britain was one of the leading members of the League and could justifiably have
been expected to play a leading role in seeking to resolve a complex problem. A
crucial element, however, in arms limitation agreements is verifiability and there
was general agreement in the post-war period that it would be impossible to
prevent secret chemical weapons research and manufacture. Further, the
experience of the Great War had shown that chemical weapons could, in certain
circumstances, be effective. If the Cabinet took the view, therefore, that
chemical weapons disarmament was not only impossible but undesirable for
military reasons, it should have repudiated the existing Conventions because they
were worthless and set about initiating a programme of public education
designed to prove that chemical weapons were not morally inferior to other
types of weapons. In defence of the Cabinet's decision of 4 March 1920, it could
be argued that uncertainty was inevitable given that the war had only finished
recently, that it was unclear whether the USA would ratiIr the Versailles Treaty
and that the League was in its infancy. Uncertainty and cynicism remained,
however, the defining qualities in the Government's handling of the question of
chemical warfare during the next five years.
The Cabinet decision of 4 March 1920 regarding chemical warfare policy
was the starting point for a serious debate on this issue within the Government
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during the following summer. Within both the War Office and the Admiralty
there was considerable dissatisfaction and in a memorandum of 3 May 1920,
covering a memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir Henry
Wilson, the Secretary of State for War, Winston Churchill, asserted that the
Government's 'indeterminate policy' was placing Britain at a disadvantage
compared with the other major Powers. 11 In his own memorandum Wilson
attempted to make a powerful case for Britain accepting gas as a legitimate
weapon of war. The Great War, he argued, had shown that gas was an effective
weapon and history demonstrated that it was impossible 'to prevent an effective
weapon being used once it has proved its value'. Its likely importance in !i.iture
wars was considered to be demonstrated by the fact that the USA had voted to
spend £26m on gas warfare and had already spent half that sum. This was two
hundred and fifty times greater than the £52,000 allocated by Britain for
chemical warfare research in the financial year 1920-21. Although Wilson did
not know as much about French preparations for gas warfare, he claimed they
were studying the matter 'very seriously'. A further danger for Britain was that
Germany had a very large peace-time chemical industry so that, although its gas
warfare installations had been destroyed, it would always be in a position
speedily to convert the products of the industry for military purposes. Wilson
held that it was entirely inappropriate to argue that Britain could not denounce
the Germans for having used gas in the war and then prepare to use it itself in
some future conflict. This was because the German crime, in his opinion, lay not
in its use of gas but in its unilateral repudiation of an international Convention.
Wilson also sought to make a case for the use of gas on the ground that it was
very far from being a cruel and inhuman weapon. Statistics from both Britain
"Cab24/105: CPI2I 1, 3 May 1920
82
and the USA showed that only 3-4% of gas casualties in the war had died
whereas at least 20% of the casualties of other weapons had proved fatal. The
CIGS even attempted to make out a case for chemical weapons reducing the
level of brutality in war in that they provided 'a means of "doping an opponent
and thus putting him hors de combat while attaining one's object; in fact, it is a
truer conception of modem gases to consider them as drugs rather than as
poisons'. 12
 Wilson contradicted this aspect of his own argument, however, by
stating that if Britain did not take a positive line in favour of chemical weapons
there was a serious risk that a large number of British lives would be lost in any
future war. Wilson was in no doubt, though, that the Government should take
the initiative and seek to educate public opinion in favour of the use of gas as a
weapon. The only constraint on gas warfare should be financial. The view of
Britain's senior militaiy officer, therefore, was that Britain should repudiate the
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which had been effectively over-taken by
scientific developments and the events of the war.13
In advancing this policy Wilson received strong support from the First
Sea Lord, Earl Beatty, who wanted the Navy to have the capability to develop
and manufacture both gas shells and anti-gas equipment. Beatty considered that
the Government's policy on chemical warfare was placing the Navy at a
disadvantage, particularly in comparison with that of the USA which, he
reported, had already developed gas weapons. Beatty was clearly angered by the
US Government which, 'having inoculated Europe with the idea of a League of
Nations, have since approved the adoption in practice of an entirely opposite
doctrine, viz : rapid. thorough and vast preparations for War'.' 4
 When, however,
'Cab24/l05: CP121 1, 16 April 1920. Italics original.
'3lbid.
' 4Cab24/105: CP1246, 7 May 1920. Underlining original.
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the War Office and Admiralty arguments were considered in the Cabinet on 12
May 1920, the Government declined to pursue the policy advocated by these
two Service Departments and maintained the same indecisive line which it had
taken since the end of the war. There remained general agreement that Britain
should not enter into an international agreement on chemical weapons unless it
could be sure that there were effective means in place to ensure that no countly,
whether a member of the League or not, could secretly prepare to break it. It
was also pointed out, though, that if some limitation were not placed upon
chemical warfare, 'there would be no limit to the destructiveness not merely to
armies but also to civil populations from the employment of bacteriological and
other poisonous methods') 5 At this time Balfour was attending a meeting of the
League Council as Britain's representative, and it was decided that the question
should be reviewed by the Cabinet once he returned. Hankey had drafted a note
to the League which was intended to be a statement of the Government's
position. It highlighted the continuing uncertainty within the Cabinet:
The British Government are advised that if they desire to be free to
use poison gas in the event of war, it would be necessary for them to
renounce the Land War Convention and the Declaration of 1907....
They are, however, most reluctant to take so drastic a step, as they
hold the view that this new method of warfare ought never to have
been employed and they would rejoice to see it put an end to. Article
171 of the Treaty of Versailles ... begins with the statement that the
use of these gases is prohibited and in these circumstances, the
15Cab23/21: Cabinet conclusions, 12 May 1920
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British Government feel that the Allies are morally bound to do all in
their power to prohibit their use.
On the other hand, unless the prohibition of these gases is universal
among all the nations of the world, no country could afford to
abandon the experiment nor the equipment of its forces with these
gases. In self-defence every nation will be bound to do its best to
keep abreast with other countries in research and preparations in
order to defend its soldiers and place itself m a position to undertake
reprisals.'6
Uncertainty was added to uncertainty by the Cabinet's delay in making a final
decision on whether or not to send this note to the League: Hankey was only
instructed to send Balfour a summary of the main points of the Cabinet's
discussion and to ask him to inquire informally as to the likely attitude of the
League Council. There was still no sign of the British Government attempting to
provide a lead. In the meantime the War Office was authorized to continue with
its chemical warfare research.'7
The attitude of the two senior Service Departments and the Cabinet
decisions of 12 May 1920 appalled Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for
India, and H.A.L. Fisher, the President of the Board of Education. Montagu was
deeply concerned about two aspects of the Government's emerging chemical
warfare policy. First, he saw the contradictory tendency in the War Office
argument that gas should be regarded as an acceptable weapon of war and the
Cabinet's declaration in the draft note to the League. Montagu believed that in
' 6Cab24/105: CP1218, 4 May 1920
'7lbid.
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resolving this contradiction, the Government was facing 'a momentous decision'
and he was unhesitating in arguing for acceptance of Hankey's draft note to the
League on the ground that it would destroy any possibility of Britain's being able
to advance the arguments and policy advocated by Wilson and Beatty.'8
In addition to this objective, however, Montagu considered that the issue
of chemical warfare had a direct bearing on India. Montagu was here not
concerned with chemical weapons as an element in British disarmament policy
but as a factor in the internal armaments policy of the Empire. Montagu entirely
rejected the idea that gas should be used against frontier tribesmen or against
Afghans except as a measure of retaliation and he gave two closely connected
reasons why the use of gas woud be disadvantageous to the British position in
India. First, Britain's 'clean methods of fighting and our humanity to prisoners of
war in these regions in the past have bred a certain measure of humanity in the
enemy, and our higher standards of conduct have tended to raise those of our
uncivilised neighbours'. This was an improvement from which, he argued, Britain
had benefited for it wished to be on friendly terms with these neighbours and
might even have to bring them under British rule. Second, Montagu took the
view that if Britain were to use gas in India, it would lower its prestige and
'leave behind a heritage of resentment and revengefulness from which we
ourselves shall be the first to suffer'. This resentment would be particularly
powerful given Britain's strong denunciation of the German use of gas in l915)
He wanted the Cabinet, therefore, to reject Wilson's proposal that gas
should be accepted as a legitimate weapon and to leave it to the Secretary of
State for India to decide whether gas warfare should be prosecuted in the sub-
continent. This last point, however, makes it clear that Montagu, for all his
' 8Cab24/105: CP 1278, 12 May 1920
'9lbid.
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hostility to the use of gas in India, held that it was necessaiy for the Indian
Government to have a chemical warfare capacity and he declared that he had
instructed it 'to prosecute it on a limited scale and in an unobtrusive manner'.
Montagu must, therefore, be placed in the intermediate category of those who
opposed Britain initiating chemical warfare but who believed that it should have
the ability to respond in like manner if gas were used against it. He was much
more concerned with maintaining the military independence of the Indian
Government from the authority of the War Office than he was with the issue of
chemical warfare in the debate about British disarmament policy.2°
The one voice within the Cabinet raised in favour of Britain
unambiguously taking the lead in chemical warfare disarmament was that of
Fisher. His position was that of an idealist in that he wanted Britain to suspend
its work on chemical warfare until all possibilities of ending or limiting it had
been thoroughly considered and to make a serious attempt through direct
negotiation with other Powers or through the League to achieve this end. In
advocating this course, Fisher rejected the principal arguments advanced in
favour of chemical weapons. They would not be cheap because '.. .all experience
shows that a new development in the art of war invariably involves additional
cost'; and they were not humane because they were capable of development in
such a way that they could be used against civilian populations. While he
recognized that research into chemical weapons would almost certainly be
impossible to prevent, he thought that it would be possible to identif,r Wan army
were making serious preparations to use gas warfare techniques:
9bid.
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There is no country in the world in which a million men can be made
to undergo a particular kind of discipline in secret. If, therefore, the
Governments of the Great Powers were to undertake to abstain from
preparing chemical warfare and were to break their undertaking, the
fact would certainly become known.
Although Fishe?s position was that of an idealist, this does not mean that his
understanding of nations and their armaments policies was unrealistic. He
explicitly recognized that gas warfare might be too attractive to nations to
persuade them to abstain from developing and using it. He considered, however,
that the end of the war offered time and opportunity for chemical warfare
disarmament to be achieved and he was deeply opposed to allowing the initiative
within the British Government to fall into the hands of the Service Departments:
I do not think that we should be hurried by our Naval and Military
Advisers into a precipitate acceptance of innovations which we have
more than once condemned, which we have forbidden to the
Germans, which are repugnant to the feelings of the great mass of
our people, and which are easily capable of developments from
which the imagination recoils.2'
These memoranda from Montagu and Fisher initiated a brief but serious
debate within the Govermnent about chemical warfare, and during the course of
the summer there were three further Cabinet papers dealing with the issue.
21Cab241106: CP13O1, 17 May 1920
Cab24/107: CP1496, June 1920; Cab24/108: CP1538, 23 June 1920;
Cab24/1 10: CP1758, 7 August 1920
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Wilson sought to answer Fisher's attack on the views of the Service
Departments. The central feature in Fisher's argument was that, while it would
be impossible to prevent Powers from secretly conducting chemical warfare
research, no country would be able secretly to train a substantial army in the
techniques of gas warfare. Wilson argued in response that it would be possible
to delay training troops in the techniques of gas warfare until war had started so
that a Power could then take advantage of its secret research which had been
conducted in the years before the outbreak of war. This point is hardly
convincing given that a memorandum produced by the CWC stated that the
organization of both defensive and counter-offensive measures could not be left
until war was declared. Wilson also attacked very strongly the Fisher thesis that
as Britain did not intend to go to war in the near future, there would be plenty of
time to develop knowledge of gas warfare should the need arise. In response to
this Wilson made two telling points. First, this point could equally well be made
about the development of any weapon. Second, war might be forced upon
Britain: it did not have to be a development which it was actively seeking.
Wilson's realist advice to the Government remained that Britain could not await
the outcome of League deliberations before developing its chemical warfare
capacity.
Certain points of fact, however, concerning fighting in India which
Wilson made in support of his position were challenged by Montagu. Wilson had
asserted that lives had been sacrificed in India because of the refusal to use gas
and he specifically referred to the capture of the Afghan fort of Spin Baldak on
27 May 1919. In his paper Montagu stated that the capture of this fort occurred
WOl88/l44: undated memorandum in file headed Policy in regard to research
work in connection with gas warfare and state of preparedness of the Fighting
Services 1922-1924'
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only seventeen days after the first suggestion made by the War Office in a
telegram to the Commander-in-Chief dated 10 May, that gas might be useful in
India. It was only on 11 June 1919 that Brigadier-General Charles Foulkes,
Director of Gas Services for the British Armies in France from 1917 to 1918 and
President of the Chemical Warfare Committee from 1918 to 1921, left for India
with gas samples whose utility he intended to test under Indian conditions. As
regards the casualties incurred in taking the fort of Spin Baidak and the fortified
hills to the north east of it, Montagu gave these as 18 killed and nineteen
wounded rather than the '40-5 0 casualties' referred to in Wilson's
memorandum. 24
 Just as the CIGS was being challenged on matters of detail, so
also were the War Office's details of American spending on chemical warfare
research. Rather than Wilson's earlier claim that the USA had already spent half
of the £26m allocated to chemical warfare research in late 1918, Churchill stated
that they 'appear actually to have spent at least a quarter of this sum since the
war' and that Lim would be available to the chemical warfare establishment in
America for 1921. Churchill's memorandum revealed that Wilson's original
figures had been challenged both before they were put to the Cabinet and
subsequently. Despite obviously having been thrown on to the defensive,
however, Churchill sought to regain ground for his Department's case by
pointing out that the American Chemical Warfare Services had 100 officers and
1,200 other ranks whereas Britain had as yet no such peace establishment -
though he hoped to gain authority for about 21 officers and 209 other ranks.
Further, whereas the Edgewood Arsenal in the USA had the capacity to produce
250 tons of gas daily, Britain could only produce 10 tons of gas daily.
24Cab24/105: CP12I 1, 16 April 1920
Cab24/110: CP1758, 7August 1920
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These papers, which were submitted to the Cabinet between April and
August 1920, reveal that there were serious differences of opinion about the
policy which the British Government should be advancing regarding chemical
warfare. Wilson, Beatty and Churchill saw the matter as being a crucial element
in Britain's armaments policy and of vital importance for the country's security.
They had no faith in the possibility of international agreement securing chemical
warfare disarmament: any such agreement, they held, would be fraught with
danger for Britain because it would be impossible to prevent Powers conducting
secret research. Fisher, however, believed that chemical warfare was an evil
which the British Government should commit itself to eradicating through
international discussion and negotiation. He was, therefore, the protagonist of
chemical weapons disarmament. While this debate was taking place within the
British Government, the newly established League was beginning to examine the
issue.
In May 1920, as the debate on chemical warfare was beginning within
the British Government, the League Council was meeting in Rome and, at its
meeting of 19 May 1920, it passed a resolution establishing the PAC. This new
body was constituted under Article IX of the Covenant to advise the Council on
military, naval and air questions generally and on disarmament in particular. It
was composed of Service delegates only and therefore had a vested interest in
the subjects under discussion.
Balfour, Britain's representative on the Council at the Rome meeting,
gained authority to submit a questionnaire regarding chemical weapons to the
PAC? The questionnaire asked the PAC whether gas was a fundamentally cruel
weapon, whether there should be a limitation of the quantity of gas which could
Cab4/12: CD memorandum 535-B, 21 November 1924
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be used in war, whether there were effective measures by which the use of gas
could be prevented and whether it was possible to prevent gas experiments and
manufacture. The PAC was also invited to give its opinion on international
regulations concerning chemical warfare. This last question the PAC considered
to be political and so beyond its competence as a purely technical commission.
Its response to the other questions, however, was presented to the Council on
22 October and discussed at the meeting of the Council on 25 October.
The PAC's conclusion was that gas was a cruel weapon but that it was
no more cruel than some other methods of waging war so long as it was used
only against combatants; in contrast the use of gas against non-combatants was
both cruel and unacceptable. In answer, however, to a question from Balfour
during the Council's discussion, the President of the PAC, Brigadier General
Clive, stated that gas weapons must be regarded as inhumane because they
harmed civilians and because their use could not be limited to a particular area.
The PAC also stated that it would be impossible to prevent the research and
manufacture of poisonous gases during peace time. In the light of this Balfour
stated that any international ban which the Council might impose on chemical
weapons would disadvantage honest nations because the unscrupulous Powers
would continue their chemical warfare preparations in secret. 27 He suggested,
therefore, that it might be better for the Council to ignore the question
altogether. This view, however, was rejected by the President of the Council,
Leon Bourgeois, because the Press knew that the PAC was considering the
question. Accordingly, the Council decided to condemn the use of poisonous
gas, to ask the PAC to consider what methods might be used to control the
production of gas weapons and to invite the Governments of member states to
27Balfour doubtless placed Britain in the category of'honest nation'!
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consider what penalties might be used against those Powers which used such
weapons.
Whereas 1920 saw considerable attention given to the question of
chemical warfare both within the British Government and the League, in 1921
the subject was pushed to one side. To all intents and purposes realism had won
within the Cabinet since chemical warfare preparation went ahead and efforts to
achieve an international ban were notable by their absence; and a lack of
imagination and energy appeared to have emerged within the League. Although
the First League Assembly in 1920 had authorized the Council to establish the
TMC, which would be a non-technical body whose task would be to submit
disarmament proposals, this held no meetings before July 1921. The
performance of the PAC was also disappointing to the extent that, at the Second
League Assembly in 1921, Lord Robert Cecil, speaking as a representative of
the South African Government, questioned whether the continuance of the PAC
served any useful purpose. The only initiative which was taken came through
the work of the Third Committee. The Third Committee's rapporteur was Cecil
and its report was presented to the Assembly on 27 September. 3° When the
report was discussed by the Assembly on 1 October, Cecil explained that the
Committee wanted the TMC to consider whether an appeal could be made to
scientists engaged in gas warfare research to ensure that their studies were
published. Here was a clear expression of one of the principles on which the
League was founded - the belief that public opinion and open debate could play
a beneficial role in international relations - and it was entirely in keeping with
FO371I5482: Procès-Verbal of the 10th Session of the Council of the League
of Nations, 20-28 October 1920
FO371/7062: verbatim record of the 6th Plenary Meeting of the Second
League Assembly, 8 September 1921
30F0371/7056: Report by the Third Committee of the Second League Assembly,
'Reduction of Armaments', 27 September 1921
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this idea that Cecil should think that if knowledge of chemical warfare research
were made public, this might deter nations from using gas. In pursuit of this
objective the TMC invited the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation to
consider the matter, but on 5 August 1922 this Committee reported that it was
unable to suggest any methods by which scientists throughout the world could
be induced to publish their findings relating to chemical warfare.3
Despite this setback, again at Cecil's suggestion, the TMC appointed a
special committee to consider collecting and publishing information about the
results of the manufacture and use of new methods of war. This would include
the growth in the destructive power of bombs as well as developments in poison,
chemical and bacteriological warfare. This special committee finally submitted its
report, written by Colonel Réquin, a French member of the TMC, directly to the
Council in autumn 1924. It contained the opinions of seven leading scientists
from Europe and North America but offered no new insights on chemical
warfare. It could only note that Powers possessing chemical weapons might
chose to use them against civilians as well as against troops; thus it was
important to recognize 'the vital danger to which a nation would expose itself if
it were lulled into security by over confidence in international treaties and
conventions'. 32 This conclusion to Réquin's report explicitly called into question
the value of international treaties in regulating chemical warfare, revealing the
enormous problems which this issue caused for those committed to
disarmament. As will be seen, however, it did not prevent the League making a
further attempt at chemical disarmament in 1925; and in any case, by the time
the Réquin report was written, developments within the League had been
overtaken by an American initiative at the Washington Conference in 192 1-22.
3 Adm1 16/2142: Report of the TMC, 7 September 1922
32W0188/144: Report of the TMC, 30 July 1924
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The principal purpose of the Washington Conference was to establish a
naval arms control argreement and it is on this aspect of the Conference that
most attention has been focused. Indeed, the most recent publication on the
Conference makes only one brief reference to the chemical warfare Resolution
which was adopted unanimously on 7 January 1922. This Resolution caused
some difficulties for Balfour, the head of the British delegation, and forced the
issue of chemical warfare back on to the Government's agenda. In general,
Britain's preparations for the Conference, although limited, were flexible; but on
the narrow issue of the regulation or limitation of methods of war, the Cabinet,
acting on a CII) recommendation, had laid down that all attempts to raise the
issue should be resisted.M Balfour hoped that the Conference would not consider
poisonous gas but on 6 January 1922 a member of the US delegation, ex-
Secretary of State Elihu Root, sprung upon the Conference a Resolution closely
modelled on Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles:
The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, and all
analogous liquids or material or devices, having been justly
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world, and a
prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a
majority of the civilized powers are parties;
Now to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as
a part of international law, binding alike the conscience and practice
33Goldstein, E. and Maurer, J. (eds.) The Washington Conference. 192 1-22 -
Naval Rivalry. East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (ilford: Frank
Cass, 1994)
Erik Goldstein, 'The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the
Washington Conference' in 	 pp.4-34; Cab23/27: Cabinet conclusions, 1
November 1921; Cab4/7: CII) memorandum 280-B, 24 October 1921
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of nations, the Signatory Powers declare their assent to such
prohibition, agree to be bound thereby between themselves, and
invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.35
In his communications with the Government on this Resolution, Balfour
provided an interesting distinction between the technical side and the political
side of the question. As far as he was concerned, the technical side was relatively
simple. It was impossible for an international treaty to prevent the building of
factories which would produce materials which had a legitimate peaceful
application yet which could be used also to produce poisonous gases. Likewise,
it was impossible to prevent the discovery of new gases. In this situation, no
country could make its safety dependent on other countries abiding by rules
which they had promised to observe. It followed, therefore, that whether the
Conference condemned gas or not, Britain would still have to take action to
ensure that it could defend itself against gas attack. On the basis of this analysis,
it would have been logical for Balfour to assert publicly that the Root chemical
warfare Resolution was meaningless but the Root Resolution had political
implications of which Balfour was only too aware. Simply because the
Resolution was a reaffirmation of the principle which had been expressed in the
Conventions concluded at the two Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907, in the
declaration by the Allied and Associated Powers on 25 March 1918 and in
Article 171 of the Versailles Treaty, to have rejected it in direct opposition to
American and Dominion opinion at Washington would have been politically
impossible:
35W033/1014: 2nd Report of the CWC, 1922
96
If [the] British delegation were to resist on some technical grounds a
policy which, on every other ground, they would like to see made
effective, their position will be hopeless. They will be charged with
appealing to sentiments of humanity when it suits them - as it does in
the case of submarines - and being indifferent or hostile when their
interests are not especially concerned. It may well be that [the]
French and Japanese will follow [the] American example and accept
[the] American scheme. In that case its rejection will justly be laid
wholly at our door and an intolerable situation will be created.
The tone of Balfou?s telegram indicates that his main concern was to prevent
Britain facing international criticism for taking an indifferent attitude to the
question of chemical warfare. The Washington Conference may have taken place
outside the framework of the League, but the League notion that diplomacy
should be subject to the scrutiny of public opinion appears to have been a
significant factor in Balfour's thinking. There was considerable hope within the
League that the Washington Conference would stimulate progress towards
chemical disarmament, and the TMC suspended its inquiry into the subject until
they had received details of the agreement concluded at Washington. 37 At the
same time, the chemical warfare establishment in Britain was right in stating that
the Root Resolution, which was translated into treaty form at Washington, did
not in itself change British armaments policy, as distinct from disarmament
policy.
CaM/7: CID memorandum 327-B, 7 January 1922
37F0371/83 17: memorandum by Wigram, 4 April 1922
WO33/1O28 : 3rd Report of the CWC, 1923
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Throughout 1921 the British Government had largely ignored the subject
of chemical warfare, allowing the CWC to continue its work under the
indeterminate policy so strongly criticized by the War Oflce in 1920. The
unanimous acceptance at the Washington Conference of the Root Resolution,
however, resulted in chemical warfare once again being considered by the British
Government. In the early months of 1922 the Treasury sought to persuade the
Government to reduce the scale of its chemical warfare research and to put
pressure on other Powers to do the same. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir
Robert Home, was especially concerned that the War Office wanted to expand
the staff at the Porton Experimental Station and to purchase land which had
been devastated by gas experiments. He was 'most reluctant to sanction
expenditure on a constantly developing service, without any limit of time, one
effect of which.. .must be to lead other Powers to continue experiments possibly
not purely defensive'. 39 Home was not advocating chemical disarmament; rather
he was motivated by domestic financial considerations and his principal concern
was to bring about a reduction in the cost of Britain's armaments policy. What
interested him most, therefore, was the outcome of the policy which he
supported, not the means by which it was achieved. The Assistant Chief of the
Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Sir Alfred Chatfield, a member of the British
delegation at the Washington Conference, had anticipated this reaction by the
Chancellor and had tried to forestall it by advising, at Washington, that the Root
Resolution should be amended in such a way as to make it clear that the
signatory Powers were permitted to carry out chemical warfare research. He had
been over-ruled, however, by Balfour. 4° Within the CII) the Treasury argument
was advanced by George Barstow, Controller of the Supply Services Branch.
39Cab24/137: CP4054, 22 June 1922
40Adml/8621/40: minute by Chatfield, 28 June 1922
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Barstow 'dominated the Treasury's views on service issues'4' but within the CU)
there was overwhelming opposition to him on this subject. Churchill, now
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Worthington-Evans, Secretary of State for
War, Lord Lee of Fareham, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lieutenant-General
Sir Philip Chetwode, Deputy CIGS, rejected the Treasury argument. In addition
to the familiar points in favour of defensive chemical research, it was pointed out
that neither Germany nor the Soviet Union was bound by the Washington
Convention. As these two Powers were not members of the League, it would be
practically impossible to ask them to stop their work on gas warfare. Even
though Germany was already bound by the Versailles Treaty, these arguments
were sufficient for the CU) to recommend that the War Office should be allowed
to continue their chemical research The Treasury gave way and on 22
September 1922 approved the continuation of research into defensive methods
which could 'include such offensive research and experiments as are necessary to
ensure that protective measures are adequate'.42
Following the defeat of the Treasury's brief attempt to prevent the
expansion of Britain's chemical warfare research, the issue disappeared from the
Government's agenda until early in 1924. Whereas previously the initiative had
been taken by those who, for differing reasons, were opposed to the
development of Britain's chemical warfare capacity, its re-emergence as an issue
of some importance was the result of a War Office attempt to persuade the new
Labour Administration to strengthen what it claimed to be the essentially
defensive nature of the country's policy. This began with a CU) paper written by
Lord Cavan, the CIGS, arguing that since the Washington Treaty, Britain had
41 Ferris, op.c, p.S
42Cab2/3: CU) minutes, 28 July 1922; Cab4/8: CU) memoranda 354-B, 19 July
1922, and 355-B, 17 July 1922; W033/1028: 3rd Annual Report of the CWC;
Cab24/137: CP4054, 22 June 1922
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fallen behind the major powers - Italy, Germany, Roumania, the Soviet Union,
the USA and France - in its capacity to fight gas wars. 43 Subsequent discussion
within the CU) revealed wide-ranging concern about the inadequacy of Britain's
capacity to defend both its troops and its civilians from gas attack. Lieutenant-
General Sir Noel Birch, Master-General of the Ordnance (MGO), who was
responsible for research and development in chemical warfare, complained at the
inadequacy of the sums allocated to him: in the current estimates Birch had
hoped to get £35,000 but he had been held to the sum of26,00O which had
been allocated for research in the previous year. Cavan pointed out that
shortages of money meant that the War Office had had to close gas chambers
which were essential if troops were to be properly trained. He also drew
attention to the fact that the Indian Government had abolished the post of Gas
Adviser to the Indian army and that all gas training establishments in India had
been closed. This meant that when reservists returned to Britain from India, they
had had no training in anti-gas dril1."
Cavan believed that the first step to remedying these problems, as the
War Office saw them, was to change what might be described as the chemical
warfare culture which prevailed within the British Govermnent. He wanted
authority to insert in the Field Service Regulations and other training manuals of
the British Army a statement based on that which appeared at the beginning of
the French Field Service Regulations. This stated that, in the event of war, the
French would seek an agreement between the combatants not to use gas as a
weapon of war but, if such agreement proved impossible to achieve, they would
consider themselves free 'to act according to circumstances'. Two of the most
influential non-Service members of the CII), Lord Haldane, Lord Chancellor and
43Cab411 1: CII) memorandum 483-B, 23 February 1924
MCab2/4: CII) minutes, 3 April 1924
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Chairman of the CID, and Warren Fisher, Secretary to the Treasury, were more
concerned, however, about the efficiency of gas masks within the Fighting
Services and their availability to the civilian population should the country be
threatened with a gas attack. There was general agreement within the CU) that
all these matters needed attention and recommendations to this effect were
made. In a telling observation, however, Fisher commented:
.that it was undesirable to call attention to an increase in expenditure
in the direction of expenments in gas warfare. He considered that the
form of presentation of such expenditure in the Estimates might be
adjusted so as not to call undue attention to the fact that we were
cariying out experiments in this direction.45
For all their conviction of the need for a change in policy in a realist direction,
leading decision-makers were no more willing to attempt to lead public opinion
than they had been in 1920 when Wilson and H.A.L. Fisher had made
diametrically opposed proposals to the Cabinet.
Following this meeting of the CU), Birch called a meeting of the CWC
on 15 May 1924 which was attended by representatives of the Army, Navy and
Air Force. The Committee was confident that the gas masks issued to the Armed
Forces were adequate to defend them against all the gases which other Powers
might use. It reported, however, that while anti-gas training in the Navy was
adequate, it was inadequate in the Army and the Air Force. This problem could
only be overcome if thorough anti-gas training measures were introduced and
this would necessitate the re-opening of gas chambers. The cost of putting these
45Ibid.
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measures into effect would be £110,000 in capital expenditure and £85,000 in
additional annual expenditure. As regards the provision of gas masks for the
civilian population, the Committee recommended that the Government establish
a factory for this purpose, capable of the necessary expansion should the need
arise. These recommendations were embodied in a memorandum by Birch and
approved by the CII) at its meeting of 28 July 1924. At this stage the War
Office's objective was to win authority to spend more money on research in
defensive methods of gas warfare. At the same time, however, a quite different
policy began to emerge.
In its 4th Annual Report covering the period to 31 March 1924, the
CWC expressed uncertainty as to whether existing policy allowed them to make
preparations for the large scale manufacture of gas and its rapid use against an
enemy acting in breach of the Washington Treaty. At this time Britain had no
stocks of gas shell or other offensive gas weapons, all these having been
disposed of following the Washington Treaty. 47 The Fighting Services thought
the situation intolerable and sought to reverse it, the first to take action being the
Air Force. At the CD meeting of 3 April 1924, Lord Thomson, Secretary of
State for Air in the Labour Government, sought and won approval for
experiments to be carried out using gas filled bombs and other apparatus for
dispersing gas from the air. Thomson argued that this was for defensive
purposes as such experiments would make it possible to assess the danger to the
civilian population which might arise from such an aft ack. Nevertheless, it was
but a short step from this position to advocacy of a more clearly offensive policy
and this occurred in December 1924, following the defeat of the Labour
Cab4/1 1: CD memorandum 497-B, 26 May1924; Cab2/4: CD minutes, 28
July 1924
47W033/1049: 4th Annual Report of the CWC, 1924
Cab2/4: CD minutes, 3 April 1924
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Government in the General Election, in the form of CID memoranda from
Worthington-Evans, the new Secretary of State for War, Beatty and the Air
Stafl' Worthington-Evans justified his request for the authority to study the
employment of offensive gas on the ground that this was necessary for the
development of effective defensive techniques. Beatty's concern was that under
the existing War Office proposals, Britain would only have the means to produce
gas in bulk if hostilities were to occur. The consequence, argued Beatty, would
be a period of from 2 to 3 months - during which Britain was building up its
stocks of gas - when the country would be vulnerable to a gas attack against
which it could not retaliate. Thus the First Sea Lord wanted policy amended so
that the country was committed to holding sufficient stocks of gas to retaliate
immediately to a gas attack. More forthrightly, the Air Staff argued that Britain's
Armed Services needed an offensive chemical warfare capacity because 'the most
practicable and only true deterrent against gas attack is the ability to carry out
counter-offensive measures'.49
The proposals of the Fighting Services to change policy were discussed
at the CU) meeting of 5 January 1925, which recommended that the French
formula regarding the use of gas be incorporated into the training manuals of the
Service Departments. The CU) also urged the Government to authorize the
study of offensive gas so that immediate retaliation could be carried out if
Britain faced a gas attack. This included the necessary preparation for the bulk
production of gas and the holding of stocks of gas to bridge the period between
an outbreak of hostilities and the beginning of general bulk production. 5° Thus,
when the Cabinet approved these recommendations on 18 February 1925, it
Cab4/l2: CU) memoranda 546-B, 12 December 1924, 548-B, 18 December
1924, and 552-B, 16 December 1924
50Cab2/4: CU) minutes, 5 January 1925
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appeared that the consideration of chemical warfare policy within the CII)
during the previous year had resulted in a clear change of emphasis: the CWC
had been authorized to base its policy on the development of a counter-offensive
capability.5' For all practical purposes it appeared that the flickering attempts at
chemical disarmament in 1920 and 1922 had been extinguished and the primacy
of Bntish armaments policy asserted. Further, there was an attempt on the part
of the CWC to encourage the development of an imperial chemical warfare
capacity which met with some success when Australia established a Chemical
Warfare Board.52
fronically, shortly after this change of emphasis in British chemical
armaments policy, there was a further attempt to bring about chemical warfare
disarmament through the League. Despite the fact that the report of the special
committee, established by the TMC to investigate the question of chemical
warfare, had concluded that international Conventions could not prevent powers
developing a gas warfare capacity, a Gas Protocol emerged from the Arms
Traffic Conference held in Geneva in the spring of 1925. This Conference was
attended by the representatives of forty-three countries, including Germany and
the USA, and its most important outcome was the Geneva (Gas) Protocol of 17
June 1925. By this Protocol the forty..one signatory States agreed to be bound
by the existing Conventions prohibiting the use of poison gas in warfare. They
also agreed to make every effort to persuade other countries to accept the
Protocol.53
51 Cab23/49: Cabinet conclusions, 18 February 1925
52W033/1078: 5th Annual Report of the CWC, 28 May 1925
53Protocol for the Prohibition of the use in war of Asphyxiating.. Poisonous or
other Gases. and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Geneva. June 17 1925,
Cmd. 3604 of 1925
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Although the CWC rightly observed that the Geneva (Gas) Protocol in
no way changed Britain's chemical warfare policy, it caused alarm within the
War Office.' In the CD, Worthington-Evans argued that Britain should not
ratify the Protocol because, if it were to do so, 'her actions in the future would
be tied to a certain extent, while any Power who refused ratification would be
free to develop chemical warfare to any extent desired'. He was wholly wrong in
making this point, as the Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, pointed out
because the Protocol was only binding on other nations who had signed the
Protocol and who abided by it; there was nothing in the Protocol to prevent
chemical warfare research and preparations to use gas weapons in retaliation
against such an attack. Nevertheless, Worthington-Evans had the support of
Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for Air, and William Bridgeman, First Lord of
the Admiralty, in advancing once again the argument that gas was a more
humane method of war than high explosives and Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of
State for India, claimed that it could be very useful against frontier tribesmen
who had become accustomed to bomber attacks and simply hid in caves at the
first sight of aeroplanes. These views did not prevail, though, against the opinion
of Chamberlain, who pointed out that repudiation of the Protocol meant going
back on the Washington Treaty and the other Conventions against the use of
poisonous gas. To have taken the path recommended by Worthington-Evans and
to have declared gas a legitimate weapon of war would have amounted to 'a
complete somersault', an acrobatic manoeuvre unacceptable to public opinion.
There was no need for the Government to incur the displeasure of public opinion
by rejecting a Protocol which did not interfere with its policy as regards chemical
warfare. The Armed Forces would be free to continue their gas research and the
WO33/1 128: 6th Annual Report of the CWC, 25 May 1926
105
Government would appear to be on the side of the angels in declaring that the
offensive use of gas in war was wrong, as wrong as it had been in April 1915
when the Germans initiated its use. But as regards ratification, there was no
question of Britain trying to provide a lead to the other nations, the CII)
recommending that Britain should adopt 'a neutral attitude' until other Powers
signified their intentions, and ratify only if other Powers did so.55
Britain finally ratified the Protocol on 9 April 1930, France, Germany,
Italy and the USSR having ratified between 1926 and 1929. Britain added two
reservations: the commitments only applied in respect of other States which had
ratified the Protocol and would cease Wan enemy failed to respect the Protocol.
In the USA opposition to the Protocol was so strong that Senator Wiffiam
Borah, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, withdrew it from
Senate consideration. The USA did not ratiIr the Protocol until 1975.
There can be no doubt that chemical warfare was a complex matter
which caused serious technical and moral problems. In the political context
prevailing after the Great War it is not surprising that these problems proved
impossible to resolve. The persistent failure of imagination on the part of British
Governments is, however, a depressing feature of the period from 1918 to 1925.
Although it was widely believed that chemical weapons would ultimately prove
to be enormously destructive, at no stage did decision-makers of the first rank
endeavour to initiate a programme of disarmament. Instead, the preferred modus
operandi of British Ministers was to deplore the existence of chemical weapons
while simultaneously declaring that it was impossible to do anything about them.
This might be an appropriate attitude for clergymen to strike in the face of sin
55Cab2/4: CU) minutes, 22 July 1926 and 11 November 1926
Spiers, E.M. Chemical Warfare (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986) pp.46-47
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but for the representatives of a major Power it constituted a failure of political
leadership.
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Chapter 5 - Naval Disarmament 1918-22
Amongst those most committed to disarmament in the years following
the Great War, the League of Nations was the focal point for such negotiations.
It is ironic, therefore, that the only agreement which achieved any limitation and
control of armaments in the period of this study should have taken place outside
the machinery of the League and as a result of an initiative by the USA, which
was not a League member. In this sense, and because it was concerned with
arms limitation and control amongst a small group of Powers only, the
Washington Conference 192 1-22 stands on the periphery of this study. At other
levels, however, the Conference stands at its centre. First, it sought to deal not
just with naval armaments but also with land and air armaments and with
chemical weapons, all of which were accorded considerable importance within
the League. Second, the Conference directly influenced two League sponsored
attempts at disarmament: the initiative to bring about an extension of the
principles which were held to underpin the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at
Washington and the scheme for land and air disarmament which was advanced
within the TMC by Viscount Esher. Both of these schemes receive detailed
attention in subsequent chapters. Third, consideration of naval disarmament - in
the limited sense of arms reductions - by British decision-makers in the years
before the Washington Conference and at the Conference itself expose the
considerable range of pressures which were operating on them in the post-war
period.
Britain emerged from the Great War and the peace-making process at
Paris with considerable advantages as far as its international position was
concerned but was also facing problems which were potentially very serious.
Germany's naval power had been destroyed and its military strength massively
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reduced so that the threat which it had posed prior to 1914 no longer had to be
taken into consideration. With the German Fleet interned and then scuttled, the
British Navy very nearly equalled all the other fleets in the world combined in
terms of tonnage and numbers of fighting ships. 1
 Britain was also able to
strengthen it Empire, through the mandates system, following the collapse of
German power. It could further be argued that the League Covenant was
beneficial to Britain in that it did not impose upon it any heavy commitments.
Yet the post-war world was also fraught with danger for Britain. Nationalism in
Ireland and India and fighting in Egypt, Iraq and Afghanistan threatened the
security of its Empire, there were serious economic problems at home which
could weaken the countiy's ability to provide for imperial defence and the naval
building programmes of the USA and Japan challenged Britain's naval
supremacy. The fact that these naval building programmes threatened the
possibility of confrontation between the USA and Japan in the Pacific was an
additional problem for British decision-makers: Britain remained in alliance with
Japan, had close links with the USA and extensive interests of its own in the Far
East. For these reasons it could not regard such developments with detachment.2
The Admiralty was especially and inevitably concerned about the growth
of US naval power. In early November 1918, before the Armistice had been
signed, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Eric Geddes, asserted that President
Wilson wishes to create a sea power other than ours' and that 'it is the aim and
purpose of the President to reduce comparatively the preponderance in sea-
power of the British Empire'. 3
 At this stage, however, there was also concern
'McDonald, J.K. Lloyd George and the search for a postwar naval policy 1919'
in Taylor, A.J.P. (ed.), Lloyd George: twelve essays (London: Hamish Hamilton,
1971) p.192
2Goldstein, E. 'The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Washington
Conference' in Goldstein and Maurer (eds.), opcj, pp.4-5
3Adml 16/1810: memorandum by Geddes, 7 November 1918
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within the Admiralty regarding the impact of Wilson's commitment, as expressed
in the fourth of his famous Fourteen Points of 8 Januaiy 1918, 'that national
armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety',
and the impact of the proposed League Covenant. 4 Memoranda produced in
December 1918 for the War Cabinet indicated a number of important points
about the Admiralty's attitude to disarmament.5
First, it opposed the idea of a disarmament process being initiated
through the proposed League of Nations because it believed that the inevitable
consequence would be to deprive Britain of its naval independence and 'to place
in the hands of some international tribunal the responsibility of determining what
naval force is required for the protection of the Empire'. 6 Second, it rejected that
which Madanaga has defined as the direct or technical approach to arms
reduction, 'a method whereby a direct solution is sought in the examination of
the technical means for reducing and limiting annaments at once'. 7 Instead it
argued for 'the indirect or political method whereby the solution of the problem
is sought in the creation of the political circumstances required for disarmament
to take place, so to say, of itself'. 8 The Director of the Plans Division, Captain
Cyril Fuller, set this out quite clearly in a note covering his department's
memorandum of 2 December 1918:
4laylor, A.J.P. English History 1914-45 (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1973) p.163
5Adml/8592/131A: timitation of armaments and standards of relative naval
strength', 2 December 1918; Admi 16/1 772: 'Memoranda by the Admiralty on
naval aspects of a League of Nations and limitation of armaments', 23 December
1918
6Adml 16/1772 : Memoranda by the Admiralty on naval aspects of a League of




What the nations of the world should strive for is not a reduction of
armaments by means of some artificial code, but the elimination of
competitive building. If this is attained, reduction of armaments will
come about of itself.9
At this stage, however, the Admiralty was not able to put forward any
suggestions as to how such competitive building might be eliminated. A
notable feature of this period was the unwillingness of the Admiralty to
advocate any schemes by which disarmament might have been achieved.
Third, it made it clear that if a reduction in the size of the various fleets
could be achieved, this reduction should be proportionate so that Britain's
relative superiority could be maintained. 10 It was also essential, it held, that
the Navy was sufficiently strong to fliffil its historic role of defending the
country's world-wide imperial interests."
In rejecting the direct approach to arms reduction, the Admiralty
considered the possible means by which a proportionate limitation upon
the strength of all navies might be achieved. It argued that this might be
done by value of overseas trade, tonnage of mercantile fleet, pre-war or
present strength or by length of coastline. It rejected fixing naval strength
on the basis of the tonnage of mercantile marine as this would limit a great
Power such as the USA to a relatively small fleet. The problem with basing
naval strength on pre-war or present strength was, according to the
9Adml/8592/131A: note by the Fuller, 5 December 1918 covering a Plans
Division memorandum, 'Limitation of armaments and standards of relative naval
strength', 2 December 1918
'°Adml/8592/13 1A: 'Limitation of armaments and standards of relative naval
strength', 2 December 1918
"Admll6/l 772: 'Memoranda by the Admiralty on naval aspects of a League of
Nations and limitation of armaments', 23 December 1918
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Admiralty, that it would perpetuate standards of naval strength after they
had become obsolete. This was, however, to be the basis of the Naval
Limitation Treaty concluded just two years later at Washington and, as
will be seen in the next chapter, it formed the basis of an initiative,
sponsored by the Admiralty, to extend the Washington principles to the
other naval Powers which possessed capital ships. The Admiralty also
argued that it was inappropriate to base naval strength on length of
coastline because the principal purpose of navies was to protect trade and
to maintain communications. Having rejected these three possible
methods, the Admiralty concluded that the best method for fixing naval
strength was the value of overseas trade, even though it envisaged that
fluctuations in the value of such trade might cause some difficulties.'2
The Admiralty then turned its attention to the method by which
naval armaments might be limited and once again it offered four
possibilities: size of naval estimates, number and type of ships, strength of
personnel and aggregate tonnage of ships. The first, a form of budgetary
limitation, was rejected as being too open to evasion given that there was
ample scope for dispute over which items of expenditure should be
included in the estimates. The second was also rejected on the ground that
it would be difficult to secure international agreement as to the definition
of types of ships. In view of the agreement achieved in 1922 at
Washington, based on capital ship size and tonnage, it could be concluded
that the Admiralty was being either disingenuous or unimaginative in so
arguing. The third method was considered inappropriate because there
were differing systems of service and these would make it very difficult to
'2Thid.
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establish a basis for assessing personnel strength. The Admiralty was not
prepared to accept aggregate tonnage of ships as a basis for detennining
naval size, on the ground that it would work to the disadvantage of a
nation such as Britain which required 'ships of good sea-keeping qualities
and great fuel capacity' but would not hinder a nation which wanted ships
only for aggressive purposes. 13 The Admiralty memorandum concluded,
therefore, that 'any attempt to set up arbitrary and artificial standards of
relative strength or to limit the natural expression of a nation's instinctive
and reasonable determination to judge how best to protect its own
interests is foredoomed to failure'.' 4 As Roskill has suggested, it is
impossible not to conclude that the Admiralty's arguments were
constructed so as to reach just such a result and to demonstrate that
Britain's naval needs were greater than those of any other Power.' 5 Such a
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that at much the same time the US
Navy Department argued that its needs were greater than those of any
other Power on the ground that the sea lanes which required its protection
were immensely long, circling both American continents, except for the
Arctic, and extending as far west as the Philippines. The US Navy
Department's map showing the sea lanes requiring the protection of the
British Navy was remarkable in that it circled the east coast of Africa
only. 16
 Independently of each other the Naval Staffs of the world's two
greatest sea Powers were deliberately constructing arguments to
demonstrate the over-riding requirements of their own Fleets.
'3lbid.
14Ibid.
' 5Roskill, S. Naval Policy Between the Wars. I: The Period of Anglo-American
Antagonism 1919-1929 (London: Collins, 1968), p.83
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Allied negotiations over the pre-Armistice agreement in Paris in
late October and early November 1918 and the subsequent peace
negotiations in Paris revealed that the British Government was, at that
time, in agreement with its Naval Staff regarding the maintenance of
Britain's sea supremacy. This was made vety clear by Lloyd George's
declaration that 'Great Britain would spend her last guinea to keep a navy
superior to that of the United States or any other power'.' 7 The problem
with such an approach was that by early 1919 it was clear that the USA,
already second in terms of naval strength to Britain, intended to build a
Fleet which would, at least, equal Britain's Navy. On 2 December 1918
Wilson, in his message to Congress before sailing for Paris, had sought
approval for a three year building programme which would provide sixteen
capital ships. These ships would be in addition to the nineteen capital ships
of the 1916 building programme: work on these had been delayed by the
Great War but, once the Armistice had been concluded, the US
Government prepared to continue with it. Although Wilson withdrew
support for the 1918 programme in May 1919 because it was not expected
that the newly elected Republican Congress would support it, the 1916
prgranime remained and this caused considerable unease within the British
Government.' 8
 Although the British Navy was clearly superior to the US
Navy in terms of ships in service, it was facing a serious challenge as
regards vessels currently under construction or authorized.'9
Historians of British naval arms limitation policy in the period
following the Great War have identified a number of pressures operating
' 7McDonald, op.cit.. p.191
'8lbid p.193
' 9Hall, C. BritainAmerica and Arms Control. 192 1-37 (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1987), p.13
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on the Lloyd George Administration. Financial stringency was clearly of
very considerable importance and the Prime Minister wanted the US
Government to reduce its naval expenditure so that Britain could do the
same. On 25 March 1919 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Walter Long,
complained to the Admiralty Board that their proposed estimates were too
high given the financial constraints operating on the Government. At the
same time Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War and Air, was
under similar pressure from Bonar Law to reduce the spending of his
Departments. 2° This emphasis on the importance of financial pressures
received support from McKercher who argued that Britain was
overstretched in an unstable world facing the threat of Bolshevism and the
French desire for revenge against Germany, in addition to the challenge of
US naval ambitions. 2' McKercher stated that British naval arms limitation
policy in the 1920s was almost exclusively shaped by domestic politics and
that there was direct public pressure to spend less on arms on the grounds
that there should be no more war. In this respect he attached much
importance to the role of the Union of Democratic Control and the League
of Nations Union. Such direct public pressure was reinforced by more
indirect pressure to reduce arms spending so that the Government would
be able to spend money on domestic social progranimes. It is, however,
difficult to accept McKercher's assessment of the impact of pacifist and
pacificist pressure groups in the period 19 18-25 as the official records
20McDonald, op.cit., p.193-94
21 McKercher, B.J.C. 'The Politics of Naval Arms Limitation in Britain in the
1920s' in Goldstein and Maurer (eds), op.cit., pp.35-59
9bid.
See Ceadel, M. Pacifism in Britain 19 14-1945: The Defining of a Faith
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) for a discussion of the distinction between
pacifism and pacificism
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show little evidence of decision-makers' susceptibilities to such opinion.
By contrast with McKercher's emphasis on domestic political
considerations, Fry stresses the importance of the relationship between
financial and political problems on the one hand and the significance of
imperial considerations on the other. 24
 He considers that Britain's
commitment to imperial security was of central significance and was never
in question.
Lloyd George's statement in late 1918 that Britain would do all
that it possibly could to maintain its naval supremacy accords with Fry's
assessment and suggests that the Prime Minister was prepared to pursue a
policy based on competition rather than agreement. The opening stages of
the peace negotiations at Paris confirmed this and have been referred to by
Roskill as 'the naval battle of Paris'. This revolved around the British
determination not to lose its dominant naval position and its even stronger
hostility to the US Government's definition of freedom of the seas. By
early April, however, this competition gave way to compromise. On 10
April, Cecil and House reached an agreement by which the USA agreed to
suspend its 1919 three year building programme and to consider
postponing construction of ships of the 1916 programme which had been
authorized but not laid down. In return Britain agreed to support the
establishment of the League of Nations and to accept a clause in the
Covenant affirming the validity of the Monroe Docti1ne. More
significantly, however, the two nations concurred that there should be an
agreement as to the relative strengths of their Navies, a decision which
24Fry, M.G.F. 'The Pacific Dominions and the Washington Conference, 192 1-22'




represented 'the first tentative commitment by the two major naval powers
to the idea of determining naval relationships by agreement rather than by
competitionY' The problematical issue of how such agreement was to be
achieved was not, however, considered.
As the British and US Governments moved towards cooperation in
naval matters, the Admiralty began to consider the implications of
membership of the League. Memoranda written in February 1919
identified the circumstances in which war might break out under the
League Covenant and stressed the importance of immediate action by
naval forces should hostilities occur. It was argued that without such
action it would be impossible 'to ensure the control of the sea
communications essential to the co-operation of the League'. The
difficulty envisaged was that this rapid naval action would have to be
taken, in the event of a sudden outbreak of war, before a Supreme War
Council could be formed. The Naval Staff considered, therefore, that some
form of special arrangement should be put in place so that the League
members would be able to take such rapid action. What is striking is that
the memorandum suggested that the naval security of the League should
be entrusted to the British Navy. In support of this it was argued that in
most cases which could be envisaged, this would occur automatically
given the power of Britain's Navy and its widespread imperial interests. It
was also recognized that such a development could work very much in
Britain's interests:
27Hall, op.cit., p.17
Adm1/8558/l29: 'Military Aspects of the League of Nations', 25 Februay 1919
and 'Naval Considerations', 25 February 1919
Adml/8558Il29: 'Naval Considerations', 25 February 1919
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It need hardly be said that so far as the British Empire itself is
concerned no better arrangement could be conceived. Its present
responsibility for its own security would, it is true, be somewhat
increased, but not necessarily in so far as battleship strength, the
principal cause of the cost of naval armaments, was concerned; this
cost would actually be reduced if other nations could be induced to
take a moderate view of their own naval requirements on the
understanding that in case of a League war their interests, other than
purely local defence, would be undertaken by Great Britain.30
These proposals went no further than the Chiefs of the Military and Air Sections
and it was hardly conceivable that they would have won support from the US
Government which might well have seen them as an attempt to maintain British
naval supremacy under the guise of support for the League. Nevertheless, the
tone of the memorandum is not hostile to the League and represents an
apparently serious attempt to consider bow Britain should respond to its
establishment.
The Plans Division, which in June 1919 remained under the direction of
Captain Fuller, went a stage further in terms of support for arms limitation
initiatives through the League and put forward a proposal which aimed at
disarmament, as understood in this thesis, even though it was also intended to
maintain Britain's naval supremacy. This proposal also represented a move away
from the Plans Division's previous support for the indirect approach to
disarmament and towards support for the direct method. The Plans Division
expected that the question of reduction of naval armaments would 'assume great
9bid.
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prominence in the near future' and held that, 'as an honest member of the
League, we must show a real desire to limit expenditure on naval armaments,
and must endeavour to produce a scheme, to which the agreement of the other
members of the League will be possible'. 3' It proposed that Britain should state
that it would immediately stop the construction of all warships over 8,000 tons
and reduce its Navy by 1935 to a specified number of ships of not more than
8,000 tons. Such action by Britain would, however, be dependent on other
nations agreeing to limit their ships to this maximum tonnage and to scrapping
larger warships by 1935.32 The Plans Division proposed limiting the size of
individual ships to 8,000 tons as this was the smallest size of ship which could
meet both the peace-time requirements of the British Navy and the demands of
the League, should a war occur. It explicitly stated that the British Navy could
not be limited to any specific number of warships relative to other Powers, as
such a limitation might prevent it from fulfilling its duties of imperial defence and
it recognized, therefore, that it could not ask other Powers to limit the number
of their vessels. The British Navy could, however, declare that it required a
specific number of ships not exceeding 8,000 tons and that it would not exceed
this number as long as other Powers kept the number of their warships within
reasonable limits. The British Navy would reserve the right to increase the size
of its Navy Wit considered that its supremacy was under challenge.33
The Plans Division proposal was far-sighted in that it argued, in effect,
that capital ships were redundant because in the Great War the main battle fleets
had neutralized each other. Heavy expenditure on this class of ship was,
therefore, unnecessary. Britain's principal requirement was for cruisers and the
31 Adml/8592/13 1A: Plans Division memorandum, teague of Nations.




memorandum proposed that Britain needed eighty eight ships of this type in
order to meet its peace-time requirements. The scheme was also clearly intended
to throw the US Government onto the defensive concerning its own capital ship
building programme. If, as the Plans Division anticipated, the USA did oppose
the proposal, it could be answered by showing that 'the attitude they adopt is the
veiy one which surrounded Germany with an atmosphere of suspicion, since
they can show no just cause for an enormous navy at present, with their
comparatively small trade and colonial possessions, and their independence of
oversea trade for their means of existence'. The Plans Division took the view,
however, that its proposal depended on all nations joining the League because it
could not operate if there was a nation outside the League free to build a large
battle fleet. It was also determined that Britain's naval security should be
maintained by ensuring that the country had the capacity to increase its power by
rapid shipbuilding:
In fact, the weaker the navies in existence, in peace-time under the
League, the quicker could we hope to increase our advantage in
war-time by new and more powerful construction, though we must
be careful to see that in the soothing atmosphere of the League of
Nations the right hand of our ship designers does not lose its
cunning.35
This concern with maintaining Britain's shipbuilding capability was a very





This Plans Division disarmament initiative was not well received by
the Naval Staff. Commodore Sinclair, Director of Naval Intelligence,
asserted that the USA would not accept a scheme which confirmed
Britain's naval supremacy and that the Japanese would also reject it as it
focused competition on the type of ship where they were weakest.
Captain Aylmer, Assistant Director of the Operations Division, also took
the view that the USA would oppose the proposal because it believed that
it would at some stage have to fight the Japanese and it had to be ready,
therefore, to fight in the Pacific without leaving its Atlantic coast
unprotected. Rear Admiral Fergusson, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff,
adopted a decidedly sceptical view of the League and asserted that 'The
old position of these Islands as regards Maritime defence is not really
changed by 6 months conversation in Paris - worthy as the intention may
be'. Both Aylmer and Fergusson considered that the best policy as far as
reduction of arms was concerned was to do nothing very much and wait to
see how matters developed:
It is believed that this matter will settle itself if left to itself No
country can afford to spend vast sums on unproductive material at
the present time, nor for many years to come.39
Despite the unenthusiastic response to the paper, it was resubmitted in a
slightly modified form by Fuller in late September 1919. This was because the
first meeting of the League would occur in November and at that meeting the
Adm1/8592/131A: minute by Sinclair, 9 July 1919
37Adml/85921131A: minute by Aylmer, 11 July 1919
Adm1/8592/13 IA: minute by Fergusson, 17 July 1919
39Adml/8592/131A: minute by Aylmer, 11 July 1919
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British naval representative would have to know whether he was to support the
existing policy and also be provided with arguments against the proposals of
other Powers which could not be expected to coincide with British naval
interests. The existing policy was set out in the paper entitled 'Admiralty Policy
in relation to the Peace Settlement', and held that 'any attempt to set up arbitrary
and artificial standards of relative strength or to limit the natural expression of a
nation's instinctive and reasonable determination to judge how best to protect its
own interests is foredoomed to failure'. 40 The Plans Division did not like this
policy because 'This non possumus attitude towards this question does not give
a basis from which to meet the arguments of Foreign Powers, nor does it discuss
possible means of retaining our supremacy with the least expenditure'. 4' It was
for this reason that the Plans Division re-submitted the paper which it had
proposed in June, despite the unfavourable response which it had then received.
The paper made no more progress in its second incarnation than it had in its
first.
As the Plans Division put forward its scheme for limiting naval arms, a
different and more limited approach to the problem was initiated by the British
Government. On 16 July 1919 the Cabinet Secretary, Hankey, went with Lloyd
George to Criccieth for a conference on economic policy and, during the course
of this meeting, he wrote a paper entitled 'Towards a National Policy. July 1919'.
In the section which dealt with foreign and defence policy, Hankey argued that
US financial, economic, maritime and military power was such that Britain could
not successfully wage war against it. Hankey, however, considered such a war to
be extremely improbable and argued, therefore, that there was no need for
Britain to base either its military or naval spending on such a war. In support of
40Adml/8592/131A: memorandum by Domville, 24 September 1919
41Ibid.
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this view he pointed out that before the Great War, Britain's military and defence
spending had been determined without reference to the USA. He did,
nevertheless, argue that Britain should maintain naval equality with the USA so
that the country could not be pressurized by an anti-British President. This was a
very similar point to the one which Long had made earlier in the month when
arguing in favour of the Admiralty's estimate of over £170m for 1919-20. The
First Lord of the Admiralty took the view that there were important diplomatic,
deterrent and prestige benefits to be gained from Britain having the world's
largest Fleet. Instead of taking account of the US Navy, Hankey suggested that
Britain might base its naval construction programme on a two-Power standard,
excluding the USA. This would have meant Britain maintaining a Fleet equal to
those of France and Japan. As McDonald has pointed out, this would not have
been likely to improve relations with either Japan or France and it would not
have benefited Anglo-US relations if the outcome were a British Fleet which
equalled or exceeded that of the US. Hankey's thoughts were not focused solely
on the relationship between British expenditure on the Navy and Anglo-US
naval competition. He recognized that there would have to be not only a naval
reduction agreement between Britain and the USA but also international naval
disarmament.42
At this stage the British Government made no moves to initiate naval
disarmament but, by the end of July 1919, it had decided that it should seek
special negotiations with the US Government in order to resolve three key
problems: Ireland, naval construction and the League. The Government hoped
that Viscount Grey of Fallodon, the former Foreign Secretary, would be
prepared to accept an invitation to be Ambassador to the USA in succession to
42McDonaId, op.cit., p.200
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Lord Reading. In a meeting with Haldane, the former Liberal Lord Chancellor,
and Colonel House, Woodrow Wilson's special emissary, Grey made it clear
that, although he was not prepared to become Ambassador, he would undertake
a special mission to Washington if the British Government agreed with him as to
how these problems werre to be tackled. As far as the naval question was
concerned, Grey took a position which was very similar to Hankey's in that he
held that Britain should make it clear to Wilson's administration that it would not
engage in naval construction against the USA but that it would build against any
European Power which threatened its security. There were, however, clear
difficulties with the approach advocated by Grey and Hankey:
The problem with both was that while the United States and Great
Britain could each piously pronounce that her naval standard did not
include the other, the two fleets were bound to be compared and to
appear as rivals. Grey's scheme required that each nation decide that
it was a matter of no moment if the other possessed a larger navy.
There was no reason to expect either nation to adopt this attitude.43
It would also be possible for Britain to engage in competition with the USA
under the pretext of using the other two Powers as the basis for comparison.
Following his meeting with Grey and Haldane, House wrote to Wilson,
expressing the view that the British Government would be less keen to send
Grey to Washington once it had read his memorandum on naval policy. In this,
however, House was wrong for Lloyd George was very keen for Grey to go,
even when he knew his views on naval policy, and Grey was willing to go as
p.203
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long as he had instructions which satisfied his understanding of what was
required. Grey wanted the Government to issue a public statement declaring that
Britain would take no account of US naval estimates when framing its own
estimates. Grey was confident that the result of such a policy would be to bring
an end to US plans to build a large Navy. He took the view that if Britain failed
to adopt this policy the outcome would be naval competition with the USA
which Britain would certainly lose. Grey did, however, accept Lloyd George's
view that this policy would have to be met with a reciprocal policy by the USA.
Accordingly, on 13 August, Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the
Commons, announced in the House that Grey would go on a special mission to
Washington, pending the appointment of a permanent Ambassador early in
192O.
The financial pressures confionting the Government at this time and the
Admiralty's determination to resist cuts in naval spending were evident in the
Cabinet meeting of 5 August 1919. It was at this meeting that Lloyd George
declared that he wanted the Government to be able to determine defence policy
over a given period of time and he suggested that five or ten years might be an
appropriate period. The Cabinet decided, therefore, that the Admiralty, India
Office and War Office should provide information concerning defence over these
two periods for consideration by the Cabinet. The Admiralty was also asked to
provide information on the existing and likely future strength of the US Navy.45
On 8 August the Admiralty sent Lloyd George information regarding the
size of the US Fleet and four days later it produced a memorandum dealing with
post-war naval policy. In this memorandum, which was framed around four




the post-war period. First, although it did not consider that the USA intended to
become an aggressive Power, it was concerned that a combination of cuts
affecting Britain's capital ship Fleet and completion of the USA's 1916 capital
ship construction programme of 1916 would place Britain 'in a position of
manifest inferiority" At this time no one in the British Government could have
doubted the Admiralty's determination to do all that it could to ensure that
Britain remained the world's principal naval Power. Yet the Admiralty also
wanted the Government to decide its attitude to arms reduction and the League.
Long's comments on the possible inter-relationship of these two issues were
important for they indicated possible Admiralty support for disarmament and
suggested that the Plans Division proposals of June 1919 had not fallen on
entirely deaf ears:
Unless we are to throw away the principle of mutual reduction of
armaments, I suggest that we should not take any serious action
independently of the procedure under the Covenant, but that
whatever decision be arrived at, the procedure should be to propose
to all the Allied Powers a reduction under the provisions of Article 8
of the Covenant. It might be advisable to sound the U.S.A.
beforehand as to whether they will take joint initial action with us in
putting forward such proposals through the Council of the League.
We shall then know whether the object of the U.S.A. in projecting
this big Fleet (as some people think) [is] merely to have a powerful
weapon with which to obtain a general reduction of Armaments, or
Adml16/1774: memorandum by Long, Post-War Naval Policy', 12 August
1919
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whether it is really their intention to force us to the alternative of
either competing with or accepting numerical inferiority to them.47
Long took the view that the extent to which the League was successfiul would
also influence the decision as to whether the country's defence policy was to be
decided over five or ten years. His concern was that the Admiralty only had
information regarding the naval construction plans of the USA and Japan
extending over a five year period so that, in the situation which pertained in
1919, it was impossible to say what the strength of these two Powers would be
in 1929. Long recognized, however, that it would be possible to make more
effective reductions over a period often years. This was an additional reason, in
Long's opinion, for attaching importance to the work of the League as early
progress there in the field of international arms reduction might enable the
Government to determine its defence spending plans over the longer of the two
periods suggested by Lloyd George. Despite this willingness to consider
disarmament initiatives through the League, Long also made clear in his
memorandum that the Admiralty favoured a resumption of maintaining a naval
presence in foreign waters for prestige purposes. This does not, nevertheless,
detract from the tone of the memorandum which was generally positive in its
attitude to arms reduction, as long as there was movement in the same direction
by the USA.
Prior to the Cabinet receiving this Admiralty memorandum, a meeting of
the Cabinet Finance Committee had already drawn up the essential features of a
new naval policy. Attending this meeting were Lloyd George, Bonar Law,




was suggested that the Navy should stop all new construction and maintain a
Fleet which was no larger than the pre-war standard but it was recognized that
this would be difficult to maintain lithe USA kept in commission a larger Fleet
than that possessed by Britain. In order to deal with such a problem it was
suggested, therefore, that Britain should seek a naval arms reduction agreement
with the USA.. As McDonald has pointed out, this was in keeping with the
promises which had already been made to rey. The Finance Committee also
proposed that the naval estimates for 1920-21 should be £60m and that the
estimates should be based on the assumption that there would be no great war
within the next ten years and that the principal responsibility of the defence
forces was to keep order in Britain and all other non-self-governing British
territories.50
When the Cabinet met on 15 August it considered no business other than
the estimates for the Fighting Services and Longs memorandum of three days
previous was not considered. The Cabinet minutes do, of course, record the
decisions which were taken but they provide no indication of the discussions
which took place. As far as the Navy was concerned, these decisions were
significant but they were not as restrictive as they might have been had the
Cabinet confirmed all of the suggestions made at the Finance Committee
meeting of 11 August. The famous Ten Year Rule was laid down, the Admiralty
was instructed to undertake no new construction and it was instructed to frame
new estimates not exceeding £60m. 5' It was not, however, required to operate
on the basis that its principal responsibility was to keep order in the United
Kingdom and those parts of the Empire which were not se1fgoverning. If this
49McDonald,	 p.210
50Ibi . , p.2 ii
51 Ibid.. pp.212-13
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restriction had been imposed 'it would have left Long with very little except for
his flag-showing light cruisers'.52
The Cabinet followed up its establishment of the 15 August principles by
agreeing, five days later, the tenns of a fonnal letter of instruction to be given to
Grey regarding his mission to Washington. This stated that the naval estimates
for 1920-21 would not take account of the USA as a potential enemy and that,
although a precise figure for the naval estimates for that year could not yet be
provided, it was envisaged that the number of capital ships in full commission
would be below the pre-war figure and that no new naval construction would be
undertaken. It was also stated that the new estimates would be explained in full
to the House of Commons in the autumn and that reciprocity was anticipated
from the US Government. 53 It was clear, therefore, that when Grey left for
Washington in September 1919, British naval policy was to be based on the
agreement which he had reached with Lloyd George earlier in the year. It is for
this reason that McDonald took a very different view of the genesis of the Ten
Year Rule from Roskill. Roskill argued that Beatty had a very strong influence
on Long's memorandum of 12 August which itself powerfully affected
Government policy:
It seems certain that it was Long's memorandum of 12th August
1919 which caused the government to issue the notorious 'Ten Year
Rule', since three days later the Cabinet directed that the service




year 'on the assumption that the British Empire would not be
engaged in any great war during the next ten years'.TM
The Admiralty's reaction to the Ten Year Rule and to the imposition of
the £60m maximum for the 1920-2 1 estimates was to warn the Cabinet in late
October that Government policy meant that Britain would have to share
worldwide naval supremacy with the USA and that, if the USA completed its
1916 building programme and Britain undertook no new construction, the USA
would be the world's leading naval Power by 1923. Accordingly, the Admiralty
Board recommended that Britain should either seek agreement with the USA on
the basis of naval parity or embark on a new construction programme. 55 In
Roskill's view it was this assessment of Britain's naval position which was the
crucial factor in the Government's decision to ask Grey to undertake the special
mission to Washington. McDonald, by contrast, has shown that the principal
ideas associated with the Cabinet decisions of 15 August emerged from the
Finance Committee meeting which took place four days earlier and before
Long's memorandum of 12 August. The relationship between the 15 August
principles and the Grey mission was the reverse, therefore, of that suggested by
Roskill:
.it seems clear that Lord Grey's special mission to the United States
in the autumn of 1919 was not a result, as often assumed, but rather
an important and immediate cause of the government's new naval






Grey arrived in Washington on 27 September 1919 but his mission had
already been rendered abortive by the thrombosis which had struck Wilson on
the previous day and on 5 October, Grey wrote to Lloyd George explaining that
this was the situation. In late November, however, the British Government
began to receive reports which indicated that the USA was beginning to reduce
its Navy. As a result, Lloyd George, with Long's approval, sent a telegram to
Grey on 25 November asking him to provide as much information as possible
about US naval policy. The Prime Minister explained that this was required to
enable the Government to produce the naval estimates for 1920-2!. Grey
responded on 26 November that his enquiries indicated that the USA was
reducing its Fleet. Its existing strength in officers and men was 107,400 rather
than its proposed establishment of 150,000 and this personnel shortage meant
that most US ships had reduced crews. In the light of this Grey advised Lloyd
George to hold down the naval estimates as an example to the USA. Grey feared
that, if Britain tried to arrive at a naval agreement with the USA, it would have
the opposite effect and provoke renewed pressure for a large Fleet. McDonald
considered that Grey's approach was correct for the uncertain political situation
in the USA, where a Democratic Administration, deprived of Presidential
leadership, was in conflict with a Republican Congress, which meant that any
Anglo-US naval agreement was impossible.
There were, however, clear grounds for criticizing such an approach to
the USA. The Foreign Secretary, Curzon, was evidently dissatisfied with Grey's
advice for it represented a change from the policy which had been agreed before
the latter's departure for Washington:
58Thi, pp.219-221
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It was a part of Lord Grey's instructions that if we reduced, the
Americans should be asked & should promise to do the same. He
took our pledge and now we are asked to forego theirs.59
There was also the danger that such a policy would expose the British
Government to the criticism that it was surrendering naval supremacy to the
USA. The Admiralty had already thrown down a challenge to the Government in
its memorandum of 23 October by stating that the decision to authorize no
further construction inevitably meant US superiority in the very near future and
urging that this be explained both to Parliament and to the Empire. The
Admiralty clearly wanted the Government to shy away from this challenge and in
this respect it emerged victorious for Lloyd George never provided Parliament
with a full explanation of the new naval policy. 60 McDonald has argued that, in
the face of his failure to balance cuts in the British naval estimates with
corresponding reductions in the USA's naval plans, Lloyd George sought to
pursue a policy which involved neither significant Cuts in naval expenditure and a
recognition that the US Fleet would soon establish supremacy nor a commitment
to heavy expenditure to ensure that Britain remained the world's foremost naval
Power. As a result:
He therefore attempted, for almost two years, to support both these
contradictory policies simultaneously, or alternatively. Thus the
reassessment of British naval policy in the second half of 1919




incompatible policies. The result was, on the one hand, a gradual and
reluctant adoption - or admission - of a naval one power standard for
capital ship equality with the United States; and, on the other hand, a
general continuation of the restrictions on naval planning and
expenditure - such as the ten year rule - imposed on the admiralty at
the 15 August cabinet meeting.6'
Yet, as Ferris has shown, the move towards a one-Power naval standard
represented a victory for the Admiralty over the apparent constraints of the
principles governing the Navy laid down in August 1919.62 In a memorandum of
13 Februaiy 1920, Long asked the Cabinet to authorize estimates of £84m for
192021 . 63
 These were justified, he asserted on the grounds of maintaining the
Fleet at the minimum strength required for imperial security, the liquidation of
the terminal expenses of the Great War and the abnormal expenditure arising out
of the temporary obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. Long
held that it would not be possible for the Government to present the estimates
without a clear statement of naval policy and he reminded the Cabinet of the
Admiralty's views as set out in the memorandum of 24 October. Long was
concerned that estimates introduced in the USA since then suggested a Ilirther
increase of two battleships and one battle cruiser over the 1916 programme. In
this situation Long held that Britain had either to negotiate a naval arms
limitation agreement with the USA based on equality, when such an opportunity
presented itseli or to begin a construction programme of its own. Any other
course of action would, he considered, see Britain fall into second place as a
61 Ibid., p.221
62Fems, op cit.. pp.60-63
63Adm116/1774 memorandum, Navy Estimates and Naval Policy', 13 February
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naval Power. Long wanted a naval entente with the USA which would make it
possible for the two Powers to move in 'the direction of reducing that ample
margin of naval strength which we alike possess over all other navies.M If this
could not be achieved, however, then Britain would have to act in order to
maintain its naval supremacy and that meant stating that 'a one-power standard
against the strongest naval power is the minimum standard compatible with our
vast sea requirements' and basing the country's construction programme on
this.65
 Despite the fact that he was contemplating the possibility of a naval arms
race between Britain and the USA, Long held that the expenditure which the
Admiralty was proposing constituted the moderate naval estimates for which
Grey had called.
In March 1920 Long gained Cabinet approval for the naval estimates and
he submitted them to Parliament, reallirming the principle of the one-Power
standard and emphasising that no money was being sought for new
construction. This statement was not formally authorized by the Cabinet but
Ferris has suggested that it had the Prime Minister's approval because Lloyd
George probably regarded Long's declaration as a clear but not a provocative
warning to America which did not commit Britain to specific actions'. Although
this might be regarded as a shrewd ploy by Lloyd George, it seriously
undermined the policy which the Cabinet had approved in the previous year:
In fact, Long had reversed the August 1919 decision about naval





standard and the Admiralty could defend virtually any proposals by
using this vague concept.67
In the same month as Parliament approved the one-Power standard and,
in so doing, appeared to clarify British naval policy, the US Senate refused to
pass the Versailles Treaty by a two-thirds majority and thereby removed the
possibility of any Anglo-American initiative to achieve naval disarmament
through the League. The combination of Wilson's incapacity and the Senate's
decision to detach itself from the great international initiative to which he
attached such importance meant that there was little prospect of naval arms
limitation in the early 1920s.
By late 1920 the Admiralty was pressing the view that Britain needed a
programme of naval construction Wit were to maintain the one-Power standard
which Long had publicly declared on 17 March. In a memorandum for the
Cabinet, the First Lord argued in November 1920 that the USA had neither
curtailed their 1916 construction programme nor revealed any desire to seek a
naval arms limitation agreement with Britain. As a result, the point had been
reached where Britain either had to lay down new ships or recognize that within
three years its Navy would be inferior to that of the USA. Long reiterated that
the Admiralty's concern was not that Britain would be at a disadvantage in the
event of a war with the USA - he did not consider such a conflict possible - but
that the country's prestige demanded that equality be maintained. In order to
reinforce this argument Long asserted that it was the very impossibility of war
with the USA which was 'the sole justification for admitting "approximate
67Ferris, op.cit., pp.62
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equality" between us [Britain and the USA] as consistent with the security of the
Empire': the implication was that had it been any other Power, such as Japan,
the Admiralty would have been seeking more than 'approximate equality'. The
one-Power standard would be maintained, the Admiralty argued, if the
Government authorized the beginning of a building programme which would
involve laying down four replacement capital ships in 192 1-22 and a further four
in 1922-23. The full programme would extend over five financial years, involve
expenditure totalling £83.8m and ensure equality by 1925, as long as there was
no further construction by the USA or Japan.7°
The Government was now confronting the serious problem which the
failure of Grey's mission had created. It had no desire for a naval arms race but,
in the absence of Presidential leadership in the USA, it was difficult to see how
this could be avoided. The situation was exacerbated by US opposition to
Japanese aims in the Western Pacific and on the Asiatic mainland. It was hardly
surprising, then, that the Cabinet had no desire to antagonize the Washington
Administration by acceding to the Admiralty's demands. Instead it asked the CU)
to consider the question of British naval strength, a move which resulted in the
establishment of the Naval Shipbuilding Sub-Committee of the CII) under the
chairmanship of Bonar Law. 7' The Admiralty, however, continued to pressurize
the Government. In mid-December, Beatty expressed his strong concern at the
reduced shipbuilding capacity in Britain and asserted that, if naval construction
were delayed until 1923-24, it could not be guaranteed that there would be
sufficient facilities for four ships to be laid down in one year. This was because





were not being maintained. 72 At the end of January 1921, Beatty received strong
support from Long in memoranda to the CID and to the Cabinet. 73 The First
Lord's attitude echoed the intransigence which Lloyd George had shown in the
first months after the Armistice:
I hope that this question may definitely be decided without any
further delay, as it is of the utmost importance that our policy should
be known; that those who provide the necessary material should at
once get to worlç and that the world should know that, whatever
our economies may have to be, we are determined not to surrender
the position at sea which we have held for so long, and from which
the world, quite as much as ourselves, has derived such immense
benefit.74
The views of Long and Beatty indicate that the political and Service
chiefs of the Navy were determined to do all they could to use the one-Power
standard as a weapon against the Cabinet's reluctance to allocate funds to naval
construction. There were no signs that either of these men was prepared to put
forward initiatives which might have made possible the achievement of naval
arms limitation. Yet, in a paper written in August 1920, when the international
context was no more favourable than it was in the period from November 1920
to January 1921, the Plans Division once again revealed a willingness to move
72Adml 16/1775: memorandum by Beatty, 'Naval Construction', 14 December
1920
73Adml 16/1775: memorandum by Long, 28 January 1921; Cab24/1 19: CP2518,
31 January 1921.
74Adml 16/1775: memorandum by Long to the C, 28 January 1921
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towards a disarmament policy. 75
 The Director of the Plans Division was now
Captain Barry Domville who had been appointed in May 1920, having been
Full&s deputy since August 1919. The Plans Division held that, as a member of
the League, the three principal questions affecting British naval policy were arms
limitation, the private manufacture of arms and the interchange of information
amongst League members regarding arms. Of these it considered arms limitation
to be the most important but it recognized the difficulties facing the British
Government. The USA was not then a member of the League and it would not
be clear whether it was to become a member until after the Presidential and
Congressional elections of 1920. The position of the USA was, of course,
crucial as it was the only Power with sufficient wealth to build a Fleet which
could rival and surpass that of Britain in the near future. Until the attitude of the
USA to Article VIII of the Covenant of the League was defined clearly,
therefore, 'Great Britain must take the greatest care not to bind herself in any
way whatever by any sort of agreement which can hamper her naval
development'. The Plans Division held, however, that Britain was the principal
Power to have signed the Covenant and, therefore, 'she must shew [sic] her faith
in the League by being prepared with some policy in connection with its naval
clauses'. 76
 The policy which was advanced was clearly intended to preserve
Britain's relative naval supremacy but, had it or any similar policy been adopted,
it would have marked the adoption of a more positive approach to the issue of
naval disarmament.
The purpose of the paper was to work out a ratio of the naval needs of
the five principal naval Powers - Britain, the USA, France, Italy and Japan - and
75Adml/8592/13 IA: memorandum by the Plans Division, 'Admiralty Policy and
the League of Nations', 11 August 1920
76Ibid.
138
to adopt this as the scale of naval strength which none of the Powers should
exceed. The paper offered seven criteria by which the all-important ratio was to
be determined. These were the length of coastline, the transportation of man-
power to the mother-country, the man-power for an expeditionary force, the
extent of overseas trade, the size of the mercantile marine, national wealth
insurance and national prestige. The Power which had the highest score for each
of these was allocated 10 points and then the other Powers were given a figure
as a ratio of 10. Once this had been done it was possible to add up each Power's
total ration. The Power with the highest total was then given 10 and the total of
the other Powers was worked out as a ratio of 10. The result of the Plans
Division's calculations was that 10 was given to Britain, 6.1 to the USA, 2.7 to
France, 1.4 to Italy and 2.04 to Japan."
Having established a ratio of the naval requirements of the various
States, the paper then sought to determine a standard by which the naval
strength of a Power could be measured. It offered the same four possibilities
which had been identified in the Admiralty's paper of 23 December 1918,
namely, the size of the naval estimates, the number and type of ships, the
strength of personnel and the aggregate tonnage of the navy. It differed from the
1918 paper, however, in that, while it rejected the first three, it held that the
aggregate tonnage of the navy might be employed without damaging Britain's
interests. The advantage of measuring naval strength by aggregate tonnage was
that it was difficult to disguise the approximate tonnage of ships. It was still
possible, however, that this might be an unsatisfactory standard to employ
because, once an aggregate tonnage limit had been established, 'we might find
ourselves forced by one nation's building programme into the construction of
77Ibid.
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capital ships which would take up nearly our allowance of tonnage, while we
urgently needed cruisers to protect our trade routes from another power building
cruisers'. 78 The Plans Division held, however, that it would be possible to
overcome this problem by limiting the size of individual ships. This meant, of
course, that the maximum size of a warship would have to be determined. It was
argued that warships would have to be sufficiently large and fast to deal with
modern liners and this criterion indicated that a large cruiser was required: a
cruiser displacing no less than 10,000 tons was thought necessary. Once this size
had been decided upon, the aggregate tonnage standard had to be determined.
The Plans Division decided that Britain needed 100 cruisers because this was the
number which it had on trade duties in December 1914 when German cruisers
were threatening the country's trade routes. On the assumption, therefore, that
10,000 ton ships were the standard, Britain required a total naval tonnage of im
tons. When this was applied to the ratio previously decided, it meant that the
USA would be allowed 610,000 tons, France 270,000 tons, Italy 140,000 tons
and Japan 204,000 tons.79
Although the Admiralty papers contain no Staff criticisms of these
detailed and rather complex proposals, it is difilcult to imagine that they would
have been received any more favourably than those put forward by the Plans
Division in June 1919. The CU) Naval Shipbuilding Sub-Committee, under
Law's chairmanship, did indicate division amongst naval specialists regarding the
future value of the capital ship. In their evidence to the Sub-Committee, Rear-
Admirals Charles de Bartolomé, a former 3rd Sea Lord, Sidney Stewart Hall,
Commodore of the Submarine Service from 1915 to 1918 and Herbert William




serious doubts regarding the continued dominance of that type of ship'. 8° Long,
Churchill and Beatty, however, took the view that Britain would have to lay
down new capital ships without delay if the one-Power standard were to be
maintained and if the country were to have a strong hand in future naval arms
limitation negotiations with the USA. 8' Such powerful advocates of the
importance of the capital ship would never have accepted a scheme which
envisaged its obsolescence. Further, these proposals clearly did not accord with
the ambitions of the USA, Japan or Italy. The USA sought parity with Britain
but the Plans Division scheme ensured a marked British superiority in cruiser
strength. Japan would never have accepted disarmament proposals which not
only abolished the capital ship, to which it attached such importance, but also
gave France, as well as Britain and the USA, a greater aggregate tonnage. While
Italy's preparations for the Washington Conference indicated that it was
prepared to accept a Fleet limited in size to 80% of that of the French Navy, it
was scarcely conceivable that it would agree to an aggregate tonnage only
5 1.85% of that of the French Navy. Only the French might have been expected
to look favourably on these disarmament proposals. This was because they had,
as early as 1920, attached much greater importance to cruisers than to
battleships and the tonnage allocated to them would have given them sufficient
superiority over the Italians to maintain control of the Mediterranean. It is
highly doubtful, however, that they would have accepted such a low ratio
compared with that of Britain.
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The Plans Division's proposals were a very obvious attempt to maintain
Britain's naval supremacy by aiming at the ultimate removal of the capital ship
and basing naval strength on the cruiser, the very type of ship to which it
attached so much importance for the task of trade defence. Despite this and the
other criticisms which might be levelled against the proposals, they were also
intended to initiate a disarmament process which would enable Britain to avoid
having to choose between an expensive naval construction programme or the
surrender of its naval supremacy. It was the only initiative of this type to emerge
from official sources and its failure to progress beyond the Plans Division left
Britain with no policy other than defence of the one-Power standard at a time
when financial constraints were bearing down heavily on the Government. As a
result, conflict between the Admiralty and the Treasury was inevitable over the
192 1-22 estimates.
The Admiralty's original sketch estimates for 192 1-22 totalled £98m but
they had been reduced to £85.5m by December 1920 when they were submitted
to the Cabinet. This lower figure was not acceptable to the Cabinet Finance
Committee which, early in 1921, directed the Admiralty to prepare new sketch
estimates which did not exceed £60m. The Admiralty, however, was clearly
determined to resist the Treasury and, on 25 January 1921, re-submitted sketch
estimates totalling £85m plus £4m for new construction. TM On 18 February Long
resigned due to ill health and his place as First Lord was taken by Viscount Lee
of Fareham. It appears that Lloyd George wanted Lee to resist Admiralty
influence and reduce naval expenditure. 85 Lee did submit a reduced estimate of
TMRoskill, op.cit., p.226; Admi 16/1 775: memorandum by Lee, 'Navy Estimates,
1921-22', 28 February 1921
85Ferris, op.cit., p.82
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£82,879,000, including new construction, and his subsequent involvement in the
Washington Conference was to undermine his standing with senior naval
officers. He did, however, argue strongly in defence of the Admiralty's position,
asserting that the Government had provided no basis for its policy other than the
one-Power standard. Despite the gap between the reduced estimate and the
Cabinet Finance Committee's figure of £60m, early in March 1921 the
Chancellor agreed to a total ofjust under £80m plus £2.5m for the replacement
of obsolete ships. Although there was general satisfaction with this in the
Admiralty, Lee reported that he had been given a firm instruction that there were
to be no supplementary estimates.
The Admiralty had gained most of what it wanted for 192 1-22 but it
soon came under renewed pressure from the Treasury. The country's economic
condition continued to deteriorate and in May 1921 the Chancellor ordered the
Admiralty Board to review its current expenditure carefully with a view to
producing significantly reduced estimates for 1922-23. The Admiralty responded
by cutting its sketch estimates from £88m to £81m but then, in early August,
submitted a supplementary estimate of nearly £12m, despite the Cabinet's
instruction to the contrary only a few months before. The Admiralty once again
got most of what it wanted but in the same month the Government appointed a
Committee on National Expenditure under the chairmanship of Sir Eric Geddes.
By the time it submitted its First Interim Report to the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, the Washington Conference was already well underway. The Geddes
Committee had, however, recommended cuts in the estimates of all the Fighting
Services for 1922-23; for the Navy the proposed reduction was from £8 im to
£60m. The reaction from the Fighting Services was so strong that the Cabinet
Roskil1, op.cit., pp.226-227
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set up a new Committee under Churchill, who was then Secretary of State for
the Colonies, to adjudicate on the recommendations. The work of Churchill's
Committee was very considerably eased by the success achieved at Washington
as regards naval arms limitation.87
In the light of this worsening economic and financial situation it is hardly
surprising that Britain favoured naval arms limitation but the Government had no
clear policy for the achievement of such an objective and it had no intention at
this stage of seeking to initiate disarmament. There can be little doubt that the
crucial factor in the success of the Washington Conference, as far as naval arms
limitation is concerned, was the changed political situation in the USA. By the
end of 1920 it was clear that the US Congress was reluctant to provide the Navy
Department with the funds it required for new naval construction: the Navy
Department was able to continue work on the 1916 construction programme but
it could not go beyond this. In this respect US politics appeared very similar to
the British situation but there was a key difference at this stage in that the new
President, Warren Gamaliel Harding, who had been elected in November 1920,
took the view that naval arms limitation was impractical. This was clearly
demonstrated in May 1921 when he urged the Senate to support the Naval
Appropriations Bill for 192 1-22: this included fimds for building more of the
ships provided for in the 1916 construction programme. Harding was
confronted, however, with what developed into powerful opposition from
Senator William Borah. On 14 December 1920, Borah introduced a resolution
requiring the summoning of a naval Conference so as to achieve a 50%
reduction in the naval building programmes of Britain, Japan and the USA, and




were accepted. Borah's resolution was passed with only four votes against it and
the Senate added the extra funds to the Naval Appropriations Bil1.
As a result of this development it seemed that 'The initiative in
Washington was now firmly in the hands of Borah and those in Congress who
favoured the summoning of a naval conference outside the forum of the League
of Nations'. 9° Harding was not, however, prepared to allow this loss of initiative
to become permanent and, as both Hall and Buckley have shown, his decision to
summon the Washington Conference was intended to wrest control of domestic
politics from Borah and his supporters and to give the USA the leading role in
international diplomacy. 9' This was no easy task for the Harding Administration
had to satisfy the obvious public desire for a reduction in expenditure on the
Navy while at the same time achieving naval parity with Britain and dealing with
the perceived threat posed by Japanese policy in Korea, China and the Pacific.
Policy options which involved either completion of the 1916 building
programme or a decision to join the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in order to ensure
influence in Asia, were most unlikely to win the support of the US Congress and
public. This was because the Government would have been committing the
country to significant expenditure on naval construction or taking on extensive
international responsibilities. If the US Government decided to cut the naval
budget, it would certainly win support from those whose prime concerns were
financial, but it would not be able to exert any influence over either Britain or
Japan. It was these concerns which prompted the US Government to pursue a
policy which involved entering into an international naval arms limitation
9Hall, op.cit.. p.25; Northedge F.S. The Troubled Giant - Britain among the
Great Powers 1916-1939 (London: Bell, 1966), p.281; Goldstein, op.cit., pp.15-
16
90Hall, op.cit., p.25
and Buckley, T.H. 'The Icarus Factor, the American pursuit of myth in
naval arms control, 1921-36' in Goldstein and Maurer (eds.), op.cit. pp.124-146
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agreement in exchange for an end to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and a
settlement intended to limit Japanese ambitions in Asia and the Pacific. This
involved a significant voile-face by Harding: previously the US President had
rejected arms limitation as impractical but he now saw it as central to the success
of his Administration in both domestic and foreign policyY
A further encouragement for Harding to seek naval arms limitation
through an international Conference held in Washington was the fact that Lloyd
George was considering calling just such a Conference himself In March 1921
Lee gave a speech to the Society of Naval Architects which conceded the
principle of naval equality with the USA and was clearly intended to win favour
with Harding The British Government followed this up in June by making
enquiries in both the USA and Japan about the desirability of summoning an
arms limitation Conference. Had such a Conference been called as a result of a
British initiative, Harding would obviously have found it more difficult to
determine the Conference agenda and he would not have been able to
demonstrate US leadership in international affairs. The US President, however,
moved more quickly than Lloyd George. On 8 July the US Ambassadors in
London, Paris, Rome and Tokyo were instructed to propose such a Conference
to their Governments and on the following day the US Secretary of State,
Charles Evan Hughes, proposed that discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern
Affairs should also be placed on the agenda. Just two days later Harding
announced his plans, which were welcomed by Lloyd George in a statement
which he made to the House of Commons. The widening of the scope of the
Conference to take in Pacific and Far Eastern affairs, in addition to naval arms
Bucldey, op.ci pp.128-131
Northedge, The Troubled Giant, pp.278-9
HaII, op.cit.. p.26
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limitation, meant that the USA sent invitations to China, Holland, Portugal and
Belgium, as well as to the other four major naval Powers Harding made it
clear that he would not agree to the Conference taking place anywhere other
than Washington: the initiative was veiy firmly with the USA.
The decision to deal with Pacific and Far Eastern affairs at the
Conference underlined the significance of the Anglo-Japanese Affiance which
would come to an end, if not renewed, on 13 July 1921. Early in the previous
year the Foreign Office had indicated that it supported renewal as a counter-
balance to a possible Soviet threat and that opinion in Japan was also favourable
to renewal. The Admiralty, however, considered 'a continuation of the alliance
neither necessary nor desirable' but a rather different view was expressed by Sir
Auckland Geddes, the British Ambassador in Washington, in November 1920.
He reported that, while public opinion in the USA would be hostile to a renewal
of the Alliance, anti-British feeling was already so strong that it was unlikely to
be exacerbated by its continuation. Geddes argued that it would be premature of
the Government to announce that it did not intend to renew the Alliance, unless
it attached over-riding importance to avoiding poor relations with the USA. He
thought it would be more appropriate to renew the Alliance for four years,
amending it in such a way as to bring it into line with the League Covenant.
Geddes' opinion in favour of renewal of the Alliance was supported in June 1921
by the CII). It was concerned that, if Britain engaged in naval construction in
order to prevent its Navy being overtaken by those of Japan and the USA, there
would also have to be heavy expenditure on developing its Far Eastern harbour
95Roskill, op.cit.. pp.301-302
Northedge, The Troubled Giant, p.284
Roskill, op.cit., p.293
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and oil-storing facilities so as to accommodate much larger ships. If the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance were renewed, such expenditure could, at least, be delayed.
A further factor which the British Government had to take into account
in deciding the future of the Japanese Alliance was the state of Dominion
opinion, particularly as there was an Imperial Conference in the summer of 1921.
The Conference opened on 20 June and Lloyd George's references to Japan did
not make clear the Government's intentions concerning the Alliance. He spoke
favourably of Japan but also stressed the importance of maintaining good
relations with the USA. The other Dominion Prime Ministers who were
directly concerned with relations between Britain, Japan and the USA were,
however, Less equivocal. Hughes of Australia and Massey of New Zealand were
very much in favour of renewal, largely because they were fearful of the threat
which the Japanese Navy posed to their security and lacked confidence in
Britain's ability and the USA's desire to help them in the event of conflict in the
Pacific. By contrast, Meighen, the Canadian Prime Minister, was a powerful
advocate of a policy which stressed the importance of good Anglo-US relations.
He argued that renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would harm these
relations and damage the prospects of concluding a naval arms limitation treaty.
Meighen was, of course, influenced by the fact that Canada and the USA had the
same concerns over the security of the North American continent and
immigration from Japan. In both the short and medium terms Meghen emerged
victorious: the Imperial Conference ended without there being any statement of
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McKercher has argued that the financial and economic pressures which
operated on the British Government in the immediate post-war years made it a
willing participant in the Washington Conference.'°' This view is tenable if
willingness is taken to mean acceptance of the invitation to attend the
Conference. 1f however, willingness is measured by a desire to make the
Conference a success and the belief that such success could be achieved, it is
impossible to agree that Britain was a willing participant. Fry, Goldstein and Hall
have each drawn attention to the British Government's very limited preparations
for the Conference.'°2 Britain had wanted a preliminary conference with the USA
at which the two nations would have been able to agree the basic principles for a
settlement of the situation in the Pacific and a reduction in the US Government's
naval building programme. Harding's Administration rejected this proposal,
however, a decision which so irritated Curzon that he determined to allow the
USA to organize every aspect of the Conference proper and thereby take the
blame if it failed. Three other key British officials - Geddes, Victor Wellesley and
Crowe - doubted that the US decision-makers had sufficient grasp of the
international situation to be able to organize a successful Conference. Crowe
thought it most unlikely that they had worked out a practical scheme for arms
reduction, although it must be remembered that Crowe's general view was that
this was, in any case, an impossible task. Lloyd George's unwillingness to attend
the Conference and his selection of Conservatives to represent Britain suggests
that he thought it would end in a failure with which he wanted neither himself
nor the Lloyd George Liberals directly associated.'°3
'°'McKercher, op.cit.. p.43
'°2Fry, op.cit. pp.p.74; Goldstein, op.cit. pp.18-23; Hall, op.cit.. p.28
'°3Goldstein, op.cit., pp.18-21
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Although Balfour's experience as a former First Lord of the Admiralty,
Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister and experienced member of the CU) made
him a powerful leader of the British delegation, he had spent the three months
prior to the opening of the Washington Conference in Geneva representing
Britain at the League and, when first asked to take on this role, had suggested
that Law would be a more appropriate figure. Balfour only agreed after Law had
declined the invitation.' 04 Given Balfour's own lack of enthusiasm for the task
and the fact that the Government sent him to Washington without a negotiating
brief, it is very much to his credit that the British delegation worked so
effectively. He largely overcame his Government's inadequate preparation for the
Conference by developing his own negotiating brief between 2 and 8 November
as he crossed the Atlantic. Balfour understood that the Cabinet wanted the
British delegation 'to secure the largest possible limitation of armaments
consistent with the safety of the British Empire' but he considered that this could
only be achieved if the political difficulties in the Pacific and China were
resolved. As a result of this thinking the British approach to disarmament at
Washington was based on the indirect or political method.'°5
Balfour attached the greatest importance to the question of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance which would clearly be a difficult problem to resolve because
it was viewed differently by the Governments of the USA, Japan and Britain's
Pacific Dominions. He was aware that the USA was strongly opposed to a
continuation of the Alliance and regarded its termination as essential for the
successful negotiation of an arms limitation agreement. Yet, although the
weakness of both the Soviet Union and Germany meant that Britain no longer
had the same need for the security which the Alliance offered, Balfour
b04Th, p.22
'°5DBFP. No.4 15, Balfour to Lloyd George, 11 November 1921
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considered that 'we are bound to give the utmost consideration to the feelings of
an ally who has loyally stood by his engagements and rendered us valuable
support in the late war, and we cannot contemplate any action calculated to
alienate, much less to outrage, Japanese sentiment'. 106 This thinking was
reinforced in his mind by the pro-Alliance sentiments which had been expressed
at the recent Imperial Conference by Australia and New Zealand. He proposed,
therefore, a tripartite agreement between Britain, the USA and Japan, the
essential features of which would terminate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance without
offending Japan, avoid military commitments which would be unacceptable to
the USA and reassure Australia and New Zealand as to their security.' 07 In
addition to these proposals concerning the three major naval Powers, Balfour
also set out for Lloyd George a draft agreement relating to China which was
'based on the desirability of substituting a system of international co-operation
for the international rivahy in China which has in the past produced such
unhappy results in that countiy'.1
The striking feature of Balfour's approach was that he gave greater
importance to the political and security issues in China and the Pacific than he
did to the details of naval arms limitation which was held to be the principal
objective of the British delegation at Washington. This was in marked contrast
to the US Government which sprung on the Conference at its first plenary
session a detailed and radical set of proposals for naval arms limitation. This
emerged as a result of a significant difference in the attitudes of the General
Board of the US Navy on the one hand and Harding and Hughes on the other.





construction programme had been completed, providing them with a capital ship
strength of nearly im tons by 1927 and parity with the British Navy. Under
pressure from the State Department, the General Board reduced its requirements
to 820,000 tons and declared that it could not go below this figure but this was
not sufficient for the President and his Secretaiy of State. On 31 October the US
delegation to the Conference decided to propose a much more dramatic
programme of naval arms limitation. 109 This occurred because the USA's political
leaders were prepared, in advance of the Conference, to assert their dominance
of the naval officers. It is highly likely that there would not have been a naval
arms limitation agreement had the British Government not been prepared to do
the same at the Conference, even though it had not done so previously.
The US naval arms limitation proposals, which Hughes had gone to
considerable and successful lengths to keep secret, were presented to the
delegates to the Washington Conference at its opening session on 12 November
1921. They involved the scrapping of all capital ship building programmes,
acceptance of the existing strength of the naval Powers as the standard of the
relative strength they should retain, the use of capital ship tonnage as the
measure of naval strength, the scrapping by Britain,, Japan and the USA of
1,876,043 tons of ships already built or under construction, a ten year holiday as
regards capital ship building, a limitation of 35,000 tons displacement on all new
ships and acceptance, subject to the ten year holiday, of twenty years as the age
limit for replacement. Neither France nor Italy were required to reduce their
capital ship strengths because at that time they were not engaged on any building
programmes. Once the naval holiday was over the Powers would be able to
replace capital ships which were twenty years old so that, by 1942, the maximum
109Roskill, op.cit., pp.307-309; Davis G.T., A Navy Second to None (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1971), pp.277-278
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replacement tonnages would be reached. These were 500,000 tons for Britain
and the USA, 300,000 tons for Japan and 175,000 tons each for France and
Italy. By this means the capital ship ratios of 5: 5: 3: 1.75: 1.75 would be
reached for these five Powers. Hughes also put forward proposals to limit the
auxiliary ships - cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers and submarines - of the
three major Powers and it became clear later at the Conference that he also
favoured the application of the capital ship ratio to the auxiliary ships of France
and Italy."°
In view of the British Government's long-standing desire to bring an end
to the possibility of naval arms competition with the USA and its publicly stated
acceptance of the one-Power standard, it was not surprising that, on hearing
these proposals, 'The British could hardly hide their intense elation over the
disclosure of a dazzling victory for the Empire won without a struggle'." 1 When
Balfour accepted Hughes' proposals in principle at the next plenary session of
the Conference on 15 November, he was confirming that Britain was prepared
both to share naval supremacy with the USA and to reduce its own Fleet." 2 This
did not mean, however, that Britain was entirely satisfied and Balfour indicated
that it required more cruisers and destroyers than were allowed for in the USA's
scheme. Beatty was also strongly opposed to the ten year naval holiday on the
grounds that it 'would result in decay of naval ship construction and armament
industries unless firms were heavily subsidized'. He favoured instead an
'alternative scheme of substituting slow and steady replacement for spasmodic
building'. " 3 In this view he received support from Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith,
Economic Adviser to the Government and Head of the Economic Section of the
"°Roskill, op.cit., pp.310-31!; Davis, op.cit., pp277 and 286-289
"Davis, op.cit.. p.277
"2Hall, op.cit., p.4
" 3DBFP. 417, Balfour to Curzon, undated
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British delegation at Washington, who argued that the 'American proposal for
ten years' holiday would result in violent fluctuation in employment'. 114 On 15
November, however, Lloyd George made his own views on this issue very clear:
We feel that the sovereign virtue of the naval holiday consists in the
fact that there will for ten years be a complete cessation of capital
shipbuilding. There will be no rivalry in improved designs between
the three great Naval Powers, and the existing fleets which they are
to keep will not be rendered obsolete by the appearance of superior
capital vessels. We feel that this advantage far outweighs the
convenience of keeping armament plants in moderate activity by
spreading replacements slowly over the ten years' holiday period. It
also outweighs the inconvenience of having to make a sudden
expansion of shipbuilding plants at the end of the period. We would
rather keep the necessary plant in existence by subsidies than mar the
effect to world peace of the ten years' holiday by building new
battleships."5
Balfour favoured Beatty's scheme but the issue was finally decided on 10
December when Balfour read to the British delegation a personal telegram from
Lloyd George stating that the Cabinet agreed to the ten years' holiday." 6
 In just
the same way that Harding and Hughes had over-ruled the General Board
concerning the proposals which were to be made to the Conference on 12
" 4DBF, 418, Balfour to Curzon, 14 November 1921
' 15DBFP, 420, Curzon to Balfour, 12 November 1921
6Roskill, op.cit.. pp.314-315
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November, the Cabinet over-ruled the Admiralty and its Economic Adviser
regarding this important issue.
The determination of the British and US Governments to reach
agreement on naval armaments did not mean that a limitation treaty was a
foregone conclusion. As Maurer has convincingly shown, there was a need for
compromise on several key issues." 7 Japan's chief delegate, Baron Tomosaburo
Kato, the Minister for the Navy, would have liked a higher ratio for the Japanese
Navy and he stressed the importance of its retaining the Mutsu, its new
battleship which was 98% complete when the Washington Conference opened.
The agreement which was reached on this issue allowed Japan to keep the Mutsu
but it had to scrap one of its older battleships. The USA was allowed to keep the
two ships of its 1916 programme which were closest to completion - the
Colorado and Washington - but had to scrap its two oldest Dreadnoughts and
Britain was allowed to build two new battleships of a maximum 35,000 tons
displacement. This was a pleasing outcome for the Admiralty as it meant that it
was able to build the battleships Nelson and Rodney." 8 The result of these
changes was that the battleship tonnages for Britain and the USA were increased
to 525,000 tons by 1942 and for Japan to 315,000 tons."9
There was also a danger that the emerging agreement would be wrecked
by the French demand for a battleship ratio equal to that of Japan and superior
to that of Italy. Neither Britain nor Italy, however, was prepared to accept this
and the head of the French delegation, Prime Minister Aristide Briand, gave
way, despite strong objections from his chief technical adviser, Admiral de Bon.
This French concession on the battleship ratio was matched by a determination
" 7Maurer, J. 'Arms Control and the Washington Conference' in Goldstein and
Maurer (eds.), op.cit., pp.267-293
" 8Roskill, op.cit., pp.315-318; Maurer, op.cit., p.280
' 19Davis, op.cit., p.297
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to resist restrictions on the building of cruisers, destroyers and submarines below
the figures which de Bon had put forward - 330,000 tons of cruisers and
destroyers and 90,000 tons of submarines.' 20 French intransigence over cruisers
suited the Admiralty because it, too, opposed Hughes' proposals regarding this
class of ships. At Washington, Beatty asserted that Britain's colonial and trading
interests were so extensive that its cruiser needs were absolute and could not be
related to the strengths of other nations. 12' Britain held to this doctrine of
absolute requirements in cruiser strength throughout the 1920s and 1930s but at
Washington it was able to allow France to take responsibility for the failure to
reach anything other than agreement that cruisers should be armed with nothing
larger than eight inch guns and should not exceed 10,000 tons displacement.
It was not only necessary for the Powers to compromise on these
technical details in order to reach agreement on the limitation of naval
armaments. Although Hughes had not made any dramatic proposals concerning
the Pacific and Far Eastern affairs when he opened the Conference on 12
November, it was clear that the US Government saw the issues of security and
naval arms limitation as being inextricably linked. This fact reveals the wisdom
of the negotiating position set out by Balfour in his despatch of 11 November to
Lloyd George. The Four Power Treaty between Britain, France, Japan and the
USA was very important for the Harding Administration because it ended the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance and required these Powers only to consult in the event
of a dispute between them in the Pacific, thereby exempting the USA from
military or naval commitments. A key figure in the US delegation was Henry
Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and majority
leader of the Senate. Following the conclusion of the Conference, 'Senator
'20Maurer, op.cit.. p.280
' 21Hall, op.cit., p.29
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Lodge made the tie between the naval treaty and the Four-Power Treaty very
explicit by scheduling the vote [in the Senate] on the latter treaty first and by
stating that its ratification must precede that of the naval treaty'.
Just as the Four Power Treaty was essential to US acceptance of the
naval agreement, Japanese acceptance of the capital ship ratio would have been
inconceivable had Britain and the USA not accepted a freeze on the construction
of naval bases in the Pacific. It was accepted that Britain would not fortifr Hong
Kong, the USA would not fortify Manila or Guam and Japan would abandon its
plans to forti1r Formosa, the Pescadores and Oshima. The effect of this
agreement was that the nearest British naval base to Japan would be Singapore
and the nearest US base would be Hawaii, which was 3,800 miles away.' As a
result, Japan emerged from the Washington Conference as the dominant Power
in the Western Pacific but this was clearly the price which Britain and the USA
had to pay in order to secure its acceptance of the principal features of the Naval
Limitation Treaty.
A further security issue which might have prevented a naval arms
limitation agreement at Washington concerned Anglo-French relations and the
connection between land and air arms on the one hand and naval arms on the
other. In three Foreign Office despatches of 22 and 23 November, Lloyd George
and Curzon made clear to Balfour at Washington their serious fears about the
growing strength of France's land forces and the extent of its air power.124
Although these documents referred to the existing good relations between
Britain and France, their tone revealed the serious decline in Anglo-French
relations since the end of the Great War. According to the assessments of the
Buckley, op.cit., p.132
'Roskill, op.cit., pp.315-316
' 24DBFP, 439, Curzon to Balfour, 22 November 1921; DBFP, 442 and 443,
Curzon to Balfour, 23 November 1921
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General Staff France would have an Army in excess of 4m men by 1923,
compared with the 3,304,000 which it had available on the outbreak of war in
1914, and the Air Staff estimated that France could drop thirty-one tons of
bombs daily on London and the south-east of England and thirteen tons every
night, without allowing for the use that might be made of their civilian aircraft'.'
These assessments served only to reinforce the CID's fears that France was
building a submarine fleet which would be capable of establishing 'a mortal
blockade of Great Britain'. This combination of factors prompted Lloyd
George to inform Balfour that 'we cannot contemplate a result of the
Washington Conference which would leave France and other European nations
as powerfully armed as before while we alone having already reduced the army
and the air force to the minimum had also bound ourselves to a great reduction
of the navy'.'27
If the Cabinet had compelled Balfour to follow this line it is most unlikely
that there would have been an agreement between the five principal naval
Powers. Balfour, however, realized that there was very little chance of
persuading France and Italy to agree to the abolition of submarines and that
France would only consent to a reduction in its land and air forces if Bntain and
the USA were prepared to guarantee its security. He did, though, believe that it
would be possible to achieve a reduction of naval armaments and a settlement of
the situation in the Pacific and Far East and that it would be a mistake to throw
away this opportunity in pursuit of the impossible. In a gently ironic way he
poured scorn on the instructions which he had received from Lloyd George and
Curzon:
'DBFP. 443, Curzon to Balfour, 23 November 1921
' 26DBFP. 442, Curzon to Balfour, 23 November 1921
' 27DBFP 439, Curzon to Balfour, 22 November 1921
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I am to try, if possible, to induce the French to agree to a very small
battle fleet so as to leave us free to accept American proposals
without modification. Having persuaded them to deprive themselves
of their form of naval defence I am then to persuade them that they
really require no submarines because a war between France and
England is unthinkable. This task being successfully accomplished, I
am then to ask them to reduce the number of their aircraft seeing
that we cannot sleep securely in our beds lest in a war with France,
London should be burnt to the ground ! For a task so complex as
this I fear a trained diplomatist is required. But I will do my best.'
Balfour was, of course, not solely responsible for the agreement reached at
Washington but his realism was undoubtedly a powerful, positive factor and
contributed to the praise he received from contemporaries, such as Hankey, and
the earidom which he received in May 1922)
The Washington Conference, in combining elements of Hughes' carefully
constructed technical plan for a reduction in naval armaments with a willingness
to address important security issues affecting especially the positions of Britain,
Japan and the USA in the Far East, was very successful for Britain in a number
of important respects. Prior to the Conference there were decision-makers who
thought that their post-war fear would be realized and that Britain and the USA
would embark on a major naval arms race which would be ruinously
expensive.' 3° The Naval Limitation Treaty ensured that this did not happen and
'DBFP, 448, Balfour to Curzon, 24 November, 1921




Britain was able to reduce its expenditure on the Navy. The naval estimates for
1922-23 were £64,883,700, a reduction ofE17,595,300 on those for 1921-22
and, in introducing the estimates for 1923-24, Amery stated that the Washington
Conference had saved the country £15-20m pa..' 31 The agreement regarding the
construction and fortification of naval bases in the Pacific also provided security
for Australia because Japan could not build a naval base from which any attack
against it could be launched. As a result, Australia was able to reduce its naval
forces and its defence budget and focus instead on economic growth.'32
In other respects the outcomes of the Conference were not so beneficial
for Britain. The failure to reach agreement on cruisers, destroyers and
submarines left the way open for competition in these auxiliary vessels. There is
indeed a case for the argument that the agreement regarding capital ships
stimulated such competition. The situation in the Pacific in the longer term was
also far from clear. It had been agreed at the Imperial Conference that Britain
should build a naval base at Singapore which would enable its Navy, based in
home and Mediterranean waters, to go to the Pacific to deal with any crisis
which might arise. This strategy might have made it possible for Britain to
enhance its security in the Pacific but no decision had been taken at that stage as
to when construction of the Singapore naval base would begin and, even when it
was completed, it would not provide security against a simultaneous threat in
Europe and the Pacific.'33
The Conference has also been criticised from the perspective of
disarmament. Although he saw it as being a moderate success, Madariaga
observed that this was because it worked as 'an Armaments Conference' in that
' 31 Chaput, op.cit., pp. 125
' 32Fry, op.cit., p.93
' 33Ibid., pp.94-96
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the Powers were concerned 'to maintain and if possible improve their relative
armaments'.' He put this same view forward in an amusing story about five
wealthy bankers in Renaissance Italy who agreed, under financial pressures, to
restrict the number of their mistresses. The outcome of their discussions was that
the two wealthiest bankers were allowed five each, the next was allowed three
and the other two were permitted to keep one each and pay occasional visits to
another. These decisions were then presented by the five as being made out of
respect for the sacrament of marriage.' 35 Madariaga took the view that Powers
would always be motivated by a cynical perception of their own self-interest
until there was a community of nations based upon a recognized system of
international law. In the absence of such a community, armaments, he argued,
are a symptom of international suspicion and tension, not a cause:
And therefore to want disarmament before a minimum of common
agreement on fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go
undressed in winter. Let the weather be warm, and people will
discard their clothes readily and without committees to tell them
how they are to undress.'
This metaphor misses a vital point, however, about the relationship between
armaments and international relations. Although the weather will not be affected
by the amount of clothes people wear, commitment by significant Powers to a
disarmament process can have a beneficial impact on the climate of international
affairs. The Powers who gathered at Washington were certainly concerned to
'Madariaga, S. de Morning without Noon - Memoirs (Farnborough: Saxon
House, 1974), p.72
' 35Madariaga, Disarmament, pp.99-101
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improve their armaments position relative to each other but the experience of
negotiating a multi-lateral arms limitation agreement did bring about a significant
improvement in international relations. Although Anglo-US naval rivalry
continued, it was more limited in scope than it might otherwise have been and
the agreement did stimulate efforts to achieve more broad-ranging disarmament
through the League. Far from being separate from the process of creating a
more co-operative international environment, disarmament is an important
element in that process. The Washington Conference not only brought to an end
a very difficult period for those British decision-makers concerned with naval
policy, it also gave an indication of what could be achieved if political leaders
were sufficiently committed to the process to assert their authority and it
stimulated further attempts to bring about disarmament through the League. The
British Government had stumbled, almost by accident, on a new approach to
defence and foreign policy.
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Chapter 6 - Naval Disarmament 1922-24
The Washington Conference 1921-22 was viewed with some suspicion
by League enthusiasts because it threatened to undermine the importance of
Geneva as the focus of attempts to bring about the limitation and control of
armaments by international agreement.' The Treaties concluded as a result of
this Conference brought about arms reduction, in the short term at least, but
they do not satisf,' the definition of disarmament used in this thesis because the
decision-makers were concerned primarily with product, to the exclusion of
process. The achievement of the British delegation led by Balfour, however
much importance might be attached to it, did not reveal that the Government
was committed to the process of arms control and limitation through general
international agreement. It is the case, however, that the generally perceived
success of the Washington Conference was seen by some to offer an opportunity
to extend naval disarmament through the League and to reassert the primacy of
process over simple product.
From 1922-24 there was a serious attempt within the League to bring
about an extension of the principles which were held to underpin the Naval
Limitation Treaty agreed at Washington. This attempt culminated in February
1924 in what has often been referred to as the Rome Naval Conference but was
in fact a special meeting of the Naval Sub-Commission of the PAC. This
Conference and the negotiations which preceded it have received scant attention
from historians largely, no doubt, because they brought no tangible outcome. It
is also true that in the period 1922-24 Cecil's draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee
and then the Geneva Protocol were of much greater importance to
'Towle, op.cit., p.130
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contemporary decision-makers. It is, perhaps, not surprising, therefore, that
those interested in the study of arms limitation and control through the League
have focused on these initiatives rather than on the attempt to extend the
principles of the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty. For their part, historians
of naval arms limitation in the 1920s have focused on the Washington
Conference itself, and the Conferences which took place at Geneva in 1927 and
London in 1930. Yet, despite the fact that the attempt to extend the principles of
the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty to non-signatory Powers was over-
shadowed by these more wide-ranging proposals to achieve disarmament, it
merits detailed consideration.
Unlike the other proposals to achieve disarmament through the League
which are considered in this study, the attempt to extend the principles of the
Washington Naval Limitation Treaty to non-signatory Powers emerged not from
League idealists but from within a British institution which would normally be
classified as ultra-realist, namely, the Admiralty. Although it was put forward
within the TMC, it came from Captain John Roderick Segrave, the Admiralty's
representative on the PAC from 1920 to 1923. The course of events from the
conclusion of the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty to the eve of the Fourth
League Assembly in September 1923 appears to indicate that the Admiralty was
committed to the idea of extending the principles of that Treaty to non-signatory
Powers, even to the extent of proposing means by which the Soviet Union might
be included in the scheme, despite the fact that Britain had not yet recognized its
Government and that it was not a member of the League. Segrave was the
official representative of the Admiralty and so it is reasonable to assume that his
scheme was put forward 'with at any rate the full knowledge, and presumably the
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assent of the Admiralty'. 2 Although there is no direct evidence in support of such
an assessment, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Admiralty saw in League
action the prospect of a wide-ranging agreement which could only benefit
Britain's naval position. The draft Convention that emerged from the Naval Sub-
Commission of the PAC involved no extension of Britain's naval commitments
and, if translated into an international treaty, limited the extent to which the
Admiralty would have to concern itself with naval expansion by other Powers. In
short, the Admiralty recognized that League institutions could be used to serve
Britain's best interests. In advancing and supporting the extension of the
Washington principles the Admiralty was not, however, on the available
evidence, revealing an overt commitment to the process of disarmament. Rather,
it appears that the Admiralty saw an opportunity to achieve through the League
a desirable outcome, namely, naval arms limitation by low risk means. Its
approach, therefore, was thoroughly pragmatic and concerned with the
armaments question as an element of internal policy.
Segrave's initiative did, however, expose disagreements between those
within the Foreign Office sympathetic to disarmament and those hostile to it, on
the one hand, and between the Admiralty and the Foreign Office on the other.
As negotiations at Geneva developed, differences of strategy between the
Washington signatory Powers which were members of the League and between
some of the smaller naval Powers also emerged. These differences, together with
a shift to an overly ambitious policy by the League, in large part explain why no
Convention resulted from this attempt at international disarmament. The failure
to achieve an agreement has prompted Towle and Roskill to conclude that the
Rome Conference was a complete failure, though their respective analyses are
2Adinl 16/2 184: memorandum by Tufton, 9 April 1923
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hardly detailed. 3 At the time, however, there were observers, such as Rear
Admiral Aubrey Smith, Britain's representative on the Naval Sub-Commission of
the PAC from 1923 to 1927, whose assessment of the Rome Conference was
more sanguine, and although it cannot be regarded as a success, there is
definitely a case for viewing the Conference in a more positive light now that the
records of the Conference are fully available.
In February 1922, the same month in which the Washington Conference
completed its work, Segrave put before the TMC a proposal that the principles
of the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty be extended to the non-signatory
Powers who were members of the League. At the July session of the TMC
Segrave followed up this proposal by putting forward a draft Convention by
which it might be achieved. Similar schemes were put forward by the Marquis di
Saluzzo, the Italian representative, and by Colonel Réquin, the French
representative. In response to these initiatives the TMC approved the proposal
to extend the principles of the Treaty to the non-signatory Powers and requested
the Council to refer the three draft Conventions to the PAC so that the Naval
Sub-Commission could consider the scheme and report on it. The TMC
requested the PAC to present its report by the end of July so that the TMC
could consider the matter again before the Third League Assembly in September
1922. By setting this timetable the TMC hoped to be able to present definite
proposals for the extension of the principles of the Treaty to the non-signatory
Powers to the 1922 Assembly, together with a recommendation that an
international Conference be summoned in order to draw up a treaty.4
Although the Naval Sub-Commission of the PAC adhered to the
timetable requested by the TMC, presenting its report on 26 July 1922 together
3Towle, op.cit., p.136 and Roskill, op.cit., p.427
4F0371/7256: letter by Drummond to League members, 14 August 1922
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with a single draft Convention drawn from the three schemes previously
submitted, certain problems arose immediately between the major and minor
naval Powers represented on the Commission. Of these six Powers, four were
signatories to the Washington Treaties, namely, Britain, France, Italy and Japan
- the others were Spain and Brazil. In the first instance the representatives of the
Powers had to decide the principles on which the proposed Convention should
be based. The Washington signatory Powers thought that it should be based
upon the principle of maintaining the status quo. The Brazilian and Spanish
representatives, Admiral Pemdo and the Marquis de Magaz respectively, took a
quite different view. They based their position on Article 8 of the Covenant of
the League and argued that the most important principles were those of national
security, geographical situation and special circumstances which might affect a
country's naval requirements. They held that because the Washington Naval
Limitation Treaty did not take place under the auspices of the League, its
signatories were able to take decisions without reference to the Covenant but
such freedom of action could not and should not apply to a treaty negotiated
through the institutions of the League. When this Hispano-Brazilian position was
put to the vote it was rejected by four votes to two, the Sub-Commission
dividing between Washington signatory and non-signatory Powers. The
immediate result was that Penido refbsed to co-operate in the work of the Sub-
Commission and he thereafter abstained from voting. Margaz, however,
participated in the subsequent discussions, subject to the reservation that he was
speaking personally and that his remarks in no way bound his Government.5
5F0371/7256: Report of the Naval Sub-Commission of the Permanent Advisory
Commission on the Extension of the Washington Naval Treaty to the Non-
Signatory Powers Members of the League of Nations, 26 July 1922
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As a result of the discussions between the five representatives prepared
to continue with their work, the Sub-Commission was able to draw up a single
draft Convention, although Margaz made reservations on the tonnage allocated
to Spain. 6 This draft Convention followed the Washington Naval Limitation
Treaty in laying down direct limitation of total tonnage for capital ships only,
that is, vessels which exceeded 10,000 tons or carried a gun with a calibre in
excess of 8 inches. As with the Washington Treaty, it also took as its basis for
estimating replacement tonnage the status quo on 12 November 1921 and laid
down a naval holiday, a period often years from the same date, during which no
capital ship was to be laid down. Despite the fact that these principles were
drawn from the Washington Treaty, the purpose of the draft Convention was
quite different from it, as was explicitly recognized by the Sub-Commission. The
objective of the Washington Powers had been to carry out reductions to large
navies and impose limitations as to their future size whereas the purpose of the
draft Convention was only to impose limitations on future naval building 'so
eliminating the unknown factor and preventing competition in navies or the fear
of such competition'. 7
 The articles which dealt with aircraft carriers did permit an
increase in tonnage as Powers were allowed to construct carriers up to a total
tonnage equal to one third of their total capital ship tonnage. This decision was
defended on the ground that the relevant articles amounted to 'a limitation on
future development of a new and experimental type of ship, as did the similar
clauses of the Treaty of Washington'.8
6See Appendix 1 for the text of the draft Convention for the Extension of the
Washington Naval Treaty to the Non-Signatory Powers of the League of
Nations, 27 July 1922.
7F0371/7256: Report of the Naval Sub-Commission of the Permanent Advisory
Commission on the Extension of the Washington Naval Treaty to the Non-
Signatory Powers Members of the League of Nations, 26 July 1922
8lbid.
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At the outset Penido and Margaz had clearly considered that the
principle of maintaining the status quo meant that their countries would not be
able to increase the size of their Navies. Their concern on this point appears,
however, to have been misplaced for the Sub-Commission, which in reality
meant the Washington signatory Powers, intended that its draft Convention
would be examined by an international Conference which would take into
account the special needs and conditions of each State and, just as had been
done at Washington, make appropriate modifications to the principle of the
status quo. This flexible approach was to characterize the position of the British
Admiralty in all negotiations on the issue. Such modifications, though, could not
be proposed by the Sub-Commission because from the nine Powers in the
League which possessed capital ships and were not signatories to the
Washington Naval Limitation Treaty, only the Brazilian and Spanish
representatives were present. 9 The Sub-Commission also envisaged the final
Convention being signed not just by these nine Powers but by all the League
Powers which were not signatories to the Washington Treaty. This was because
although the draft Convention only laid down tonnage limits for capital ships, it
did contain provisions limiting the size and armaments of other ships. It was,
therefore, considered appropriate that League members which did not possess
capital ships should also be parties to the Convention.'0
Despite the veiy clear differences between the Brazilian and Spanish
representatives on the one side and those of Britain, France, Italy and Japan on
the other, the Naval Sub-Commission had responded swiftly and effectively to
the scheme initiated by Segrave from within the TMC. The single draft
Convention which it had drawn up marked the start of a disarmament process
1bid.
'°Ibid. and Appendix 1
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which offered some prospect of real achievement. At this stage, however, the
main work had been done by the representatives of the four League Powers
which were signatories to the Washington Treaty: if there were to be a
Convention the agreement of forty two other Powers would have to be secured.
The Brazilian and Spanish opposition to the principle of the status quo indicated
that reaching such an agreement would be no easy task. The TMC was,
nevertheless, able to adhere to its original timetable and in September it adopted
the Sub-Commission's draft Convention proposing that this should serve as a
basis for an international Conference to consider the question. 1 ' Significantly, at
this meeting the TMC also went beyond the scheme as originally envisaged and
recommended that all States, whether they were members of the League or not
should be invited to participate in this Conference. 12 This was to prove a crucial
error taken in disregard of the prevailing diplomatic realities. In particular, it
meant that the Soviet Union would have to be included in the disarmament talks
and, given the nature of the Bolshevik Government and its relationship with
other States regarding the wars of intervention against it, this was always likely
to create serious problems and make the likelihood of a successfiul conclusion
more remote. There can be no doubt that the more limited of policy of seeking
the extension of the Washington Treaty to League Powers only was the wiser
course.
When the TMC's recommendations came before the Third Committee
(Reduction of Armaments) of the Third League Assembly later in September,
they were not approved without opposition. As was the case in the Naval Sub-
Commission, it was the Brazilian delegate who expressed dissatisfaction with the
' 1 Adml 16/2 184: memorandum by Tufton, 9 April 1923
12F0371/8319: Report of the Third Committee (Reduction of Armaments) to the
Third Assembly, 22 September 1922
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course of action being proposed. Brazil took the entirely reasonable view that
'disarmament for States at the height of their naval power was one thing,
disarmament for a State such as Brazil, which was growing in economic and
political importance and which was only beginning to develope [sic] what it
regarded as a Navy adequate to its needs, was a wholly different proposition'.13
This clearly meant that naval disarmament within the League should not be
achieved on the basis of the status quo for this would disadvantage developing
States and those States which had been created since the end of the Great War
and had yet to develop a navy. The Third Commission was not prepared to
allow this concern to become an obstacle to further progress and it agreed that
the Conference envisaged should not be bound by the draft Convention which
the Naval Sub-Commission had produced. 14 This enabled the Third Committee
to recommend that the Assembly adopt a resolution embodying the proposals of
the TMC.' 5 When the Assembly met, this was sufficient to win a pledge from the
Brazilian delegate that his Government would participate in the Conference so
long as it was understood that it would not take measures which departed from
the letter and spirit of Article 8 of the Covenant.'6
Although the principle of basing naval disarmament on the maintenance
of the status quo was likely to cause further problems, the recommendation that
all States should participate in the proposed Conference was a source of much
greater difficulty. This recommendation was unanimously agreed by the Third
' 3F0371/8319: Notes on the work of the Third Committee (Reduction of
Armaments) at the Third Assembly of the League of Nations 1922, 21 October
1922
'4lbid.
' 5F0371/83 19: Report of the Third Committee (Reduction of Armaments) to the
Third Assembly, 22 September 1922
'6F0371/83 19: Notes on the work of the Third Committee (Reduction of
Armaments) at the Third Assembly of the League of Nations 1922, 21 October
1922
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Assembly and it meant that Germany, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Hungary,
Mexico, Ecuador, Hedjas and San Domingo would be invited to attend the
Conference.' 7 The last four mentioned States did not possess capital ships and so
they could simply be added to the list of signatory Powers referred to in Article
1 of the draft Convention. 18 Turkey's involvement would depend on the outcome
of the negotiations following the Chanak crisis; and Hungary had just been
allowed to join the League by the Third Assembly so it would be able to sign the
Convention on the same basis as that of the other ex-enemy States, Austria and
Bulgaria, who had already joined the League. Although Germany was not yet a
member of the League, Segrave stated that it too would be able to sign the
Convention on the terms proposed for Austria and Bulgaria, namely, 'that she
shall accept the limitations of the Convention "in so far as they are applicable
and are additional to the limitations already accepted" •19 The Soviet Union,
however, was a very different case.
The Soviet Navy was not limited by any treaty and was substantially
larger than the Navies of the other Powers which were to be invited to
participate in the League disarmament conference. In a report of 17 October,
therefore, Segrave suggested that the Soviets should be required to reduce their
Navy, as the Washington Powers were doing, rather than being treated on the
same basis as the smaller naval Powers and not being required to scrap any ships
or abandon any construction programmes. But if this were the case, it would
hardly be possible to include the Soviet Union in the same Convention as the
other Powers because it would be treated entirely differently. Segrave proposed,
therefore, that the Soviets agree to a protocol by which they would adhere to the
' 7Adml 16/2184: memorandum by Tufton, 9 April 1923; F0371/7257: report by
Segrave, 17 October 1922
' 8See Appendix I
' 9F0371/7257: report by Segrave, 17 October 1922
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Washington Naval Limitation Treaty and scrap 207,162 tonnage of ships,
leaving a total tonnage of 175,080 tons and a replacement tonnage allowance of
175,000 tons, equal to that of France and Italy. The Soviet Union would also be
allowed the same total tonnage for aircraft carriers as France and Italy, namely,
60,000 tons. Segrave calculated that this would be a reduction of 54% in the
Soviet Fleet as compared with an average reduction of 51% for the Washington
signatories.20
In this detailed report it is, perhaps, surprising that Segrave made no
reference to the fact that Britain did not recognize the Soviet Government.
However, in seeking the opinion of the Foreign Office on Segrave's proposals,
the Admiralty emphasised the problem: if Soviet naval forces were limited either
by a protocol to the Washington Treaty or as a result of their participation at a
League Conference, the Soviet Government would have to be recognized. 2' This
was too much for the Foreign Office, which reacted as though its primacy in
foreign policy was being usurped - perhaps not surprisingly given the
circumstances. Thus, the Foreign Office response to Segrave's proposals - on 29
November - was ahnost entirely negative. At the general level, the Foreign
Secretary considered it 'premature' to go any further with plans for a League
Conference on naval disarmament because at that stage the Washington Treaty
had not been ratified? More specifically, Soviet involvement in any extension of
the Washington Treaty could not be considered until the whole question of its
relations with the British Government had been resoIved.
20Ibid.
21 FO371/7257: letter from Walker to the Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign
Office, 16 November 1922
FO 371/7257: letter from the FO to the Admiralty, 29 November 1922
9bid.
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This Foreign Office caution was wise, particularly in view of the marked
differences between Britain and the Soviet Union concerning the resolution of
the Turkish crisis. At the end of 1922 and the first half of 1923, however,
differences opened up between the Admiralty and the Foreign Office concerning
naval disarmament through the League. There are no Admiralty papers which
provide for a detailed examination of their motives in supporting this policy but
there can be little doubt about the strength of their support. Despite the negative
tone of the Foreign Office in its letter of 29 November, just one month later the
Admiralty wrote suggesting that the British representative on the Council of the
League should press for invitations to be issued for a Conference on extending
the principles of the Washington Treaty to non-signatory Powers. 24 The Foreign
Office position remained unchanged, Crowe minuting that there should be no
question of inviting Powers to such a Conference until the Washington Treaty
had been ratified: at this stage neither France nor Italy had ratified the Treaty.
Accordingly, in a undated memorandum, Balfour, Britain's representative on the
League Council, was informed that this was the Government's policy.26
The Foreign Office position might have caused Balfour some
embarrassment, particularly as the report of the British delegates to the Third
League Assembly referred to the decision to call an international Conference as
'the most immediate constructive work of Geneva towards disarmament' -
Balfour himself was the head of this five member delegation. 27 At its meeting of
31 January 1923 the Council decided, however, that it would not summon the
international Conference until after the close of the Pan-American Conference
24FO371/8480: Admiralty letter to the FO, 30 December 1922
FO371/8480: minute by Crowe, 6 January 1923
FO371/8480: undated FO memorandum for Balfour
rLeague of Nations. Third Assembly. Report of the British Delegates. 1923.
Cmd.1807 of 1923
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which would open on 4 March in Santiago and which was expected to consider
the arms question. As regards those States which were not members of the
League, the Council decided that it would be best for their inclusion to be left
for the Conference itself to determine but the Secretary-General was directed to
notify these States that a Conference was to be held in the near fiiture. But this
proposed course of action did not go far enough for the TMC which, on 12
February 1923, requested the Council to instruct the PAC to consider extending
the scheme to States which were not members of the League. Accordingly a
letter was sent to all Council members asking them if they were in agreement
with this proposal. By 21 March 1923 the League had received affinnative
replies from France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Sweden, Brazil and Spain but not
from Britain, China and Uruguay. The nature of Britam's delayed response on
this matter revealed differences of opinion within the Foreign Office.
Charles Tufton, a Counsellor, considered that Britain should agree to
this League proposal on the ground that any reluctance on its part to do so
'would be difficult to explain, and would certainly be liable to
misinterpretation'. 30 In a minute of 9 April, however, Sperling was much less
supportive of the scheme:
On its merits it appears a misguided proposal, and our agreement
to it will certainly be quoted in future as committing H.M.G. to
going into a disarmament conference with Russia, among other
Powers. 31
FO371/8482: memorandum by Tufton, 9 April 1923
FO371/8481: memorandum by Drummond, 21 March 1923
30F0371/8482: memorandum by Tufton, 9 April 1923
3 FO371/8482: minute by Sperling, 9 April 1923
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Crowe supported Sperling's doubts about the scheme which he considered to be
yet another example of the wholly inappropriate influence of the TMC under
Cecil's influence. 32 Crowe considered, however, that if Britain's representative on
the Council, Edward Wood, President of the Board of Education, found it
difficult to object, he should agree but state that the Government 'reserves liberty
of action and decision' concerning the conclusions of the PAC. 33 This was the
policy which Wood was instructed to pursue and he was also advised as to the
most appropriate procedure to follow in order to avoid isolation on the Council.
It was suggested that he should speak privately with the French representative
before the meeting and win his support for the British view that discussion of the
extension of the Washington principles to States outside the League was
premature given that the Treaty itself had not yet been ratifled. It is rather
surprising that the Foreign Office, in producing the memorandum, appears not to
have taken account of the fact that, according to Tufton's memorandum, the
French Government had already agreed that the PAC should conduct such a
discussion.35
It transpired at the meeting of the Council in April 1923 that Wood was
able to have discussion of the question postponed but not through private
discussion with the French representative. Instead he won Italian support by
arguing not only that the Washington Treaty had not been ratified but that the
Pan-American Conference was still taking place, that the PAC's agenda was so
full that it would be virtually impossible for the naval Conference to take place in
1923, that it would not take long for the PAC to discuss the subject and that
32F0371/8482: minute by Crowe, 9 April 1923
33Ibid.
'Adm1 16/2184: FO memorandum, 'Extension of the principles of the
Washington Naval Treaty', 14 April 1923
35F0371/8482: memorandum by Tufton, 9 April 1923
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international circumstances might change, especially concerning the Soviet
Union, and that these changes might affect discussion within the PAC. Two
months later the Foreign Office held that these points should again be used to
secure further postponement of the issue at the July session of the Council
meeting, despite the fact that the Pan-American Conference had ended without
reaching any agreement on arms reduction or limitation. 37 Cecil, who
represented Britain at this Council meeting, followed the Foreign Office
instructions, but he made it quite clear that he wanted no further delay, urging
the Council to declare its intention to take a decision at the next session.
By late August 1923 the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty had been
ratified and the Foreign Office had no objection, therefore, to the PAC
discussing 'from the purely technical point of view' the conditions to which non-
League members should conform if they were to take part in a naval
disarmament Conference. 39
 Nevertheless, the Foreign Office still instructed Cecil
to make it clear that the British Government 'reserved entire liberty of action and
decision as to their attitude towards the conclusions' which might be arrived at
by the PAC.4° Such an approach was clearly greeted with dismay by Cecil at
Geneva and he instructed Tufton to write to Tyrrell seeking a change in the
Foreign Office position. The basis of Cecil's argument was quite straightforward:
in making such a reservation the Government was acting against the
unanimously agreed decision of the League Assembly of 1922 to issue
Adm1 16/2 184: FO memorandum, 'Extension of the principles of the
Washington Naval Treaty, 26 June 1923
37Ibid.
Adm1 16/2 184: League of Nations. Temporary Mixed Commission for the
Reduction of Armaments. Memorandum by the Secretariat, 9 July 1923
39AdmI 16/2 184: FO memorandum for Cecil, 'Extension of the principles of the
Washington Naval Treaty', 27 August 1923
1bid.
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invitations to both League and non-League members. 4' As Tufton himself had
previously pointed out when trying to persuade his Foreign Office colleagues to
take a more positive and supportive attitude on this issue, the British delegation
to the 1922 Assembly had 'pressed acceptance of the resolution strongly'. Cecil
was certainly very keen that the proposed Conference should take place and he
asserted not only that it was difficult to see how it could harm British interests
but also that 'the Admiralty themselves are most anxious for the proposed
conference to be held'. 43 These arguments proved sufficiently powerful to
prompt a change of view within the Foreign Office because on 11 September,
Tyrrell wrote to Cecil informing him that Curzon no longer required him to
make the reservation regarding the British position concerning the proposed
naval Conference.
The support which Cecil and Tufton gave to the Admiralty's proposal to
extend the principles of the Washington Treaty to non-signatory Powers was
strongly opposed by Crowe who considered that the entire project was doomed
to failure from the outset. Throughout the period from 1918 until his death in
1925, Crowe showed himself to be a trenchant critic of all arms control and
limitation initiatives, especially those advanced through the League. In mid-1923
he was intensely critical not only of the proposal to extend the principles of the
Washington Treaty but of the Treaty itself:
That agreement does not infact [sic] exist in an operative form. It
has never been ratified, and it looks as if it possibly never will be.
At best it deals with a small corner of the naval problem. So far
41 Adml 16/2184: letter from Tufton to Tyrrell, 30 August 1923
42F0371/8481: memorandum by Tufton, 9 April 1923
43Adml 16/2184: letter from Tufton to Tyrrell, 30 August 1923
Adm1 16/2184: letter from Tyrrell to Cecil, 11 September 1923
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as it has been - prematurely - put into execution by our
Admiralty, it has already led us into serious difficulties. Any
extension of it will undoubtedly give rise to more. Like all plans
of so-called disarmament, it is far from satisfactory.45
Crowe was, of course, wrong as regards ratification of the Washington Treaty,
but his criticism of the Admiralty is striking. Crowe questioned whether the
Washington Treaty would have been negotiated had it not been for Britain's
desire to save money and 'a suspicion that capital ships might prove to be, under
conditions of modern warfare, a bad investment'.
The British Government was undoubtedly concerned about the cost of
maintaining its naval position but Crowe's observation about the value of capital
ships was strikingly at odds with Roskill's assessment of the Washington Treaty.
Roskill asserted that, despite developments in air power, 'British and American
official naval opinion was however firmly wedded to the belief that the capital
ship was still the backbone of the fleet and the basis of seapower; but in both
countries there was a strong desire to press ahead with the development of
aircraft carriers - even though their aircraft were still regarded only as auxiliaries
to the big guns of the capital ships.' 47 The Admiralty's backing for an extension
of the principles of the Washington Treaty appeared to give support to Roskill's
assessment: it was because they continued to attach importance to capital ships
that they wished to extend control of this class beyond the Washington Powers
and they considered that the best way of so doing was through a disarmament
process under the auspices of the League. Although there was clearly more to
45F0800/243: memorandum by Crowe, 24 June 1923
FO8OO/243 : 'Note on Lord R.Cecil's Scheme of Guarantee Treaties and
Disarmament' by Crowe, 25 June 1923
47Roskill, op.cit., p.322
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naval arms limitation than the question of capital ships, they were important and
Cecil was surely nght to argue that Britain's interests could not be harmed by
supporting such a process. There is no intention in this chapter to argue that the
process could have been successful but the lukewarm Foreign Office response
was an attempt to close the door too early and for no good reason. Crowe
perceived a dangerous world in which it was inappropriate for Britain to
continue its advocacy of disarmament:
It is not good policy to take part in advocating measures which
are not likely to be found workable or to meet with acceptance.
Such an attitude only tends to inspire mistrust and evoke
suspicions of the promoters being moved by selfish interest. The
wiser policy is to allow matters to develop on the natural lines of
progress; to devote thought and energy to the solution by
peaceful means of particular difficulties as they arise instead of
dogmatising on universal panaceas; to endeavour, gradually, by
fair dealing, by the creation of useful precedents, by the
formation of international habits, to build up a general feeling of
reliance on pacific methods to ensure that in the settlement of
differences which inevitably arise between States, justice rules
and right prevails.
It can be argued that, in pressing for the most wide-ranging discussion of the
extension of the principles which governed the Washington Treaty, men such as
Cecil, Segrave and Tufton were seeking to establish just these useful precedents
FO8OO/243: 'Note on Lord R.Cecil's Scheme of Guarantee Treaties and
Disarmament' by Crowe, 25 June 1923
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and international habits; but this policy received little support from senior
decision-makers within the Foreign Office.
Curzon's decision in September 1923 to remove the reservation
regarding a possible international Conference on naval disarmament meant that
Cecil was able to support positive resolutions on this issue at the Council
meeting of 20 September. The PAC was instructed to consider the question of
extending the scheme to non-League members and to reconsider the draft
Convention 'with a view to its universal acceptance from a naval technical point
of view'. 49 In recommending reconsideration, the President of the Council,
Antonio Salandra, was taking due account of the Brazilian and Spanish
opposition which had been voiced previously in the PAC. He held that it was
important for the success of the international Conference that the draft
Convention, which was to be the basis of discussion, should command the
widest possible support from naval experts.5°
The initial opposition to the draft Convention of the Spanish and
Brazilian representatives on the Naval Sub-Commission of the PAC was a
powerful reason for the Council to proceed to organize the full Conference
rather than inserting a second round of technical discussion involving more naval
experts. The Council decided, however, on just such a second round of technical
discussion and in October the Secretary-General of the League informed the
Foreign Office that the PAC had decided to hold a meeting for this purpose on
21 January 1924.' This meeting was threatened by the assassination in
Switzerland of Vorovsky, joint head, with Foreign Minister Chicherin, of the
49Adml 16/2 184: Report to the Council of the League of Nations by Salandra, 17
September 1923
50Ibid.
51 Adml 16/2 184: letter from Drummond to the FO, October 1923
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Soviet delegation to the Lausanne Conference. 52
 The Soviet Union declared that
it would only attend the PAC meeting if it were not held in Switzerland. This
was of considerable concern to Cecil because he considered that the attendance
of the Soviet Union was crucial to the success of the meeting but he did not
want the Swiss Government to be offended. 53 Both London and Paris were
suggested as possible alternatives but circumstances resulted in Rome being the
new venue. This was because the Italian member of the Naval Sub-Commission,
Admiral Acton, had recently been made Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Navy
and his appointment would make it difficult for him to be away from Rome. As
neither the Foreign Office nor the Admiralty had any objections to meeting in
Rome, it was decided that the Conference of the Naval Sub-Commission should
take place there no earlier than 14 and no later than 29 February 1924.M The
delegates assembled on 14 February and their discussions were presided over by
the Swedish representative, Admiral de Riben, and were held in private.55
In certain respects the Rome Naval Conference was a rather strange
gathering. First, although its purpose was focused on naval disarmament
amongst those Powers which had not signed the Washington Treaty, the draft
Convention on which it was based was the work of those League Powers which
were signatories to this Treaty. Second, while the draft Convention which had
been produced by the PAC did not envisage the inclusion of Britain, France,
Italy and Japan, as members of the PAC these Powers were clearly entitled to be
present and to vote on any proposals put before the Conference. Third, it was
required to confine its work to technical naval issues yet, as one contemporary
52Northedge, The Troubled Giant, pp.206-207
53AdmI 16/2 184: telegram from Cecil to the FO, 18 December 1923
FO371/9597: letter from Drummond to the FO, 10 January 1924
55F0371/9597: letter from the British Embassy in Rome to the FO, 15 February
1924
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appreciation of the Conference has observed, 'the Commission had before it
matters which were not only naval but political, each inseparable from the other,
and the dividing line of which is as incapable of definition as the stage at which a
kitten becomes a cat'. It was these political questions which ultimately stood in
the way of general agreement at Rome and would have to be resolved before a
treaty extending the principles of the Washington Treaty won general approval
from non-signatory Powers possessing capital ships.
One difficulty was the inadequate representation of the Powers. In this
respect the Turkish Government failed even to reply to the invitation to attend
the Conference - although, as the Treaty of Lausanne had not as yet been
ratified, it was still technically at war with the Allied and Associated Powers. In
addition, the Argentinian and Uruguayan representatives stated at the outset of
the Conference that their Governments had instructed them not to take part in
the discussions although they remained in attendance as observers. The most
important difficulty, however, identified by Eduard Benes in a report to the
Council, was the continuing division between those Powers which wanted
simply to extend the two principles of the Washington Treaty, namely, laying
down the tonnage of capital ships on the basis of the status quo and establishing
a holiday in capital ship construction, and those which wanted naval limitation to
be based on Article 8 of the Covenant which would mean determining the size of
each State's Navy according to an assessment of its national security needs.57
The latter approach inevitably meant that the Conference would be unable to
remain within its terms of reference and limit its discussions to the technical
aspects of naval disarmament. Instead it would stray into political matters which
NBKR 4X168 : 'An Appreciation of the Rome Naval Meeting', undated
memorandum, signature illegible
57F041 1/1: Report to the Council of the League by Benes, June 1924
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the representatives were not competent to determine. This was most marked in
the case of the Soviet Union's representative, Eugene Berens, who, 'while an
expert, was also in some ways a plenipotentiary, as he put forward proposals
some of which were purely political, and was evidently in direct consultation
with his Government during the sittings'. It applied also, though, to several
other Powers and contributed to reserves being made by seven Powers as
regards the draft Convention.
The draft Convention initially drawn up by the PAC had laid down as the
criterion for fliture limitation of capital ship building the status quo as at 12
November 1921. At Rome, however, only Denmark, the Netherlands and
Norway were prepared unequivocally to agree to this principle. In contrast, the
representatives of Brazil, Spain and the Soviet Union sought to create a situation
whereby each State would be able to fix its own tonnage guided by an
assessment of its own defence requirements. They even suggested that the
attempt to reach an agreed criterion should be dropped and that the capital ship
tonnage required by each State should be put into the draft Convention. As was
pointed out, however, 'if such a proposal were agreed to it meant that the
meeting was entirely objectless [sic], and that the result might much more
economically have been achieved by each Power informing Geneva by letter of
its tonnage requirements'.59
In practice, the representatives were forced by the lack of an agreed
criterion to consider and vote upon the tonnage demands put forward by each
State. Accordingly, the Soviet representative, Berens, put forward a total capital
ship tonnage for his country of 490,000 tons, vastly in excess of the 175,000




tons suggested by Segrave in his proposal by which it would become a party to
the Washington Treaty. Berens argued that, because its capital ship tonnage at
the time of the Conference was 340,538 tons, the Soviet Union should have the
right to lay down new construction. Politically, however, the demand was
unacceptable because it would establish the Soviet Fleet as the third most
powerfiul in the world; thus it was rejected by six votes to four - the four
Washington Powers together with Brazil and Sweden voting against - with five
countries abstaining.60
Berens then put forward the much reduced figure of 280,000 tons for
the Soviet Union but this was dependent on five political conditions, notably that
the implementation and supervision of the Convention should be supervised by
some organization other than the League, that the Bosphorous and Dardanelles
were closed to warships and that the Korean Straits were demilitarized. 61 These
demands went so far beyond the specifically technical competence of the
Conference that the delegates unanimously agreed that they could not consider
them.62 The demands also went far beyond what was politically achievable. The
agreement concerning the Dardanelles made at Lausanne the previous year
meant that there was no prospect of this Soviet condition being met and its
continued opposition to the League was unacceptable to the other Powers
represented at the Rome Conference.
60NBKR 4X168: 'League of Nations. Naval Sub-Commission of the Permanent
Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions. Extension to Non-
Signatory States of the Principles of Washington for the Limitation of Naval
Armaments. Report to the Council', 29 February 1924
61Ibid.
62Ibid.
63Dockrill, ML. and Gould, J.D. Peace without Promise - Britain and the Peace
Conferences. 1919-23 (London: Batsford, 1981), pp.238-239
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The Soviet Union was not the only State whose naval demands presented
difficulties. Although the Spanish won agreement for 105,000 tons of capital
ships, its demand to be allowed new construction in 1927, 1929 and 1931 so
that it could build up to this figure from the 81,072 tons it possessed at the time
of the Conference, was rejected. Spain's demand for this new construction meant
that it was not, in practice, prepared to accept the principle of a naval holiday, a
fact which the Belgian, Czech and Japanese representatives stated they had not
realized when voting in favour of the figure of 105,000 tons. As a result of these
votes, Spain's representative declared that it would accept no limitations on its
Navy other than those compatible with Article 8 of the Covenant. At the close of
the Conference, however, the Spanish position was modified. In a note in
defence of his country's position the Spanish representative declared that Spain
had been prepared, without reservation, to limit its Navy to 105,000 tons and
that it would accept a temporary limit of 82,000 tons if the other riparian Powers
of the Western Mediterranean were prepared to do likewise.
The Spanish representative's reference to his country's willingness to
accept the higher tonnage limit 'without reservation' was intended to place it in a
favourable light compared with several other Powers. Brazil and Chile, for
example, were only prepared to accept a limit of 80,000 tons of capital ships if
Argentina did the same, while Greece made its acceptance of 36,000 tons
conditional upon Turkey agreeing to the same tonnage and retaining the three
capital ships which it - Turkey - then possessed. In addition, Sweden accepted
60,000 tons only as long as the other nparian States of the Baltic agreed not to
NBKR 4X168: League of Nations. Naval Sub-Commission of the Permanent
Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions. Extension to Non-
Signatory States of the Principles of Washington for the Limitation of Naval
Armaments. Report to the Council', 29 February 1924
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exceed the same tonnage in the Baltic and Arctic Seas. These reservations
reveal the quite specific regional concerns which influenced these Powers. Brazil
and Chile were markedly inferior to Argentina in capital ship strength but they
wished to assert their right to equality. In the Balkans the Greeks were focused
on the threat posed by Turkish nationalism and the Swedes recognized the much
greater presence in the Baltic of the Soviet Fleet.
On the surface, the number of votes taken on tonnage to be allocated to
the Powers and on the exceptions to the application of a naval holiday until
1931, together with the non-attendance of Turkey, the non-involvement of
Argentina and Uruguay and the unrealistic demands of the Soviet Union,, appear
to justi1r the discussions at Rome being described as a Conference which
'bordered on farce'. If this were the case, however, consideration of the issue
would not have continued within both the Admiralty and the Foreign Office in
the months between the end of the Conference and the Fifth League Assembly in
September 1924. In particular, it should be emphasized that the Rome
Conference was a technical gathering, not a Conference where the
representatives carried plenipotentiary powers to make political decisions. It was
a gathering which could be - and 	 - used, by all Powers, to gain an insight
into the policies and projected demands of other Powers, more especially
potential enemies and rivals.
In this context it is perhaps surprising that historians have ignored the
altogether more sanguine judgements of some well-informed contemporaries,
and in particular those whose critical gaze was not distorted by lenses coloured
in favour of League disarmament initiatives. For example, on 4 March 1924
65Thid and NBKR 4X/68 : 'An Appreciation of the Rome Naval Meeting'
undated memorandum, signature illegible
Towle, op.cit.. p.!36
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Britain's new representative on the Naval Sub-Commission of the PAC, Rear
Admiral Aubrey Smith, provided a rather optimistic assessment of the
proceedings.67 He considered that the discussions had been held in a friendly
atmosphere and that it was apparent that 'the majority of the countries
represented did not desire and, in fact, could not afford to build any capital
ships, but their national pride (in the case of the South American States a vely
powerfiul factor) would not allow their representatives to subscribe to any
conditions which imposed this limitation'. Aubrey Smith did not consider this to
be an obstacle to further progress on the issue and he thought there was a real
possibility of being able to hold a fill international Conference as had been
originally intended. He recognized, however, that Turkey would have to be
persuaded to attend such a Conference and that pressure would have to be
placed on the Soviet Union so that it would 'accept a maximum tonnage which
will admit of the countries bordering on the Black Sea and Baltic removing their
reserves'. It is, of course, the case that none of this happened and, therefore, it
is easy to criticize Aubrey Smith for excessive sanguinity. Yet within the
Admiralty, Aubrey Smith's position received some influential support from
Captain Dudley Pound, Director of the Plans Division, who was undismayed by
the failure to reach any agreement at Rome. He had not expected agreement7°
and so, in his view, 'this failure to agree is consequently not considered
necessarily to prejudice the success of a diplomatic conference if one is held
later, nor to make the holding of such a conference impracticable'.7'
67F041 1/1: report by Aubrey Smith, 4 March 1924
Ibid.
Ibid.
' Admll/2184: minute by Pound, 11 October 1923
71 Adml 16/2185: minute by Pound, 25 March 1924
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At this stage, the path from Rome to a full diplomatic Conference was
not clear. The purpose of the Rome Conference had been to reconsider the draft
Convention drawn up in 1922 with a view to its unanimous acceptance from a
technical point of view so that it could then form the basis of a full international
naval disarmament Conference. The failure to reach agreement at Rome did not
prevent the convening of a second technical Conference, a further meeting of the
Naval Sub-Commission supplemented by representatives of Powers from outside
the League which possessed capital ships. Indeed, on 14 March the Council
decided to send all States a copy of the report of the Rome Naval Conference
and ask their opinion as to whether a second technical conference should in fact
be held. 72 The Admiralty and the Foreign Office were in full agreement that this
was inappropriate so there was no delay in responding with a firm rejection of a
second technical meeting.73
On 16 June the Council decided to place the matter of extending the
principles of the Washington Treaty to non-signatory Powers before the Fifth
Assembly of the League to enable it 'to define the essential principles on which a
general conference on the limitation of naval armaments might be based'. 74 This
Council decision led to discussion within the Admiralty as to how best to
approach this issue at the forthcoming League Assembly. Rear Admiral Maurice
Fitzmaurice, Director of Naval Inteffigence, argued in favour of abandoning the
status quo as a principle on which the naval armaments of the lesser Powers
might be based and instead fixing the size of their Fleets 'strictly in accordance
with what is necessary for their naval security'. 75 Doubtless drawing on his
72F0371/9597: extract from the 8th meeting of the 28th session of the Council
of the League of Nations, 14 March 1924
73F0371/9598: letter from Cadogan to Drummond, 11 April 1924
74F041 1/1: letter from Drummond to the FO, 25 June 1924
75Adml 16/2185: minute by Fitzmaurice, 3 July 1924
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experience of the Rome Naval Conference, Aubrey Smith rejected this
suggestion on the ground that it 'will provoke endless discussion, probably lead
to claims to increase armaments, and further, some of the Powers signatories to
the Washington Treaty may protest that their position has been compromised'?6
Aubrey Smith was acutely aware that it was not only those Powers with capital
ships which were interested in the issue and that any attempt to base naval
strength on national security would make it difficult to exclude lesser naval
Powers from the discussions. The Roumanian Government had previously
argued that its interest in the Black Sea meant that it should have been invited to
participate in the Rome Conference and the Belgian representative, who did
attend the Conference in his capacity as a PAC member, despite his country
possessing no capital ships, introduced a reservation to the effect that it wished
to acquire four monitor class ships which would be less than 10,000 tons but
which would carry guns in excess of 8 inches but less than 16 inches.77
In his report on the Rome Conference, Aubrey Smith had urged caution
about holding a second such Conference as it was possible that 'the result will be
the creation of more navies, and we thus arrive at a paradox, the conference to
limit naval armaments results in an increase in navies'.' 8 This careful approach
emerged as Admiralty policy and in late July a letter from Alex Flint to the
Foreign Office stated its opposition 'to the elaboration of any statistical or other
scheme which will purport to take account of the necessities of the naval
security of each State' on the simple ground that it would not be possible to
'6Adml 16/2 185: minute by Aubrey Smith, 4 July 1924
"NBKR 4X/68: teague of Nations. Naval Sub-Commission of the Permanent
States Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions. Extension to
Non-Signatory States of the Principles of Washington for the Limitation of
Naval Armaments. Report to the Council', 29 February 1924
'FO41 1/1: report by Aubrey Smith, 4 March 1924
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achieve. 79 Instead the Admiralty held to its policy of the status quo and a naval
holiday. At the same time, the Admiralty insisted that these principles had to be
applied flexibly so that where adjustments to the status quo were necessary - in
Latin America, for example, where it was clear that equality between Argentina,
Brazil and Chile would have to be established - exceptions could be made.8°
By the summer of 1924, the enthusiasm of the Admiralty for the scheme
which Segrave had put forward some two and half years before was cooling.
Henceforward, their preferred option was 'to avoid any definition of principles,
since agreement is likely to be very difficult' 8' and this Admiralty advice was
incorporated within the memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office for
Britain's delegate to the Fifth League Assembly, Lord Parmoor, but at this stage
the situation was changing rapidly both in London and Geneva. In London, the
policy of the new Labour Government towards naval disarmament had not yet
been not worked out, and the lines of communication between MacDonald,
Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, and officials within the Foreign Office
were anything but clear. At Geneva, although the Assembly had been requested
by the Council to set out the principles on which an international Conference for
naval arms limitation might be based, in other words, to do what the Rome
Conference had failed to do, there was considerable doubt as to whether this
could be achieved, with the result that the League apparently began to seek a
new basis for a Conference, which was to be one not merely for the extension of
the principles of the Washington Treaty but 'a general conference on naval
armament'.
79Adml 16/2185: letter from Flint to the FO, 25 July 1924
80Ibid.
81Ibid.
FO371/9598: undated, unsigned minute from the American Department
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The situation was further complicated by indications that further
initiatives towards general disarmament were expected from the US Government
and even from MacDonald himself Officials within the American Department
were expecting the British Prime Minister to make a broad-ranging statement
about disarmament although, on 27 August, Ronald Ion Campbell wrote that
'On another paper the Prime Minister has said that it is not his intention to do
83 In this changed situation, the American Department thought it would be
better if the League dropped the matter of naval disarmament as a separate
concern, so that it could be incorporated into discussion of the whole question
of disarmament either at a Conference which it was thought the US Government
intended to call, or as a result of an initiative at Geneva. Although little could be
expected from the US Government, Tyrrell expected that Calvin Coolidge
would be elected as President and he - Tyrrell - wanted 'to avoid any scheme
which would make [American] participation more difficult or impossible'. 84 In
this respect, any further League initiative on the lines discussed at the Rome
Conference would cause very serious problems with the USA, unless the Soviet
Union was excluded. This was primarily because the USA did not recognize the
Soviet Union and thus would not consider inviting the Soviet Union to sign a
protocol to the Washington Treaty.85 The only way out of the impasse appeared
to be a new initiative whose appearance was expected but whose shape was then
unknown. This is, in fact, what happened, although it would be almost two years
- 18 May 1926 to be precise - before the League's Preparatory Commission for
the Disarmament Conference convened in Geneva.
83F0371/9598: minute by Campbell, 27 August 1924
84F0371/9598: minute by Tyrrell, 21 August 1924
85Adml 16/2 185: minute by Flint, 8 March 1924
For an analysis of the origins of the Preparatory Commission see Richardson,
op.cit., pp.29-Si
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In assessing the Rome Conference, Roskill has made the error of
describing it as the international Conference which the Third League Assembly
in 1922 wished to summon so as to achieve a treaty by which the principles of
the Washington Treaty could be extended to the non-signatory Powers. It was
actually a preparatory meeting which was intended to provide a basis for such a
Conference. As such it failed and ultimately the responsibility for this failure
must rest with the decision of the TMC to include those Powers which stood
outside the League. If the TMC had been prepared, in the first instance, to seek
agreement only between those League Powers which were not signatories to the
Washington Treaty but whiJi did possess capital ships, the outcome of the
Conference might have been different. Three of these States - Denmark, Norway
and the Netherlands - were willing to accept the status quo and the principle of
the naval holiday in capital ship building. There was also 'the germ of an
agreement between the three South American states', Argentina, Brazil and
Chi1e. If these six Powers had been prepared to sign a Convention based on the
draft drawn up by the PAC in July 1922, disarmament, as understood in this
thesis, would have been stimulated and the authority of the League strengthened.
The TMC's determination, however, to include the Soviet Union in the
discussions at Rome, despite its refusal to recognize the League, resulted in the
discussions being dominated by its extreme demands. Having decided to extend
the proposed naval Convention to non-League powers it would not be an easy
task to exclude the Soviet Union from the process but there was clearly no
prospect of it accepting a settlement based on the Washington principles. It is
deeply ironic that this initiative, which might have stimulated disarmament, was
Roskill, op.cit.. pp.426-427
NBKR 4X/68: 'An Appreciation of the Rome Naval Meeting' , undated
memorandum, signature illegible
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put forward and supported for so long by the Admiralty and yet ultimately
pushed beyond any prospect of realization by the more determined advocates of
disarmament at Geneva, including Cecil.
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Chapter 7 - The Problem of Land and Air Disarmament:
In 1922 the TMC was galvanized into action not only by the work of
Admiral Segrave but also by that of two new British members, Viscount Esher
and Lord Robert Cecil, who put forward initiatives for land and air disarmament.
Although the Great War had seen a veiy extensive development of air power and
the emergence of separate Government departments for its organization, there
continued to be close co-operation between air and land forces. In the early
1920s it was argued, therefore, that 'air forces must be considered as an integral
part of the land armies, and agreements as to the reduction of land armaments
must also cover the air services, which are organised in connection with these
armies'.' This analysis underpinned the Esher and Cecil proposals which, like the
scheme to extend the principles of the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty to
non-signatory Powers, constituted what Salvador de Madariaga, Director of the
Disarmament Section at the League of Nations from 1922-27, has referred to as
'the direct or technical method' of achieving disarmament. 2 This stems from the
conviction that arms races cause wars and that it was logical, therefore, to seek
to discover technical means by which disarmament might be achieved so as to
reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of war. Opposed to this is the indirect
method of achieving disarmament which starts from the assumption that the
threat of war causes arms races and argues that the correct approach is to seek
solutions to the political problems which lead to wars. 3
 It is significant that at the
same time as he proposed a direct method of achieving land and air
disarmament, Cecil also put forward a different scheme, the draft Treaty of
'CTA14O: 'Note on relation of air warfare to the reduction of land armaments',




Mutual Guarantee (1MG), which attempted to combine the direct and indirect
methods to achieve general disarmament. The importance attached to the 1MG
resulted in the Esher plan being dropped and Cecil's initiative regarding land and
air disarmament being pushed into the background. This was unfortunate for the
cause of disarmament as a combination of the Esher plan and Cecil's proposals
for the limitation of land and air arms offered a genuine prospect of progress.
The treatment of Esher's proposal by both contemporaries and historians
is of considerable interest. Segrave's scheme for the extension of the principles
of the Washington Treaty to non-signatory Powers has largely been ignored by
historians, as was shown in the previous chapter, even though it was still being
discussed within the League as late as 1924. By contrast, Esher's land
disarmament scheme received very little support within the League or from
leading British decision-makers and by autumn 1922 it had been superceded by
Cecil's proposal for a 1MG. Yet, despite its short life, it has been treated by
historians as a serious element in the attempt to achieve disarmament through
the League of Nations. In her study of international disarmament Kitching has
given some attention to possible explanations for the failure of the Esher plan.4
Madariaga asserted that it was rejected because it dealt only with land forces and
the French and Italians were not prepared to separate land and naval
disarmament. 5 Kitching was rightly unconvinced by this argument because, only
a few weeks before Esher put forward his initiative, the French and Italians dealt
separately with naval armaments at the Washington Conference.6 Instead she
followed Esher's two biographers in accepting the veracity of Esher's own





withdrew his plan because Cecil was so determined to press ahead with the
TMG.7
More important than these considerations of why the plan failed is
Towle's assessment of its wider significance. Although he considered that its
acceptance could only have been temporary because it placed the German Army
in a position of inferiority measured against that of France, he believed that it
could have had a beneficial effect on relations within Europe:
Nevertheless, acceptance of the Esher plan might, for a few years,
have turned attention away from the vexed question of the
correlation of forces in Europe. The Esher proposal was the most
realistic British paper on land disarmament in the inter-war years.
Nor is that very surprising ; Esher was the only British strategist of
such distinction who applied his mind to the problem at the League.
He knew what was possible and what was advantageous. But the
moment, if it ever existed,was lost.8
Towle asserted that the plan failed because the other TMC members were 'either
too limited or contrary' to see its advantages. 9 There is much truth in this
judgement but it is not entirely satisfactory because it fails to offer a reasoned
consideration of the TMC's reaction to the Esher plan, it takes no account of the
opinions expressed within the League Council and the PAC or by the decision-
makers of the principal League Powers and it ignores the possibility of linking
7Fraser, P. Lord Esher. A Political Biography (London: Hart-Davis MacGibbon,
1973), pp.402-403; Lees-Milne, J. The Life of Reginald 2nd Viscount Esher.




the Esher plan with Cecil's proposals for land and air disarmament. Richardson
was right, therefore, to point out that there has been no fill-scale analysis of the
plan.'° The purpose of this chapter is to put this omission right.
The period from the end of the Great War to early 1922 offered little
hope of progress for those committed to land and air disarmament as understood
in this thesis. In December 1918 Cecil, commenting on General Smuts' famous
memorandum concerning the forthcoming Peace Conference, stated that the
establishment of quotas of soldiers would, for ten years at least, be 'perfectly
illusoiy' because during this period 'every great nation will have several million
trained soldiers whom they can summon at a moment's notice." He was equally
unconvinced by the idea of quotas of equipment because of the changes which
had taken place in the nature of warfare:
The really important weapons in the next war will be aeroplanes,
steel foundries, and chemical works. All these have peaceflul, as well
as warlike uses. It would be very difficult to control the degree to
which governments rendered them adaptable in advance to war
purposes.'2
These views were, of course, expressed before the establishment of the League
but Cecil's caution was justified by the absence of any significant developments
during the First League Assembly in 1920. From the point of view of
disarmament all that emerged from this First Assembly was the recommendation
'Richardson, D. A History of Disarmament and Arms Control (London:
Routledge, awaiting publication), p.192
"Cecil Papers: ADD5 1076, notes dated 24 December 1918, commenting on a
memorandum by Smuts; F0371/4353: memorandum by Smuts, 'The League of
Nations. A Programme for the Peace Conference', 16 December 1918
'2lbid.
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that Governments should give an undertaking not to exceed for the first two
financial years following the financial year 192 1-22, the sum total of expenditure
on the Fighting Services provided for in their budgets for 192 1-22. This was, in
effect, an attempt to move League members towards arms limitation based on
budgetary means, taking the financial year 192 1-22 as the status quo. Hankey's
draft reply stated that the British Government supported the principle of the
League's recommendation, that it had already effected considerable reductions in
its military expenditure and that it anticipated further economies during the next
two years. Further economies would, however, have to be subject to
reservations regarding expenditure incurred under Articles 8 and 16 of the
Covenant of the League, those dealing with national security and League
imposed sanctions respectively. On 11 May 1921 the Cabinet approved this
reply on the understanding that it 'did not prejudice the liberty of the
Government to make such provision for Imperial defence as might be essential
to our security in the unsettled conditions now prevailing'.' 3 For those who
sought disarmament through the League this response was, for all practical
purposes, meaningless. The British Government had reduced expenditure on
armaments but in so doing it was concerned with domestic economic and
financial considerations and not with a desire to encourage disarmament through
the League. As far as the General Staff was concerned, this process of military
arms reduction had, by October 1921, already gone as far as it could without
endangering the security of the British Empire.' 4 The British approach to land
disarmament was at this stage clearly a combination of the cautious and the
unenthusiastic.
' 3Cab23/25: Cabinet conclusions, Ii May 1921
' 4Cab417: CID memorandum 276-B, 5 October 1921
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A formidable range of technical arguments had also been developed
against air disarmament. The most significant statement of these arguments was
set out in the report of the Committee on Aircraft at the Washington Conference
in December 1921.' This Committee was made up of officers from Britain,
France, Italy, Japan and the US under the chairmanship of Rear Admiral William
Moffett of the US Navy. A key element of discussions in the early 1920s
regarding limitation of air armaments was civil aviation. The difficulty was that,
with aircraft still in the early stages of their development, there was very little
difference between commercial and military aircraft. The Committee believed
that, over time, developments in commercial and military aircraft would diverge
so that it became increasingly difficult to convert civil aircraft for military
purposes.' 6 That stage had not been reached though and this meant that both the
machinery and the personnel of commercial aircraft could then easily be adapted
to military purposes. It followed, therefore, that if there were to be an effective
limitation of military aircraft, there would have to be some limitation of
commercial aircraft too. This, though, was impractical because it would limit the
development of a new means of transport and communication which was likely
to be of increasing benefit both socially and economically. Owing to this, the
Committee concluded that limitation on commercial aircraft would be
disastrous.' 7 The only exception to this was the commercial use of lighter-than-
air-craft or airships because with these there was a strong correlation between
their size and efficiency. To be effective militarily airships would have to be
capable of carrying a significant load at reasonable heights and considerable
speed. Only large airships would be able to do this and their size, like that of
' 5Air51590/S22926: Report on Limitation of Aircraft as to Numbers, Character




warships, meant that their construction could not be kept secret. It would be
possible, therefore, to limit such airships by size and to ensure that the limitation
was adhered to. The problem which the Committee identified was the obvious
one: limitation by size would also affect the commercial use of such airships
because they became increasingly efficient the greater their size.18
As regards military aircraft the Committee considered that there were
five methods which might be employed to ensure the limitation of those which
were heavier-than-air. These methods were limitation by number, amount of
horsepower, lift tonnage, personnel and budget: for each method the Committee
set out what appeared to be conclusive objections. A major difficulty in seeking
limitation by numbers was that the status quo could not be taken as the basis
because different States were at very different stages in the development of their
air forces. Further, air forces were influenced by the size of a nation's land and
sea forces because aircraft largely operated as auxiliaries to these forces. The
nature of a nation's defence policy could also affect its air force. As examples of
this, the Committee suggested that some States would wish to have large air
forces for coastal defence whereas others would use their armies and navies for
this purpose. Some States were substituting air forces for other forms of
defence. This was particularly so in the case of Britain which was developing air
power for controlling its tribal subjects. Although the Committee did not
mention Britain, it did point out that aircraft were being used in this way and
that the size of the air force required would be influenced by the size and nature
of the territories to be patrolled. The number of aircraft which a nation chose to
maintain would also be influenced by its geographic location and the proximity
and strength of its enemies. Even if numbers could be limited, which the
19Ibid.
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Committee thought impossible because it could not see a method by which an
appropriate ratio could be found, this would be insufficient unless the character
of aircraft was also limited. Without limitation of character, States would
compete not in numbers but in the size and power of their military aircraft.'9
The Committee held that any attempt to limit horsepower was doomed
to failure, whether it was focused on the total horsepower in assembled planes or
assembled engines or on the horsepower in a single individual plane of a
particular type. This was because such limitation could only be based on the
cubic capacity of the engines and they feared that a nation would secretly
develop a means by which greater horsepower could be achieved from an engine
of limited cubic capacity. A further problem was that even if limitation by
horsepower could be agreed, it would require such a stringent inspection system
that no Power would be likely to submit to it. The difficulty with lift tonnage
was very similar in that the Committee thought that a nation might be able
secretly to develop a wing shape which offered extreme lifting efficiency. Any
attempt to limit personnel would fail because States organized them differently,
some having separate air forces while others incorporated their air forces in the
military and naval forces. In addition, there were differences in terms of service -
long or short term service, voluntary or conscript - which affected the efficiency
of the air forces and both the size and the efficiency of the reserve forces.
Budgetary limitation would also fail, so the Committee argued, because there
were so many different methods of distributing budgets under different sub-
headings that determining and comparing the sums which were spent on the




Despite these technical arguments against air disarmament and the
generally cautious approach of the British Government, the prospects for land
and air disarmament were not entirely negative. On 25 February 1921 the
Council of the League had authorized the establishment of the TMC, six of
whose members were to be chosen from the PAC. The PAC decided on 1 March
that its six members should be from Brazil, Britain, Spain, France, Italy and
Japan. In response to these League decisions, at a Cabinet meeting on 29 April,
it was determined that Britain should be represented on the TMC by a naval
officer with a militaiy and air deputy. Accordingly, on 3 May the Admiralty
appointed Admiral Sir Somerset Gough-Calthorpe as Britain's representative
with Colonel G.S. Clive and Group Captain Percy Groves his military and air
deputies. 21 The TMC, however, also contained six civilians, one of whom was
HAL. Fisher: at this time Britain only had one representative on the TMC. The
TMC held its first meetings on 16 and 17 July 1921 following which Group
Captain Groves wrote to the Air Ministry enclosing a copy of the minutes of the
TMC meeting. It has already been seen that considerable opposition developed
within the Foreign Office to the activities of the TMC on the ground that it
comprised members who were not responsible to their respective Governments:
Crowe frequently inveighed against Cecil's activities on the TMC for just this
reason. Groves, though, considered Fisher's remarks at this first session of the
TMC to be of interest because they were indicative of the Government's views.
Although Fisher declared that he was not speaking as a member of the British
Government, Groves' assessment is surely correct given that Fisher was a
member of the Cabinet. The striking feature of Fisher's contribution to the
21 Air5/559: undated and unsigned note concerning the resolutions adopted by the
Council of the League on 25 February 1921
Air5/559: letter from Groves to Steel, the Director of Operations and
Intelligence at the Air Ministry, 27 July 1921
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TMC's discussions is that he argued in favour of land and naval arms limitation
being dealt with separately and he put forward the view that budgetary limitation
of land armaments might be possible and that it merited further investigation. As
far as naval arms limitation was concerned, he thought that the way forward lay
through comparison of capital ships. Fisheis assessment was proved highly
perceptive by the fact that within a few months agreement was reached at
Washington to limit naval arms by just such comparison, and that at the League
an attempt was made to achieve land disarmament by employing budgetary
limitation as one of the methods.
This was Fisher's only significant contribution to the work of the TMC
but he played a crucial role in securing the appointment of Esher as his
replacement on the Commission. In December 1921 he wrote to Esher, at Lloyd
George's request, inviting him to serve on the TMC. 24 Fisher bad been the British
representative but he had recently been compelled to resign by pressure of work.
His letter made it clear that the Government wanted Esher to serve on the TMC
because it was thought that his expertise in defence matters might result in a
scheme for arms reduction which would win French acceptance. Initially Esher
was not enthusiastic about taking on this task because on 21 December 1921 he
had dinner with Aristide Briand, the French Prime Minister, whose attitude was
not very encouraging. This prompted Esher to reply to Fisher setting out the
conditions which he considered necessary on the British side if he were to be
able to play a positive role:
Unless the P.M. feels strongly about the whole question: unless a
vigorous attempt is to be made to come to grips with the two
i1bid.
24Esher papers: letter from Fisher to Esher, 17 December 1921
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questions of Disarmament on land, and the limitation of private
Armament production, I fear the whole discussion will range
interminably up and down academic avenues.25
Despite his obvious doubts and his dislike of the President of the TMC, René
Viviani, whaihe described as 'a vain swollen headed fellow', Esher was prepared
to join the TMC and he rapidly put forward a plan which 'cut through the
verbiage of previous discussions'.26
When he joined the TMC, Esher was nearly seventy years old and his
career had provided him with extensive and relevant experience for service on
the TMC. For five years from 1880 he had been the Liberal MP for the
constituency of Penryn and Falmouth, in 1903 he was chairman of the Prime
Minister's committee on the War Office and in 1905 he was appointed a
permanent member of the CID. By the early 1920s Esher was very concerned
about the poor relations between Britain and France and his principal purpose in
accepting Fisher's invitation was the conviction that he might be able to do
something to improve these relations 27
In drafting his land disarmament plan Esher was seeking to act in
accordance with the Second League Assembly's decision to adopt the
recommendation of the Third Committee:
That the Temporary Mixed Commission be asked to make proposals
on general lines for the reduction of national armaments which, in
order to secure precision, should be in the form of a draft treaty or
25Lloyd George Papers: F16/7/76, letter from Esher to Fisher, 21 December
1921.
Ibid. and Richardson A History of Disarmament and Arms Control, p.180
27Lees-Milne, op.cit.. p.336
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other equally definite plan to be presented to the Council if possible
before the Assembly next year.
Esher rejected the idea of a draft treaty on the rather imprecise ground that it
would not be 'profitable' but he thought that the TMC would be able to come
forward with a plan of the type envisaged by the Third Committee. Esher's plan
quite explicitly drew on the Washington precedent of applying armaments
restrictions according to a fixed ratio. In his scheme metropolitan standing
armies would be limited in size on a numerical basis. Esher established units of
men, numbering 30,000, and then allocated to each Power a co-efficient by
which these units would be multiplied to give the number of men allowed to
each Power. The plan applied only to metropolitan military and air units so that
the imperial Powers were able to decide freely the size of the forces they
required for colonial defence. It also excluded reserve or territorial forces but it
included the permanent staffs of such forces together with all permanently armed
police forces. Esher also proposed arrangements which would have made the
PAC responsible for the implementation of this disarmament scheme. The PAC
would be given greater authority in that it would be under a President appointed
by the French Government and it was also to be made responsible both for
reporting infiingments of the plan to the League and for drawing up any military
schemes necessary for the enforcement of the plan. Governments would also be
required to provide air, military and naval attaches appointed by the PAC with
such information concerning armaments as the Commission required.
L1oyd George Papers: F11617/82, Proposals put forward by Lord Esher for
discussion at the next plenary meeting of the Commission, February 1922
9Tbid.
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Although Esher had rejected the idea of drafting a treaty, his scheme
made explicit reference to the necessity of the Powers ratif,ring a treaty which
would fix the ratio of their armed forces. Within six months of such ratification,
the Powers would have to reduce their land and air forces to the levels which
were set out in the final paragraph of Esher's plan. The German, Austrian,
Bulgarian and Hungarian forces were to remain as defined in the relevant Peace
Treaties but figures were provided for all the other European Powers which
were members of the League. France would have the largest land and air forces,
set at 180,000, Poland would have 120,000, Czechoslovakia, Britain, Greece,
Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Roumama and Spain would have 90,000 each,
Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland would have 60,000 and,
finally, Portugal would have 30,000. These limitations were to remain in force
for ten years.3°
Esher was clearly seeking to gain French support by allocating to it the
largest number of forces and placing a strengthened PAC under a French
President. Further, by excluding from the forces to be limited those stationed
overseas there was a greater likelihood of the plan winning the support of the
principal imperial Powers, France and Britain. Esher had, in fact, discussed the
outline of his plan with French military officers 'who nearly had a fit' but then
gave their provisional agreement when they saw the figures arrived at under the
ratio. 31
 He had not, however, had any talks with British officers about his
proposals and his comment to Fisher - 'I cannot imagine what ir W.O. will say
- indicated that he expected opposition from this source. 32 There were signs,
though, at this early stage, of significant political support for Esher in Britain.
30Ibid.
31 Lloyd George Papers: F16/7/81, letter from Esher to Fisher, 21 February 1922
32Ibid. Underlining original
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Fisher wrote expressing his satisfaction that Esher had 'launched a plan for
reduction on a big scale' because this would provide the next League Assembly
with a 'signe de vie' from the TMC. 33 At this time Hankey also appeared very
encouraging and gave every impression of wanting to see the League take the
initiative in international disarmament discussions:
I have not had time to get in touch with your work yet, but I hope to
do so shortly. My view is that the League of Nations should take up
the whole of the work of the Washington Conference on armaments
and apply it throughout the world. Thus, the principles of the Naval
Agreement should be extended to the Powers who did not take part
in the discussions on armaments at Washington and all the nations
which are members of the League should be asked to agree to the
Poison Gas Resolutions and any other of the same type. I only throw
this observation out for you to think about. I also made the same
suggestion to Eric Drummond.'
Hankey's deputy as Cabinet Secretary, Thomas Jones, was also in
communication with Esher and he described the plan as 'admirable'. 35 This
support soon cooled, however, in the face of opposition from other Powers,
opinion within the League and the War Office.
It is remarkable, in view of Esher's close connections with leading British
politicians and officials, that even in mid-March 1922 the Foreign Office had no
details of his scheme and had to write to the Cabinet Office seeking further
33Esher Papers: 5/59, undated letter from Fisher to Esher
Esher Papers: 19/5, letter from Hankey to Esher, 27 February 1922.
35Esher Papers: 19/5, letter from Jones to Esher, 21 March 1922
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information before being able to reply to a letter from the Italian Ambassador,
Giacomo de Martino. Dc Martino had written to Crowe asking for the views of
the British Government on Esher's scheme and declaring that the scheme was
unacceptable to the Italian Government. The Cabinet Office reply to Crowe
provided a copy of the Esher plan and suggested that he should write to the
Italian Ambassador distancing the Government from Esher's scheme. It should
be pointed out that the Government had not yet considered the scheme, that
Esher's proposals had not been 'inspired or initiated' by official sources and that
TMC members, other than those representing the PAC, the International Labour
Office and the Provisional Economic and Financial Commission, did not
represent individual Governments and, therefore, had complete freedom of
action. Crowe replied to de Martino in just these terms but this episode
provided Crowe with a further opportunity to minute his dissatisfaction with the
arrangement by which Esher sat on the TMC with complete freedom of action.
Crowe considered that this was a potential source of trouble because others
would regard Esher as a Government representative no matter how strongly the
Government asserted the contraiy.37
Crowe's irritation was entirely justified but the nature of Esher's position
enabled the Government initially to give some informal encouragement to his
disarmament initiative without having to take responsibility for it. Dc Martino's
letter, however, forced the Government's hand. At this stage it could have given
the Esher plan greater official support but this was not forthcoming and,
although the Prime Minister was kept informed about the initiative, it was
discussed neither by the CII) nor the Cabinet. In view of its frequently stated
desire to see agreement on the limitation of land and air forces, the Government
FO371/8317: Cabinet Office letter to Crowe, 23 March 1922
37F0371183 17: minute by Crowe, 28 March 1922
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was unwise to distance itself from the Esher plan so early in its life. There was
little to lose in encouraging ft&rther consideration of the plan and much to gain in
terms of a possible improvement in European relations and a lifting of the threat
of renewed armaments competition. As it was, by detaching itself from the plan
the Government exposed it to serious attack.
First, Eshe?s proposals were considered at the League Council meeting
of 25 March 1922. On this occasion the Italian representative, the Marquis
Guglielmo Imperiali, expressed the opinion that the TMC had exceeded its duty
in proposing a scale of co-efficients for the limitation of land arms. Fisher, who
had remained a Council member, despite resigning from the TMC, agreed with
Imperiali but he did not wish to restrict the freedom of the TMC and he pointed
out that it was up to the Council to decide whether or not to transmit the TMC
plan to Governments and up to Governments to decide whether or not to reject
the plan. Imperiali had support from the French representative, Leon Bourgeois,
but Fisher argued that there was no need to limit the discussions of the TMC as
long as they were kept secret. Fisher's latitudinarian view appears to have won
the day for the Council decided only that its minutes should be transmitted to the
TMC.
The objections expressed by the Marquis Imperiali and the support which
he received from Fisher were used by the Army Council to justifr its rejection of
Esher's proposals. The Army Council's principal objection, however, was simply
that the ratio allocated to Britain did not provide the country with a sufficiently
large military force. Under Esher's plan the Army and Air Force would be
allocated 90,000 men but the Army Council's estimate of the number it required
Esher Papers: 19/7, minutes of a meeting of the Council of the League of
Nations, 25 March 1922.
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for the future, leaving the RAF out of the allocation, was 121,5OO. This Army
Council opposition could not in itself be a valid reason for rejecting the Esher
plan for its very object was to bring about a reduction in land and air forces: it
could not do so if it simply confirmed the numbers of effectives required by the
Army high commands of the various European powers. It could be argued, quite
legitimately, that British military policy was based on the requirements of
imperial defence and did not take account of the scale of forces maintained by
any other Power. The British Government did, however, wish to bring about a
reduction in armaments, even if that was for primarily internal reasons rather
than because it was committed to a policy of disarmament. This presented clear
problems regarding British military policy which could only be resolved through
the exercise of political will. As has been seen, such political will was
conspicuous by its absence. This meant that if the plan was to have any chance
of survival, it would have to win significant support within the key institutions of
the League. This was not to be and both the PAC and the TMC decided that the
Esher plan was an inappropriate instrument for the achievement of land and air
disarmament.
Although Esher presented his plan at the third session of the TMC in
February 1922, it was not discussed in that forum until the fourth session which
took place in Paris from 3-7 July 1922. Then the TMC decided that Esher's
proposals should be referred both to a technical sub-committee and to the PAC
for further consideration. It was in these two forums that the most important
criticisms of the plan were put forward and one of the most powerful voices
against the plan was that of Colonel Réquin, the French military representative
39Cab4/8: CID memorandum 341-B, 6 May 1922
FO371/8318: resolutions adopted by the TMC at its Fourth Session, 3-7 July
1922
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on the PAC and a member of the TMC. In a paper prepared for the technical
sub-committee established by the TMC, Réquin rejected the idea that it was
possible to assess a country's military strength solely on the basis of its numerical
size in peace time. He did not deny that this was a significant factor but he
argued that there were others which were of equal, if not greater, importance:
The possibilities of organising the whole nation when mobilised, the
military training of all its citizens, the figures of its population, its
land and sea transport facilities, its resources in raw materials, its
industrial capacity and its readiness to adapt its peace-time stores or
natural industries to war purposes - these are the essential factors on
which a nation's military strength depends.4'
Réquin argued that it was inappropriate to apply the Washington formula of a
ratio to the land forces of the European Powers. This was because at
Washington the agreement reached applied only to one element of the Powers'
naval forces, namely, battleships, and the ratio applied 'harmonized with their
respective policies'. 42 By contrast, Requin considered that Esher was seeking to
impose an arbitrary ratio on the European Powers based on a co-efficient which
was not justified on any clear basis:
If some state or other requests to be allowed to retain an army of
90,000, it will not be because three times 30 is 90, but because,




when its national resources have been taken into account, 90,000
will be sufficient for it in its military organisation.43
Réquin attached considerable importance to the fact that naval forces could not
be rapidly expanded following the outbreak of war whereas land forces
underwent considerable and rapid change following mobilisation. Esher's
scheme, by focusing only on the peace time strength of land forces, disregarded
what Réquin considered to be essential, The potential military strength of every
state'. For this reason Requin regarded Esher's thinking as being some one
hundred and fifty years out of date. The plan might have been appropriate in the
eighteenth century, 'in the days when professional armies had an existence
entirely distinct from that of the nation and went to war on the basis of their
peace time armaments, without the rest of the nation taking part', but it had no
relevance to the 1920s. 45 Réquin did not simply expose what he considered to be
the inadequacies of the Esher plan; he also set out a different basis for addressing
the armaments problem. Réquin wished to see the indirect method applied to the
problem of land forces in the early I 920s for he argued in favour of addressing
the relevant political problems:
.it is not a question of fixing a ratio between States, but of
discovering, for each of them, the minimum peace armament
corresponding to its needs and to its responsibilities. These needs





first of all the political problem which must be solved, and its
solution will not be attained by employing a dozen figures or so.
This critique of the Esher plan, coming as it did from the military representative
at Geneva of the League's largest military Power, was bound to exert a
considerable influence on the discussions of the TMC's technical sub-committee
and its report echoed a number of Réquin's observations.
Réquin has been described as 'one of the clearest brains, most determined
wills and most commanding personalities which the peculiar world of Geneva
experts has known'. His criticism of Esher for putting forward proposals based
only on the peace-time strength of an army is flawed, however, in that it was
clearly impossible to limit the militaiy strength of an army once it was mobilized:
a nation at war would use all the resources it possessed to ensure its survival and
would accept no limitation on the expansion of its land and air forces. This was
recognized by the special sub-committee of the TMC which had been set up to
consider the Esher plan. It produced a report based on its meetings in London
from 3-5 August and in Geneva on 30 August 1922. Although the sub-
committee held that Esher was right to focus on the limitation of the peace-time
strength of military forces, at the outset of its report it stated that Esher's
proposals could not be accepted because they were based on arbitrarily chosen
co-efficients and did not take account of the requirements of national safety. An
assessment of a State's national safety had, in the opinion of the sub-committee,
to be based upon estimates of the forces of neighbouring countries which might
pose a threat and of the assistance which might be provided by other States. The
Ibid. Underlining original
47Madariaga, Disarmament, p.95
CTAl39: Report of the Special Committee to the TMC, undated.
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sub-committee nevertheless considered that there was value in seeking, as Esher
had done, to find a means by which the national forces of a State might be
measured. They agreed, however, with Réquin that this could not be achieved
simply by measuring numerical strength alone: account also had to be taken of
the war material available to a nation. This, they considered, was a task for the
PAC, which was also examining the Esher plan, but they did suggest the
possibility of using budgetary assessment as a means of measuring the strength
of an army and, therefore, of the limitation of such strength.49
The PAC's analysis of Esher's proposals was carried out separately by the
Military, Naval and Air Sub-Commissions, each of which met on 30 August
1922 to consider the question, 'Is it possible to find a common measure of the
military forces of the different states in time of peace ?'° Esher's scheme did, of
course, only apply to land and air forces but it was considered by the Naval Sub-
Commission simply to ensure that the PAC's examination was complete. Not
surprisingly, the Naval Sub-Commission answered the question in the affirmative
because the Washington Treaty was based on just the principles that Esher was
seeking to apply to land forces. The Air Sub-Commission took a similar view as
regards lighter-than-air-craft because it held that individual airships could
constitute a common unit of measurement, although the existence of commercial
airships, which could be used for military purposes, would ensure that the co-
efficient was not entirely accurate. 51 In all other respects, however, the Military
and Air Sub-Commissions declared Esher's plan to be unworkable.
The Military Sub-Commission followed Réquin in criticizing the plan for
taking account only of effectives when, in fact, a State's military strength
Ibid.
50CTA169: Report of the PAC on the Draft Scheme for the Reduction of
Annaments proposed by Lord Esher, 1 September 1922
5tIbid.
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comprised a number of other factors, including material and its budgetary
allocation. It also argued that all these factors varied in value from one State to
another as a result of differences in organization and use. This applied even to
the element on which Esher's plan was based, the number of effectives which a
State maintained:
From the point of view of national security, long-service soldiers
have a greater value than conscripts. The former are able to serve as
cadres, while the latter are not. From the point of view of the
maintenance of internal order, on the other hand, they are of equal
value. Furthermore, the total number of men may be temporarily
increased by reservists undergoing their period of training. In
consequence, there is variation in number and in value from the point
of view both of peace and of war.52
As far as military expenditure was concerned, the Sub-Commission argued that
this was subject to very considerable variation according to price differences
between States and variations in the value of gold. Although it claimed that it
would be possible for a technical committee, such as the PAC, to provide an
approximate estimate of a State's military power, the Sub-Commission
concluded that 'no examination of peace strengths would be of value for
purposes of comparison'.53
The Air Sub-Commission had two principal arguments against the Esher
plan. First it set out the reasons why a common unit of measurement for air




aircraft as a unit of measurement because there was considerable variation in
their engine-power and argued that engine-power itself could not be a basis for
comparison on the ground that the method by which it was measured differed
between States. Further, a State's geographical and political location affected the
nature of its air armament so that 'some States would possess a more effective
armament by using light fighting machines than by employing powerful craft
with a wide radius of action'. The Sub-Commission also argued that it would
be impossible to establish a system by which the reserve aeronautical stocks and
spare parts which States possessed could be effectively inspected, yet these were
factors of considerable importance in measuring a country's air power. When it
turned its attention to budgetary methods of assessment, the Sub-Commission
argued that variations in States' budgetting methods meant that it would be
impossible to determine those sums which were being spent on war material.
Further, given the rapid development of air power, States were likely to find it
necessary to spend considerable amounts simply to maintain the effectiveness of
their air forces, without actually increasing the number of militaiy aircraft which
they possessed. The second point which it put forward against the Esher plan
was that it was inappropriate to try to compare States' air forces in peace time
because they could be rapidly expanded in the event of war by the modification
of commercial aircraft. On these bases, then, the Air Sub-Commission followed
its military counterpart in declaring that the Esher plan could not be adopted as a
practical and effective means by which disarmament might be achieved.55
The combined weight of these criticisms from the TMC and the PAC
spelled the end for Esher's plan. Esher himself had been concerned that the




important respects. First, having put his proposals before the TMC in February,
Esher was concerned that a too early discussion of them would upset the French
and thereby exacerbate Anglo-French relations when his principal purpose had
been to do something which would improve these relations. In mid-June 1922,
Esher wrote to Balfour saying that he had heard rumours that the TMC was to
meet later that month and that his disarmament scheme would then be discussed.
He feared that this discussion would not meet with French approval and
therefore wanted it defened. In May, however, the Foreign Office had pressed
for an early meeting of the TMC. 57 This pressure, initiated by Fisher, led the
Council to ask the TMC to meet in the near !ijture: as has been seen, the fourth
session took place in Paris from 3-7 July. Having secured this meeting of the
TMC, the Government could not then ask for it to be postponed and, in any
case, Esher's fears about Anglo-French relations deteriorating because his plan
was being considered by the TMC in Paris were misplaced. He did not represent
the British Government and his proposals were very favourable to France: they
would have the largest Army in Europe and the unrestricted right to recruit more
colonial troops. When Balfour replied to Esher, he explained that discussion of
his proposals by the TMC could not be prevented:
They are formally before the Commission and for good or for evil
probably I think for good, they will certainly be considered. Among
other people, Bob Cecil is, I think determined to raise them.
FO371/8318: letter from Esher to Balfour, 12 June 1922
57F0371/8317: minute by Orde,5 May 1922
FO37l/83 18: letter from Balfour to Esher, 20 June 1922
218
The second reason for Esher's dissatisfaction with the TMC's treatment
of his proposals was the fact that they were submitted to a technical sub-
committee and to the PAC for fhrther consideration. By this time Cecil had
joined the TMC and put forward his plan for a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee
(TMG). It was this proposed Treaty, together with Esher's plan, that the
technical sub-committee of the TMC, under Cecil's chairmanship, was to
consider. Esher clearly thought that this way forward indicated a lack of
enthusiasm both for his plan and for the TMG. He made this quite clear in a
letter to Cecil written at the start of August:
By appointing a purely Technical Sub-Committee the T.M.C.
indicated that the views of the non-Techniciens [sic] were of no
importance in the examination of your plan and mine.59
The attention given to Cecil's TMG within the League over the next two and a
half years suggests that Esher's judgement was not entirely correct but his
opposition to this procedure was certainly not misplaced. In putting forward his
proposals Esher was seeking to move towards disarmament, in terms of both
process and product, but he was under no illusions about the dangers which
would continue to confront the international community. Rather than offering a
panacea, his clear objective was to make war less likely:
The plan for limiting the numbers of established armies on a peace
footing, which bears my name, but of which I do not claim to be the
59Esher Papers: 19/7, Esher to Cecil, 1 August 1922
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inventor60, was put forward to show that a scheme of disarmament
could be practically handled, if the goodwill was there. I have never
contended that to limit armaments was to end the possibility of war.
But I do contend that it brings within narrow limits the possibility of
sudden attack by one nation upon another. For this reason the
experiment is worth trying, always assuming that the people of the
world are serious in desiring to reduce the chances of war.6'
It was for this reason that Esher wished to avoid a situation in which his plan
was subjected to detailed scrutiny by technical experts who would undoubtedly
produce a range of objections that would kill it and destroy any possibility of it
having the ameliorating effects intended by its author. Instead, as Esher
explained in a memorandum which was circulated to members of the TMC, he
wanted the plan to be placed intact before the next Assembly as evidence that
the TMC had responded to the previous Assembly's instructions to come
forward with a treaty or plan for disarmament. He did not, however, want the
plan to be considered at the Assemby: that task should be postponed until
1923 . 62
 Such a procedure would undoubtedly have ensured for it a political
rather than a technical analysis, at least in the first instance. As it was, Esher
believed that the TMC was rushing unnecessarily and that there was, by late
August, insufficient time for the TMC to produce 'a reasoned scheme' for the
opening of the Assembly on 4 September.63
60This was a reference to Major-General Frederick Maurice with whom Esher
had worked on the scheme
6'Esher Papers: 19/7, Esher to Cecil, 1 August 1922
62Esher Papers: 1917, memorandum by Esher, 26 August 1922
63Ibid.
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Although the League did not formally reject Esher's plan, there was little
hope of its making further progress and this resulted in his resignation from the
TMC in January 1923. During 1922 a different but potentially complementary
means of achieving some measure of disarmament emerged." At the TMC
meeting of July 1921, Fisher bad suggested the possibility of budgetary
limitation of armaments and this idea was taken up by Cecil when he joined the
TMC in July 1922. In fact, Cecil had submitted a paper on this subject to the
technical sub-committee which the TMC had appointed to consider both the
Esher plan and Cecil's TMG. As well as submitting his paper on budgetary
limitation to the technical sub-committee of the TMC, Cecil also sent it to Esher
and to Cavan, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, for their comments.65
Cecil's clear intention in proposing budgetary limitation was to achieve
land disarmament through the development of a practical method by which the
amount of armament or material with which armies were equipped might be
limited or reduced. He identified three factors which influenced the strength of
an army: the number of regular troops, the length of service of each man and the
material possessed by the forces. Cecil had no proposals for limiting the length
of service and so he quite explicitly set it to one side. As regards material, he
wanted 'to find some method of limitation which shall be elastic enough to give
governments liberty to construct the weapons they wish to have, but which will
nevertheless effectively limit the total quantity of their armament'. He held that
detailed lists of the sort imposed upon Germany in 1919 would clearly be the
simplest way of achieving limitation but precisely because such lists were not
elastic, Cecil recognized that this approach would be unlikely to win
"Esher Papers: 5/5 9, Law to Esher, 31 January 1923
65W0/32/5941: 'Note on the limitation of the equipment of land armies by the
method of budgetary appropriation', 26 July 1922
Ibid.
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international support. The listing method would only be acceptable as a starting
point. Given that nations would not destroy weapons already possessed, such
weapons or material would have to be listed at the outset of an armaments
agreement. In order to deal with the two elements of military strength which
Cecil thought it was practical to limit, that is, the number of regular troops and
the material they possessed, he proposed what was effectively a development of
Esher's scheme. The number of regular troops would be broken down into units
of 30,000 and each unit would be assigned a fixed annual budgetary
appropriation:
This sum should be spent exactly as each government wishes to
spend it. Some government might prefer to concentrate on one class
of weapon and others on other classes, but their total amount of
equipment would, after their existing stocks are obsolete, be strictly
limited by this budgetary appropriation.67
In defence of this proposal Cecil argued that the weapons purchased by a given
sum of money did not vary from country to country because 'The price of guns,
tanks, aeroplanes etc. depends almost entirely on the price of steel, and the price
of steel is a world price roughly the same in every country'. In military budgets
it would be necessary, Cecil further argued, to separate expenditure on material
from that on the maintenance of regular troops and fortifications. It would not
matter, however, how much Powers spent on the maintenance of such troops, as




ignored on the ground that 'fortifications are purely defensive and cannot be
used for aggressive attack, to prevent which is the object of disarmament'.
Cecil's proposals received very different responses from Esher and the
War Office. Esher had ruled out budgetary limitation when putting forward his
scheme for ratios of men because the cost of personnel differed significantly
from one country to another. He agreed with Cecil, however, that this was not
the case as regards material, which was largely determined by raw material costs.
Although his realism made him aware of the difficulties, he nevertheless
considered that the project was within the realm of practical politics and
therefore worth pursuing:
I am well aware that no plan that can be devised would be proof
against deception and a determination on the part of a nation to
violate its engagements. But given the searchlight of publicity, and
the goodwill of nations to minimize the chances of war, to which the
Prime Minister appealed a few days ago with such invincible
eloquence, I think a plan for establishing a ratio of war material on a
budgetary basis could be devised without much difficulty and I
sincerely hope that this will be the conclusion of your Technical
Committee.7°
By contrast the War Office took a wholly negative position on budgetary
limitation as proposed by Cecil. The War Office files provide no formal written
response from Cavan but there are pencilled comments by an unidentified official
in the margins of the copy of Cecil's paper. At the end of his paper Cecil asked
9bid.
70Esher Papers: 19/7, Esher to Cecil, 1 August 1922
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whether budgetary limitation would give the same amount of armament in every
country, whether military budgets could be divided into separate categories and
whether it would be possible to prevent Powers from secretly transferring funds
from one category to another. The marginal comment next to each question is
simply 'No'.7'
Cecil did not allow the proposal to drop because of this negative War
Office response and in January 1923 he submitted a memorandum to the CU)
which was effectively the same as his original paper. The essential difference is
that he added two questions to the three with which he had concluded the earlier
paper:
4. Is the danger of evasion of obligations greater in connection with
this plan than in connection with any other scheme of limitation
which can be devised?
5. By what methods could such an agreement as this be controlled?72
Cecil's case in persisting with the idea of budgetary limitation was strengthened
by the fact that during the discussions within the TMC concerning the Esher
plan, 'The French representatives pointed out that their experts held that in
estimating the strength of a given military force, only one-sixth must be allowed
for man-power and five-sixths for the materiel with which it is equipped'. 73 In
the next month the War Office did provide a formal written response to Cecil's
ideas regarding budgetary limitation. This came in an appendix to a General Staff
71W0/32/5941: 'Note on the limitation of the equipment of land armies by the
method of budgetary appropriation', 26 July 1922
72Cab4/9: CII) memorandum 393-B, 5 January 1923
"Ibid. Italics original
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memorandum dealing with the proposed TMG. 74 This was not a detailed
response, however, and, rather than answering the questions which Cecil had
posed, it scarcely went beyond restating them. It concluded with four questions,
three of which were the same as those posed by Cecil in his January
memorandum on the subject. The General Staff did, however, raise three
objections to budgetary limitation of material. The first concerned the starting
point for such a scheme. They agreed with Cecil that this would have to be the
status quo but they were clearly unconvinced that Governments would reveal
'not only the extent of their reserve stocks, but also what they hope and trust are
secret appliances and machines'. 75 They were similarly doubtfiul that it was
possible to ignore the differences between countries in the maintenance costs of
personnel because those countries which had to spend more would have less to
spend on material and would thus be disadvantaged compared with those which
could maintain personnel more cheaply. This was not a powerfil argument,
however, because it applied regardless of whether or not there was a
disarmament agreement. Finally, the General Staff challenged the claim that it
was possible to ignore the cost of fortifications on the ground that these were
for defensive purposes only. This was because the building of effective
fortifications could free men for offensive purposes. An additional problem
which they identified was 'the possibility of transforming material intended, or
said to be, for permanent fortifications into material susceptible of use by mobile
troops'.76
The non possumus approach of the War Office and the failure of the
Government to provide political support to the Esher plan and Cecil's scheme of




budgetary limitation which, like Esher's proposals, was not discussed in the
Cabinet or the CID, restricted Britain's options concerning air policy. In the
period 192 1-23 there was increasing concern within the British Government
about the extent to which British air power had fallen behind that of France. 77 At
a CII) meeting in October 1921 during which the forthcoming Washington
Naval Conference was under consideration, Balfour stated that he just been
made aware of the extent of French superiority in the air: at that time they had
47 squadrons to Britain's 3 . Six months later the Secretary of State for Air,
Frederick Guest, drew the attention of the Cabinet to the plans of the French
Government to increase the number of its long-range bombing squadrons from
62 to 140 and he also stated that the French were building 150 per month
whereas Britain was building only 23 per year. 79 At this time a CII) sub-
committee was examining the extent of the continental air threat and Balfour
once more returned to the subject in May 1922 when the sub-committee's report
was before the CID. As Balfour stated, this imbalance was an extremely
worrying situation if viewed from a purely strategic and tactical point of view. It
was the case, however, that the international and diplomatic perspective had to
be taken into consideration: it was 'hardly conceivable' that France would launch
an air attack on Britain. 80 Yet this did not mean that Britain could simply ignore
the growing discrepancy in air power between itself and France. In August 1922
the Cabinet was informed by the CID that the Home Defence Air Force should
be increased to 500 planes, the minimum figure compatible with the country's
safety. It was estimated that this would cost £2m p.a., £900,000 of which could
77 See Ferris, op.cit., pp.126-132 for a discussion of British fears of a French air
menace and Trenchard's cynical use of it to achieve his objectives for the RAF.
78Cab2/3: CII) minutes, 14 October 1921
79Cab23/29: Cabinet conclusions, 15 March 1922
80Cab213: CII) minutes, 24 May 1922
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be obtained by savings on the Air Mlnistiy vote with the remainder coming from
savings on the Admiralty and War Office votes. 8' In order to make the
recommendation even more compelling, 'The Cabinet were reminded that the
present weak position of Great Britain in the air placed us diplomatically at a
great disadvantage vis a vis the French Government'.
A key figure in these considerations was the Cabinet and CU) Secretary,
Maurice Hankey, who saw the air question as one element in a complex equation
which had a wide ranging impact on the financial position of the British
Government and its defence policy. In late July he had circulated to the Prime
Minister, Balfour and Chamberlain a copy of a memorandum which he had
written on the air question and which was shortly to be considered by the CID.
What concerned Hankey was that Britain was pressured, on the one hand, by the
need to counter the French air threat and, on the other, by the need to counter
the US naval threat. If Britain could not provide the resources to deal with both
these challenges, it had to resolve 'not a mere air, naval or military question, but
a tremendous question of Imperial policy'. 84 In short, the Government would
have to chose between inferiority to the US at sea and to the French in the air.
According to Hankey, this dilemma did not have to be faced before there had
been consideration of resolving the basic problem by means of three inter-related
elements. First, he argued that there was scope for a reorganization of the Air
Ministry's budget. His analysis of that budget showed that 77% was spent on
overhead charges, a figure which he thought to be excessive. He suggested that
the Government should allow the Air Ministry an additional £2m on the
condition that they found a further £2m for aircraft out of these overhead
8'Cab23/30: Cabinet conclusions, 3 August 1922
82Thid. Underlining original
%loyd George Papers: F26/2/9, memorandum by Hankey, 28 July 1922
9bid.
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charges. He calculated that the £4m which would thus be made available could
provide 40 additional squadrons. If 2 squadrons were brought home from abroad
and added to the existing 3 squadrons, this would provide a total of 45
squadrons and 'Such a force would at least not be contemptible, and as finances
improve, could be increased'.85
 The second element in Hankey's proposed
approach involved warning the Dominions that the French air menace was so
severe that Britain would have to consider cancelling part of its capital ship
building programme unless the Dominions were prepared to co-operate more
closely with Britain on naval matters. Finally, Hankey suggested using a carrot
and stick approach to France. The stick would take the form of a warning that
Britain would do all that was necessary to achieve equality of air power with
France but as this stick was wielded, Britain should also hold out the prospect of
arms limitation and a pact:
In order to avoid a new and ruinous competition in armaments, we
should propose a definite scale of mutual limitation. This might be
combined with some concession in regard to the French debt, and be
one of the conditions of a pact, if pact there is to be.
Hankey's views are of some interest from the point of view of land and
air disarmament and its relationship to British defence and foreign policy. The
Cabinet Secretary was a significant influence and gave considerable thought to
these matters from an essentially realist point of view. In this instance he was
concerned with the inter-relationship of air arms limitation as a factor in Britain's




Dominions policy on the other. Although he was not approaching the issue from
the perspective of a commitment to disarmament, as defined in this thesis - his
concern was to reach an agreement with France rather than to work towards a
general disarmament agreement throught the League - Hankey nevertheless
considered that the achievement of a scale of mutual air arms limitation was at
least possible. Support at this stage for an initiative combining the Esher and
Cecil proposals on land and air disarmament might, therefore, have made sound
political sense.
Instead, by May 1923 the Govermnent was moving inexorably towards
an increase in the RAF and Salisbuiy was authorized to state in a House of
Lords debate that such a development would 'in all probability be required'. At
this time French troops were occupying the Ruhr following the German failure
to maintain their reparations payments and there was considerable concern
within the Cabinet that French policy might result in armaments competition
between Britain and France. In the following month the Cabinet strengthened
this statement. On 13 June it was agreed that Derby should make an
announcement in the Lords that 'no material further reduction in the total
establishment of the Regular Army would take place' and one week later the
Cabinet took the decision to begin expansion of the RAF so as to provide a
Home Defence Air Force strong enough to protect it from attack by the
strongest air force within striking distance, that is, the French: a strength of 600
first line machines was envisaged. In making these announcements, however,
the Government was still concerned that it should not be seen to be closing the
door on armaments limitation. It was thought that in making his statement,
Derby should point out that Britain had reduced its land forces to the lowest
Cab23I45: Cabinet conclusions, 9 May 1923
Cab23I46: Cabinet conclusions, 13 and 20 June 1923
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level consistent with national safety. This, it was hoped, would avoid 'any
possible setback to the cause of the limitation of arInaments'.° When Baldwin
announced the RAF increases on 26 June 1923, he made a statement which
seemed to go beyond Derby's self-justi!ying nod in the direction of arms
limitation and offered some encouragement to the development of a general
scheme for the limitation of air armaments. He declared that the Government
would co-operate in any such plan that was based on the Washington Naval
Treaty. 9' Neither Derby nor Baldwin was, of course, suggesting any initiative on
the part of the Government and with this announcement of air rearmament, the
moment was lost.
The Esher plan and Cecil's ideas on budgetary limitation of material
meant that there were a few months in 1922 during which it might have been
possible to reach agreement on a basis for the comparison and limitation of
European land and air forces. It is true that the French obsession with security
was an obstacle which would have been extremely difficult, perhaps impossible,
to overcome. The Esher-Cecil proposals were killed too early, however, and the
responsibility rests with both the British Government and the TMC. Despite
wanting an agreement which would limit land and air arms, the British
Government did not maintain a close interest in the initiatives put forward in the
TMC. Instead of using its considerable prestige and influence in favour of
further discussion and negotiation of the Esher-Cecil proposals, it revealed a
crucial lack of political will and imagination. For its part, the TMC made the
mistake, as Esher himself pointed out, of immediately subjecting his proposals to
89Cab23/46: Cabinet conclusions, 13 June 1923
9bid.
91 Air5/3601S.23438: Comments on Proposed Air Staff Memorandum on the
Limitation of Air Armament; Air Staff Memorandum on Limitation of Air
Armament, December 1923
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examination by technical experts, on both the TMC and PAC, whose criticisms
they too readily accepted. Esher's subsequent resignation from the TMC and
Cecil's domination of it meant that the attempt to base a land and air
disarmament agreement on direct methods was effectively rejected and attention
shifted to Cecil's very different initiative, the TMG.
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Chapter 8 - The Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee 1922-24.
Although Cecil had given considerable time to the possibility of
achieving disarmament through the direct method, in the period from mid-1922
until the end of 1923 most of his energies were focused on an attempt to deal
simultaneously with the problems of security and disarmament. He was
convinced that 'without an effective guarantee of security, there could be no
hope of disarmament and that, without a reduction and limitation of armaments,
a guarantee of security was impracticable'. 1 As a result largely of Cecil's efforts,
in late 1923 the League was able to submit a draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance
(TMA) to Governments for their consideration. 2 The TMA was founded on two
schemes presented to the TMC, one by Cecil and one by the French
representative, Colonel Réquin. In neither Cecil's initial proposal nor in the TMA
were there any technical details concerning the means by which armaments were
to be reduced. In this respect it was very different from the Esher scheme and
constituted the first attempt to achieve disarmament by the indirect method.
Unlike the proposals to extend the principles of the Washington Treaty to non-
signatory Powers possessing capital ships and the Esher plan, the TMA received
much attention from decision-makers within the British Government. Their
responses revealed considerable hostility to the scheme and very little
understanding of or support for the principles of disarmament. A treaty of
mutual guarantee would have involved Britain in commitments to the defence of
other Powers, France in particular, and there were few in the Government who
were prepared to give this serious consideration.
1 Cecil of Cheiwood, Viscount A Great Experiment (London: Jonathan Cape,
1941), p.152
2See Appendix 2 for the text of the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance
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On 25 March 1922 the League Council appointed Cecil to the TMC and
he very soon established himself as its dominant personality. 3 At the fourth
session of the TMC, which took place in Paris from 3-7 July 1922, he presented
his proposals to link security and disarmament in a draft Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee (TMG). In so doing, Cecil, like Esher before him, was responding to
a decision of the Leagu&s Second Assembly in 1921. On 1 October it adopted
the report which had been put forward by the Third Committee four days before.
This contained eleven recommendations, one of which invited the TMC to put
forward general proposals for arms reduction 'in the form of a draft treaty or
other equally definite plan, to be presented to the Council if possible before the
Assembly next year'. 4 Unlike Esher, however, Cecil believed that it was practical
to submit such proposals in the form of a draft treaty. At this time Cecil was not
a member of the Government but he sought the assistance of the War Office in
developing his ideas. He received a very discouraging response.
Early in July, shortly after attending the fourth session of the TMC, Cecil
invited the Secretary of State for War, Worthington-Evans, to comment on the
two papers which he had prepared concerning disarmament. The first, Draft
Resolution on the Principles of Disarmament', set out the basis of Cecil's
thinking on the subject at this stage. He held that 'the majority of Governments
would be unable to accept responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments
unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their
countries'. Such a guarantee could be provided through 'a general defensive
agreement between all the countries concerned, binding all or some of them to
provide immediate and effective assistance in accordance with a prearranged
3Cecil Papers: ADD51 110, Drummond to Cecil, 31 March 1922
4F037117056: Report by the Third Committee, 27 September 1921.
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plan in the event of one of them being attacked'. 5 The second paper, 'New
Disarmament Proposals', was an early form of Cecil's draft Treaty. 6 Under this
nations would agree to arms reduction and mutual assistance through the
League in the event of attack. No Power was to be required, however, to
provide such assistance outside its own continent.
The response of the British General Staff to Cecil's proposals was
notably unenthusiastic and based on hard-headed realism. They asserted that
conventional deterrence held the key to national security, not mutual assistance
and the authority of the League:
It has always been accepted that the only satisfactory guarantees
against aggression are, in the case of a powerful State, the
possession of such armed strength, either of its own or by virtue of
an alliance, as would deter any other state or group of states from
attack; or, in the case of a small state, the existence of a powerful
state or group of states pledged to protect it.7
In addition to this rejection of the fundamental premise on which the draft Treaty
was based, they set out two practical military objections. First, in their view
Cecil's idea that a nation's obligation to provide assistance to a State which was
the victim of aggression should be limited to its own continent vitiated the whole
Treaty. This was because the British Empire held possessions across the world.
If Britain were to be attacked by Japan in India or Australasia, it would have to
5W032/5941: Proposals of the League of Nations regarding General
Disarmament and Military Comments on, 15 July 1922
6W032/5941: 'New Disarmament Proposals', 8 July 1922
7W0 32/5941: Proposals of the League of Nations regarding General
Disarmament and Military Comments on', 15 July 1922
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deal with this alone at a distance of more than 3-7,000 miles from its base. This
would, of course, have been the case whether or not there was a treaty of mutual
guarantee. The key issue was that, in the event of conflict between European
Powers, Britain would be required to take action against the aggressor. It was
the case, however, that, by early 1924, there was Dominion opposition to the
TMA. Canada, in particular, had stated that it would not be able to participate in
the Treaty because of the continental limitation. It was both a North American
State and a member of a worldwide Empire and its Government could not see
how these potentially conflicting considerations could be reconciled. 9 At a
meeting with Cecil on 19 June 1924, the Prime Minister, MacDonald, had
argued that such Dominion opposition was a 'fatal bar' to the TMA. Cecil found
this vely difficult to accept and he responded by pointing out that it amounted 'to
a new constitutional rule that this countly can never enter into any engagement
of importance without the assent of each one of the Dominions'. He was clearly
very well aware that arguments against the TMA based on Dominion opposition
were pretexts for those whose hostility to it stemmed from a fundamental
rejection of a disarmament process based on the League.'°
The General Staffs second practical dbjection concerned the proposal
that any State which was a victim of aggression would first have to appeal to the
League for assistance. This would inevitably result in a delay which would place
all the advantages in the hands of the aggressor:
Time is the essential factor in war. Napoleon has said "ask me
anything in war except time". Such a moment is not the time to
8lbid.
9Cab4Il 1: CII) memorandum 488-B, 18 March 1924
'°Cecil Papers: ADD5 1081, Cecil to MacDonald, 23 June 1924
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indulge in the passing of notes and the holding of conferences, only
instant action on a prepared plan will be of the slightest avail.'1
These inter-related issues of delay and the need for pre-arranged military plans
were ones which the War Office continually repeated during the period in which
the draft Treaty was being considered and they were also dealt with by
Worthington-Evans in a letter to Cecil in August 1922. Worthington-Evans
wrote that League action under the Treaty would require military co-operation
in advance to produce plans to deal with all possibilities of attack by one nation
or group of nations against another nation or group of nations. He claimed,
therefore, that British officers might be given the unreal task of preparing
schemes to meet an attack by other signatory Powers on the British Empire. In
his reply Cecil accepted the force of Worthington-Evans objections regarding
the formulation of military plans against possible acts of aggression and pointed
out that they had already been strongly put by the French. He was also able to
tell Worthington-Evans that suggestions for meeting these objections had been
made by a special sub-commission of the TMC, largely the work of Requin.12
This special commission of the TMC met in London from 3-5 August
and in Geneva on 30 August 1922. It argued that there would be two distinct
periods in any war which occurred as a result of aggression after there had been
a general and mutual reduction of armaments. The first period, which it
designated period A, would involve the Powers employing only those forces
which they had been allowed under the arms reduction treaty and would
probably only last for a few months. The second period, period B, would be
"W03215941: Proposals of the League of Nations regarding General
Disarmament and Military Comments on', 15 July 1922
'2CeCi1 Papers: ADD5 1095, Worthington-Evans to Cecil, 11 August 1922 and
Cecil to Worthington-Evans, 14 August 1922
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characterized by the employment of forces mobilized and trained following the
outbreak of war. If the guarantee provided under the treaty were to be effective
and thereby make possible a significant reduction in armaments, the special
commission held that it would have to ensure that any State which was the
victim of aggression would not be totally defeated during period A. Ideally it
should ensure that an aggressor State would almost certainly be defeated during
period A. It did not, however, believe that it would be possible to prepare in
advance detailed militaiy plans to meet every conceivable case of aggression. In
order to overcome this problem it suggested that any State which was either
attacked or considered itself threatened with attack should appeal to the League
Council and state the forces which it could provide to meet the attack during
period A, the additional forces which it would require in order to defeat the
aggressor and the States from which it wanted these forces to be drawn. If the
Council considered the requests of the threatened State to be both reasonable
and practical, it would invite the necessary States to provide the forces required
and also, with the advice of the PAC, appoint one of these States to take charge
of the forces. The special commission held that this machinery would require
States to maintain forces consistent with the maintenance of national security
and to ensure that certain elements of these armed forces were available to be
used at the invitation of the Council.'3
These proposals were far from being a solution to the problems identified
by Worthington-Evans and the General Staff. They did, however, suggest a way
forward and merited fhrther consideration. Cecil not only referred to them in his
letter of 14 August but also offered to send them to Worthington-Evans. The
Coalition Government fell on 19 October, however, and there is no record of
' 3CTA139: Report of the Special Commission to the TMC, undated
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further correspondence between the two men on this matter. While Cecil hoped
that the Third Assembly would provide a basis for further progress, he was
under no illusions about the likely response of the War Office:
.1 fear from the tone of your letter that we shall have to do what we
can in this direction without the assistance of the British War Office.
I am sorry, but not surprised.'4
Cecil's proposals were received in the Foreign Office on 26 July 1922. Its
response was less negative than that of Worthington-Evans and the General
Staff but it revealed very little enthusiasm for Cecil's initiative. Cecil Hurst, the
Legal Adviser, understood, however, that it was likely to be discussed at the
Third Assembly later in the year and it was important, therefore, for it to be
given careful consideration. Hurst considered the main problem regarding any
disarmament scheme to be political. The principal obstacle to disarmament, in his
view, was France, and British policy on this question was inevitably determined
by its interpretation of the French attitude. Hurst considered that there were two
possible explanations of this attitude. The first was rooted in French fears
concerning its security. In April 1919, Clemenceau believed that he had
concluded an alliance with Britain and the USA which would secure France
against any future German aggression. Colonel House, however, doubted that
the US Senate would ratii,r the guarantee and on 27 June, the day before the
Versailles Treaty was signed, Lloyd George introduced the word 'only' into the
Anglo-French Treaty. This ensured that the British guarantee to France would
come into force 'only when' the American Treaty was ratified. Antony Lentin has
' 4Cecil Papers: ADD5 1095, Cecil to Worthington-Evans, 14 August 1922
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suggested that Clemenceau failed to notice this and on the next day he signed
the Treaty.' 5 When the US Senate reflised to approve the Versailles Treaty,
therefore, this tripartite arrangement collapsed and France had to face the
problem of dealing single-handedly with any possible resurgence of German
power. In this situation it was unrealistic to expect the French to reduce their
armaments. Cecil's scheme would, however, provide France with the security
that it required and thereby create the international context in which a general
reduction and limitation of armaments might be possible. Hurst took the view
that 'any scheme which helps the cause of disarmament by helping France to
disarm deserves benevolent consideration at the hands of H.M.G."6
Hurst also argued that it was possible to see French hostility to arms
reduction as an essential element in an altogether more aggressive policy. He
could not discount the possibility that France was 'profiting by the disappearance
of the German menace to aid her in securing the hegemony of Europe in the
manner that Louis Quatorze and Napoleon strove for it'.' 7 If that were the case it
would clearly be an error for the other Powers to reduce their armed forces.
Hurst considered, therefore, that it was essential, to provide the wery strongest
opposition to Cecil's scheme, unless the Government was convinced that France
would abide by it. The most logical way of testing the French Government's
intentions was, as Hurst recognized, to give the drafi Treaty 'at the least
sympathetic consideration at Geneva' and see how they reacted to it.' 8 At this
stage, however, Hurst adopted a very negative attitude to the League. He
' 5Lentin, A. 'Trick or Treat? The Anglo-French Alliance, 1919' in History Today,
vol. 42, December 1992 and line aberration inexplicable'? Cleinenceau and the
Abortive Anglo-French Guarantee Treaty of 1919' in Diplomacy and Statecraft,
vol.8, No.2, July 1997




referred to the Assembly as 'the happy hunting ground of the crank and the
enthusiast' and suggested that there was a strong possibility that States would
not fuffil their obligations under the TMA unless sanctions were imposed upon
those which failed to assist the victim of aggression.19
At the end of August 1922 the Foreign Office decided, rather
remarkably, that it was not required to provide an opinion concerning the draft
Treaty as it was initially a matter for the CD and finally for the Cabinet. The
Government, however, soon found itself under some pressure regarding the draft
Treaty because of developments at the Third League Assembly. Since the 1921
Assembly the TMC had held three meetings and its report formed the basis of
the deliberations of the League's Third Committee, which dealt with arms
reduction and whose rapporteur was Cecil. As regards Cecil's draft Treaty, the
Committee accepted his principle that a treaty of guarantee and arms reduction
were 'the two essential parts of one policy' and that, if possible, they should be
effected at the same time. 2° This agreement in principle was not unanimous,
though, and there were some important points of difference on the Third
Committee concerning the TMG.
Foreign Office notes on the Third Committee's work reveal that there
were three schools of thought which would have to be reconciled if anything
practical were to be achieved. Some, most notably Cecil himself; asserted that
the Treaty should be universally binding. The Scandinavian Powers were
unhappy at this prospect and 'took the line that disarmament might well proceed
in certain areas and not in others'. 21
 These Powers were apparently 'perturbed at
'1bid.
9O372/8319: Report of the Third Committee to the Third Assembly of the
League of Nations, 22 September 1922
21 F0371183 19: notes approved by Fisher on the work of the Third Committee of
the League of Nations, 21 October 1922
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the prospect of any Guarantee which would bind them, for example, to come
forward and protect Finland or the new Baltic States from Russia, or which
might bind, say, Sweden to definite engagements in the event of Roumania or
Portugal being attacked'. Finally, the British took the view that it was not
possible for them to accept even the principle of a treaty of mutual guarantee.
This position was set out by Fisher who stated that 'the policy of the British
Empire was one, and that the contingency had to be faced, under a system of
mutual Guarantee, of the Dominions of the Empire being called to give
assistance in a cause in which they could have no immediate interest'. 23 It was to
meet these different schools of thought that the Third Committee proposed, in
resolution XIV, that either a general treaty or a number of partial treaties
operating in specific areas should be considered.24
Resolution XIV was adopted by the League Assembly and in late
October the Foreign Office received a letter from D. da Gama, the Acting
President of the Council, asking the British Government to consider the proposal
and submit their observations to the League by 1 June 1923. The Foreign
Office, however, held to its previous position, namely, that this was a matter on
which the CID should prepare views so as to enable the Cabinet finally to decide
policy. Segrave, Britain's naval representative on the PAC, urged the Foreign
Office to encourage the CII) to work quickly because the French wanted to
discuss the issue at a PAC meeting in early December. Crowe was extremely
unhappy with the situation which had developed and asserted that Britain's
representation at the League was poorly organized. Crowe believed that the
Ibid.
Ibid.
24FO372/83 19: Report of the Third Committee to the Third Assembly of the
League of Nations, 22 September 1922
FO37l/8319: letter from da Gama, 23 October 1922
Adm1/863Vl67: minute by Segrave, 13 November 1922
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British representatives at the League should have supplied a report setting out
their views and proposals concerning a treaty of mutual guarantee. Instead the
Foreign Office had received only a 'rather vague and general note' by Fisher.
This meant that it would be impossible for the British Government to provide a
considered response by the beginning of December. If the French wished to
discuss the subject at that early date, Crowe wrote that Britain would have to
ask for a postponement.v
Segrave was not the only person seeking a rapid policy decision from the
British Government for, just before Christmas 1922, in response to the
resolutions adopted by the recent League Assembly, Cecil formally set out his
draft TMG for consideration by the CID. Cecil's TMG was quite complex,
comprising seven sections and twenty five articles. Under the TMG signatory
Powers would provide assistance to any State which was the victim of
aggression. This assistance would take the form of a financial and economic
blockade and the provision of stipulated portions of their military, naval and air
forces. In addition, there would be supplementary military conventions for the
defence of countries thought to be in particular danger. Under these conventions
States would be committed to sending specific numbers of troops to specific
areas in the event of war. This was an attempt to win French support: unless
clear provision were made for its security, France would not agree to a treaty of
mutual guarantee. The 1MG envisaged that any State which was attacked would
be able to resist, for a short period at least. During this time the League Council
would organize a unified military command structure but, until this was
established, the forces assisting a State which was being attacked would be
under the command of that State. This would apply to naval forces as well as to
27F0371/8319: minute by Crowe, 13 November 1922
See Appendix 3 for the text of Cecil's draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee
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land and air forces. States would only be required to provide land and air forces
within their own continent but the obligation to provide naval forces would not
be so limited as circumstances could be envisaged in which none but naval forces
would be of any value, for example, a Japanese attack on Australia. At the core
of Cecil's TMG, however, lay a commitment to arms reduction. Signatory
Powers would be required to reduce their armed forces in time of peace to a
level laid down by the League Council. Any Power which was the victim of
aggression would be guaranteed the assistance of the other signatory Powers
only if it had complied with this requirement. Cecil believed that, through this
linkage of arms reduction and mutual guarantee against aggression, the TMG
would ensure that 'aggressive warfare would become so dangerous that it would
not, in fact, take place'. He recognized, however, the over-riding importance of
great Power co-operation and asserted that the involvement of Germany or the
Soviet Union was essential if the project were to be successful.
Following the Third Assembly of the League, the British Service
Departments submitted Cecil's TMG to much closer scrutiny. Within the
Admiralty there was considerable concern that the Navy would be required to
take on major responsibilities but that Britain would gain nothing in exchange.
Segrave excluded the possibility of the TMG resulting in any reduction in the
size of the Navy because, as a result of the Washington Treaty, it had already
been reduced to the minimum compatible with imperial requirements. This meant
that the key question, in his opinion, was the nature of the duties which the
TMG would impose on the Navy. He thought that if the League had to deal with
an aggressor, it was likely that naval forces would be called upon simply because
they were available and this would inevitably place the British Navy in a position
Cab4I8: CII) memorandum 383-B, 19 December 1922
243
of great importance. His concern was that the TMG might require the Navy to
place at least a part of the Fleet at the call of the League Council, acting by a
three-quarters majority. He pointed out that, in this respect, the TMG went
beyond the League Covenant because the latter laid down that the Council's
decisions had to be unanimous. 3° This proposed change in the Council's decision-
making procedures also concerned Alexander Flint, Principal Assistant Secretary
at the Admiralty. He was not, however, entirely negative in his attitude to Cecil's
scheme for he thought that 'A great deal might be made of this Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee if it was skilfully and carefully worked out'. Nevertheless, Flint did
think that the proposed special arrangements for countries facing particular
dangers indicated that France was likely to be the main beneficiary of the
Treaty.31
 Captain John Hamilton, the Deputy Director of the Plans Division,
writing for Pound, the Director of the Plans Division, concluded that the 1MG
would mean that 'the Navy of the most powerful State would be available for the
weak power at the dictation of the League of Nations, whose prestige would be
enhanced at the financial expense of the Power possessing the strong Navy'. For
this reason he believed that Britain had little to gain from the TMG. 32
 These
views formed the basis of the Admiralty's first memorandum on the 1MG. While
strongly critical of Cecil's scheme, the Admiralty expressed less hostility to the
idea of regional agreements. This was because such agreements, by definition,
limited the requirement to take action to a specified geographical area: the
Admiralty was determined to limit its commitments and 'to consider the effect on
its interests before entering into any individual agreement'. 33 It was in Europe,
though, that the main security fears existed and it was inconceivable that there
30Adml/86321167: minute by Segrave, 13 November 1922
31Adml/8632/167: minute by Flint, 14 November 1922
32Adml/86321167: minute by Hamilton, 24 November 1922
33Cab4/8: C memorandum 381-B, 12 December 1922
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could be a treaty of mutual guarantee in that region which did not involve
Britain.
In January 1923 the Air Staff declared that they were unable to support
the TMG. They argued that the process to decide the aggressor State was likely
to result in delay before action could be taken and this would have a deleterious
effect on that action. Further, the range of possible places in which action might
have to be taken precluded the preparation of any plans, yet 'It is an accepted
principle in war that operations without adequate preparation are foredoomed to
fai1ureY Air Commodore John Steel, now Deputy Chief of the Air Stafi also
described the TMG as 'unreal' and wrote that 'it is a waste of effort spending
very much time in thinking about it'. He had presumed, however, that the
scheme should be treated seriously because Britain was a member of the
League. 35 In the process of drawing up their memorandum the Air Staff had,
therefore, avoided being entirely negative. Although they thought that the TMG
was unlikely to produce any significant reduction in air armaments, they
considered that it might create the conditions in which a disarmament process
could be successful:
.it is possible that a scheme whereby the members of the League of
Nations would bind themselves to take combined punitive action
against any State guilty of aggression, whether by sea, land, or air,
might act as a strong deterrent to would-be belligerents, and, by
Air2/234/S2 1484/Part 1: Air Staff memorandum, The Proposed Treaty of
Mutual Guarantee', Januaiy 1923
35Air2/234/S2 1484/Part 1: 'Notes by the Air Staff on the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee and Regional Agreements proposed by the League of Nations',
undated
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lessening the risk of war, produce an atmosphere more favourable to
proposals for general disarmament.
The War Office formally responded to the TMG in February 1923 and its
views were essentially the same as those which had been presented to Cecil by
the General Staff and Worthington-Evans in the previous summer. In addition to
their strictures against the continental limitation, the delay involved in identifying
an aggressor and the impossibility of preparing plans to meet every conceivable
act of aggression, the General Staff set out a number of other objections. They
asserted that 'in the majority of cases' economic and financial blockade could not
be operated effectively, that it was 'impossible for us to commit ourselves blindly
to place British troops under the command of some foreign General Staff and
that the TMG was more likely to result in an increase rather than a decrease in
armaments because States would be required to maintain elements of their forces
for use by the League. They also stated that it was not possible to conclude such
a Treaty until agreement had been reached on the means by which armaments
could be compared.37
Charles Orde, a Foreign Office Clerk in the Western Department, was
right to describe these criticisms of Cecil's scheme as 'captious & question-
begging'. The tone of the General Staff memorandum was entirely hostile to the
TMG and there was no attempt to see positive aspects in the proposals or
suggest ways in which they might be improved. The argument that the TMG
would involve an increase rather than a decrease in armaments was especially
tendentious. Article 25(b) of the TMG stated that countries which were the
Ibid.
37Cab418: CID memorandum 395-B, February 1923.
FO3 71/9418: minute by Orde, 5 February 1923
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victims of aggression would only be entitled to receive assistance if they had
reduced their armaments in accordance with the plan agreed by the League or
had taken steps to ensure that such reduction was carried out within two years
of the Treaty being ratified. The implementation of such an arms reduction plan
would inevitably have contributed to the creation of a more peaceful
international environment and made aggressive military action by any Power
more diflicult. Such action would, in any case, have to be carried out at a much
lower level. Further, the existence of the TMG would be likely to deter potential
aggressors and thereby reduce the risk of war.
In the same month as the General Staff submitted their criticisms of the
TMG to the CD, Cecil formally set out his scheme at the second meeting of the
6th session of the TMC on 10 February. During the course of his presentation he
pointed out that the draft Treaty 'does not touch the real question of reduction
of armaments neither does it propose any scale of reduction'. Cecil considered it,
instead, to be 'a step forward towards the moral disarmament which is the
essential preliminary for an agreement as to the scale of armaments which is to
be maintained by the nations of the world.' 39 This was a clear recognition that the
TMG was an attempt to achieve disarmament through the indirect rather than
the direct method. Despite this the TMC decided that the TMG should be
subjected to technical examination. It was referred, therefore, to the PAC which
met for its 10th session on 16 April.
The British Government's preparations for this meeting were dilatory and
unco-ordinated. On 11 April the CII) considered the question of the instructions
which should be given to the British representatives on the PAC. Curzon, the
Foreign Secretary, was not present at the meeting as he was abroad and the
39Adml 16/2 184: Limitation of Naval Armaments, 1922-23
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views of the Foreign Office were made known only shortly before the meeting.
As a result, the CII) did not make any decision or recommendation on the
application of the principles contained in the League Assembly's Resolution
XLV. The British representatives on the PAC were instructed, therefore, to
confine the discussion to an explanation of the practical difficulties which had
been set out by the Service Departments in their memoranda. When the PAC
met, however, it discussed both Resolution XIV and Cecil's TMG, despite the
objections of the British representatives.4'
In contrast with the British Government's failure to provide their
representatives on the PAC with clear instructions, the French delegation was
extremely well prepared. At the end of March they produced a detailed technical
assessment of Resolution XLV and the TMG. While the concern of the principal
British decision-makers was to minimize their commitments, the concern of the
French was to maximise their security. The French had serious doubts about the
nature of the assistance which would be provided under a general treaty of
guarantee because there would be a large number of Powers with very different
national interests. If the guarantees could not be clearly defined, it would be
logically impossible to reduce armaments in proportion to these guarantees. A
further problem from the French perspective, and one which they shared with the
British General Stafi stemmed from the fact that it was not practical to draw up
plans of mutual assistance to meet all possible cases of aggression. This meant
that the treaty would be unable to meet its own objective of providing assistance
which was both immediate and effective. The French argued that these
uncertainties would present serious obstacles to arms reduction under a general
40Cab4/9: CII) memorandum 420-B, May 1923
41 Air2/234/S2 1484/Part 1: report by Lt.-Col. S.J. Lowe, Britain's military
representative at the League of Nations, 3 May 1923
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treaty because if States were to provide assistance, they would have to maintain
armaments at a minimum allowing them to do so. It would be practically
impossible, however, to determine what this minimum should be and this in turn
would make it impossible to ensure that States did not build excessive
armaments.
These objections pushed the French towards a rejection of a general
treaty and advocacy of partial treaties which would offer to States 'assistance
capable of being measured'. 43 This meant, the French argued, that it would be
possible under such treaties to put into operation arms reduction proportionate
to the definite guarantees provided by such treaties. Partial treaties also had an
advantage which was of crucial importance to the French. While a general treaty
could offer States a final victory against an aggressor but could not protect them
from invasion, partial treaties could provide protection against invasion because
the assistance offered would form the subject of a pre-arranged plan and would,
therefore, be both immediate and effective. The French accepted that partial
treaties would be open, that is, registered with and publicized by the League but
they wanted conditions laid down for the admission of any new State and
specified that such admission would have to be unanimously approved by the
existing signatories.'
Differences of opinion within the PAC concerning the application of the
principles contained in Resolution XIV prevented agreement on this subject. The
note prepared by the French delegation was taken as the basis of discussion but
the Spanish, later supported by the Italians and Japanese, disagreed with the
French view that, if a treaty of mutual guarantee were to be of any use, it had to




prevent aggression and invasion. The Spanish considered that this was
impossible and they argued that a guarantee treaty would be of benefit Wit
ensured that an aggressor would ultimately be defeated. 45 As regards Cecil's
TMG, however, the PAC unanimously concluded that t did not provide a sound
basis on which to build an arms limitation scheme and argued in favour of partial
treaties.This was not surprising because the head of the French delegation,
Réquin, was also the President of the PAC and the memorandum which the
British General Staff had prepared on Cecil's scheme for the CID was taken by
the PAC's Military Sub-Commission as the basis for its discussions.
The TMG was examined shortly afterwards by a special sub-committee
of the TMC which met in London, under Cecil's chairmanship, from 14-17 May.
This sub-committee, having taken note of the PAC's report, subjected the TMG
to a clause by clause analysis. As a result of this process, there were alterations
to the TMG and reservations by some members of the sub-committee. There
were also declarations by some members and in one such declaration Cecil
criticised the PAC report for favouring a system of partial treaties and for stating
that arms reduction should follow the conclusion of such treaties:
To me it seems that any such plan is a mere reversion to the old
system of group alliances leading to competitive armaments, and so
far from producing any reduction of armainent[sic] would plunge the
world back into exactly that state of things as that which ultimately
resulted in the World War. Moreover, it does not appear to me that
45Air2/234/S21484/Part 1: Report by Lowe, 3 May 1923
Air2/234IS21484fPart 1: Opinion of the PAC concerning Cecil's TMG, 21
April 1923
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the proposal does in any respect carry out the principles of
Resolution 14, or indeed, of Article 8 of the Covenant.41
Cecil was prepared, however, to support the PAC's idea of combining partial
agreements with general obligations and he urged those who were unhappy with
his scheme to put forward an alternative proposal which would confonn to the
principles of Resolution XIV and provide for arms reduction.
Cecil recognized that international discussion and co-operation were
integral parts of disarmament and he was determined to do all he could to retain
French involvement in this process. In the summer of 1923, therefore, he
followed up his declaration in the report of the special sub-committee of the
TMC by encouraging the French members of the TMC to produce an alternative
to his scheme. As a result, Réquin submitted to the TMC a draft Convention of
Mutual Assistance which sought to combine partial agreements with general
obligations, as the PAC's report on the TMG had suggested. 5° The PAC
considered the draft Convention on 5 July at the first plenary meeting of its 11th
session which was held in Geneva. Opinion on the scheme was divided. Five
delegations, those of Belgium, Brazil, Britain, France and Sweden, considered
that it offered 'a hopeful basis for the elaboration of a scheme of mutual
assistance leading to a reduction of armaments'. 51 The Italian, Japanese and
Spanish delegations, however, expressed opposition to the idea of partial treaties
which, they believed, would lead to military coalitions and so make arms
47Air2/234/S2 1484/Part 1: Report of the Special Sub-Commission of the TMC
relating to Draft TMG presented by Lord Robert Cecil, 16 May 1923
Ibid.
49Cecil Papers: ADD51 103, memorandum by Cecil, 11 December 1924 - see
also Cab4/12: CII) memorandum 547-B, 11 December 1924
50See Appendix 4 for the text of Réquin's draft Convention of Mutual Assistance
51Air2/234/S2 1484 Part II: PAC report, 7 July 1923
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reduction all the more difficult to achieve. 52
 The task of attempting to reconcile
the Cecil and Requin schemes was left to the 8th session of the TMC in August
1923.
Prior to this meeting of the TMC there were Governmental changes in
Britain. The Prime Minister, Bonar Law, resigned because of ill-health and was
replaced on 21 May by Stanley Baldwin. He brought Cecil into the Cabinet as
Lord Privy Seal with special responsibility for League affairs. This meant that
Cecil now had an opportunity to answer critics of his scheme within the British
Government directly and generate greater understanding of the importance of
disarmament in defence and foreign policy. His position as both a non-official
member of the TMC and one of the Government representatives at the League
was invidious and, as has previously been discussed, caused problems within the
Foreign Office.
On 29 June, just one month after Cecil joined the Government, the CII)
held its first serious discussion of the TMG. Before it were important
memoranda by Hankey and Cecil. It is not clear who, if anyone, authorized
Hankey to submit a memorandum but he had a strong interest in defence matters
and a powerful position as Secretary to both the Cabinet and CD. Hankey
sought to suggest that he supported the underlying principles of Cecil's TMG but
his detailed arguments against it, many of which were specious, revealed little
understanding of disarmament, as defined in this thesis. He stated that Britain,
having signed the League Covenant, was committed in principle to arms
limitation and, for this reason, could not reject the principle of a general Treaty
of Mutual Guarantee out of hand. In his opinion such a Treaty also offered
considerable advantages to Britain because it had 'already carried reduction of
52Ibid.
53Air2/234/S2 1484 Part II: Report by Lowe, 14 August 1923
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armaments to considerable lengths' and stood 'to gain from anything which
induces other nations to reduce their armaments.M He saw this feature of the
TMG as more important than the guarantee of mutual assistance which would
follow an internationally agreed arms reduction plan. With British forces 'already
reduced to the minimum consistent with our national security, we ought to gain
from the fact our possible rivals, whose forces are not so reduced, would
probably have to diminish their forces relatively to our own'. British arms
reduction since the end of the Great War had been driven by considerations of
internal policy and Hankey clearly saw the TMG as a means by which the
armaments balance might be made more favourable to Britain. His subsequent
arguments revealed that this concern was not matched by a commitment to the
international control and limitation of armaments as a foreign policy objective.
Hankey was interested only in the product element of disarmament and not in its
aims and process.
In April 1923 the Foreign Office's Historical Adviser, James Headlam-
Morley, argued that treaties of guarantee based on defensive alliances had
proved to be effective. He held that Cecil's TMG was effectively just such an
alliance, characterized by the fact that it was intended to be permanent, although
it would at first be limited to fifteen years, rather than being limited to a specific
period of time, as had always previously applied with such treaties. This aspect
of the TMG, he argued, offered a significant advantage:
In the past diplomatists have always been privately considering
whether the time has not come for a change of alliances, and have
even deliberately been working towards this end. This element of
MCab4/9: CID memorandum 420-B, May 1923
55Ibid.
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uncertainty would be eliminated and the longer the alliance existed,
the more probable is it that an atmosphere favourable to its own
continuance would be created.
Hankey, by contrast, was sceptical about treaties of guarantee in general and
cited recent instances in which, he claimed, countries had avoided their
obligations under such treaties: Italy and the Triple Alliance in 1914 and the
Franco-Italian refusal to co-operate with the British forces at Chanak and Ismid
in autumn 1922. The Cabinet Secretary was, however, being deliberately
misleading. In 1914 the Italians had taken advantage of a clause in their alliance
Treaty with Germany and Austria-Hungary to abstain from action and there was
no treaty binding the French and Italians to support Britain at Chanak.
In his comments on other aspects of Cecil's TMG, Hankey was similarly
disingenuous. He argued that in military affairs Britain had to ensure the security
of India and the Persian oil fields. The principal threat, the Soviet Union, had
apparently been removed but there could be a revival of Soviet power and in
such a situation Hankey did not believe that any British Government could
entrust the security of these regions to a guarantee from Powers which had no
interests in India or Persia. There was, however, no proposal in the TMG that
Britain should do this and to suggest otherwise was a deliberate misreading of
the Treaty. Hankey also stated that Cecil's proposals would restrict the defence
flexibility on which British Governments had previously relied. This was
because, under the TMG, each State would be allowed forces of a certain
number and strength. If another State considered that a Power was exceeding
the armaments permitted, it could appeal to the Secretary-General of the League
Cab4I9: CIII) memorandum 416-B, 19 March 1923
57Cab4/9: CIII) memorandum 420-B, May 1923
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who would then summon a meeting of the Council. if three quarters of its
members agreed that the accused State had exceeded its armaments allocation,
the Council would require that Government to take appropriate action to come
within the scope of the Treaty within six months. Failure to do so could result in
a trade and financial boycott being imposed upon the recalcitrant Power. The
problem for Britain with such an arrangement was that it maintained its military
forces at a low level and only increased them in order to meet particular
emergencies. As examples of this policy Hankey offered the raising of a defence
force during the industrial crisis of 1921 and the formation of the Black and
Tans for service in Ireland in May 1920. The idea, put forward by Hankey, that
under the TMG this might result in Britain being subjected to financial and
economic sanctions was hardly credible.
Hankey's concerns regarding the identification of an aggressor State and
the action to be taken against such a State were more convincing. He echoed the
War Office in stating that the four days' delay in determining an aggressor State
could give it a crucial advantage. More importantly, once the Council had
decided which was the aggressor State, Britain would have to provide forces for
offensive action against this State. This would be an unlimited commitment
which, Hankey argued, appeared 'to render somewhat illusoiy the apparent
limitation of the commitment to an agreed proportion (one quarter) of a state's
naval and air forcesl.s9 If limitation of liability was practically impossible, the
question of military plans to deal with aggression was also problematic and




The spectacle of the appropriate organ of the League meeting week
after week and month after month to prepare elaborate international
plans of war against Russia one day, Germany another, France a
third, and Great Britain a fourth, and the tactful withdrawal of the
member to be planned against, is one which it is difficult to envisage
seriously. Yet without such plans there would be nothing but muddle
and disaster when the day came.6°
Hankey considered that this day was likely to come sooner and more often for
Britain than any other Power because its Empire extended to evety continent.
Such an extension of Britain's militaiy commitments meant that for Hankey a
general Treaty of Mutual Guarantee was unacceptable in 1923. Although he
supported the agreement of partial treaties of mutual guarantee, the tone of this
memorandum indicated that Hankey had little time for disarmament by the
indirect method through negotiation at the League of Nations.
Cecil responded quickly to Hankey's analysis producing a memorandum
for the CU) on 15 June 1923. Despite the PAC's rejection of his Treaty, he was
optimistic that final agreement on it could be reached once a number of details
had been adjusted. As regards Hankey's comments, Cecil immediately
recognized the validity of the criticism that the draft Treaty entailed large and
indefinite commitments. He was determined, however, that this objection should
not be exaggerated. His scheme would be operative in the first instance for only
fifteen years and the British Government would, therefore, be able to escape
from its commitments if it had not achieved 'the objects for which it was made,
namely, a general reduction of armaments based on a secure peace'. if these
9bid.
61 Cab4/1O: CD memorandum 431-B, 15 June 1923
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objects were achieved, it followed that the commitments under the draft Treaty
would present the British Government with no problems. During the fifteen
years when the Treaty would be operative, Britain's commitments would be
extended in two ways. By the League Covenant, Britain was already committed
under Article 16 to the imposition of a blockade against an aggressor State.
Under Cecil's TMG it would also be committed to military action at the request
of a three quarters majority of the League Council. The guarantee and hence the
military action would only come into force, however, after arms reduction had
been effected. The chance of aggression would, therefore, be significantly
reduced. Cecil was unwilling to attach too much importance to Britain's being
bound by a three quarters majority on the Council. This was because there were
ten States represented on the Council so Britain would require the support of
only two other States to avoid being over-ruled.62
In further support of a Treaty of Guarantee, Cecil argued that in any
serious breach of the peace involving the great Powers, Britain was bound to be
involved but if such a Treaty were in force, the likelihood of its having to fight
with few or no allies was significantly reduced. He recognized that the
preparation of detailed military plans to deal with every possible outbreak of
hostilities was impossible but this did not mean that nothing of value could be
done to provide for action under a general Treaty. The allocation of fixed
proportions of naval and military forces, together with prearranged plans for
unity of command, would make the draft Treaty more effective. Cecil also
believed that the four days' delay between the outbreak of hostilities and a
decision by the Council identif'ing the aggressor was of less danger in practice
than in theory. Any State taking aggressive action under the draft Treaty would
9bid.
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be trading a short term military advantage for the certainty of an ultimately
crushing defeat. It is quite clear that for Cecil the very existence of the TMG
made it less likely that the signatory Powers would have to fulfil their obligations
under it. It was for this reason that Cecil regarded the TMG as an essential
contribution to the achievement of long term peace: no State would be able to
engage in aggressive action with the slightest prospect of success. At the very
heart of the TMG lay a basic commitment to disarmament. Cecil did not shrink
from this: for him disarmament was of such importance that he was ready to
increase Britain's obligations in order to achieve it. He had no doubt that the
prospects for British and international security would be enhanced by a Treaty of
Mutual Guarantee which was based on disarmament.63
When the CII) finally conducted a serious discussion of the question of
treaties of mutual guarantee on 29 June 1923 there was, inevitably, a clash
between those who were fundamentally opposed to the internationalism which
such proposals represented and those who considered that it was essential to
consider all suggestions to bring about general disarmament. Curzon, the
Foreign Secretary, and Ameiy, First Lord of the Admiralty, were very firmly in
the first of these groups. Curzon was not even prepared to accept the relatively
uncontentious point which Hankey had set out at the start of his memorandum,
namely, that Britain was in favour of general disarmament. Amery held that in
signing any treaty of guarantee the 'country would enter into commitments
which would be out of all proportion to the advantages which we should gain'.TM
Amery was as unhappy about partial treaties as he was about general treaties:
the inevitable tendency of both would be to draw Britain into conflicts on the
European continent. For Amery the British Empire provided all the mutual
63Ibid.
TMCab2/3: CD minutes, 29 June 1923
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support that was necessary. Curzon was broadly in favour of the views
expressed by Amery. Although he could see the economic value of some form of
partial arms limitation, he held that the situation in Europe was too dangerous
for Britain to entertain further arms reduction. Curzon also claimed that public
opinion had to be taken into account. Here he meant the House of Commons
which, in his view, would never 'agree to sending our reduced forces on some
expedition on the Continent of Europe - say, in Bulgaria - in support of a cause
which was not of vital interest to this country'. 65 Curzon was apparently unaware
that these statements were contradictory: if Britain were not prepared to become
involved on the continent there was no reason why it should not reduce its
military forces still further. He also argued that partial treaties of the type
proposed by the French delegation on the PAC were no different from the
system of alliances which had caused the Great War:
if a Treaty of Partial Guarantee was undertaken by a group
consisting of England, France, Italy and Belgium, such a course
would immediately throw Germany into the arms of Russia and
possibly of Turkey, which would result in exactly the same sort of
group alliances as existed prior to the late war.
In contrast to Curzon and Amery, the Secretary of State for Air, Samuel Hoare,
believed that Britain, as a member of the League, had to give the proposals
serious consideration for if the country were not 'prepared to take such a step





Cecil, of course, challenged the very basis of the views put forward by Curzon
and Amery. He pointed out that under Article VIII of the League Covenant,
Britain 'had entered into a solemn obligation to formulate a plan for the general
reduction of armaments'. Economic considerations demanded that any such
plan should be given serious consideration before being rejected and, as far as
public opinion was concerned, Cecil argued that 'if the Government were to
announce that they were unable to support a scheme for the limitation of
armaments, they would not only be defeated in the House of Commons, but also
be defeated at the next General Election'. This indecisive meeting of the CU)
closed with Salisbury offering the pious hope that the League might be able to
solve the problem.
In the days after this CII) meeting there was an exchange of views
regarding the TMG between Cavan, the CIGS, Derby, the Secretary of State for
War, and Salisbury, Chairman of the CII). Cavan wrote to Derby that treaties of
mutual guarantee, whether general or partial, were unworkable because 'It is
impossible to visualize any State reducing its armaments on the illusory promise
of assistance from other States'. He wanted, however, to avoid rejecting the idea
without proposing an alternative. He suggested, therefore, 'a Treaty to Withhold
and not to Give assistance'. This Treaty was based on the idea that a State would
not be able to fight a war without some aid from other Powers. Cavan envisaged
a situation in which the League would designate a State to be in the wrong and
all the other States would then guarantee not to assist the aggressor. Cavan
believed that the key advantage of his scheme was that it would be less




explain how such a scheme would induce any State to carry out a policy of arms
reduction.7°
Derby set out his thinking in a memorandum which expressed no opinion
concerning Cavan's proposal but revealed some support for Cecil's scheme. He
agreed that a general guarantee and arms reduction were inextricably linked on
the ground that 'a general guarantee would be of no advantage unless it was
followed by a reduction of armaments and therefore expenditure'. Tithe
guarantee were to be of sufficient value to result in arms reduction, Derby
believed that it was essential to specifi the amount of assistance which was to be
given. This, however, would involve extending Britain's commitments and Derby
supported the General Staff view that this would involve an increase rather than
a decrease in the size of the British Army.7'
Derby sent both his own memorandum and Cavan's idea to Salisbury for
his consideration. Salisbury did not think that Cavan's scheme was a significant
improvement on the League Covenant but he had no proposals of his own to put
forward. He did, however, think that it would be wise to support further
negotiations at the League for these could do no harm and would avoid Britain
being accused of taking a non possumus approach. He was acutely aware that
the major area of international tension was in Europe and that this could only be
resolved by a disarmament process based on a security agreement. Failure to
achieve such an agreement would be very dangerous:
Personally I take a very moderate view about this subject.. .But I
really do not believe we shall get through even the present crisis in
Europe without some mutual engagement of security as between
70W0137/6: Cavan to Derby, 30 June 1923. Underlining original
71W013716: memorandum by Derby, 2 July 1923
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France and ourselves and certain other Powers. And one problem is
how to bring this about without calling into being again the old
system of European groups opposed to each other, which, instead of
ending in a limitation of armaments is quite as likely to end in their
increase.72
This assessment corresponded closely to that of his brother, but Cecil placed a
greater emphasis on the importance of disarmament. The memorandum which he
submitted to the CU) on 15 June had first been sent to Curzon and at that stage
it had a different opening paragraph which began with the arresting observation
that It is as useless to expect most militaiy and naval experts to be in favour of
disarmament as it is to expect cobblers to be opposed to the use of leather.' Cecil
wanted the Cabinet to accept arms limitation as their policy and to 'instruct their
naval and militaiy advisers to devote their energies to the formulation of a
scheme for that purpose'.73
In mid-1923, however, Cecil had little cause for optimism. There was no
suggestion that the British Government would be prepared to adopt the TMG
and the PAC had already rejected his scheme. Official opinion within the Foreign
Office was especially hostile to the TMG. Gerald Villiers, head of the Western
Department, had previously described Cecil's proposals as 'Utopian in theory and
unworkable in practice' and in May he expressed his satisfaction at the PAC's
opposition to the TMG. 74 Crowe had long held the view that disarmament was
impractical and he considered that it was a waste of time and energy to seek to
72W0137/6: Salisbury to Derby, 13 July 1923
73F0371/9419: memorandum by Cecil, 15 June 1923
74F0371/9418: minute by Villiers, 16 February 1923; F0371/9419: minute by
Villiers, 1 May 1923
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solve the complex problem of disarmament through the equally problematical
method of a treaty of guarantee.75
When the TMC met in August for its 8th session, however, it adopted a
much more positive approach to this task and succeeded in reconciling the
mutual guarantee schemes proposed by Cecil and Réquin. The outcome was the
draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (TMA). 76 This was largely made possible by
the fact that The French shewed[sic] an unexpected spirit of conciliation which
was without doubt engendered by their desire to arrive at an agreed text'."
There has been, however, considerable disagreement in judging both the TMC
negotiations and the TMA which emerged. Wheeler-Bennett praised the TMC
for combining the Cecil and Réquin drafts but Raffo has argued that Cecil was
out-manoeuvred by Réquin with the result that the TMA conformed more
closely to French ambitions. 78 Segrave also considered that the TMA more
closely represented Réquin's views but Cecil, perhaps not surprisingly, claimed
that it very closely resembled his own scheme. 79 Analysis of the draft schemes
and the TMA indicates that Cecil was correct.
It is true that the League's TMA was in certain important respects quite
different from the TMG. Réquin's scheme provided for partial agreements in the
form of special defensive treaties, between two or more Powers, which had to be
registered with the League. This was retained in the TMA which referred to
them as complementary defensive agreements. The TMA also required
unanimity on the Council, rather than the three quarters majority stipulated in the
75F0800/243: memorandum by Crowe, 24 June 1923
76See Appendix 2 for the text of the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance.
77Air2/234/S2 1484 Part II: report by Lowe, 14 August 1923
78Wheeler-Bennett and Langermann, op.cit., p.98 and Raffo, P.S. Lord Robert
Cecil and the League of Nations', Liverpool University, Ph.D., 1967, p.189
79Adml 16/222: minute by Segrave, 18 August 1923; Cecil Papers: ADDS 1103,
memorandum by Cecil, 11 December 1924
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TMG, when determining an aggressor or deciding whether a State had
exceeded, in time of peace, the armaments it was to be allowed. In its essentials,
however, the TMA represented a serious attempt to achieve disarmament in
terms both of process and product. Whereas, under Réquin's scheme, the scale
of arms reduction was to be determined by individual Governments and carried
out only once they were satisfied that mutual assistance could be provided, the
TMA retained the key element in Cecil's scheme: before any signatory Power
received security guarantees, it had to commit itself to a League sponsored
disarmament plan.
In her analysis of the TMA, Kitching appeared to misunderstand both
Crowe's principal criticism of the TMG and the relationship between security
and disarmament set out in the TMA. Crowe was convinced that a general
scheme of arms reduction and limitation was itself impractical and that an
attempt to achieve it by working out a treaty of general guarantee was,
therefore, an exercise in 'putting the cart before the horse'. 8° Kitching considered
that Crowe, in making this comment, was criticising the TMA, rightly, for
requiring States to disarm before being entitled to the guarantee of assistance.8'
As the principal purpose of the TMA, however, was to achieve disarmament, it
was wise to deny Powers the security guarantees provided by the TMA until
they had, at least, begun the process of disarmament. At the Fifth League
Assembly in 1924, Parmoor was equally determined that the security guarantees
offered by the Geneva Protocol would not come into force until a plan for
general disarmament had been achieved. Kitching, incorrectly, considered that
80F0800/243: memorandum by Crowe, 24 June 1923
8tKitching, op.cit., p.85
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this was not the case as she praised the Protocol for putting the horse before the
cart.82
The TMA, as approved by the TMC, was then submitted to the League
Council at its meeting on 31 August. It was considered by the Fourth Assembly
and then communicated to Governments for their observations. The very
similarity between Cecil's original scheme and the TMA ensured that the
opposition of the British Service Departments was maintained. In memoranda
produced in October and November, the General Staff and the Air Staff restated
their objections. The fact that the League Council could call upon specific States
to provide forces for action against an aggressor, determine the forces which a
State should put at the disposal of the League and both appoint and direct the
overall commander for these forces was totally unacceptable. Both Staffs argued
that arms reduction could only be achieved if the guarantee provided under the
TMA was effective and this meant that assistance to the victim of aggression had
to be immediate. This required appropriate pians to be prepared in advance and,
as had been argued from the outset, this was impossible under a general treaty.
This objection would not apply with the same force to partial treaties but the Air
Staff argued that arms reduction could not be achieved until the disparity
between the British and French Air Forces had been reduced significantly. It did
not see how any partial treaty would be likely to affect this factor. The General
Staff were convinced that the French saw partial treaties as the means by which
Britain could be drawn into a military defensive alliance.
In late October 1923 the Admiralty made clear that it held firmly to the
position which it had set out in a Cabinet paper the previous July concerning the
9bid.. pp.85-86
83Cab4110: CII) memoranda, 464-B, November 1923 and 465-B, 10 October
1923
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TMG. It argued that the TMA would increase the country's naval commitments
and therefore necessitate an increase rather than a decrease in Britain's naval
forces and that the one-Power standard meant it was unacceptable to
contemplate any reduction in the British Navy which would allow it to fall below
the strength of another naval Power. The Admiralty, however, had not taken
account of the fact that under the TMA, any arms reduction plan was to be
based on information provided by the signatory States as to the reduction and
limitation of arms which they considered proportionate to the security provided
by the guarantee agreements. The Washington Treaty and the fact that the
British Navy was likely to be a provider, rather than a consumer of security,
meant that Britain would be able to argue convincingly that there should be no
further reduction in its naval strength.
This continued opposition to the TMA from the Service Departments
contributed to the considerable tension which existed in the Foreign Office in
late November. The attitude of the Government's naval, military and air advisers
made it almost certain that the Government would reject the TMA. This meant
that, if Cecil were still the British representative at the 1924 League Assembly,
he would not only have to oppose the scheme which he had played a large part
producing, but also explain and defend British opposition to it. Curzon sent a
memorandum to Cecil setting out these concerns and suggesting that the TMC
should be dissolved. 85 Cecil replied the next day and argued both for the
continuation of the TMC and for discussion of the TMA by the CII). He
claimed, with some justification, that the TMA could contribute to a significant
improvement in relations between the European Powers and re-stated his
9O371/9421: letter from Flint to the FO, 31 October 1923; Cab 24/161:
CP3 11, Naval Staff memorandum, 3 July 1923
85F0371/9421: FO memorandum, 26 November 1923 and Curzon to Cecil, 27
November 1923
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conviction that the Service Departments should be subordinate to the wider
objectives of Britain's disarmament policy:
The Treaty of Mutual Assistance may be objectionable, but they
[Britain's military and naval advisers] really have got to consider
how they are to carry out their obligations under Article 8 of the
Covenant in the first place; and in the second what steps we are to
take to allay the international suspicion which at present is at the
bottom of more than half our troubles. After all the French have a
real grievance in the failure of the Americans to ratify the Tri-Partite
Pact on the faith of which they abandoned their claim to the Rhine
frontier and it surely makes any plan worth consideration if the
principal military power in Europe regards it as a practical step
towards disarmament. Any scheme of naval disarmament which we
did not approve could be of no use; any scheme of military
disarmament which the French do approve is worth consideration.
The terms of both the TMG and the TMA provided for the separate ratification
of the Treaty in the different continents of the world and many of Cecil's
observations, including those to Curzon, indicate that his attention was focused
primarily on Europe. Richardson argued that this feature of the TMA was its
principal weakness because 'it endeavoured to impose regional security pacts on
quasi-collective principles on regions where the objective conditions for the
implementation of such pacts did not exist'. 87 It was certainly true that the TMA
would be totally ineffective in both the Far East and on the American continent
FO371/942I: Cecil to Curzon, 28 November 1923
Richardson, British disarmament policy, p.15
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without the participation of the USA. In Europe, however, British and French
participation was crucial and Britain could have tested France's commitment to
military disarmament by adopting a positive approach to further negotiation of
the draft Treaty in that continent. The future of the TMA was not, however,
decided by the Conservative Administration because Baldwin contrived to lose
the December 1923 General Election over the question of protection.
The advent of the first Labour Government did not, though, bring any
change in the British attitude to the TMA. On 3 April 1924 it was discussed by
the CU) which concluded that the draft Treaty could not be recommended for
adoption by the Government. In justification of this decision it set out all the
objections which had previously been made by the Service Departments. Cecil,
now no longer a member of the Government but on close terms with
MacDonald, wrote to the Prime Minister in June urging him to declare his
Government's support for the principles of the TMA and continue discussion of
the Treaty. His efforts were in vain. On 30 May the Cabinet had already
accepted the CD conclusions and agreed that MacDonald should write to the
Secretary-General of the League making it clear that 'the British Government is
definitely opposed in principle to the proposed Treaties of Mutual Assistance'.9°
MacDonald's letter was sent to the League on 5 July and it set out the
principal objections which had been made on many occasions within the British
Government since Cecil first outlined his scheme two years before. It argued that
the guarantee provided under the Treaty was not sufficiently sure to bring about
arms reduction. This was because the TMA failed to provide a definition of
aggression, it would be impossible to draw up pre-arranged plans to meet every
Cab2/4: CU) minutes, 3 April 1924
Ceci1 Papers: ADDS 1081, Cecil to MacDonald, 23 June 1924
90Cab23/48: Cabinet conclusions, 30 May 1924
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possible case of aggression, and assistance to victims of aggression was
dependent on the consent of the Power required to provide assistance. As
Madariaga has written, it was paradoxical that the French should have sought to
strengthen the military guarantees of the TMG only for the TMA to be rejected
by the British Government 'on the ground that as a military instrument the Draft
Treaty was not effective enough'.9' This paradox was underlined by the fact that
the Labour Government's view implied that more guarantees were required
before disarmament could occur, even though such a view was strongly opposed
by the majority of British decision-makers. MacDonald also claimed that the
Treaty would require Britain to increase its Armed Forces, that the provision for
the conclusion of partial treaties meant there was a danger of the old alliance
system re-emerging and that there was an unacceptable increase in the powers of
the Council. Although this rejection was couched in placatoiy tones - there was
appreciation of the work of the League and the Government declared its
support, in principle, for an international conference to devise a scheme for
international disarmament - it was clear that there could be no further progress
with this first attempt to achieve disarmament by the indirect method.
Two months after its rejection of the TMA the Labour Government
played a leading role in negotiating the second attempt to achieve disarmament
by the indirect method, the Geneva Protocol, which was very similar to the
TMA In so doing it revealed a very serious degree of confusion in its foreign
and disarmament policy. In the light of the Conservative Governments'
opposition to the principles underlying the TMA there can be no doubt that it
would have been rejected by Baldwin's second Administration in 1925 in just the
91Madariaga, Disarmament. p.12!
9O37I/IO568: MacDonald to Drummond, 5 July 1924
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same way that the Protocol was rejected. MacDonald and his colleagues would,
however, have served the cause of disarmament rather better had they declared
their support for the principles of the TMA, sought amendment of the Treaty
through the League and thereby tested the extent of French commitment to the
process. Such an approach would also have enhanced the Administration's
reputation in the sphere of international policy. Instead, it accepted Service
Department and Foreign Office criticisms of the TMA and then proceeded,
through the negotiation of the Protocol, to stimulate even more intense criticism
from the very same Departments.
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Chapter 9- The Geneva Protocol
The initial phase in the history of post-war disarmament caine to an end
with Britain's rejection of the Geneva Protocol in March 1925.' Although the
Labour Government played a significant role in drawing up the Protocol, it was
guilty of confused thinking over the question of disarmament. Cecil was right to
assert that its decisions to reject the TMG and then support the Protocol were
'curiously inconsistent'. 2
 The strong opposition to the Protocol within Baldwin's
second Administration was, by contrast, entirely consistent with Conservative
antipathy to the TMG in 1923. Austen Chamberlain's determined advocacy of a
new approach to European security problems resulted in the Locarno Treaties of
October 1925. This settlement separated the issue of security from that of arms
reduction, tended to undermine the authority and prestige of the League and
marked a return in Europe to the diplomatic methods which the League had
been intended to replace. The pursuit of disarmament, as defined in this study,
had received a severe blow.
On 30 May 1924 the Labour Cabinet finally decided that it could not
accept the TMA but it wished to make it clear that it remained committed to the
search for arms limitation. MacDonald and Parmoor were authorized, therefore,
to write to the Secretary-General of the League stating that although the
Government was opposed in principle to the TMA, it was in favour of an
international conference on the limitation of armaments, 'whenever a favourable
opportunity presents itself. 3
 The defeat of Poincaré's Bloc National in elections
earlier that same month and the appointment as French Prime Minister of
'See Noel-Baker, P.J. The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes (London: King and Son, 1925), Annex VIII, pp.215-224,
for the text of the Geneva Protocol
2Cab4/12: CII) memorandum 547-B, 11 December 1924
3Cab23/48: Cabinet conclusions, 30 May 1924.
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Edouard Herriot, Radical Mayor of Lyons, made possible a significant
improvement in Anglo-French relations. The two Prime Ministers held talks in
London on 2 1-22 June and in Paris on 8-9 July and during these conversations
MacDonald promised to discuss disarmament and security once the reparations
issue had been resolved and also agreed to join Herriot in making an appearance
at the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations in September. The London
Conference of July-August dealt with reparations by means of the Dawes Plan
and, although MacDonald doubted whether political conditions in Europe were
favourable to disarmament, he nevertheless kept his promise and arrived in
Geneva on 3 September. 4 Despite MacDonald's doubts, this Assembly produced
the Geneva Protocol, the second plan which aimed to achieve disarmament by
the indirect method.
MacDonald's lack of confidence in the prospects for disarmament and his
preoccupation with the reparations issue almost certainly explain the fact that he
arrived in Geneva without having made any preparations for the Assembly. It
would appear that the speech which he made to the Assembly on 4 September
was largely written the day before it was delivered. It was, nevertheless, of great
significance for two reasons. First, no other British Prime Minister or Foreign
Secretary had addressed the Assembly. Second, MacDonald argued that
Germany should be admitted to the League of Nations and that a system of
arbitration was required as a basis for a successfiul conference on arms reduction.
Herriot addressed the Assembly on the following day and, although he
supported MacDonald on the issues of arbitration and arms reduction, he argued
that these were inextricably linked with security. For France, he asserted,
arbitration without security would not be sufficient. There then followed Anglo-
4Marquand, D. Ramsay
 MacDonald, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), pp.35 1-
352.
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French collaboration which, on 6 September, resulted in a resolution being
presented to the Assembly inviting the First and Third Committees to consider
the relationship between arbitration, security and disarmament and the possible
amendment of those articles of the Covenant of the League which concerned the
peaceful settlement of disputes.5
MacDonald then left Geneva to return to London. The work of drafting
the Protocol was left to the British delegation headed by Lord Parmoor, Lord
President of the Council and leader in the House of Lords, who had been given
responsibility for League questions, and Arthur Henderson, the Home Secretary.
The Third Commission was primarily responsible for the Protocol and the main
burden of the work in the British delegation fell to Henderson. 6 It is remarkable
that such an initiative should have been taken without any prior discussion within
the Government and that the British delegates were given considerable
independence when conducting the negotiations. This independence and the
apparent tone of the discussions at Geneva rapidly produced disquiet within both
the Admiralty and the Cabinet.
The Admiralty's concern was based on reports which had appeared in
The Times on 15 and 16 September indicating that Parmoor had effectively
offered the services of the Navy to the League. A letter was sent, therefore, to
the Foreign Office inquiring into the accuracy of these reports. 7
 The Foreign
Office sought to ease Admiralty concerns by pointing out that the Press reports
were exaggerated and providing information about the real position in the form
of the telegraphic correspondence between Parmoor and MacDonald. This
correspondence indicated that the British and French delegations were working
5lbid.. pp.352-353 and Northedge, The Troubled Giant. p.239
6Hamilton, M.A. Arthur Henderson (London: Heinemann, 1938), p.245
7Adml/8671/215: Admiralty letter to the FO, 17 September 1924
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on the assumption that aggression would be defined as a refusal to arbitrate or to
accept an arbitral award. In the event of such an act of aggression being declared
by the League, the two delegations agreed that the Council should call upon
League members to put sanctions against the aggressor into operation
immediately, as laid down in the first two paragraphs of Article 16 of the
Covenant. It was the view of the British delegation that the proposed obligations
did not go beyond Article 16 of the Covenant but that they would be
advantageous in providing the French with '[a] more precise definition of [the]
extent to which [the] obligations contained in article 16 will be met, and thus
acting as [a] more powerful deterrent against aggression'.8
At the same time as the Admiralty sought this clarification from the
Foreign Office about developments in Geneva, it also wrote to the British naval
representative at the League, Rear Admiral Aubrey Smith, seeking his opinions
on the discussions and asking him whether he had in any way been consulted
about Parmoo?s offer, as reported in the Press. On 20 September, Aubrey Smith
replied with both a brief telegram and a more detailed letter. His replies, like that
of the Foreign Office, should have eased the Admiralty's fears because he stated
that the reports were based on misunderstandings of Parmoor's comments
during Press interviews and that the proposals from the Third Committee, while
they had the effect of making the obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant
more precise, 'do not constitute any diminution of national sovereignty'. He also
made the point that the Protocol, even when signed and ratified by the
Government, would not come into effect unless the Arms Reduction Conference
which was to meet in June 1925 was successful. Aubrey Smith did report,
however, that although the Foreign Office was being kept fully informed about
8F0 letter to the Admiralty, 19 September 1924; telegraphic correspondence
between Parmoor and MacDonald, 15-18 September 1924
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the discussions at Geneva, he had not been consulted by Parmoor on any
questions concerning the Protocol.9
Neither the Foreign Office nor Aubrey Smith succeeded in quelling the
Admiralty's dissatisfaction with developments at Geneva and on 20 September
the Foreign Office received another letter setting out the Admiralty's objections
to what was to become Article 11 of the Protocol.'° One week later the
Admiralty view was further elaborated in a memorandum by the First Lord,
Viscount Chelmsford." The Admiralty view was that the economic measures
envisaged under Article 16 of the Covenant could be put into effect by domestic
action alone and did not involve the risk of naval operations being required.'2
The Protocol, however, required the signatory Powers 'to take all measures in
their power to preserve the safety of communications by land and sea of the
attacked or threatened State." 3 Chelmsford asserted, entirely reasonably, that
this was bound to involve naval action as this alone could protect a State's sea
communications." The Admiralty's view was that this would mean that the Navy
was required to assume increased responsibilities which were not consistent with
the one-Power standard and which would result in 'the gravest risks to the fleet
on which the safety of the Empire depends'. '
The problem with this Admiralty argument against the Protocol was that
it did not take account of the linkage between the security guarantees in the
Protocol and the requirement for there to be disarmament before these
9Adml/8671/215: Admiralty letter to Aubrey Smith, 17 September 1924 and
Aubrey Smith telegram to Admiralty, 20 September 1924; AdmI 16/2253: letter
by Aubrey Smith to Admiralty, 20 September 1924.
'°Adml 16/2253: letter from Admiralty to FO, 20 September 1924.
"Cab24/170: CP456, 27 September 1924
' 2Adml 16/2253: letter from Admiralty to FO, 20 September 1924.
13Noel-Baker, The Geneva Protocol, Article 11 of the Geneva Protocol, p.22!
' 4Cab24/170: CP456, 27 September 1924
' 5Adml 16/2253: letter from Admiralty to FO, 20 September 1924.
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guarantees became operative. The French delegation had sought to ensure that
the arbitration and sanctions elements of the Protocol would become operative
immediately rather than having to wait on the agreement of a disarmament plan.
On 18 and 19 September, however, the British delegation had argued strongly
on the Third Committee that the other elements of the Protocol could not come
into force until a disarmament agreement had been concluded. Parmoor stated
that MacDonald, in his Assembly speech of 4 September, had stressed that
arbitration and sanctions were to be steps towards the key objective of
disarmament and the British delegation held firmly to this position. This 'great
battle' was won when the French gave way. 16 As a result of this development
neither Britain nor any other Power would have been required to take action
against an aggressor until the arms reduction plan envisaged in Article 17 of the
Protocol had been carried out. The implementation of such a plan would
inevitably have contributed to the creation of a more peaceflul international
environment and made aggressive military action by any Power more difficult. In
such a situation it was most unlikely that the British Navy would be exposed to
unnecessary danger by having to take action under the Protocol. It was also true,
as Parmoor himself has written, that under Article 11 'the Council was not
empowered to prescribe the particular method which individual nations should
follow'.' 7
 It was for each signatory Power to determine, in the light of its
geographical position and military and naval power, what action it was able to
take.
' 6F0371/10570: summary of the Sixth Meeting of the Fourth Sub-Committee of
the Third Committee, 18 September; minute by Orde, 23 September 1924;
summary of the Sixth Meeting of the Fourth Sub-Committee of the Third
Committee, 19 September 1924
"Parmoor, Baron A Retrospect - Looking back over a life of more than eighty
years (London: Heinemann, 1936), p.238
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The relationship between the Protocol and the arms reduction plan
envisaged by it was analysed by David Hunter Miller in his contemporary
assessment of the League's proposals. He stressed that the security guarantees
offered by the Protocol were dependent upon Powers implementing a multi-
lateral arms reduction scheme:
• . .the Protocol can come into force as a legal obligation only on the
date of the adoption by the Conference of the Plan for the Reduction
of Armaments; and from that date till the date when the Council of
the League of Nations declares that the Plan has or has not been
carried out, it may be said that the Protocol is only provisionally in
force; it is subject to avoidance.'8
The Protocol did not provide a definition of 'carried out' or state the time to be
allowed for this process: these details were to be decided by the Arms Reduction
Conference. There can be little doubt, however, that Miller was right to envisage
that 'carried out' would mean the transformation of the arms reduction plan into
'a binding agreement'.' 9 In this important respect there was no difference
between the TMA and the Protocol. The TMA was more precise in that it stated
that an agreed arms reduction plan had to be carried out within two years of its
adoption but both schemes to achieve disarmament by the indirect method
asserted the primacy of arms reduction.
Madariaga, another contemporary observer, considered that, during the
period of MacDonald's administration, 'the military, naval and air "advisers" of




the British Government were never more powerful'. 2° During the period when
the Protocol was being negotiated, however, the reverse appears to have been
true. The Admiralty was sufficiently concerned at the British delegation's failure
to consult with Aubrey Smith that it sent Dudley Pound to Geneva in order to
put its case concerning the Protocol directly to Parmoor and Henderson. Pound
arrived in Geneva on 28 September and his report indicates that Henderson was
singularly unsympathetic to the Admiralty's concerns.2'
At 4.00 p.m. on the day he arrived, Pound had an interview with the
Home Secretary who took a very combative approach in response to suggested
amendments to the Protocol. The Admiralty wanted changes in three areas.
First, it wanted to ensure that the Navy had freedom of movement at all times, as
long as that movement was not intended to further aggression. This was in
response to Article 7 of the Protocol which stated that, in the event of a dispute
arising between two States, States signatory to the Protocol agreed not to 'take
any measures of military, naval, air, industrial or economic mobilizations, nor, in
general, any action of a nature likely to extend the dispute or render it more
acute'.22 Second, it wished to ensure that in the event of war, no judicial body
was given the power to alter or to criticize existing maritime law. Finally, it was
concerned to ensure that the Navy was not required to take action to protect the
communications of a threatened State, unless war was declared against the
aggressor. This was a clear reference to Article 11 of the Protocol which
Chelmsford had criticized in his Cabinet paper of 27 September. Henderson,
however, asserted that the amendments proposed by the Admiralty had not been
received in sufficient time for them to be considered before the Protocol was
20Madariaga, Morning without Noon, p.53
21Adml/8672/224: Director of Plans' Report on Visit to Geneva, 10 October
1924
Noel-Baker, The Geneva Protocol, Article 7 of the Geneva Protocol, p.218
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finally approved by the Third Committee on 27 September and that this was the
Admiralty's own fault. Pound countered by asserting that the Admiralty had not
received any drafts of the Protocol before 27 September.
Following this exchange there was discussion of the changes that the
Admiralty wished to introduce but Henderson held to his position that it was too
late to re-open any of the articles of the Protocol to further discussion, that
allowing forces to be moved whilst arbitration was in process would run counter
to both the spirit of the Protocol and to the line taken by the French during its
negotiation and that such changes were, in any case, 'contrary to the policy of
the Prime Minister'. 24
 Henderson's biographer provides a rather more dramatic
description of the way in which the Home Secretary dealt with the Admiralty's
representative but there can be no doubt that the British delegation was
determined to adhere to the Protocol. Pound had to be satisfied with Parmoor's
speech at the Assembly during which he stated that it was unlikely that the
Council of the League would regard as an infraction of Article 7 any movement
of naval or air forces which occurred for the purposes of self-defence following
a dispute.
Tension between the Government and the Admiralty concerning the
negotiation and the terms of the Geneva Protocol was reported in the Press and
also prompted questions in the House of Commons. On 2 October Clynes, the
Lord Privy Seal, took Prime Minister's questions and was asked by Curzon27




Adm1/8672/224; Director of Plans' Report on Visit to Geneva, 10 October
1924
27Francis Richard Henry Penn, Viscount Curzon, Conservative MP for Battersea
South
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'whether the Government have made any conditional promises with regard to the
use of the British Navy?' In reply Clynes stated that he had no information on
this matter other than that which had been reported in the Press and these
reports he did not accept. In the Foreign Office there was apparently ignorance
as to the origins of these Press reports but the role of the Navy was quite clear:
The protocol imposes no special obligation on the British Navy, as
such. The obligation, however, it may be interpreted, is shared by the
naval and military forces of all the states which may sign the
protocol, though in practice it will no doubt mean that the British
Navy will be called upon more frequently than the naval and military
forces of any other state.
The controversy nevertheless continued and on 8 October the Prime
Minister was asked in the Commons by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Assheton
Pownali, Conservative MP for Lewisham East, if the British delegation at
Geneva had made any commitments concerning the Navy. MacDonald replied
that the Government would soon publish both the text of the Protocol and the
reports to the Assembly of the First and Third Committees. He held that these
papers would enable MPs to understand the nature and effects of the Protocol.3°
MacDonald was then asked by Commander Carlyon Bellairs, Conservative MP
for Maidstone, if the Government had taken advice from the Admiralty. In the
light of Pound's report, MacDonald's reply appeared disingenuous:
FO37l/1O571: extract from Hansard, 2 October 1924
FO371/1O571: minute by Campbell, 4 October 1924
30F0371/10571: extract from Hansard, 8 October 1924
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That is so. As a matter of fact, before the agreements were come to,
before the matter was finally passed on to the Assembly, a special
representative was sent from the Admiralty. I do hope hon. Members
will not take as gospel any of the extraordinary statements which
appeared in the newspapers while the meetings were taking place.3'
This reply prompted angry comments by the two most senior naval officers,
Beatty and Vice Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, Deputy Chief ofthe Naval StafF
Keyes wrote that 'The Prime Minister's reply to Corn. Bellairs implies something
which is not true!' and Beatty recorded that 'No steps were taken to obtain
Admiralty advice. The Adty. took the initiative and forced their views on the
F.O. and on the Delegates	 with complete success'.32
There are those who have criticized MacDonald for dishonesty in his
handling of other aspects of Government policy at this time. 33 It is likely that the
Labour Administration's treatment of the Admiralty during the negotiation of the
Protocol and MacDonald's attempt to gloss over what took place would have
intensified the senior Service's already considerable opposition to this
disarmament scheme. Whether or not this opposition would have been
sufficiently strong to prevent the Government from signing the Protocol is not
clear and has been a source of disagreement amongst historians. Orde has
31 Adml/8672/224: Director of Plans' Report on Visit to Geneva, 10 October
1924; extract from Hansard, 8 October 1924
32Adml/8672/224: Director of Plans' Report on Visit to Geneva, 10 October
1924; minutes by Keyes, 11 October and Beatty, 14 October 1924. Underlining
original
33See Ellis, E.L. T.J. - A Life of Dr. Thomas Jones (CardifF University of Wales
Press, 1992), pp.269-276 and Roskill, S. Hankey - Man of Secrets vol II. 1919-
1931 (London: Collins, 1972), pp.375-381. Ellis accused MacDonald of
'evasions, half-truths and bare-faced lying that left some of his Cabinet
colleagues aghast' (p.273) over the Campbell case in 1924. This is supported by
Roskill's account of the Campbell case.
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argued that it would have been but Marquand considered that, although the
Prime Minister's own view on the Protocol was not known, 'the high probability
is that, when the battle over the Protocol began in earnest, MacDonald would
have fought in its support'. This was because MacDonald believed that
disarmament was essential to the achievement of peace and that the French
would not participate in a disarmament convention unless their security was
assured. The Protocol was the price that would have to be paid for a
disarmament agreement: Wit brought peace to Europe it would be a small price.
An additional point in support of the argument that MacDonald would have
supported the Protocol is that it emerged from a League of Nations resolution
which he had moved at the Assembly.35
Early in October, MacDonald also received advice from the British
Ambassador to France, the Marquess of Crewe, who considered that the
Protocol was encouraging French opinion to take a more favourable view of
security, arbitration and disarmament. Crewe reminded the Prime Minister that
Herriot, in the previous August, had stated that France required three guarantees
of its security, supplementary to those provided by the Versailles Treaty, Wit
were to support the Allied military occupation of the Rhineland being brought to
an end. The first of these supplementary guarantees should be a defensive pact
between Britain and France to replace the 1919 Treaty which was abandoned
when the USA withdrew from it. There should also be defensive pacts between
the Allies which had borders with Germany and non-aggression pacts,
safeguarded by the League, between these Powers and Germany. Finally, there
should be a treaty of mutual assistance to protect States against aggression.
HOrde, A. Great Britain and International Security 1920-1926 (London: Royal
Historical Society, 1978), p.69 and Marquand, op.cit., p.356
35Marquand, op.cit.. p.356
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Crewe took the view that if the Geneva Protocol were put into force and
included Germany, Herriot's supplementary guarantees would be provided,
except for the defensive pacts between Britain, France and the Allies
neighbouring on Germany. From the point of view of disarmament, Crewe
believed that there were three important factors which would encourage the
French Government to make concessions, if the Geneva Protocol were accepted.
First, French finances would be strengthened if spending on armaments could be
reduced. Second, if France did reduce its expenditure on armaments, it was
thought that the British and American Governments would moderate their
attitudes concerning the countly's war debts. Third, the French had much to lose
concerning security if they rejected the Protocol:
There would...! am convinced, amongst all thinking people here, be
a very real reluctance, in the face of the relative strengths of the
French and German populations, lightly to abandon, as a result of
failure to come to an agreement with Great Britain at a disarmament
conference, the new guarantees of security which under the terms of
the protocol now at last appear to be so nearly within the grasp of
France.
If Crewe's assessment of French opinion regarding the Protocol were
correct there was a strong case for the Labour Government, had it remained in
power rather than falling over the matter of the Campbell Case, signing and
ratifying the Protocol. Herriot's desire for a defensive pact, in addition to the
Protocol, would certainly have met strong opposition in Britain. The British
FO37l/lO571: telegram from Crewe to MacDonald, 6 October 1924
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Government would, however, have had a powerful position from which to
negotiate with the French on this issue. It is unlikely that the French would have
been willing to give up the advantages which the Protocol provided because
Britain refused to enter into an additional defensive pact with them. French
support for the Protocol was confirmed by the fact that its Government laid
before the Chamber of Deputies on 28 November two bills proposing the
ratification of the Protocol and the recognition of the obligatory jurisdiction of
the Permanent Court of International Justice.37
By this time, however, the future of the Protocol, as far as Britain was
concerned, would be decided by Baldwin's second Administration which was
appointed following the Conservatives' victory in the November 1924 General
Election. Conservative hostility to general treaties providing for security and
disarmament had been revealed during 1922-23 when the proposals put forward
by Cecil and Réquin had resulted in the TMA. It was, therefore, most unlikely
that the Protocol would receive much support within the Government. The only
member of the Cabinet in favour of disarmament through the League was Cecil,
who was appointed Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster with responsibility for
League affairs. He lost no time in trying to persuade the new Foreign Secretary,
Austen Chamberlain, that the Government should adopt a favourable attitude to
the Protocol. In a letter of 17 November he made it clear that, while he would
have preferred the League to have continued with its examination of the TMA,
he considered that the Protocol was beneficial to Britain. This was because, in
Cecil's opinion, Britain would eventually find herself involved in an arms race if a
general disarmament agreement were not achieved. The Protocol offered the
37F0371/10572: Crewe to Austen Chamberlain, 1 December 1924
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means by which such an arms race might be avoided and Britain's military and
naval position might be strengthened:
It would be a real relief to us if we could induce the French to
reduce their air force, and agree to some limitation of submarines
and perhaps cruisers also. Indeed since armed strength is a relative
matter and we have greatly cut down our armaments particularly on
land it is clear that the more we can do to induce other nations to
follow our example the greater becomes our effective military
power.
Cecil attached so much importance to the Protocol that he believed it should be
considered by a special committee comprising Dominion representatives and
political figures drawn from across the political spectrum. In a subsequent letter
he suggested that Balfour, Grey, Lloyd George and MacDonald should be
invited to serve on this committee.
In a letter which he wrote to Baldwin on 25 November concerning the
procedures by which the Government was to consider the Protocol, Chamberlain
revealed a willingness to respond positively to Cecil's suggestion concerning a
special committee. It had already been decided that the initial discussion should
take place within the CII) but Chamberlain then wanted a special political sub-
committee to be appointed 'to decide the fundamental political issues which are
absolutely of the first consequence in determining our relations with the rest of
the world'. He advised the Prime Minister to invite Balfour, Haldane and Grey to
join this sub-committee so that it would be possible to arrive at a genuinely
FO8OO/256: Cecil to Austen Chamberlain, 17 November 1924
39F0800/256: Cecil ot Austen Chamberlain, 21 November 1924
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national policy regarding the Protocol. 4° Chamberlain was less convinced,
however, about the merits of the Protocol itself. Although the French strongly
favoured a League guarantee of the type offered by the Protocol, Chamberlain
did not think that they would regard it as a substitute for mutual defence treaties.
He anticipated, therefore, that if Britain did accept the Protocol, he would
immediately receive from France and Belgium a demand to supplement the
Protocol with a tripartite treaty.4'
At this early stage in the life of Baldwin's second Adminstration,
Chamberlain's thinking was in what he described as 'a very fluid condition'.'
Amongst his Foreign Office advisers, however, strong opposition to the
Protocol was already being put forward. The most powerfiul voice against the
Protocol was, unsurprisingly, that of Crowe who argued that its provisions ran
counter to 'the real world of facts'. 43 For this self-styled realist there were three
features of the Protocol which were particularly objectionable. First, under
Article 3 of the Protocol the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International
Justice was made compulsory in disputes which involved the interpretation of a
treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if
established would constitute a breach of an international obligation and the
nature and extent of the reparation to be made for breaking an international
obligation. In October 1920 the Cabinet had rejected the principle of compulsory
arbitration and Crowe held that nothing had occurred since then which
counteracted that decision.'
40F0800/256 and AC5 1/21: Austen Chamberlain to Baldwin, 25 November 1924
41F0800/256: Austen Chamberlain to Cecil, 19 November 1924
42Ibid.
43Cab4112 and F0371/10571: minute by Crowe, 17 November 1924
"Ibid.
286
The effect of Article 4 of the Protocol intensified Crowe's opposition to
the principle of arbitration which was such an important element of the
agreement. This article stated that if the Powers involved in a dispute refused to
accept arbitration, the League Council could, if in unanimous agreement, impose
a settlement or, if there were not unanimity, refer the dispute to arbitrators of its
choosing whose arbitral award would be binding. Crowe considered that this
was 'an important and far-reaching innovation' which went significantly beyond
the scope of Article 11 of the Covenant of the League. In this he was
indisputably conect because Article 11 merely stated that in the event of war or
the threat of war 'the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise or
effectual to safeguard the peace of nations'. 45 By departing so significantly from
the flexibility which Crowe thought was such an admirable feature of this article
of the Covenant, the framers of the Protocol were, in his opinion endangering
the Covenant rather than strengthening it. This was because countries might be
faced with the possibility of an arbitral award going against them on a matter
which they considered to be of supreme national importance. In such a situation
Crowe thought it more likely that a Power would repudiate its engagement with
the League rather than face an adverse arbitral award:
There are issues so deeply interwoven with national histoiy, tradition
and sentiment that no foreign tribunal can be trusted truly to
understand and appreciate what is at stake.
45The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany.
28 June 1919. Cmd.153 of 1919
Cab4/12: CII) memorandum 538-B and F0371/10571: minute by Crowe, 17
November 1924
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This concern for the survival of the League was, however, disingenuous because
in the same minute Crowe questioned the whole process by which the Covenant
had been drawn up. He claimed that Government Departments had not been
given an opportunity to consider the draft of the Covenant with the result that it
became known to them only in its final form, 'like Minerva sprung completely
equipped from the head of Jupiter'.47
Crowe was right, however, to criticize the Protocol in terms of its likely
effect on the USA's perception of the League. He pointed out that the USA had
been unprepared to join the League with a Covenant which provided a
considerable degree of flexibility as far as the application of economic sanctions
was concerned. It was reasonable, therefore, to argue that they would be less
likely to join in the future if the application of these sanctions were made more
rigid by acceptance of the Protocol. Further, Britain had signed the Covenant
not expecting that the USA would repudiate it. This repudiation had, of course,
changed the context of post-war international relations and for Crowe this
justified any British reluctance to fuffil its obligations as a League member. It
followed logically from this view, as far as Crowe was concerned, that, if there
were to be amendment of the Covenant, it should be in the direction of limiting
British commitments regarding economic sanctions. He took the same view on
the matter of the employment of military, naval and air forces. Here the Protocol
also tightened up the obligations which applied in the Covenant by removing the
uncertainty as to the definition of an aggressor State. For Crowe this very
uncertainty was one of the advantages of the Covenant as it provided a means





Crowe's view was obviously consistent with his criticisms of previous
attempts to create through the League a different context for the conduct of
international relations. He had no doubt that the provisions for compulsoiy
arbitration and the rules for the application of sanctions against an aggressor laid
down in the Protocol were merely paper guarantees which would not prevent a
Power from using force Wit considered that matters of the very highest national
interest were at stake. The process element of disarmament remained for Crowe,
therefore, incompatible with the maintenance of Britain's position as a world
Power. What is striking about his criticisms of the Protocol is that they focus
upon the means by which the international situation was to be altered so that
arms limitation, the product element of disarmament, could be achieved: about
arms limitation itself and the Conference which the framers of the Protocol
intended should take place in June 1925, Crowe had nothing to say.
In another Foreign Office contribution to the debate on the Protocol,
Ronald Hugh Campbell pointed out that its supporters claimed that one of its
benefits was that it provided 'the only basis for a fi.irther reduction of
annaments'. Although less strident in his criticisms of the Protocol than Crowe,
Campbell's conclusions were essentially the same. He did, however, attach
considerable importance to satisfying French security concerns because this was
a problem which had been a major source of trouble for successive post-war
British Governments. Campbell expected, though, that there would be
considerable opposition from the Dominions to the Protocol and he did not think
that satisfying French security concerns justified dividing the Empire. The
pressing problem for the Government, therefore, was to decide how best to
respond to French disappointment at what Campbell described as British
Cab4/l2: CD memorandum 540-B, 20 November 1924
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'defection' from the Anglo-French understanding established by Herriot and
MacDonald. Campbell believed that Britain would have to enter into a defensive
alliance with France as nothing else would compensate it for the loss of the
guarantees which it would have gained through the Protocol. 5° It was, of course,
just such policy thinking which led to the Locarno Treaties of 1925.
Critics of the Protocol within the Foreign Office had certainly moved
rapidly to place their views before the new Foreign Secretary. By the time the
first meeting of the CID took place under the new Government on 4 December,
however, memoranda attacking the Protocol had been written by the Army,
Navy and Air Force, the President of the Board of Trade, the Treasuty and
Hankey. 5' Baldwin was present at this meeting and took the chair, although
Curzon had been appointed President of the CID and it was he who led the
discussion on the Protocol. Curzon initially provided a summary of the criticisms
which had been made of the Protocol and which were essentially the same as
those which had been made of the TMA. The principal concerns were that the
Protocol made the Covenant of the League more rigid whereas previous British
Governments had sought to render it more flexible and less precise, that its
acceptance would make it impossible for the USA to join the League, that it
would involve an increase in Britain's commitments and thereby result in an
increase in armaments rather than arms reduction and that it would undermine
British sovereignty by turning the League into a super-State. It was clear from
Curzon's summary that he was opposed to acceptance of the Protocol in its
original form and he asserted that detailed amendment would be an extremely
50Ibid.
51 Cab4/1 1: C memoranda 517-B, 30 September 1924, 526-B, 7 November
1924, and 527-B, 29 October 1924; Cab4/12: CII) memoranda 536-B, 24
November 1924, 537-B, 26 November 1924, 538-B, 17 November 1924, 539-
B, 21 November 1924, 540-B, 20 November 1924, 541-B, 29 November 1924,
and 542-B, 1 December 1924
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difficult task. Even if the British Government produced an amended draft of the
Protocol, Curzon stated that it could not be sure of this winning acceptance
from the other Powers and it would, in any case, cause considerable
controversy. Despite these doubts, however, Curzon did not believe that the
Government could simply reject the Protocol: some alternative would have to be
put forward.52
Amongst the other members who expressed their thoughts at this CII)
meeting, only Cecil sought to focus attention on the issue of disarmament. While
he was not prepared to express a final view on the Protocol, he held strongly to
the idea that disarmament should be the first consideration of the CU) simply
because the existence of the Protocol depended on agreement first being reached
on this issue. Balfour's provisional position was that Britain should confine itself
to stating that it could not take part in such a plan until the USA joined the
League and Churchill stated that he had never considered that the League was in
a position to preserve peace. He argued in favour of regional agreements under
the League to establish demilitarized zones in areas held to be of special danger:
in this respect he referred to the territory between France and Germany and to
the Polish border. There was some agreement about the way forward in that
Cecil, Amery and Curzon favoured the establishment of a special committee to
examine the issues associated with the Protocol in more detail. Amery wanted
this special committee to examine the fundamental principles on which the
Protocol and the League were based. Curzon thought it should consider both the
Protocol and Britain's attitude to the Covenant and the League, and Cecil,
inevitably, wanted it to examine whether disarmament by international
agreement could be achieved. He also urged again the involvement of political
52Cab2/4: CII) minutes, 4 December 1924.
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figures who were not members of the Government, referring specifically to
MacDonald, Grey, Asquith and Lloyd George.53
As the new Conservative Government began its consideration of the
Protocol, the matter of the preparatory work for the Conference on the
Reduction of Armaments was considered by the Council of the League at a
meeting in Rome on 9 December. At this meeting Chamberlain reported that the
Government had not yet had time to consider the Protocol and it was agreed
that the Conference on the Reduction of Armaments would be put on the agenda
for the next Council meeting which would take place in March 1925.M The
effect of this was to bring the issue of disarmament to the fore within the CD,
albeit temporarily. Just two days later Ainery told his colleagues on the CU) that
he did not believe the Government wouid have taken a decision on the Protocol
by that date. Curzon's worry was that, if this were the case, Britain would be
accused of delaying a decision on the Protocol. He argued, therefore, in favour
of an early statement to the effect that Britain would not be in a position to
discuss the Protocol at the next Council meeting. Crowe clearly thought that it
was likely that there would be an Arms Reduction Conference and he suggested
that, before any British representatives attended such a Conference, the Chiefs of
Staff should agree a disarmament plan which would serve as the basis of the
policy to be adopted by Britain. Crowe did not, of course, believe that any such
plan was likely to be workable but he argued that the Washington Conference
had been successful because the USA had produced a definite plan in advance
and this had served as the basis for discussion. In response to this suggestion
Balfour asserted that any disarmament plan produced by Britain would be a plan
53Ibid.
FO37l/lO572: minutes of the Council of the League of Nations, 9 December
1924
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for the disarmament of other nations because Britain had already disarmed to the
lowest level consistent with national safety. Amery argued that the Washington
Conference had been a success not so much because the USA had prepared a
disarmament plan in advance but because only three major naval Powers were
involved and they were a long way away from each other and none of them was
threatened by naval aggression from a neighbouring Power. By contrast, an
Anns Reduction Conference affecting all the European States would involve
much greater difficulties. In this Ameiy was surely correct but his comment did
diminish the difficulties at Washington created by the policies of France and
Italy.55
When Chamberlain returned from the Rome meeting of the League
Council he reported to his colleagues on the CII) that, as had been anticipated,
Belgium and France would still seek a tripartite security pact with Britain, even
if the Protocol were signed. Chamberlain had no faith in the Protocol, referring
to its rejection as 'quite the easiest of the decisions that we have to take', but he
was convinced that it would be 'an absolute disaster' if it were turned down but
nothing else was put in its place. Although he had formed as yet no clear idea
as to the alternative to the Protocol, it was clear that he was moving towards
support for some kind of guarantee treaty with France:
If France and England were united by a Treaty of Guarantee,
Germany would not go to war and there would be no war in the East
of Europe. So that there again you come back to this idea that the
Protocol by itself is insufficient and that a Franco-Bntish Pact really
55Cab2/4: CJD minutes, 11 December 1924
Cab2/4: CII) minutes, 16 December 1924
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gives to Europe, and gives more effectively to Europe, the security
which the Protocol affects to provide.57
By early January 1925 Chamberlain was convinced both that the Govermnent
would have to reject the Protocol and that the key issue was how to ensure
European security, which he thought was different from security in the Far East
or the Pacific. While Chamberlain thought that he had understood the problem,
he was quite open in stating that he did not have a solution. It was for this
reason that he summoned a Foreign Office conference for 22 January.
Chamberlain's decision to consult with the Foreign Office heads of
department on the situation in Europe followed on from a number of decisions
taken by the CII) concerning the Protocol. At its meeting of 16 December 1924
the CII) decided that Amery should send to the Dominion Prime Ministers and
to the Government of India the minutes of that meeting and the previous
meeting, held on 4 December, and ask for their initial observations before the
end of January. He should also propose to the Dominion Prime Ministers that
there be a conference on the Protocol at the beginning of March so that the
Government could give a reply to the League at the Council meeting later in that
month. As Chamberlain had received contradictory views concerning the
opinions of Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes towards the Protocol, it
was also agreed that he should find out what Hughes really thought. Most
importantly, however, the CID decided to appoint a sub-committee which was
to report by 10 January, if possible. The task of this sub-committee was to
consider how far the Protocol could be amended so as to meet the criticisms
which had been directed against it or to identifr the principles which should be
57Ibid.
FO371/1 1064: minute by Austen Chamberlain, 4 January 1925
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adopted Wit were decided that the Protocol should be rejected and other
proposals put forward. The fact that Hankey was to chair the four-man sub-
committee and that Crowe was to represent the Foreign Office ensured that it
would be hostile to the Protocol for both of these men were instinctively
opposed to disarmament through the League. 59 There was to be no political sub-
committee of the kind which Cecil and Chamberlain had suggested.
When the CII) next met, Hankey reported that the sub-committee would
be unlikely to have completed its work by 10 January, as had been intended
originally, but that it hoped its report would be ready shortly after that date. 6° On
the same day Chamberlain explained this situation to the Cabinet and pointed out
that until the Government had been able to decide its attitude to the Protocol, it
would be necessary to pursue 'a hand to mouth policy' as far as foreign affairs
were concerned. It has already been shown, however, that Chamberlain
believed that the Protocol would have to be rejected and in a minute of 7
January, Villiers described it as 'practically dead'. 62 The opposition of the US
Government to the Protocol confirmed this view. On 5 January the British
Ambassador to Washington, Sir Esmé Howard, discussed the Protocol with
Secretary of State Hughes. Hughes feared that the policy of a Central or South
American State might result in the League taking action which would bring it
into conflict with the Monroe Doctrine and he also foresaw problems Wan armed
blockade by the League of an aggressor country interfered with the USA's
neutral rights of trade and commerce. Hughes' opposition to the Protocol was
very clearly stated to Howard:
59Cab2/4: CD minutes, 16 December 1924
60Cab2/4: CD minutes, 5 January 1925
61 Cab23/49: Cabinet conclusions, 5 January 1925
62F0371/1 1064: minute by Villiers, 7 January 1925
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He had hoped that the Protocol would die a natural death, because
he saw in it numerous sources of trouble. In fact, if it went through
as it was, America could hardly help regarding the League as a
"potential enemy" 63
In order to avoid these problems Howard suggested to Hughes on 5
January that Britain and the Dominion Governments might ratify the Protocol
but with the reservation that the Empire would enforce none of the sanctions
embodied in it until after consultation and, crucially, agreement with the US
Government. In a subsequent conversation with Hughes on 8 January, Howard
was told that President Coolidge was prepared to support this proposal as long
as it was presented as an entirely British ithtiative. Despite Howard's
enthusiastic support for his own suggestion, this was a path which Chamberlain
had no intention of following. In his reply to Howard at the end of January he
told him confidentially that there was no likelihood of the British Government
ratifying the Protocol unless it was amended in such a way as to make it a very
different convention and he was not prepared to support Howard's proposed
reservation. In his opinion this would 'turn the United States into a super-state
with a vengeance, making them a court of appeal from all proceedings of the
League and giving them a right of veto over its decisions'.65
Just five days before Chamberlain's letter rejecting Howard's proposed
reservation, the sub-committee under Hankey's chairmanship submitted its report
regarding possible amendment of the Protocol. As was to be expected, given the
63F0800/257: Howard to Austen Chamberlain, 9 January 1925
TMlbid.
65F0800/257: Austen Chamberlain to Howard, 28 January 1925
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influence of Hankey and Crowe, the report came out strongly against the
assumptions underpinning the Protocol and did so quite explicitly:
We are at a parting of the ways. Is the League to develop gradually
on the lines of the Covenant with a view to achieve pacification by
forming the habit among nations of bringing their differences and
apprehensions to the Council for settlement with moral force as the
principal weapon and with material force in the background as a last
resort, or is it to be given a new orientation by superimposing on the
Covenant a system of compulsory arbitration closely supported by
coercion? We have proceeded on the assumption that the former
system is preferred by His Majesty's Government as the basis of the
League's activities.
It did not, however, recommend rejection of the Protocol but instead proposed
the rejection of nine of its sixteen articles and the significant amendment of the
other seven. Particular importance was attached to amendment of Article 16 of
the Covenant of the League so that if economic sanctions were applied against
an aggressor, these would only affect trade and financial relations between the
aggressor state and members of the League. Under Article 16 League members
were required to take action to prevent trade and financial relations between the
aggressor State and all other States, whether members of the League or not. The
sub-committee held that their amendment would be more likely to result in the
US Government's accession to the League.67




This desire to make the League more acceptable to the USA was, of
course, entirely consistent with the frequently expressed concerns of British
decision-makers on this point. In other respects, however, the sub-committee
was clearly motivated by more cynical political considerations. It did not believe
that an amended form of the Protocol could be of benefit to Britain but it
decided to avoid recommending its outright rejection because, 'for those Powers
who have signed the Protocol, and more particularly France, it will be easier to
meet us if we preserve at least the semblance of keeping the Protocol in being
than if we oppose to their scheme a simple negation.' A further political reason
for not rejecting the Protocol outright was that Britain would avoid being held
to blame for frustrating the proposed Arms Reduction Conference which
depended on acceptance of the Protocol.
The report of the sub-committee must be regarded as a thoroughly
disingenuous document. Neither Hankey nor Crowe had any faith in the League
of Nations or disarmament and the report was a highly complex and
sophisticated way of burying the Protocol and the proposed Arms Reduction
Conference without Britain having to carry the responsibility. It was for this
reason that Cecil was so critical of the report when it was first discussed by the
CU) on 13 February. Although he had been in Geneva until the previous
morning and claimed that he had had little chance to examine the report, he had
certainly formed a view on it. He asserted that what was proposed in Hankey's
report was 'a really fatal policy' because it would have a negative effect on the
efforts being made at Geneva to achieve international co-operation:
Ibid.
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Broadly, I am veiy firmly opposed to the way this would appear to
the Assembly of the League of Nations, or, indeed, to any other
body. What they would say is: "We ask you for three things -
disarmament, security, arbitration and prohibition of war. You give
us no disarmament" - because practically that is the effect of this
ReporL
Cecil was determined that he should not be pushed into a position where he was
defending the Protocol in all its details but, in an argument reminiscent of his
defence of the TMA, he asserted that it did not have to be accepted by all the
major Powers but could operate within Europe as a kind of regional security
pact, as long as most of the European Powers were prepared to accept it. He
also thought that the disarmament-Protocol linkage was a good test of how far
those who wanted security were being genuine. If such countries were not
prepared to go into the Antis Reduction Conference without something more
than the Protocol, their insincerity would be clearly exposed. If, however, they
went ahead with the Conference but were not prepared to agree to a
disarmament scheme, Britain would then be perfectly entitled to say that it could
not agree to the Protocol.1°
Within the CII) only Cecil argued in favour of disarmament as it is
understood in this study, that is, in terms of both process and product. Hoare,
Secretary of State for Air, expressed support for arms reduction but he did not
share Cecil's conviction that this could only be achieved through a process of
international co-opeTation based on the League. He was convinced that
economic factors were working to draw the European Powers closer together
CabV4: CII) minutes, 13 February 1925
70Thid.
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regardless of any political action which might be taken. Rather than involvement
with these Powers, Hoare urged detachment from them and this, of course,
meant rejection of the Protocol. 7' Hoare's colleagues in the CU) supported the
policy of rejecting the Protocol but there was a strong sense that something
would have to be put in its place. Austen Chamberlain was convinced that the
issue of security had to be addressed and he favoured doing this by means of an
agreement between Britain, France, Belgium and Germany guaranteeing the
western frontiers of France. 72 This was a proposal which Gustav Stresemann,
Germany's Foreign Secretary, had already made and was, of course, the basis for
the Locarno Treaties. Such an agreement, however, would be restricted to the
matter of security and would not involve any necessary move to establish a
disarmament convention.
It was this strong tendency to de-couple security and disarmament,
together with his own sensitivity to criticism from his colleagues in the CU) for
not offering any constructive proposals in response to the report of Hankey's
sub-committee, which prompted Cecil to put forward another attempt to focus
his colleagues' attention on disarmament. Richardson has described this as 'an
innocuous Protocol together with a mutual assistance arrangement between
Britain, France and Germany'. 73 This does not, however, do justice to what was
a realistic attempt to deal with European security problems without throwing
overboard the principles of the League and a commitment to disarmament
defined in terms of aims, process and product. His scheme indicated that he
accepted that both the TMA and the Protocol were too complex and required
too great a commitment by Britain.
71 Cab2/4: CU) minutes, 19 February 1925
72Cab2/4: CII) minutes, 13 February 1925
73Richardson, British Disarmament Policy, p.39
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Cecil held that French security was not simply an issue of insuring that
country against an attack on its territory: threats by Germany and Russia to
Poland and Austria would also be perceived by the French as endangering their
security. He recognized, however, that considerations of limited power, together
with the nature of domestic and Dominion opinion meant that Britain could do
little to provide security in central and eastern Europe. It could, though, do
something to ensure the security of Western Europe and Cecil envisaged specific
obligations being made by Britain to France, Belgium and Germany. To ensure
that such a development did not result in the emergence of competing alliance
systems he wanted these agreements to be placed under the supervision of the
League and for the casusfoederis to be approved by the Council. He also
wanted such agreements to be supplementary to 'some more general obligation
to preserve peace, even if that obligation is of a very slight or shadowy
description' and to involve some measure of disarmament.74
Cecil believed that these objectives could be achieved by means of a five
point Convention. Under this the signatory Powers agreed to refrain from
aggressive war against each other. In the event of one or more of the signatory
Powers resorting to such a war, the others would break off diplomatic relations
and consult together as to how to end the aggression. In this cast any of them
could ask the Council of the League to act as a mediator. Any two or more of
the signatory Powers could enter into special defensive agreements but these
were subject to the approval and sanction of the League and had to be of such a
nature that any of the signatory Powers could join them. Once the Convention
was ratified, the Council of the League was to ask the Co-ordination Committee
- the successor to the TMC - to draw up a scheme providing the principles on
74Cab4/12: CII) memorandum 591-B, 23 February 1925
301
which arms limitation and reduction might be achieved. Once such a scheme
were drawn up, the Council would then summon a Conference to consider it and
how it might be applied to the existing international situation. The Convention
would remain in force for five years but if in that time, an arms limitation and
reduction scheme were agreed, it was to continue for a further ten years. In the
first instance the Convention was to apply only to Europe and would come into
force when it was ratified by the European Powers holding permanent seats on
the Council and not less than three other Powers holding non-permament seats.'5
In his determination to achieve a multi-lateral arms limitation and
reduction agreement Cecil had retreated from the principle, enshrined in the
TMA and Geneva Protocol, that disarmament had to precede security
guarantees. His efforts to ensure that disarmament had a place in the
Government's emerging security policy for Western Europe were, however, in
vain. When the Cabinet met on 2 March it decided to accept the CD view that
the Geneva Protocol was unacceptable. The Imperial Conference on the
Protocol, which had been suggested by the CII) for early in March, had proved
impossible to organize but the Dominion Governments had communicated to the
Foreign Office their hostility to the Protocol. 76 At the same time it agreed that it
was not sufficient simply to reject the Protocol: some alternative plan would
have to be put forward which addressed the issue of national security by easing
the state of tension and insecurity which existed in Europe." By this time the
Foreign Office, following its meeting of senior officers on 22 January, had
concluded that, as the security of France, Belgium and Holland were crucial to
the defence of Britain, the British Government should be prepared to offer a
75Ibid.
76F0371/1 1065: minute by Campbell, 10 March 1925
'7Cab23149: Cabinet conclusions, 2 March 1925
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guarantee to France and Belgium. Chamberlain stressed that this was not just his
personal opinion but that of the Foreign Office as a whole. 78 This comment
masked some very considerable differences of opinion amongst senior Foreign
Office officials and it is striking that Nicholson, the author of the memorandum
setting out the Department's position following the 22 January conference,
expressed doubts about the premises and conclusions of the memorandum. He
held that Britain could do very little to influence French feelings of insecurity
and that it was, therefore, unwise to provide it with a guarantee. He accepted
that 'the alternative is to have no objective Foreign Policy at all' and asserted
such a position, 'in present conditions, would not be a wholly bad conclusion'.79
Chamberlain, however, had no doubt that he was right. The problem
which he faced lay not in the Foreign Office but within the Cabinet where he
confronted strong opposition, most notably from Churchill, Balfour, Curzon and
Birkenhead. The immediate result was that Chamberlain left for a League
Council meeting in Geneva without the Cabinet having determined a clear
policy. 8° On 12 March the Foreign Secretary told the Council that the British
Government had decided to reject the Protocol. He couched this rejection in
placatory terms and stated that as far as arbitration, disarmament and security
were concerned, the British Government was 'in the flullest accord with the ideals
which have animated the Fifth Assembly of the League'. It wanted, however, to
take a path very different from that of the Protocol. Chamberlain claimed that
78Cab4/12: CU) memorandum 593-B, 20 February 1925
79F0371/l 1065: minute by Nicolson, 26 January 1925
80Ferris, op.cit., pp.l'V1-lS4; Northedge, Troubled Giant, pp.249-SO;
Richardson, British Disarmament Policy, pp.39-41; Dutton, D. Austen
Chamberlain - Gentleman in Politics (Bolton: Ross Anderson, 1985), p.243;
Goldstein, E. 'The evolution of British diplomatic strategy for the Locarno Pact,
1924-1925', passim, in Dockrill, M.. and McKercher, B. (eds.) Diplomacy and
World Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
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the best way in which to deal with European tensions was through defensive
agreements between small groups of States, framed in accordance with the
League. 8' In the face of Cabinet opposition to an Anglo-French pact
Chamberlain had already decided to pursue the proposals which Stresemann had
put forward in Januaiy for a quadruple pact and he urged Herriot to accept this
when he saw him in Paris on 6-7 March.82
Chamberlain still had much work to do before this policy was brought to
success at Locarno in October 1925. His labours, however, pushed
disarmament into a subordinate position. During the period from March to
October 1925, only Cecil 'harped on the need for disarmament' but his efforts
were to no avail. 84 In the final paragraph of the final protocol of the Locarno
Conference the representatives of Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium,
Poland and Czechoslovakia agreed only 'to give their sincere co-operation to the
work relating to disarmament already undertaken by the League of Nations and
to seek the realisation thereof in a general agreement'. 85 This commitment to
disarmament, if it can be so described, was very different from that contained in
the TMA and the Geneva Protocol which made the security elements of the
Conventions dependent on a general disarmament agreement.
Following the defeat of the Labour Government only Cecil had tried to
prevent the Protocol being rejected. This was not, however, because he
considered it to be a well structured Convention. In his own memoirs he
81 F0371/1 1065: Austen Chamberlain's speech at the League Council, 12 March
1925
9O371/1 1065: Chamberlain to Crowe, 7 march 1925
Dutton, op.cit., pp.244-249; Richardson, op.cit., pp.41-42
Crowe, S.E. Crowe and the Locarno Pact, E.H.R. 342, January 1972;
Cab24/174: CP329, 6 July 1925; Cecil Papers: ADD51078, Cecil to Austen
Chamberlain, 7 September 1925
85Fina1 Protocol of the Locarno Conference. 16 October 1925, Cmd 2525 of
1925
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compared the disarmament element of the Protocol unfavourably with that of the
TMA. In correspondence with Hankey, he was even more forthright and
described the Protocol as 'a half baked proposal'. Such criticism was not justified
because, as has been seen, the two schemes approached disarmament in
essentially the same way. Cecil's regret at the Protocol's failure was based on his
conviction that there was an over-riding need for a general scheme of
disarmament and the Protocol, for all its weaknesses, did, in his opinion, provide
the basis for such a scheme.
Yet, for all his regret over the fate of the Protocol, Cecil had previously
recognized, in both the TMG and his proposed Convention of February 1925,
that a security and disarmament settlement was required primarily for Europe.
Headlam-Morley was right to point out that, while the principal purpose of the
Protocol was to deal with the strong feelings of insecurity which existed in
Europe, its authors had tried 'to find formulas and phrases which in appearance
are to be equally applicable to South America, to the Pacific and to the Far
East'. Such an aim was unrealistic and, for this reason, even though the
Protocol might have drawn France into serious discussion of a disarmament
Convention, Baldwin's Administration was right to reject it. It was mistaken,
however, in replacing the Protocol with the Locarno system which was
essentially 'a local 'Geneva Protocol' minus disarmament'. In failing to address
the disarmament issue, the Locarno Treaties ensured that this would continue to
be a significant problem in European diplomacy. The Labour and Conservative
Governments of 1924-25 would have made better progress in resolving the
inter-connected issues of security and disarmament had they based their policies
Cecil, op.cit.. p.159; Cecil Papers: ADD51088, Cecil to Hankey, 24 August
1925
FO371/1 1064: memorandum by Headlam-Morley, 12 February 1925
Madariaga, Morning without Noon, p.57
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on the TMA. This provided the most likely means of attaining a general
European agreement which dealt with security and disarmament. Europe needed
'a European protocol' but unfortunately neither the MacDonald nor Baldwin
Administrations recognized this.
FO371/1 1064: memorandum by Headlam-Morley, 12 February 1925
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Chapter 10 - conclusion
This study shows that, although there were five different Cabinets in the
period 19 18-25, Government policy regarding issues of disarmament was
essentially consistent and broadly in line with the thinking of its permanent
officials and Service advisers. Only at the Washington Conference and during
the League discussions which resulted in the Geneva Protocol did political
leaders choose to impose their will on dissident naval advisers. There are a
number of reasons why politicians and permanent officials were not committed
to multi-lateral disarmament negotiations through the League. In part this
reflected their own modes of thinking. British defence and foreign policy was
dominated by conservatives who placed their trust in traditional methods of
diplomacy rather than the open diplomacy advocated by League enthusiasts.
Curzon, Hankey and Crowe were realists who considered that Britain's interests
would be best served through the maintenance of strong armed forces and
minimal commitments to other Powers: they had no faith in the search for
collective security through the League. Crowe, especially, was deeply hostile to
the League and he opposed every disarmament initiative which emerged from its
various commissions during the post-war years. He even asserted that
Government Departments had not been given an opportunity to consider the
draft Covenant and implied that, if they had been allowed to do so, they would
not have supported it.' The League, he believed, threatened to undermine
Britain's freedom of action and draw the country into conflicts which it would
otherwise have been able to avoid.
Such ideological objections to the League were strengthened by the
international situation which developed following the signing of the Versailles
1 Cab4/12: C memorandum 538-B, 17 November 1924
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Treaty. The failure of the US Senate to approve the Treaty seriously weakened
the League from the outset. The USA's withdrawal from international co-
operation imposed a potentially very heavy burden on Britain as the principal
supplier of security around the world. This was at a time when the countly's
imperial responsibilities had increased and there were significant difficulties in
some of its overseas territories. The problems which these developments
presented were exacerbated by the critical differences between Britain and
France over the treatment of Germany. Ministers and officials, therefore, had to
formulate policy in a complex and challenging post-war world. In such
circumstances it was not surprising that British thinking on defence and foreign
policy issues should have been dominated by an essentially realist philosophy.
It is, however, a key argument of this study that an analysis of British
defence and foreign policy in the years after the Great War which draws too a
sharp distinction between realist and idealist, or liberal, approaches simplifies
what was, in reality, a much more complex and dynamic situation. An essentially
realist approach did not necessarily exclude the use of idealist or liberal means
and this was evident in a number of developments which have been examined.
The Plans Division's proposals for naval disarmament in the years before the
Washington Conference, the Admiralty's support for negotiations through the
League to extend the principles of the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty to
non-signatory Powers and Hankey's initial support for the Esher Plan were
instances when realist officials attempted to achieve their objectives through
liberal means. Ferris' argument concerning British strategic policy in the 1920s -
'Britain did not systematically favour or reject 'liberal' or 'realist' means. It
308
adopted whatever ones it thought would best achieve its aims in specific
circumstances.'2 - can also be applied to its treatment of disarmament issues.
Over chemical warfare, however, which received more Cabinet attention
than any of the other disarmament issues considered in this study, Governments
pursued a consistently cynical policy which fell between the realist and idealist
stools. They had little faith in the international declarations which had been made
against the use of chemical weapons, and to which they were a party, but they
were not prepared to state this openly and set about educating public opinion to
accept that Britain had to maintain a chemical warfare capacity.
This criticism cannot, though, be applied generally to Governments'
treatment of other disarmament issues in the post-war years. They should,
rather, be faulted for their failure to appreciate that a commitment to the
disarmament process could have served British interests. There were occasions
when international relations might have been improved, the League strengthened
and Britain's prestige raised if multi-lateral disarmament negotiations had been
pursued more energetically. US co-operation in the regulation of the arms trade
could possibly have been secured earlier if the Foreign Office had taken up the
amendments to the Convention of St. Germain which Seymour suggested in
June 1921. The Esher plan and Cecil's proposals for budgetary limitation
together offered the prospect of progress regarding the limitation of land and air
armaments but the Government was not prepared to give them the support they
required in order to overcome the hostility of the General Staff. Cecil's purpose
in drawing up the TMG had been to achieve a general scheme of disarmament
but the TMA, which emerged from League discussions during 1923, fell some
way short of this objective. The provision that the TMA had to be ratified
2Ferris, op.cit., p.46
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separately in each continent and that participating States could draw up
complementary defensive treaties meant, however, that it could have been most
advantageous to Britain. If this Treaty had become a reality in Europe, it might
have provided the means by which French security demands could have been
addressed, a measure of European disannament achieved and Germany
reconciled to the armaments clauses of the Versailles Treaty. From the outset,
however, the scheme was condemned by the Service Departments and it never
received support from senior officials or Government Ministers, even after Cecil
joined Baldwin's first Administration. Following the Labour Government's
rejection of the 1'MA, MacDonald did make a significant contribution to the
drawing up of the Geneva Protocol but this was an unrealistic proposal for
which his minority Administration was never likely to win Parliamentary
approval.
Kitching was essentially correct, therefore, to state that British
disarmament policy in this period was reactive. 3 The success of the Washington
Conference and the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 was the product of
initiatives by the Harding and Coolidge administrations. Both Esher and Cecil
were acting in a private capacity when they put forward their disarmament
schemes in 1922 and neither of them at any stage received support or assistance
from Whitehall. Cecil was not an easy colleague but his difficulties within
Baldwin's first Administration were largely the result of the Foreign Office's
opposition to the search for disarmament through the League. MacDonald's
speech at the Fifth League Assembly did initiate negotiations which resulted in
the Geneva Protocol but this cannot properly be described as a Government
proposal. The British delegation, led by Parmoor and Henderson, carried out its
3Kitching, op.cit.. p.174
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work independently of the Government and it is a moot point whether the
Protocol would have been approved by the Cabinet had the Labour Government
remained in office longer. Segrave's Convention, by which the principles of the
Washington Conference were to be extended to non-signatory Powers, clearly
was supported by the Admiralty, even though there are no papers extant which
deal with the genesis of the scheme. The proposal, however, was not considered
by the Cabinet and it did not receive whole-hearted support from the Foreign
Office. It is the case, therefore, that the only disarmament proposal in this period
which can properly be described as a Government initiative was the draft
Convention for the Control of the Arms Traffic which was drawn up by the
Foreign Office in December 1918 and resulted in the signing of the Convention
of St. Germain in September 1919. Government support, however, did not
survive the failure of the USA to ratify the Convention and thereafter Britain
failed to play a positive rule in international efforts to regulate the arms trade.
It would, though, be an error to place responsibility for the failure of
negotiations to achieve general disarmament through the League entirely upon
the shoulders of Britain's conservative decision-making elite. There were also
important errors ofjudgement by the TMC. It spent too much time seeking to
deal with the alleged evils which resulted from the private manufacture of
annaments and was over-ambitious in deciding that all States possessing capital
ships, whether League members or not, should be invited to attend the
Conference which would consider the draft Convention for the Extension of the
Washington Naval Treaty to Non-Signatory Powers. As regards the Esher plan
and Cecil's proposals for budgetary limitation, the TMC acted precipitately in
accepting the criticisms of the League's technical experts and shelving these
schemes in favour of Cecil's other proposal, that disarmament should be
achieved through a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. Such errors need not, however,
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have been that significant if the British Government had been prepared to use its
authority at Geneva in support of disarmament. Lloyd George's involvement in
Esher's appointment to the TMC suggested that Britain intended to build on the
success which had already been achieved at the Washington Conference and
work towards the achievement of land and air disarmament through the League.
This apparent enthusiasm soon waned and the British Government returned to
its semi-detached engagement with League disarmament negotiations.
Richardson and, to a lesser extent, Kitching, delivered severe judgements
on British Governments' handling of disarmament policy during the period from
1919-34. Richardson, however, dealt only with the Baldwin's second
Conservative Administration and Kitching concentrated her attention on the
decade following the collapse of the first Labour administration. This present
study is the first to provide a detailed examination of disarmament policy in the
period between the end of the Great War and the signing of the Locarno
Treaties. It indicates that, with the exception of chemical warfare, Governments
between 1918 and 1925 were guilty of sins of omission rather than commission.
Disarmament, as defined here, was one of the means which might have been
used in an effort to resolve international differences, especially in Europe. Such a
policy was realistic and, on a number of issues, was perceived as such by some
within Whitehall. Amongst those with responsibility for formulating disarmament
policy, however, Cecil stands out as the only person who revealed a genuine
understanding of the fact that a consistent commitment to international
negotiation through the League was essential to it success - and he was a post-
war Cabinet member for little more than a year during the period covered by this
study. The principal criticism to be levelled against British decision-makers is




for the Extension of the Washington Naval Treaty
to the Non-Signatoiy Powers of the League of Nations.
Albania, Argentine, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica. Cuba, Czechoslovakia Denmark, Esthonia, Finland,
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, the
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway Panama, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Poland,
Portugal, Roumania, Salvador, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, Spain,
Switzerland. Sweden, Uruguay, Venezuela, having taken note of the Naval Agree-
ment entered into at Washington by certain Powers, and desiring also to contribute
to the maintenance of the general peace and to prevent competition in armaments;
Have resolved, with a view to accomplishing these purposes, to conclude a
Convention to impose limitations on their respective naval armaments
corresponding to those agreed to at Washington and to that end having appointed
as their plenipotentiaries -
Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be
in good and due form, have agreed as follows:
313
CHAPTER I.
Article I. - The High Contracting Parties agree to limit their respective Naval
Armaments as provided in the present Convention.
Article 2. - The High Contracting Parties may retain respectively all vessels of war
built or building on November 12th, 1921, of which those exceeding the
limitations prescribed for the future by the present Convention are specified in
Chapter H, Part I.
Article 3. - No new capital ships shall be constructed or acquired by any of the
High Contracting Parties except replacement tonnage for the vessels specified in
Chapter II, Part 1, which may be constructed or acquired as specified in Chapter II,
Part 2.
Ships which are replaced in accordance with Chapter II, Part 2, shall be disposed
of as prescribed in Part 3 of that Chapter.
Article 4. - The total capital ship replacement tonnage of each of the following
High Contracting Parties shall not exceed in standard displacement for Argentine
81,000 tons (82,290 metric tons); for Brazil 45,000 tons (45,714 metric tons); for
Chile 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons); for Denmark 13,000 tons (13,206 metric
tons); for Greece 36,000 tons (36,571 metric tons); for Netherlands 26,000 tons
(26,412 metric tons); for Norway 16,000 tons (16254 metric tons); for Spain
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81,000 tons (82,290 metric tons); for Sweden 62,000 tons (62,984 metric tons).
Note. - Article 4 has been drafted in strict accordance with the principles
of the status quo. Nevertheless, the majority of the Members of the Naval
Sub-Commission, feel bound to call the attention of the Council to the
resulting inequality between the respective naval forces of the three South
American States: Argentine, Brazil and Chile, whereas, from a technical and
general consideration of the circumstances of these States, they consider that
they should logically have equivalent naval forces, the total tonnage in
capital ships remaining, however, below 80,000.
Article 5. - No capital ship exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard
displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction
of, any of the High Contracting Parties.
Article 6. - No capital ship of any of the High Contracting Parties shall carry a gun
with a calibre in excess of sixteen inches (406 millimetres).
Article 7. - The High Contracting Parties may not construct aircraft carriers except
within a total tonnage limit equal to one-third of their total, tonnage in capital
ships
Article 8. - The replacement of aircraft carriers shall be effected only as prescribed
315
in Chapter II, Part 2, of the present Convention.
Article 9. - No aircraft carrier exceeding 27,000 tons (27432 metric tons) standard
displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction
of any of the High Contracting Parties.
Article 10. - No aircraft carrier of any of the High Contracting Parties shall carry
a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 millimetres). If the armament
carried includes guns exceeding six inches (152 millimetres) in calibre the total
number of guns carried, except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches
(127 millimetres), shall not exceed ten. If alternatively the armament contains no
guns exceeding six inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the number of guns is not
limited.
In either case the number of anti-aircraft guns and of guns not exceeding 5 inches
(127 millimetres) in calibre is not limited.
Article 11. - No vessel of war exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric ton,)
standard displacement, other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier, shall be
acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of any of the High
Contracting Parties.
Vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under
Govermnent control for fighting purposes, which are employed on fleet duties or
as troop transports or in some other way for the purpose of assisting in the
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prosecution of hostilities otherwise than as fighting ships, shall not be within the
limitations of this article.
Article 12. - No vessel of war of any of the High Contracting Parties hereafter laid
down, other than a capital ship, shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of eight
inches (203 millimetres)
Article 13. - No ship to be scrapped after replacement in accordance with the
present Convention may be reconverted into a vessel of war.
Article 14. - No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for
the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into
vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of
guns not exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre.
Article 15. - No vessel of war constructed within the jurisdiction of any of the
High Contracting Parties for a non-contracting Party shall exceed the limitations
as to displacement and armament prescribed by the present Convention for vessels
of a similar type which may be constructed by or for any of the High Contracting
Parties.
Article 16. - If the construction of any vessel of war for a non-contracting Party is
undertaken within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties, such
Party shall promptly inform the Council of the League of Nations of the date of
the signing of the contract and the date on which the keel of the ship is laid; and
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shall also communicate to the Council the particulars relating to the ship
prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2 (b), 4 and 5, of the present Convention.
Article 17. - In the event of a High Contracting Party being engaged in war, such
party shall not use as a vessel of war any vessel of war which may be under
construction within its jurisdiction for any other Power or which may have been
constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.
Article 18. - Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to dispose by
gift, sale, or any mode of transfer of any vessel of war in such a manner that such
vessel may become a vessel of war in the Navy of any foreign Power.
Article 19. - The rules for determining tonnage displacement prescribed in
Chapter H, Part 4, shall apply to the ships of each of the High Contracting Parties.
CHAPTER II.
PART I.




















CHILE	 Almirante Latorre	 28,000
Capitan Prat	 9,902
Total tonnage	 34,902



















































































The replacement of capital ships and aircraft carners shall take place according to
the following rules:
(a) Capital ships and aircraft carriers twenty years after the date of their
completion may be replaced by new construction, but within the limits prescribed
in Article 4 and Article 7.
The keels of such new construction may be laid down not earlier than seventeen
years from the date of completion of the tonnage to be replaced, provided,
however, that no capital ship tonnage shall be laid down until ten years from
November 12th 1921.
(b) Each of the High Contracting Parties shall communicate promptly to the
Council of the League of Nations the following information:
1. The names of the capital ships and aircraft carriers to be replaced by new con-
struction;
2. The date of governmental authorisation of replacement tonnage;
3. The date of laying the keels of replacement tonnage;
4. The standard displacement in tons and metric tons of each new ship to be laid
down, and the principal dimensions namely, length at waterline, extreme beam at
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or below waterline, mean draft at standard displacement;
5. The date of completion of each new ship and its standard displacement in tons
and metric tons, and the principal dimensions, namely, length at waterline,
extreme beam at or below waterline, mean draft at standard displacement, at time
of completion.
(c) In case of loss or accidental destruction of capital ships or aircraft carriers, they
may immediately be replaced by new construction subject to the tonnage limits
prescribed in Articles 4 and 7 and in conformity with the other provisions of the
present Convention, the regular replacement programme being deemed to be
advanced to that extent.
In the event of the replacement of a capital ship or aircraft carrier under this
clause, the total tonnage possessed shall be kept within the limits laid down for
replacement in Articles 4 and by the scrapping, in accordance with the terms of
Chapter II, Part 3, of such old vessels as may be necessary.
(d) No capital ship or aircraft carrier shall be reconstructed except for the purpose
of providing means of defence against air and submarine attack, and subject to the
following rules: The High Contracting Parties may, for that purpose, equip
existing tonnage with bulge or blister or anti-air attack deck protection, provided
the increase of displacement thus effected does not exceed 15 % of the original
displacement for each ship. No alteration in side armour, in calibre, number or
general type of mounting of main armament shall be permitted.
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PART 3
Rules for the Disposal Ships Replaced
The following rules shall be observed for the scrapping of capital ships and
aircraft carriers which are to be disposed of when replaced by new construction in
accordance with Articles 3 and 8.
I. A vessel to be scrapped must be placed in such condition that it cannot be put to
combatant use.
II. This result must be finally effected in any one of the following ways:
(a) Permanent sinking of the vessel.
(b) Breaking the vessel up. This shall always involve the destruction or removal of
all machinery, boilers and armour, and all deck, side and bottom plating.
(c) Converting the vessel to target use exclusively. In such case all the provisions
of paragraph ifi of this part, except sub-paragraph (6), in so far as may be
necessary to enable the ship to used as a mobile target, and except sub-paragraph
(7), must be previously complied with. Not more than one capital ship may he
retained for this purpose at one time by any of the High Contracting Parties.
III. (a) When a vessel is due for scrapping, the first stage of scrapping, which
consists of rendering a ship incapable of further warlike service, shall be
immediately undertaken.
(b) A vessel shall be considered incapable of further warlike service when there
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shall have been removed and landed, or else destroyed in the ship:
(1) All guns and essential portions of guns, fire-control tops and revolving parts of
all barbettes and turrets;
(2) All machinery for working hydraulic or electric mountings;
(3) All fire-control instruments and range finders;
(4) All ammunition, explosives and mines;
(5) All torpedoes, war heads and torpedo tubes:
(6) All wireless telegraphy installations;
(7) The conning tower and all side armour, or alternatively all main propelling
machinery; and
(8) All landing and flying-off platforms and all other aviation accessories.
IV. The periods in which scrapping of vessels is to be effected are as follows: -
(a) The work of rendering the vessel incapable of further warlike service in
accordance with paragraph ffi of this part shall be commenced not later than the
date of completion of its successor, and shall be finished within six months from
the date of such completion.
(b) The vessel shall be finally scrapped, in accordance with paragraph II of this
part, within eighteen months from the date of completion of its successors. If,
however, the completion of the new vessel shall be delayed, then the work of
rendering the old vessel incapable of further warlike service in accordance with
paragraph ifi of this part shall be commenced within four years from the laying of
the keel of the new vessel, and shall be finished within six months from the date
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on which such work was commenced, and the old vessel shall be finally scrapped
in accordance with paragraph II of this part within eighteen months from the date




For the purpose of the present Convention the following expressions are to be
understood in the sense defined in this part.
Capital Ship.
A capital ship, in the ships hereafter built, is defined as a vessel of war, not an
aircraft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons)
standard displacement or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches
(203 millimetres).
Aircraft Carrier.
An aircraft carrier is defined as a vessel of war with a displacement in excess of
10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement designed for the specific
and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft. It must be so constructed that aircraft
can be launched therefrom and landed thereon, and not designed and constructed
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for carrying a more powerful armament than that allowed to it under Article 10.
Standard Displacement.
The standard displacement of a ship is the displacement of the ship complete, fully
manned, engined, and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and
ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous
stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war,
but without fuel or reserve feed water on board.
The word "ton" in the present Convention, except in the expression "metric tons"
shall be understood to mean the ton of 2,240 pounds (1,016 kilog).
Vessels now completed shall retain their present ratings of displacement tonnage
in accordance with their national system of measurement. However, a Power
expressing displacement in metric tons shall be considered for the application of
the present Convention as owning only the equivalent displacement in tons of
2,240 pounds.
A vessel completed hereafter shall be rated at its displacement tonnage when in




Article 20. - If during the term of the present Convention the requirements of the
national security of any High Contracting Party in respect of naval defence are, in
the opinion of that Party, materially affected by any change of circumstances, this
opinion shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations, who will
call a conference of the High Contracting Parties or take such other action as may
be necessary for the reconsideration of the provisions of this Convention and its
amendment by mutual agreement.
In view of possible technical and scientific developments and of the wording of
Article 8 of the Covenant, which states that plans for reduction of armaments shall
be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years, the Council of
the League of Nations will arrange for a conference of all the High Contracting
Parties which shall meet as soon as possible after the expiration of eight years
from the coming into force of the present Convention to consider what changes, if
any, in the Convention may be necessary to meet such developments.
Article 21. - Whenever any High Contracting Party shall become engaged in a war
without having violated in any way its obligations as prescribed in the Covenant
of the League of Nations, which in its opinion affects the naval defence of its
national security, such Party may, after notice to the Council of the League,
suspend for the period of hostilities its obligations under the present Convention,
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other than those under Articles 13 and 17 provided that such Party shall notify the
Council of the League that the emergency is of such a character as to require such
suspension.
The Council of the League will in such a case advise as to what temporary
modification, if any, should be made in the Convention as between the remaining
High Contracting parties and will if necessary, or if desired by one of the High
Contracting Parties, call a conference of these Powers with a view to obtaining
agreement. Should such consultation not produce agreement, any one of the High
Contracting Parties may, by giving notice to the Council of the League of Nations,
suspend for the period of hostilities its obligations under the present Convention,
other than those under Articles 13 and 17.
On the cessation of hostilities, the Council of the League of Nations will advise as
to what modifications, if any, should be made in the provisions of the present
Convention and will, if necessary or if desired by one of the High Contracting
Parties, call a conference of the High Contracting Parties to consider these
questions.
Article 22. - The present Convention shall remain in force until December 31st,
1936, and in case none of the High Contracting Parties shall have given notice two
years before that date of its intention to terminate the Convention, it shall continue
in force until the expiration of two years from the date on which notice of
termination shall be given by one of the High Contracting Parties, whereupon the
Convention shall terminate as regards all the High Contracting Parties. Such
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notice shall be communicated in writing to the Secretary-General of the League of
Nations to be laid before the Council, and shall be deemed to have been given, and
shall take effect, from the date on which it is received by the Secretary-General.
After the receipt of a notice of termination from any Power, the Council of the
League of Nations will summon a conference of all the High Contracting Parties
to take place within one year of the date of receipt of such notice.
Article 23. - In all cases in the present Convention where one or more of the High
Contracting Parties undertakes to notify or inform the Council of the League of
certain facts or of action taken, the Council of the League will communicate in the
shortest possible time such facts or action to each of the other High Contracting
Parties.
Article 24. - The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting
Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional methods.
The ratifications shall be deposited with the Secretariat of the League of Nations,
and the Convention shall come into force when the ratifications of all the States
named in Chapter U, Part I, as now possessing capital ships, have been so
deposited.
The Secretary-General of the League of Nations will transmit to each of the High
Contracting Parties a certified copy of the procès-verbal of the deposit of
ratifications.
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In faith whereof, the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present
Convention.
Doneat Geneva......................
F0371/8481: 27 July 1922. Italics original.
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Appendix IL
ifi. TEXT OF THE TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE.
PREAMBLE
The High Contracting Parties, being desirous of establishing the general lines
of a scheme of mutual assistance with a view to facilitate the application of Articles
10 and 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and of a reduction or limitation
of national armaments in accordance with Article 8 of the Covenant "to the lowest
point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of
international obligations", agree to the following provisions:
ARTICLE 1.
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that aggressive war is an
international crime and severally undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its
commission.
A war shall not be considered as a war of aggression if waged by a State
which is party to a dispute and has accepted the unanimous recommendation of the
Council, the verdict of the Permanent Court of International Justice, or an arbitral
award against a High Contracting Party which has not accepted it, provided, however,
that the first State does not intend to violate the political independence or the
territorial integrity of the High Contracting Party.
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ARTICLE 2.
The High Contracting Parties, jointly and severally, undertake to furnish
assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, to any one of their
number should the latter be the object of a war of aggression, provided that it has
conformed to the provisions of the present Treaty regarding the reduction or
limitation of armaments.
ARTICLE 3.
In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being of opinion that the
armaments of any other High Contracting Party are in excess of the limits fixed for
the latter High Contracting Party under the provisions of the present Treaty, or in the
event of it having cause to apprehend an outbreak of hostilities, on account of the
aggressive policy or preparations of any State party or not to the present Treaty, it
may inform the Secretary-General of the League of Nations that it is threatened with
aggression, and the Secretary-General shall forthwith summon the Council.
The Council, if it is of opinion that there is reasonable ground for thinking that
a menace of aggression has arisen, may take all necessary measures to remove such
menace, and in particular, if the Council thinks right, those indicated in sub-
paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (ci) and (e) of the second paragraph of Article 5 of the present
Treaty.
The High Contracting Parties which have been denounced and those which
have stated themselves to be the object of a threat of aggression shall be considered as
especially interested and shall therefore be invited to send representatives to the
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Council in conformity with Articles 4, 15 and 17 of the Covenant. The vote of their
representatives shall, however, not be reckoned when calculating unanimity.
ARTICLE 4.
In the event of one or more of the High Contracting Parties becoming engaged
in hostilities, the Council of the League of Nations shall decide, within four days of
notification being addressed to the Secretary-General, which of the High Contracting
Parties are the objects of aggression and whether they are entitled to claim the
assistance provided under the Treaty.
The High Contracting Parties undertake that they will accept such a decision
by the Council of the League of Nations.
The High Contracting Parties engaged in hostilities shall be regarded as
especially interested, and shall therefore be invited to send representatives to the
Council (within the terms of Articles 4, 15 and 17 of the Covenant), the vote of their
representatives not being reckoned when calculating unanimity, the same shall apply
to States signatory to any partial agreements involved on behalf of either of the two
belligerents, unless the remaining Members of the Council shall decide otherwise.
ARTICLE 5.
The High Contracting Parties undertake to furnish one another mutually with
assistance in the case referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty in the form determined by
the Council of the League of Nations as the most effective, and to take all appropriate
measures without delay in the order of urgency demanded by the circumstances.
In particular, the Council may:
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(a) decide to apply immediately to the aggressor State the economic sanctions
contemplated by Article 16 of the Covenant, the Members of the League not
signatory to the present Treaty not being, however, bound by this decision,
except in the case where the State attacked is entitled to avail itself of the
Articles of the Covenant;
(b) invoke by name the High Contracting Parties whose assistance it requires.
No High Contracting Party situated in a continent other than that in which
operations will take place shall, in principle, be required to co-operate in
military, naval or air operations;
(c) determine the forces which each State furnishing assistance shall place at
its disposal;
(d) prescribe all necessary measures for securing priority for the
communications and transport connected with the operations;
(e) prepare a plan for financial co-operation among the High Contracting
parties with a view to providing for the State attacked and for the States
furnishing assistance the funds which they require for the operations;
(I) appoint the Higher Command and establish the object and the nature of his
duty.
The representatives of States recognised as aggressors under the provisions of
Article 4 of the Treaty shall not take part in the deliberations of the Council specified
in this Article. The High Contracting Parties who are required by the Council to
furnish assistance, in accordance with sub-paragraph (b), shall, on the other hand, be
considered as especially interested, and, as such, shall be invited to send
representatives, unless they are already represented, to the deliberations specified in
sub-paragraphs (c), (ci), (e) and (I).
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ARTICLE 6.
For the purpose of rendering the general assistance mentioned in Articles 2, 3
and 5 immediately effective, the High Contracting Parties may conclude, wither as
between two of them or as between a larger number, agreements complementary to
the present Treaty exclusively for the purpose of their mutual defence and intended
solely to facilitate the carrying out of the measures prescribed in this Treaty,
determining in advance the assistance which they would give to each other in the
event of any act of aggression.
Such agreements may, if the High Contracting Parties interested so desire, be
negotiated and concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations.
ARTICLE 7.
Complementary agreements, as defined in Article 6 shall, before being
registered, be examined by the Council with a view to deciding whether they are in
accordance with the principles of this Treaty and of the Covenant.
In particular, the Council shall consider if the cases of aggression
contemplated in these agreements come within the scope of Article 2 and are of a
nature to give rise to an obligation to give assistance on the part of the other High
Contracting Parties. The Council may, if necessary, suggest changes in the texts of
agreements submitted to it.
When recognised, the agreements shall be registered in conformity with
Article 18 of the Covenant. They shall be regarded as complementary to the present
Treaty, and shall in no way limit the general obligations of the High Contracting
336
Parties nor the sanctions contemplated against the aggressor State under the terms of
this Treaty.
They will be open to any other High Contracting Party with the consent of the
signatory States.
ARTICLE 8.
The States party to complementary agreements may undertake in any such
agreements to put into immediate execution, in the case of aggression contemplated
in them, the plan of assistance agreed upon. In this case they shall inform the Council
of the League of Nations, without delay, concerning the measures which they have
taken to ensure the execution of such agreements.
Subject to the terms of the previous paragraph, the provisions of Articles 4
and 5 above shall also come into force both in the cases contemplated in the
complementary agreements and in such other cases as are provided for in Article 2
but are not covered by the agreements.
ARTICLE 9.
In order to facilitate the application of the present Treaty, any High
Contracting Party may negotiate, through the agency of the Council, with one or more
neighbouring countries for the establishment of demilitarised zones.
The Council, with the co-operation of the representatives of the Parties
interested, acting as Members within the terms of Article 4 of the Covenant, shall
previously ensure that the establishment of the demilitarised zone asked for does not




The High Contracting Parties agree that the whole cost of any military, naval
or air operations which are undertaken under the terms of the present Treaty and of
the supplementary partial agreements, including the reparation of all material damage
caused by operations of war, shall be borne by the aggressor State up to the extreme
limits of its financial capacity.
The amount payable under this Article by the aggressor shall, to such an
extent as may be determined by the Council of the League, be a first charge on the
whole of the assets and revenues of the State. Any repayment by that State in respect
of the principal money and interest of any loan, internal or external, issued by it
directly or indirectly during the war shall be suspended until the amount due for cost
and reparations is discharged in full.
ARTICLE 11.
The High Contracting Parties, in view of the security furnished them by this
Treaty and the limitations to which they have consented in other international treaties,
undertake to inform the Council of the League of the reduction or limitation of
armaments which they consider proportionate to the security furnished by the general
Treaty or by the defensive agreements complementary to the general Treaty.
The High Contracting parties undertake to co-operate in the preparation of any
general plan of reduction of armaments which the Council of the League of Nations,
taking into account the information provided by the High Contracting Parties, may
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propose under the terms of Article 8 of the Covenant.
This plan should be submitted for consideration and approved by the
Governments, and, when approved by them, will be the basis of the reduction
contemplated in Article 2 of this Treaty.
The High Contracting Parties undertake to early out this reduction within a
period of two years from the date of the adoption of this plan.
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 8, para. 4. of the Covenant, to make no further increase in their armaments,
when thus reduced, without the consent of the Council.
ARTICLE 12.
The High Contracting Parties undertake to furnish to the military or other
delegates of the League such information with regard to their armaments as the
Council may request.
ARTICLE 13.
The High Contracting Parties agree that the armaments determined for each of
them, in accordance with the present Treaty, shall be subject to revision every five
years, beginning from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.
ARTICLE 14.
Nothing in the present Treaty shall affect the rights and obligations resulting
from the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations or of the Treaties of
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Peace signed in 1919 and 1920 at Versailles, Neuilly, St. Germain and Trianon, or
from the provisions of treaties or agreements registered with the League of Nations
and published by it at the date of the first coming into force of the present Treaty as
regards the signatory or beneficiary Powers of the said Treaties or agreements.
ARTICLE 15.
The High Contracting Parties recognise from to-day as ipso facto obligatory,
the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice with regard to the
interpretation of the present Treaty.
ARTICLE 16.
The present Treaty shall remain open for the signature of all States Members
of the League of Nations or mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant.
States not Members shall be entitled to adhere with the consent of two-thirds
of the High Contracting Parties with regard to whom the Treaty has come into force.
ARTICLE 17.
Any State may, with the consent of the Council of the League, notify its
conditional or partial adherence to the provisions of this Treaty, provided always that
such State has reduced or is prepared to reduce its armaments in conformity with the
provisions of this Treaty.
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ARTICLE 18.
The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be
deposited as soon as possible at the Secretariat of the League of Nations.
It shall come into force:
In Europe when it shall have been ratified by five States, of which three shall
be permanently represented on the Council;
In Asia when it shall have been ratified by two States, one of which shall be
permanently represented on the Council;
In North America when ratified by the United States of America;
In Central America and the West Indies when ratified by one State in the West
Indies and two in Central America;
In South America when ratified by four States;
In Africa and Oceania when ratified by two States.
With regard to the High Contracting Parties which may subsequently ratify
the Treaty, it will come into force at the date of the deposit of the instrument.
The Secretariat will immediately communicate a certified copy of the
instruments of ratification received to all the signatory Powers.
It remains understood that the rights stipulated under Articles 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8
of this Treaty will not come into force for each High Contracting Party until the
Council has certified that the said High Contracting Party has reduced its armaments
in conformity with the present Treaty or has adopted the necessary measures to
ensure the execution of this reduction, within two years of the acceptance by the said
High Contracting Party of the plan of reduction or limitation of armaments.
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ARTICLE 19.
The present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of fifteen years from the
date of its first entry into force.
After this period, it will be prolonged automatically for the States which have
not denounced it.
1f however, one of the States referred to in Article 18 denounces the present
Treaty, the Treaty shall cease to exist as from the date on which the denunciation
takes effect.
This denunciation shall be made to the Secretariat of the League of Nations,
which shall, without delay, notify all the Powers bound by the present Treaty.
The denunciation shall take effect twelve months after the date on which
notification has been communicated to the Secretariat of the League of Nations.
When the period of fifteen years, referred to in the first paragraph of the
present Article has elapsed, or when one of the denunciations made in the conditions
determined above takes place, if operations undertaken in application of Article 5 of
the present Treaty are in progress, the Treaty shall remain in force until peace has
been completely re-established.
F0371/9421: 13 October 1923.
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Appendix III.
V. DRAFT TREATY OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE
PREPARED BY LORD ROBERT CECIL.
(A) TEXT SUBMITTED TO THE PERMANENT ADVISORY COMMISSION
I. General
(1) The High Contracting Parties hereby agree that if any one of them is
attacked, all the others will forthwith take such action as they may respectively have
agreed to take in accordance with this Treaty and any treaty supplementary hereto,
provided that this obligation shall be conditional upon the reduction of the military
forces of the party attacked as provided (in article ...) [sic.] hereafter.
(2) In consideration of the undertaking contained in the immediately
preceding article, each of the High Contracting Parties shall forthwith reduce its
military forces maintained in time of peace in the manner and to the extent set out for
each of them in the Annex hereto, and shall not thereafter increase them in time of
peace without the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.
(3) Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to receive such military
representatives of the League of Nations as the Council may desire to appoint, and
undertakes to furnish these representatives with such information regarding its
armaments as the Council may from time to time require.
II. Menace in Time of Peace (General).
(4) In the event of any of the High Contracting Parties regarding itself as
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menaced by the preparations or action of whatever kind of any other State, whether a
party to this Treaty or not, or as being, on account of its geographical position or for
other reasons, in a position of peculiar danger, it may so inform the Secretaiy-General
of the League of Nations, who shall forthwith summon a meeting of the Council of
the League.
(5) If the Council, by not less than a three-fourths majority, shall be of
opinion that there is reasonable ground for thinking that the said preparations or
action constitute a menace as alleged, or that the applying State is in a position of
peculiar danger, it shall, at the request of such State, negotiate a special treaty
supplementary hereto for affording adequate protection for the menaced State against
the danger to which it is exposed. This special treaty shall be in the form of a military
convention making detailed provision for military support for the menaced State in
case it is attacked.
(6) Any special treaty made in pursuance of Article 5 shall be construed as
one with this Treaty, but shall in no way limit the general obligations of the High
Contracting Parties.
(7) In the event of any High Contracting Party making the application to the
Council referred to in Article 4, all the obligations assumed by such High Contracting
Party, including that of Article 2, and all the obligations assumed by the other High
Contracting Parties in respect of such High Contracting Party shall be suspended, if it
so desires, until the special supplementary treaty which it requests shall have entered
into force.
III. Menace in Time of Peace (due to maintenance of armaments
in excess of those allowed in the Annex hereto).
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(8) In the event of the High Contracting Parties being of opinion that the
military preparations of any State party to this Treaty are in excess of the armaments
permitted to the said State in accordance with the Annex hereto, it may so inform the
Secretary-General of the League of Nations, who shall forthwith summon a meeting
of the Council of the League.
(9) If the Council, by not less than a three-fourths majority, shall be of
opinion that there is reasonable ground for thinking that the said preparations are so in
excess, it shall make such representations to the Government concerned as it may
think right.
(10) if the majority of the Council is not satisfied within six months that the
military, naval and air forces of the said Party have been brought into accordance
with this Treaty:
(a) It shall suspend the said Party from all its rights under this Treaty
under such conditions as it shall think right.
(b) It may take any other measures which it may consider right,
including a recommendation to the High Contracting Parties that penalties similar to
those provided in Article 16 of the Covenant shall be put into force against the State
whose armaments are in excess, that is to say that they will immediately subject it to
severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between
their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of
all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the
Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of
the League or not, and that they will mutually support one another in the financial and
economic measures which are taken under this article, in order to minimise the loss
and inconvenience resulting from the above measures.
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(11) If the Council, by not less than a three-fourths majority, is of opinion
that the excess armaments maintained by any State constitute a danger to the High
Contracting Party which has made an application in accordance with Article 8 hereof,
the Council shall, at the request of such State, negotiate a supplementary treaty for the
defence of the menaced High Contracting Party in accordance with the provisions of
Article 5 and 6.
IV. Provisions for deciding which State is the Aggressor in case ofAttack.
(12) In the event of any of the High Contracting Parties becoming engaged in
hostilities with any other State, whether a party to this Treaty or not:
(a) It shall so inform the Secretary-General of the League of Nations,
who shall summon a meeting of the Council of the League without delay;
(b) It shall be the duty of the Council of the League, within four days
at	 most from the date on which the Secretary-General receives such information,
by	 not less than a three-fourths majority, to decide which of the States so engaged
in	 hostilities has been the aggressor.
(c) Subject to any other consideration which the Council may think
right to take into account, that State shall be considered to be the aggressor
which has violated the territory of the other State.
(13) The High Contracting Parties agree to accept the decision of the Council
given in accordance with Article 12 and to take the measures necessary to fulfil their
obligations under this Treaty immediately this decision has been given.
V. Provisions for Mihtary Assistance to be given lo a Stare
which has actually been attacked
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(14) The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate in the manner set
out hereafter against any State which the Council has decided, in accordance with
Article 12 above, to have committed an act of aggression. The High Contracting
Parties undertake to participate, not only in measures undertaken for the defence of
the Party attacked, but also in the offensive measures required to reduce the aggressor
State to submission.
(15) The High Contracting Parties agree immediately to apply a complete
economic and financial blockade, in accordance with Article 16 of the Covenant,
against any State which the Council has decided to have committed an act of
aggression.
(16) The High Contracting Parties apart from and subject to any
supplementary Treaty concluded in accordance with Article 5 or ii above, agree to
bring military assistance to any State which is attacked, in the following manner:
(a) The High Contracting Parties agree to accept the general military
command of the General Staff of any State to whom the Council may entrust a
mandate to organise the military measures taken by the High Contracting
Parties against an aggressor State, subject to any special conditions as regards
the employment and safety of its troops which the High Contracting Parties
concerned may desire to make.
(b) Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to maintain at the
disposal of such military command an agreed proportion, not being less than
one-quarter of its naval and air forces.
(c) The High Contracting Parties agree to utiise those naval and air
forces in accordance either: (1) with the instructions given by such military
command as is appointed under Article 16 (a), or: (2) pending such
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appointment, with plans prepared by the General Staff of the State attacked.
(d) The 1-ugh Contracting Parties agree to furnish further military help
in addition to the naval and air forces referred to in (b) above, if they are
requested by the Council to do so. Provided, however, that when any such
request is made by the Council, any High Contracting Party which is asked to
furnish help shall sit as a Member of the Council.
(17) Nothing in this Treaty shall apply to any of the High Contracting Parties
not being a European State to furnish any military forces in Europe, or not being an
American State, in America, or not being an Asiatic State, in Asia, or not being an
African State, in Africa, provided that this article shall not apply to the naval forces
mentioned in Article 16 (b) above.
Vi Reparations and other Provisions.
(18) The High Contracting Parties agree that the cost of any military
operations undertaken in pursuance of this Treaty, including reparation for any
material damage committed in the course thereof, shall be borne:
(a) By the aggressor State, and
(b) So far as may be necessary, by the High Contracting Parties,
in such proportions and in such manner as may be determined (by an impartial
commission appointed for the purpose by the Council of the League of
Nations acting by a majority), or by the Permanent Court of linternational
Justice.
(19) Any Member of the League, the United States, Germany or Russia not
being one of the signatories to this Treaty may adhere to it by giving notice of
adherence to the Secretary-General of the League or to each of the High Contracting
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Parties.
Any State may, with the assent of the Council of the League or the High
Contracting Parties, adhere conditionally or to part only of the provisions of this
Treaty.
Provided always that no such adherence shall be accepted unless the Power so
adhering has reduced or is ready to reduce its forces in accordance with the provisions
of this Treaty.
(20) Nothing in this Treaty shall be deemed to diminish or affect the
provisions in the Covenant for maintaining the peace of the world.
(21) Nothing in this Treaty shall be deemed to alter or affect any provision of
the Treaties of Peace signed at Versailles, Saint-Germain, Neuilly and Tnanon in
1919 and 1920.
(22) Any question as to the meaning or effect of this Treaty, not being a
question whether the naval, military or air forces, or preparations of any of the High
Contracting Parties are in excess of those agreed to under the Annex to this Treaty,
shall be referred to the Permanent Court of international Justice, whose decision shall
be final.
(23) In this Treaty the expression "military" shall include naval and air and,
except where the context otherwise requires, the singular shall include the plural.
VII. Entry into force of the present Treaty.
(24) The High Contracting Parties agree that the scales of armaments laid
down for each of them in the Annex hereto shall be subject to revision at the
expiration often years from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.
(25) This Treaty shall be ratified by the deposit of ratifications with the
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Secretary-General of the League of Nations at Geneva. As soon as it is ratified by
certain Powers, that is to say:
In Europe, by Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia or such four of
them as shall first have ratified it,
In Asia, by Japan and one other Power,
In America, by the United States of America and one other Power,
it shall come into force in respect of that continent, provided always:
(a) That, if any of the ratifying Powers mentioned in this article by
name shall not have reduced their armaments in accordance with the Annex hereto
within two years of the entry into force of the Treaty, the Treaty shall with regard to
such Powers be null and void, and the other High Contracting Parties which have
ratified it may at any time denounce it.
(b) That, with respect to the High Contracting Parties, the rights and
obligations provided in Articles 1, 11 and 13 to 19 inclusive of this Treaty shall only
come into force when the Council shall by a three-fourths majority certify that such
High Contracting Party has reduced its armaments in accordance with the Annex
hereto, or has taken the necessary steps to secure that such reduction shall have been
carried out within two years of the ratification of this Treaty by such High
Contracting Parties.
(c) That, in the case of any High Contracting Party which considered
itself menaced and so informed the Secretary-General, in accordance with Article 4 or
8 of this Treaty, the rights and obligations of the said High Contracting Party be
suspended, if it so desires, until the special supplementary treaty for its defence,
which it requests, shall have entered into force.
F0371/9421: 13 October 1923. Italics original.
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Appendix IV.
VI. DRAFT CONVENTION OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
PREPARED BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL REQUIN
(A) TEXT OF THE DRAFT.
Note.
I. The Third Assembly of the League of Nations requested the Temporary
Mixed Commission to draw up a Draft Treaty on the basis of the principles contained
in No. XIV of its Resolutions.
Under the terms of that resolution, the Treaty in question, which is called a
"Treaty of Mutual Guarantee", should constitute the means of achieving the object
pursued by the Temporary Mixed Commission, namely, a general reduction of
armaments.
Further, a contractual obligation may take the form either of a general treaty
or of partial treaties; in the latter case, the reduction of armaments must be
proportionate to the guarantees afforded by the Treaty.
This Treaty of Guarantee or defensive agreement must impose upon all the
Contracting Parties the obligation to provide immediate and effective assistance in
accordance with the pre-arranged plan in the event of one of them being attacked.
H. The Draft of a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee was accordingly submitted by
Lord Robert Cecil to the Temporary Commission on Armaments at its meeting on
February 4th, 1923. This draft, which is to be examined by that Commission, has
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already been submitted to examination from a technical point df view by the
Permanent Military, Naval and Air Commission at the request of the Temporary
Commission.
The Permanent Commission came to the following conclusion as a result of its
technical investigation:
"The Commission is unanimously of opinion that, from a military, naval and
air point of view, Lord Robert Cecil's draft does not constitute a solid basis for the
scheme for the limitation of armaments."
Further, the Military Sub-Commission explained its position as follows:
According to Lord Robert Cecil's draft,
"No State would have any certainty as to the number and nature of
possible conflicts, nor as to the nature and value of the assistance to be provided. No
State would know the extent of its possible military commitments, nor even be able
adequately to prepare plans for the despatch of its forces and their employment in the
numberless operations in which it might be under an obligation to engage.
"If it were itself attacked, it would have no certainty as to the
assistance it would receive, nor as to who would furnish this assistance, nor how and
when it would be brought into action. It is considered, therefore, that the Draft Treaty
of Mutual Guarantee does not afford definite guarantees for immediate and effective
assistance, and consequently does not provide a sound basis for a scheme for the
reduction of armaments.
"The combination of a general treaty with supplementary treaties, in
the form advocated by the author of the plan, disregards or gives too little weight to
two essential principles laid down by the Assembly:
that which makes reductions in armaments proportionate to the
guarantee afforded by a treaty;
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and that which requires that mutual assistance, in order to be
immediate and effective, should form the subject of pre-arranged
plans.
"Subject to these reservations, the idea of combining partial
agreements with general obligations is a happy one. An attempt might be made to
discover a practical method of applying it, based on the necessities of modern
warfare. Thus, assistance might be organised beforehand with a degree of
completeness which would vary, both according to the nature of the assistance and
chronologically, according to the degree of urgency, without in any way losing sight
of the primary necessity ofpreventing the development of a conflict."
III. Bearing in mind these observations of the Military Sub-Commission, Lt.-
Colonel Réquin has prepared a "Draft of a General Convention of Mutual
Assistance", which he has the honour to submit to the Temporary Mixed Commission
for consideration.
The features of this draft are as follows:
(1) The object of the General Convention is to give effect to the obligations
of mutual guarantee inserted in Article 10 of the Covenant, in order to enable the
reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety to be
carried out in accordance with Article 8 of the Covenant. It is in conformity with the
general principles contained in Resolution XIV adopted by the Third Assembly.
(2) The Convention provides for the combination which was regarded by the
Military Sub-Commission as a happy idea, of a general agreement and partial
agreements, namely, of the two forms suggested in Resolution XIV.
(3) The General Convention does not impose upon the Contracting States any
obligations other than those already contained in the Covenant, and, in particular, in
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Article 10; it organises general measures of assistance to be rendered by all the
signatory States, measures either to supplement the assistance resulting from partial
agreements, or to take the place of such assistance in cases in which partial
agreements do not exist between certain States.
(4) Partial agreements are the essence of the system of assistance and are
intended to establish defensive groups in accordance with one of the essential
principles laid down under paragraph 3 of Resolution XIV, and referred to by the
Military Sub-Commission, i.e., the necessity for providing immediate and effective
assistance in accordance with a pre-arranged plan. Such agreements would,
moreover, be subjected to periodical revision by the signatory States, the necessity of
which was emphasised in the technical Report of the Permanent Commission on
Resolution XIV.
(5) This system of combined measures of assistance, with the guarantees of
immediate and effective help which it offers to all States, constitutes a solid basis for
a scheme for the reduction of armaments. States which are bound by partial
agreements will be under the obligation, if the military conventions supplementary to
these agreements allow them to do so, to cariy out, in accordance with paragraph 4 of
Resolution XIV, the reduction which they consider to be "proportionate to the
guarantees afforded by the Treaty". The other States, which consider that the general
measures of assistance are sufficient for them, will also proceed to reductions of
armaments to the extent to which they are enabled to do so by the confidence which
they feel in that assistance. The scheme for the reduction of armaments will therefore
be general, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Resolution XIV.
(6) The Draft Convention which is attached does not refer to certain questions
dealt with in Lord Robert Cecil's draft, e.g., the supreme command of the forces of
assistance, the supervision of armaments and the settlement of expenditure caused by
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the operations. Some of these questions may be settled by means of partial
agreements; for others, it is difficult to find any general solution applicable in all
cases which may arise, and, consequently, capable of being incorporated in a text as
general as that of the proposed Draft Convention.
(7) It is to be clearly understood that the Draft Convention does not in any
way abrogate the provisions of the Peace Treaties or the obligations resulting from
existing treaties which are known to have been concluded between certain States.
Preamble. - The High Contracting Parties, being desirous of establishing the
general lines of a scheme of mutual assistance for the purpose of enabling national
armaments to be reduced, in accordance with Article 8 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations, "to the lowest point compatible with national safety and the enforcement
by common action of international obligations", and also for the purpose of giving
effect to the obligations set forth in Article 10 of the Covenant "to respect and
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political
independence of all Members of the League",
Agree to the following provisions:
Article 1. - The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to furnish
assistance to any one of their number in case it should be the object of aggression
after having reduced its armaments in conformity with Articles 3,4 and 7 of the
present Treaty.
Article 2. - In order to enable the High Contracting Parties to render the
general assistance provided for in Article 1 above immediately effective, the High
Contracting Parties may conclude, either as between two of them or as between a
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larger number, agreements establishing groups for purely defensive purposes, and
settle in advance the measures of assistance which they would give to each other, in
accordance with Article 10 of the Covenant, in the event of any case of aggression
which they may consider possible against any of them.
Article 3. - Those of the High Contracting Parties which have concluded
agreements of the character mentioned in Article 2 undertake, if the military
conventions designed to ensure the execution of those agreements enable them to
contemplate reductions of armaments, to inform the Council of the League of Nations
of the reductions which they consider to be proportionate to the guarantees afforded
to them by these agreements, and which they consequently propose to carry out.
The agreements concluded, together with information on the proposed
reduction of armaments, shall be communicated to the League of Nations in order
that the possible cases of aggression providedfor in the said agreements may be
recognised by the Council as being included in the cases of aggression in which they
will be bound to make recommendations for the additional assistance referred to in
the second paragraph of Article 5.
They shall be registered in accordance with Article 18 of the Covenant.
Article 4. - The High Contracting Parties signatory to the agreements
mentioned above undertake to carry out the reductions of armaments which are
referred to in the preceding article, and notice of which has been given to the Council,
as soon as they are satisfied that the measures adopted by the co-signatory States
make it possible, in case of aggression, and in the circumstances expressly defined in
the said agreements, to carry out the scheme of mutual assistance provided for
therein.
They shall inform the Council in regard to the reductions of armaments
effected
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Article 5. - In all cases of aggression, for which provision is made in the
agreement constituting a defensive group, the High Contracting parties which are
members of this group undertake to put into operation automatically the plan of
assistance agreed upon between them; in all other cases of aggression, or menace or
danger of aggression, directly aimed at them, they will consult each other before
taking action, and will inform the Council of the measures which they have taken or
are contemplating, in order that the Council may take the action laid down in Article
10 of the Covenant.
The other High Contracting Parties undertake to render in all circumstances to
the members of any defensive group the assistance which the Council of the League
may recommend, as in the case mentioned in Article 6 below, and under the
conditions laid down in that article.
Article 6. - The High Contracting Parties undertake to render to those of their
number which are victims of an aggression or are threatened by aggression, and
which do not belong to any defensive group, general assistance in such form as the
Council of the League of Nations may recommend as being the most effective, after
recognising the legitimate character of the defensive action undertaken by the said
Powers. Arrangements shall be made for giving this assistance without delay and it
shall be supplied progressively according to the order of urgency which the
circumstances prescribe, to repel aggression and to punish the aggressor.
Article 7. - The High Contracting Parties which are not members of a
defensive group, and which consider that the general measures of assistance provided
for in the preceding article are sufficient to ensure their national safety, must inform
the Council of the League of the reductions of armaments which they propose to carry
out, or of the limitations of armaments beyond which they do not intend to go. They
shall proceed to carry Out such reductions at the same time as the Powers which are
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members of neighbouring defensive groups.
Article 8. - Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to accord to the
military or other delegates of the League of Nations, appointed by the Council, the
same privileges as are accorded to military, naval and air attaches accredited to it, and
to furnish them with information in regard to their armaments of the same nature as is
at present supplied to such attaches.
Article 9. - No State shall be under an obligation to co-operate in another
continent than the one in which it is situated in military, naval or air operations
undertaken in connection with the general or supplementary assistance provided for
in Articles 5 (paragraph 2) and 6 respectively of the Treaty.
Article 10. - The High Contracting Parties agree that the whole costs of any
military, naval or air operations which are undertaken under the terms of the present
Treaty and of the supplementary partial agreements, including the reparation of all
material damage caused by operations of war, shall be borne by the aggressor State
up to the extreme limits of its financial capacity.1
Article 13. - The present Convention does not in any way abrogate the rights
and obligations resulting from the provisions of the Covenant or of the Treaties of
Peace signed in 1919 and 1920 at Versailles, Saint-Germain, Neuilly and Trianon, or
from the provisions of existing agreements which are known to have been concluded
between certain States, in relation to the Powers signatory to, or beneficiary by, the
said treaties or agreements.
F0371/9421: 13 October, 1923. Italics original.
'Articles 11, 12, and 14, which were without importance from a technical point of
view, were not submitted to the Permanent Advisory Commission. They were,
however, submitted on July 16th 1923, to the Special Committee which sat in London




Amery, Leopold Stennett (1873-1955): Conservative MP for Sparkbrook, 1911-45;
Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies, 19 19-21; Parliamentary and
Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, 192 1-22; First Lord of the Admiralty, 1922-24;
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1924-29; Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs,
1925-29; Secretary of State for India and Burma, 1940-45
Avenol, Joseph Louis Anne (1879-1952): Deputy Secretary-General of the League
of Nations, 1923-32; Secretary-General of the League of Nations, 1933-40
Baldwin, Stanley, 1g Earl of Bewdley (1867-1947): Conservative MP for Bewdley,
1908-3 7; President of the Board of Trade, 192 1-22; Chancellor of the Exchequer,
1922-23; Prime Minister, 1923-24, 1924-29, and 1935-37; Lord Privy Seal, 1932-34;
Lord President of the Council, 1931-35
Balfour, Arthur James, Earl of Balfour (1848-1930): Conservative MP for
Hertford, 1874-85; Conservative MP for the Eastern Division of Manchester, 1885-
1906; Leader of the House of Commons and First Lord of the Treasury, 1891-92;
Leader of the Opposition, 1892-95; Leader of the House of Commons and First Lord
of the Treasury, 1895-1906; Prime Minister, 1902-05; Conservative MP for the City
of London, 1906-22; First Lord of the Admiralty, 1915-16; Foreign Secretary, 1916-
19; Lord President of the Council, 19 19-22 and 1925-29; leader of the British
delegation at the Washington Conference, 192 1-22
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Barstow, Sir George Lewis (1874-1966): joined the Treasury, 1898; Controller of
Supply Services, Treasury, 1919-27
rd
Bartolomé, Admiral Sir Charles Martin de (1871-1941): 3 Sea Lord and
Controller of the Navy, 1918-19
Beatty, David, Earl Beatty (1871-1936): First Sea Lord, 19 19-27
Bellairs, Commander Carlyon (1871-1955): Liberal MP for King's Lynn, 1906-09;
Conservative MP for King's Lynn, 1909-10, and for Maidstone, 1915-31; declined a
baronetcy, 1927
Benes, Eduard (1884-1948): Czechoslovak politician; Minister of Foreign Affairs,
1918-35; Prime Minister, 1921-22; President, 1935-38 and 1945-48; member of the
Council of the League of Nations, 1923-27 and from 1933; President of the League
Assembly, 1935; one of the drafters of the Geneva Protocol, 1924
Birch, Sir Noel (1865-1939): Director General of the Territorial Army, 1921-23;
Master-General of the Ordnance and fourth military member of the Army Council,
1923-27
Birkenhead, (1 Earl) Frederick Edwin Smith (1872-1930): Conservative MP for
Walton, Liverpool, 1906-19; Lord Chancellor, 19 19-22, Secretary of State for India,
1924-28
Borah, William Edgar (1865-1940): US Senator, 1907-42
Borden, Sir Robert Laird (1854-1937): Prime Minister of Canada, 1911-20;
representative of Canada at the Imperial War Cabinet, 1917-18, and the Imperial War
Conference, 1917 and 1918; Plenipotentiary Delegate for Canada at the Washington
Conference, 192 1-22
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Bourgeois, Leon Victor Auguste (1851-1925): French politician; Minister of
Justice, 1892-93; Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, 1895-96; Minister for
Foreign Affairs, 1896 and 1906; French representative on the Council of the League
of Nations, 1920-24
Briand, Aristide (1862-1932): French politician; Prime Minister and Minister of the
Interior, 1909-11 and January-February 1913; Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, 1915-17 and 192 1-22; Minister for Foreign Affairs, April-November
1924; Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1925-26; Prime Minister,
1929
Cadogan, Sir Alexander George Montagu (1884-1968): entered the Diplomatic
Service in 1909; promoted to be a First Secretary, 1919; promoted to be a Counsellor,
1928; Minister in Peking, 1934-36; Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign
Office, 1936-3 8; Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, 1938-46;
Permanent British representative to the United Nations, 1946-50
Campbell, Ronald Hugh, b.1883: entered the Foreign Office, 1907; joined the
Diplomatic Service, 1910; Private Secretary to Curzon, Acting Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, 19 19-20; promoted to be a First Secretary, 1919; served in the
Western Department
Campbell, Ronald Ion, b.18890: entered the Diplomatic Service, 1914; promoted to
be a First Secretary, 1922, transferred to the Foreign Office, 1923; served in the
American Department
Cavan, (10th Earl of) Field Marshal Frederic Rudolph Lambart (1865-1946):
Chief of the Imperial General StafI 1922-26; head of the War Office Section of the
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British Delegation at the Washington Conference, 192 1-22
Cecil of Cheiwood, (1 Viscount) Edward Algernon Robert Cecil (1864-1958):
Conservative MP for East Marylebone, 1906-10, Independent Conservative MP for
Hitchin, 1911-23, Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1918; Lord Privy
Seal, 1923-24; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1924-27
Chatfield, (1 Baron) Admiral of the Fleet Alfred Ernie Montacute (1873-1967):
Fourth Sea Lord, 19 19-20; British Naval Representative, Washington Naval
Conference, 192 1-22; Assistant Chief of the Naval Staft 1920-22; First Sea Lord and
Chief of the Naval Staff, 1933-38; Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, 1938-39
Chetwode, (1 Baron) Field Marshal Philip Walhouse (1869-1950): Deputy Chief
of the Imperial General Staff, 1920-22; Adjutant-General to the Forces, 1922-23;
Commander-in-Chief, Aldershot Command, 1923-27; ADC General, 1927-31; Chief
of General Stafi' India, 1928-30; Commander-in-Chief of the Army in India, 1930-3 5
Chilton, Henry Getty, b.1877: joined the Diplomatic Service, 1902; acted as Chargé
d'Affaires, Embassy of Rio de Janeiro, 1920-2 1; acted as Chargé d'Affaires at the
Embassy of Washington, 1 April-il April and 28 June-11 August 1922, and from 27
June 1923 to 9 January 1924 and from 24 January to 28 February and 1-11 July 1924;
appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Washington, 10 July
1924
Churchill, Sir Winston Leonard Spencer (1874-1965): Conservative MP for
Oldham, 1900-04; Liberal MP for Oldham, 1904-06; Liberal MP for NW Manchester,
1906-08; Liberal MP for Dundee, 1908-18; Coalition Liberal MP for Dundee, 1918-
22; Constitutional MP for Epping, 1924-3 1; Conservative MP for Epping, 1931-45;
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Conservative MP for Woodford, 1945-64; President of the Board of Trade, 1908-10;
Home Secretaiy, 1910-11, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1911-15; Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster, 1915; Minister of Munitions, 1917; Secretary of State for War
and Air, 1919-21; Secretary of State for Air and the Colonies, 1921; Secretary of
State for the Colonies, 192 1-22; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1924-29; First Lord of
the Admiralty, 1939-40; Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, 1940-45; Leader of
the Opposition, 1945-51; Prime Minister, 1951-55
Clerk, Sir George Russell (1874-1951): entered the Foreign Office, 1898; private
secretary to Lord Curzon, 1919; Minister to Czechoslovakia, 19 19-26; British
Ambassador to Turkey, 1926-33, to Belgium, 193 3-34, to France, 1934-37
Crewe, (1d Marquess) Robert Offley Ashburton Crewe-Milnes (1858-1945):
Secretary of State for India, 1910-15; Lord President of the Council, 1915-16;
Ambassador in Paris, 1922-28
st
Cnpps, Charles Alfred, 1 Baron Parmoor (1852-1941): Lord President of the
Council, 1924 and 1929-31; British representative on the Council of the League of
Nations and delegate to the League of Nations Assembly, 1929-31
Crowe, Sir Eyre (1864-1925): joined the Foreign Office in 1885; Assistant Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1912-29; Permanent Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, 1920-25
Curzon, George Nathaniel, Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (1859-1925):
Conservative MP for Southport 1886-98; Under-Secretary at the India Office, 1891-
92, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1895-98, Viceroy of India,
1898-1905; Lord Privy Seal 1915-16; Lord President of the Council, 1916-19;
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Foreign Secretary 19 19-23; Lord Privy Seal 1924-25
Derby, (17th Earl of) Edward George Vihiers Stanley (1865-1948): Conservative
MP for West Houghton, 1892-1906; Secretary of State for War, 1916-18 and 1922-
24; Ambassador to France, 19 18-20
Dodd, Charles Edward Shuter (1891-1974): joined the Diplomatic Service, 1919;
transferred to the Foreign Office, 1922; promoted to be a First Secretary, 1924;
Domville, Admiral Sir Barry Edward (1878-1971): Assistant Secretary, Committee
of Imperial Defence, 1912-14; Director of Plans Division, Admiralty, 1920-22; Chief
of Staff, Mediterranean, 1922-25
di
Drummond, James Eric, 16 Earl of Perth (1876-1951): entered the Foreign
Office, 1900; private secretary to the Prime Minister, Asquith, 19 12-15; private
secretary to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, 19 15-16; private secretary to the
Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, 19 16-18; attached to the British delegation to the
Peace Conference, 19 18-19; first Secretary-General of the League of Nations, 1919-
33; British Ambassador to Rome, 1933-39
Esher, (2h1d Viscount) Reginald William Brett (1852-1930): Liberal MP for Penryn
and Falmouth, 1880-85; Chairman of the Prime Minister's Committee on the War
Office, 1903; appointed a permanent member of the Committee of Imperial Defence,
1905
Fisher, Herbert Alfred Laurens (1865-1940): President of the Board of Education
1916-22; British delegate to the League of Nations Assembly, 1920-22
Fisher, Sir Warren (1879-1948): Permanent Secretary of the Treasury and Official
Head of the Civil Service, 1919-39
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Fitzmaunce, Vice-Admiral Sir Maurice Swynfen (1870-1927): Director of Naval
Intelligence, 1921-24
flint, Alexander (1872-1932): Principal Assistant Secretary at the Admiralty, 192 1-
32
Foulkes, Major-General Charles Howard (1875-1965): Gas Adviser to the British
Armies in France, 1915-17; Director of Gas Services for the British Armies in France,
19 17-18; appointed President of the Chemical Warfare Committee, 1918; toured
India in order to lecture, investigate and discuss with the Indian Government the
possibility of using gas against the tribesmen on the North West Frontier, 1919-20;
appointed Director of Irish Propaganda, 1921
Fuller, Admiral Sir Cyril Thomas (1874-1942): Director of Plans Division, Naval
War Staff, 19 17-20; Head of British Naval Section, Paris Peace Conference, 1919;
Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, 1922-23; Third Sea Lord and Controller of the
Navy, 1923-25; Second Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Personnel, 1930-32
Fergusson, Admiral Sir James Andrew (1871-1942): commanded Devonport
Reserve, 1919; Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty, 19 19-20; commanded the First
Light Cruiser Squ8dron, 1920-22; Commander-in-Chief North America and West
Indies Station, 1924-26
Geddes, (1g Baron) Auckland Campbell (1879-1954): President of the Board of
Trade, 1919-20; British Ambassador to the USA, 1920-24
Geddes, Sir Eric Campbell (1875-1937): Conservative MP for Cambridge, 19 17-22;
Minister of Transport, 1919-21; Chairman of the Committee, appointed by the
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Chancellor of the Exchequer, to advise on all questions of National Expenditure,
August 1921 -March 1922
Grew, Joseph Clark (1880-1965): Acting Chief, Division of Western European
Affairs, US Department of State, 1917-18; Secretary-General, American Commission
to negotiate peace, 1919; Minister to Denmark, 1920; Minister to Switzerland, 1921;
US representative at Lausanne Conference, 1922-23; unofficial US representative
with Temporary Mixed Commission of the League of Nations for the Control of
Traffic in Arms, Geneva and Paris, 1924; Under-Secretary of State, 1924-27;
Ambassador to Turkey, 1927-32; Ambassador to Japan, 1932-41; Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State, 1942-44; Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department
of State, 1944; Under-Secretary of State, 1944-45
Grey, Edward, 1g Viscount of Fallodon (1862-1933): Liberal MP for Berwick on
Tweed, 1885-1916; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1905-16
Guest, Captain Frederick Edward (1875-1937): Liberal MP for E.Dorset, 1911-22;
Liberal MP for Stroud, 1923-24, and for Bristol N., 1924-29; joined the Conservative
Party in 1930; Secretary of State for Air, 192 1-22
Haldane, (1d Viscount) Richard Burdon (1856-1928): Liberal MP for
Haddingtonshire, 1885-1911; Secretary of State for War, 1905-12; Lord Chancellor,
1912-15 and 1924
Halifax, (1 Earl of) Edward Frederick Lindley Wood (1881-1959): Conservative
MP for Ripon, 19 10-25; President of the Board of Education, 1922-24, Minister of
Agriculture, 1924-25; Viceroy of India, 1926-31; President of the Board of
Education, 1932-35; Secretary of State for War, 1935; Lord Privy Seal, 1935-37;
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Leader of the House of Lords, 193 5-38 and 1940; Lord President of the Council,
1937-38; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1938-40; British Ambassador at
Washington, 1941-46
Hall, Admiral Sydney Stewart (1872-1955): commanded the Submarine Service,
1906-10
Hankey, (1g Baron) Sir Maurice Pascal Alers (1877-1963): Naval Assistant
Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence, 1908-12; Secretary of the Committee of
Imperial Defence, 1912-38; Secretary of the War Cabinet, 19 16-19; Secretary of the
Cabinet, 1919-38; Clerk to the Privy Council, 1923-38; Minister without Portfolio
and member of the War Cabinet, 1939-40; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
1940-41; Paymaster-General, 1941-42
Harding, Warren Gamaliel (1865-1923): member of the US Senate from Ohio,
19 15-21; President of the USA, 1920-23
Headlam-Morley, James Wycliffe b.1863: Assistant Director of the Political
Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, 19 18-20; attached to the British
Delegation to the Peace Conference at Paris, 1919; appointed Historical Adviser to
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1920
Home, Robert Stevenson, Viscount Borne of Slamannan (1871-1940):
Conservative MP for Hilihead, Glasgow, 19 18-37; President of the Board of Trade,
1920-2 1; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1921-22
House, Edward Mandell (1858-1938): Personal Representative of President Wilson
to the European Governments 1914-16; represented the USA at the making of the
Armistice, November 1918; US Peace Commissioner, Versailles, 1918-19; member
367
of the Commission charged by the Peace Conference to make the Covenant for the
League of Nations
Howard of Pennth, (1q Baron) Esmé William Howard (1863-1939): entered the
Diplomatic Service, 1885; Minister to Sweden, 1913-1919; Ambassador to Spain,
19 19-24; Ambassador to the USA, 1924-30; member of the British Delegation to the
Paris Peace Conference, 1919
Hughes, Charles Evans (1862-1948): lawyer; Governor of New York, 1907-10;
nominated for US President in the Republican National Convention, Chicago, June
1916; US Secretary of State, 1921-25; Judge of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, the Hague, 1928-30; Chief Justice of the USA, 1930-41
Hughes, William Morris (1864-1952): Prime Minister of Australia, 1915-23;
member of the Imperial War Cabinet and delegate to the Paris Peace Conference,
1919; Minister for External Affairs, 1937-39; Minister for Industry, 1939-40;
Minister for the Navy, 1940-41
Jones, Thomas (1870-1955): Assistant Secretary and, subsequently, Deputy
Secretary of the Cabinet, 1916-30
Imperiali, Marquis Guglielmo (1858-1944): Italian Ambassador to the United
Kingdom, 19 10-20; Italian representative to the Council of the League of Nations,
1921-23
Baron Islington, Sir John Poynder Dickson (1866-1936): MP for Chippenham,
1892-1910, first as a Conservative and then, from 1905, as a Liberal, Governor of
New Zealand, 19 10-12; Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in
India, 1912-14; Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1914-15; Under-Secretary
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of State for India, 1915-18
Kato, Admiral Baron Tomosaburo (1859-1923): entered Japanese Navy aged 12;
promoted to Admiral, 1915; Minister of Marine, 1918; one of the three chief Japanese
delegates at the Washington Conference, 192 1-22
Keyes, (1g Baron) Admiral of the fleet Roger John Browniow Keyes (1872-
1945): Director of Plans Division, Admiralty, 1917; Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff;
192 1-25; National Conservative MP for Portsmouth North, 1934-43; Director of
Combined Operations, 1940-41
Law, Andrew Bonar (1858-1923): Conservative MP for Blackfriars division of
Glasgow, 1900-1906; Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, 1902-06;
Unionist MP for Dulwich, 1906-10; Conservative MP for Bootle, 1911-18; Leader of
the Opposition in the House of Commons, 1911-15; Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 1915-16; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1916-18; Conservative MP for
Glasgow, 1918-23; Lord Privy Seal, 1919-21; Prime Minister, 1922-23
Lee of Fareham, (1d Viscount) Arthur Hamilton Lee (1866-1947): Conservative
MP for Fareham, 1900-1918; First Lord of the Admiralty, 192 1-22
Lloyd George, David, 1 Earl of Dwyfor (1863-1945): Liberal MP for Caernarvon,
1890-193 1; Independent Liberal MP for Caernarvon, 1931-44; President of the Board
of Trade, 1905-08; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1908-15; Minister of Munitions,
1915-16; Secretary of State for War, 1916; Prime Minister, 1916-22
Lockhart, Lawrence, b.1887: appointed a temporary Clerk in the Foreign Office, 10
April 1916; resigned 31 July 1919; served as a temporary Clerk from January 1920
until his appointment was terminated on 31 March 1921
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Lodge, Henry Cabot (1850-1924): member of the US House of Representatives,
1887-1893; member of the US Senate from 1893
Long, (1g Viscount) Walter Hume Long (1854-1924): Conservative MP for North
Wiltshire, 1880-85, for Devizes, 1885-92, for West Derby (Liverpool), 1892-1900,
for South Bristol, 1900-1906, for South Dublin, 1906-10, for Strand Division, 1910,
and for St. George's, Westminster, 1919-21; Secretary of State for the Colonies,
1916-18; First Lord of the Admiralty, 1919-21
MacDonald, James Ramsay (1866-1937): Labour MP for Leicester, 1906-18;
Leader of the Labour Party, 1911-14; Labour MP for Aberavon, 1922-29; Prime
Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1924; Prime Minister, 1929-3 5;
Lord President of the Council, 1935-37
McNeil, Ronald John, Baron Cushendun (1861-1934): Conservative MP for
St.Augustine Division of Kent, 1911-18, and for Canterbury, 1918-27; Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1922-24 and November 1924-25;
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1925-27; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
1927-29; Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, August-December 1928
Madariaga, Don Salvador de (1886-1978): member of the Press Section of the
League of Nations Secretariat, 192 1-22; Director of the Disarmament Section of the
League of Nations Secretariat, 1922-27; Secretary of the Temporary Mixed
Commission for Disarmament and then of the Preparatory Commission for a
Disarmament Conference; Secretary of the Third (Disarmament) Commission of the
Assembly of the League of Nations, 1922-27; Secretary-General of the International
Conference for the Supervision of the Trade in Arms, Geneva, 1925; Spanish
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Ambassador to the USA, 1931, and to France, 1932-34; Permanent Spanish Delegate
to the League of Nations, 1931-36
Massey, William Ferguson (1856-1925): entered the New Zealand Parliament,
1894; Leader of the Opposition, 1903; Prime Minister, 1912-25
Maurice, Major-General Sir Frederick (1871-1951): Director of Military
Operations, Imperial General Staff, 19 15-18; Principal, Working Men's College, St.
Pancras, 1922-23; Principal of Queen Mary College (London University), 1933-44;
Professor of Military Studies, London University, 1927
Meighen, Arthur (1874-1960): Canadian politician; Prime Minister and Secretary
for External Affairs, 1920-21; Prime Minister, July-September 1926; member of the
Imperial War Cabinet, 1918
Milner, Alfred, Viscount Mimer (1854-1925): Minister without portfolio in the War
Cabinet, 1916-18; Secretary of State for War, 1918-19; Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 1919-21
Montagu, Edwin Samuel (1879-1924): Liberal MP for Chesterton, 1906-22:
Secretary of State for India, 1917-22
Nicholson, Harold George (1886-1968): entered the Diplomatic Service, 1909;
transferred to the Foreign Office, 1914; promoted to be a Second Secretary, 1919, a
First Secretary, 1920, and a Counsellor, 1925; resigned, 1929
Noel-Baker, Philip John, Baron Noel-Baker (1889-1982): member of the British
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, 1919; served with the Secretariat of the
League of Nations, 19 19-22; Professor of International Relations, London University,
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1924-29; Labour MP for Coventry, 1929-3 1; Labour MP for Derby, 1936-70;
Secretary of State for Air, 1946-47; Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations,
1947-50; Minister for Fuel and Power, 1950-51
Orde, Charles William, b.1884: entered the Foreign Office, 1909; promoted to be a
First Secretary, 1920
Pound, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Alfred Dudley (1877-1943): Director of Plans
Division, Admiralty, 1922-25; Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, 1927-29; Second
Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Personnel at the Admiralty, 1932-25; Admiral of the
Fleet, 1939
Pownall, Lieut.-Col. Sir Assheton (1877-1953): Conservative MP for Lewisham E.,
1918-45
Reading, (1 Marquess) Rufus Daniel Isaacs (1860-1935): Liberal MP for
Reading, 1904-13; Attorney-General, 1910-13; Lord Chief Justice, 1913-21; High
Commissioner and Special Ambassador to the USA, 1918; Viceroy and Governor-
General of India, 1921-26; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1931
Richmond, Admiral Sir Herbert (1871-1946): President of the Royal Naval War
College, 1920-23; Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron, 1924-25;
Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, 1927-28
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